경영전략과 경영자의 과신성향 및 적자회피를 위한 실제이익조정

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between management strategy, manager's overconfidence and real earnings management decision-making under the earning management motive to avoid deficit, which Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) mentioned as an important profit reference point.
 The analysis results are as follows. First, it is verified that companies pursuing a leading management strategy are more actively carrying out real earnings management to avoid losses than analytical or defensive companies. This can be interpreted as the fact that companies pursuing a leading management strategy with a large amount of resources available for real earnings management, such as investment scale, are performing real earnings management in a situation to avoid losses than those that do not. Second, if the managers of companies implementing leading management strategies have a tendency to overconfidence, it appears that they are more actively carrying out real earnings management to avoid losses than those that do not. This means that when managers of companies adopting leading management strategies are overconfident, they underestimate the negative effects of real earnings management, so they are actively using real earnings management.
 It is expected that this study will be able to suggest to researchers that differentiated real earnings management preference can occur depending on business strategy and earnings management incentives. In addition, it is expected that it can be a basis for the management strategy to have a dominant effect on corporate decision-making rather than the manager's tendency.