Баланс интересов внешних и внутренних бенефициаров в условиях «неполных контрактов» ресурсной экономики

Abstract

This article examines the uncertainties arising from agent interactions in interregional resource-intensive markets, particularly those prevalent in northern regions, and explores factors undermining their effectiveness Given these circumstances, the study aims to establish an optimal balance of interests between external and internal beneficiaries by taking into account interests, as well as reducing transaction uncertainty by considering their interests and mitigating transaction uncertainty through the optimization of market regulators in the context of interregional resource-intensive markets typical of northern regions. The analysis reveals that the condition of a single market equilibrium is compromised due to the influence of exogenous factors and the endogenous formation of institutional mechanisms that coordinate agent actions amid uncertain collaborations. Contrary to the neoclassical approach, which focuses on competitive pricing without altering the market structure, an alternative perspective posits that spatial externalities induce endogenous mechanisms characteristic of Chamberlin-type market structures. The study expands the understanding of uncertainty causes within the theory of incomplete contracts, incorporating social system costs into transaction costs in line with the neo-institutional concept. This conceptual framework enables the exploration of spatial entities as meso-economic systems, with a specific emphasis on the organizational and geographical characteristics of northern territories. The research evaluates four institutional zones governing economic management practices in northern regions. Through competence enhancement and optimization of market regulator design, the study demonstrates the feasibility of achieving a balance of interests between external and internal beneficiaries by strengthening institutional capital, thereby reducing social system costs. The proposed system of organizational and institutional measures enhances local institutional practices within the existing institutional matrix without violating antimonopoly legislation, as its focus is on restoring competitive conditions and reducing the costs of operating the social system.