Abstract

Outsourcing is a phenomenon regularly explored through two theories: transaction cost economics and incomplete contract theory. The second approach is frequently seen as an extension of the first but is it right to do so? Could the theory of incomplete contracts be regarded as a "2.0" transaction cost economics? This article addresses this question through the main theoretical axes of renowned researchers, notably by being awarded a Nobel Prize. While transaction costs, particularly theorized by Coase and Williamson, focus on an organizational perspective centered on governance, contractual incompleteness focuses on non-human assets and the mechanical aspects of contracts. We confront these two theories to show the points and counterpoints that can be overlapping but also deeply diverging. This article therefore provides a succinct point of view that allows the reader to quickly gain a perspective on the study of two theories at the foundation of the study of an ancient and pervasive phenomenon.

Highlights

  • Should a productive organization make or buy to maximize its income? This very long-standing question has still not lost its relevance in management science

  • Two approaches are relevant to the "mechanics" of contracts: transaction cost economics (TCE) and incomplete contract theory (ICT)

  • Is the theory relating to this notion of incompleteness a continuation of the TCE, or can it be opposed to it?. To answer this question, which is largely related to the research question of this essay, we explore the notion of contractual incompleteness

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Summary

A Reflective Study Based on Prominent Authors

Abstract – Outsourcing is a phenomenon regularly explored through two theories: transaction cost economics and incomplete contract theory. Could the theory of incomplete contracts be regarded as a "2.0" transaction cost economics? Theorized by Coase and Williamson, focus on an organizational perspective centered on governance, contractual incompleteness focuses on non-human assets and the mechanical aspects of contracts. We confront these two theories to show the points and counterpoints that can be overlapping and deeply diverging. This article provides a succinct point of view that allows the reader to quickly gain a perspective on the study of two theories at the foundation of the study of an ancient and pervasive phenomenon.

Introduction
Similarities and Differences Between the Two Theories
Conclusion

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