미국의 나토 확장과 그 대안들에 대한 평가

Abstract

Why did the United States push for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) enlargement into Eastern Europe after the Cold War? Has this effort aided or undermined US national security? Moreover, what were the roads not taken at Cold War’s end: What alternatives to NATO enlargement at it occurred were possible after 1990-1991, and what benefits and drawbacks might each of these options have entailed? These alternatives to NATO enlargement help define the plausible roads not traveled when it comes to post-Cold War European security. In turn, evaluating how these options may have operated, and what their prospective merits and drawbacks entailed, helps us understand the actual course, conduct, and outcomes of post-Cold War European security. After all, many scholars and practitioners views NATO enlargement as the “original sin” that set the trajectory of Russian-Western relations toward their current deleterious state. Still, missing in these discussions is a serious assessment of the merits and drawbacks of the policy chosen compared with the alternatives considered. In this paper, there are three parts to take up this task. First, I describe the key decision points that progressively created the policy of NATO enlargement over the past three decades. I then evaluate the rationale for the policy chosen and outline its costs and benefits. Finally, I consider the alternatives that were raised inside and outside the US government and suggest the costs and benefits of those approaches. My focus in this paper is narrowly on sharpening the parameters of the debate on NATO expansion in ways that can inform scholarly evaluations and highlight future policy options.