Abstract

Four reasons for which Aristotle claims the usefulness of rhetoric in his Rhetoric are so implicitly explicated that they require a comprehensive re-examination of their meaning. This paper is a further study beginning from critiquing Seok Hwan Han’s explanation, which heavily relies on Christof Rapp’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. This paper attempts to supplement Han’s limits with William Grimaldi’s. The conclusion is as follows. First, Aristotles own position on the usefulness of rhetoric is shaped from the context of the debate that begins in Parmenides and goes through Gorgias, Protagoras, and Plato. As to rhetoric and truth, Plato argues that if there is a necessity to constitute the political world, we should resort to philosophy, not rhetoric, as the means. However, Aristotle points out that rhetoric does not deal with truth or justice itself, but entails a necessary means to politics insofar as the world of politics is that of opinions and beliefs. Second, Aristotle’s position is to express his introspection and stance on the aspect of practices centering on the logos in his day. In this precise regard, discussion on the usefulness of rhetoric for us today should not simply be restricted to an interpretation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but extended to the practice of language and the very way in which the meaningful and useful practice of language is named.

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