Abstract

This article examines the response of the U.S. to the Korean government's power enhancement project in terms of alliance management. The Park Chung-hee administration resolved security concerns caused by increased threats from North Korea and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea, and promoted a policy to increase power for self-defense. A dual-path strategy was implemented by the Park Chung-hee administration's power enhancement policy, which combined the conventional power enhancement policy and the nuclear weapons development policy. The U.S. showed double-faced strategy to the Korea’s power enhancement policy. First, the U.S. was in a favorable position to Korea’s conventional power enhancement policy. Second, the U.S. thwarted Korea’s nuclear weapons development by checking and obstructing it. Through this study, it can be confirmed that the success or failure of an attempt to change power through the power enhancement of a weaker country in an asymmetric alliance system depends on the interests of the powerful countries. Therefore, in order to resolve the imbalance in alliance relations through the increase of its own power, weaker countries must consider and persuade the interests of powerful countries.

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