Abstract
The present article is concerned with the analysis of the main problem in cases of contesting normative legal acts – the asymmetry between the opportunities of parties. As a consequence of that asymmetry, a rational citizen has no motivation to go to court and normative legal acts which contradict superior normative legal acts continue to exist in the system of actual law. The author adapts the American model of a “private attorney general” to Russian law. The aim of this model is to provide incentives for individuals to actively contest normative legal acts by means of covering judicial expenses with contingent fees. Incentives created by this law model are reviewed with the help of legislation analysis, economic analysis of law and game theory methodology. The author also considers the existing approaches to defining the legal nature of the term “contingent fees” in modern legislation. Based on that, possible ways of improving the legal system by the means of creating a legislative base for contingent fees are suggested.
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