Сомнение как механизм смены эпистемических состояний (на материалах философии прагматизма и нейропсихологии)

Abstract

Science has not yet found a solution to the question of how cognitive mechanisms, which are crucial for the subjective processes of evaluating the reliability of information and doubt, are arranged. This ability is usually associated with both the pragmatic consequences of accepting a belief and the material substance of consciousness. In this article, the author proposes to compare one of the largest conceptions of doubt in philosophy, the pragmatic conception, with the theory of false tags, which was presented in the last decade by the neuropsychologist E. Asp in order to explain the phenomena of doubt. The article presents the theoretical aspects of both conceptions, which allows to derive the properties of doubt as an epistemic state, that is, the state of the subject’s cognitive reality, formed under the influence of external (situational, pragmatic) and internal (neuropsychological) factors. The results of the study presented in the article allow us to conclude the possibility of an interdisciplinary approach in further studies of human cognitive activity as a mechanism of various epistemic states. It is concluded that doubt itself is not one of these states, but is a secondary psychological act that ensures the transition from one epistemic state to another. This offers an alternative view to the approach established in philosophy, in which doubt precedes the fact of accepting knowledge and is an essential stage of the cognitive process.