СУБЪЕКТИВНОЕ ПРАВО КАК ИНТЕРЕС? ТРАКТОВКА КАТЕГОРИИ СУБЪЕКТИВНОГО (ЧАСТНОГО) ПРАВА В РАМКАХ КЛАССИЧЕСКОЙ ТЕОРИИ ИНТЕРЕСА

Abstract

This is an attempt of rational reconstruction and critique of the Rudolph von Jherings theory of subjective right, commonly known as “the interest theory”. First, the basic shortcomings of the classical will theory (a major alternative to the interest theory) have been articulated, which I see as a reason of the elaboration of the alternative model by Jhering. Second, the structural analysis of the Jherings interest theory has been accomplished. From the structural standpoint, Jherings theory has two components: one, substantial (interest) and another, formal (legal remedy, granted by the law when the interest has been unlawfully attacked). This two-component model seems to be unstable and prone to self-contradictions. The major reasons for such a case are the indeterminacy of the concept of interest, an inherent trend within the interest theory to replace legal analysis with sociological enquiry, as well as coherence problem with some controversial instances of subjective rights. In a broader context, Jherings interest theory can be seen as an attempt to reconcile Kantian-based German private law theory with the elements of British utilitarianism.