Abstract
The article deals with the problems of the Romantics’ attitude to Kantian criticism and dogmatic rationalism. The circumstances that actualized the methodological question of the principles of the separation of “idealism” and “realism” (in the Schellingian sense) are analysed. “Action” was considered by Romantics to be a more important moment of philosophizing than the ultimate goal of this process — conditional “knowledge”. It is proved that the fundamental difference of philosophical systems is due to the importance attached to the “absolute”. It is stated that the shift of emphasis from the object to the subject legitimized the new content of the “real”. It is concluded that romantic natural philosophy (“philosophy of life”) on the eve of the publication of Hegelian dialectics became an alternative to any philosophical dogmatism.
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