지방자치단체 사업별 예산 분류체계 개선방안에 대한 연구: 사회복지 분야 예산을 중심으로

Abstract

ABSTRACT The New Zealand public sector reform process of the late 1980s and early 1990s was notable for its attempt to clarify public accountability through the specification of outputs, contractual agreements and the disaggregation of government departments into smaller, more sharply focused agencies. While the reforms achieved managerial improvements, the accountability regime was less successful because of the difficulties of specification and the continuing robustness of ministerial responsibility in the face of attempts to limit the political control and accountability. INTRODUCTION: REASSESSING THE NEW ZEALAND MODEL New Zealand holds a special place in the recent history of public sector reform. In three major pieces of legislation in the 1980s (the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Finance Act 1989) it implemented a particularly radical version of what became known as the 'new public management' (NPM) and indeed provided an archetype of that movement (Hood 1991). The fact that reform was premised on a coherent theoretical blueprint (Treasury, 1987), which was then followed through with remarkable thoroughness and consistency marked New Zealand out as especially interesting to academic analysts as well as to practitioners with a taste for rational principle rather than incremental pragmatism. The degree of principled consistency was always somewhat overstated (Boston et al., 1996:84-85), and the system was subject to constant adjustment after its initial enactment. None the less, it stands out as a heroic, and ultimately (and predictably) unsuccessful, attempt to ground public management on clear assumptions and unambiguous principles. Clarity was the watchword of the reforms. The root causes of government inefficiency and ineffectiveness were perceived to be the failure to specify the objectives of government agencies and confusion over roles (between politicians and public servants and within public agencies) (Treasury, 1987; Scott, 1996). Once each agency and each key actor had their role clarified and their objectives specified, they could be freed from debilitating controls over inputs and processes. They could also be more readily held accountable for their performance in terms of clearly specified roles and objectives. From these assumptions followed most of the key elements of the new system (Boston et al., 1996; Treasury, 1996), including the separation of the roles of ministers and departmental chief executives (CEs), with ministers responsible for choosing 'outcomes' and CEs responsible for delivering 'outputs'; the emphasis on clear specification and costing of departmental outputs; the separation between the government's interest as 'purchaser' of public services and its interest as 'owner' of government agencies (and the consequent distinction between 'vote' ministers and 'responsible' ministers); the decoupling of non-departmental agencies ('crown entities' and 'state owned-enterprises') from ministerial direction; the disaggregation of large multi-function departments into more narrowly focused policy ministries, service delivery agencies and independent monitoring agencies; the reliance on explicit contract-like agreements to spell out the government's expectations from individual CEs and agencies. The New Zealand system has been subject to extensive examination (Scott 2001:42-62), including two major government-sponsored reviews (Logan 1991; Schick 1996) as well as several thorough academic assessments (Boston et al., 1996). In terms of improved efficiency and effectiveness, considerable benefits have been found to flow from the relaxation of central agency controls over inputs, the reorientation of agencies towards results and the adoption of strategic planning. Savings have been achieved through the decoupling of public service provision from core government departments, for instance through outsourcing, corporatization and privatization. …