Abstract
The game formalizes the game-theoretic model of the first price auction with many employers and em-ployees, implemented in l steps, with the possible occurrence of corruption. The first paragraph presents the statement of the problem, then the first price auction model is formalized with a number of assumptions. Next, corruption that occurs in this model and its effect on the auction process of the first price is considered, com-pared with the case of absence of corruption. At the end of the paper, we consider the statements formalizing the optimal anti-corruption auction scheme.
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