Protecting Chinese Interests Abroad or Planning for PRC Primacy? Andrew Scobell (bio) Andrea Ghiselli's meticulously researched and lucidly written tome, Protecting China's Interests Overseas: Securitization and Foreign Policy, explores the drivers of China's increasing global military activism and is well worth the read. He has done exceptional research in primary Chinese language sources and solidly grounded his scholarship in the relevant international relations literature. The topic is one that has grabbed the attention of the United States and other countries—the growing global activism of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China (PRC). While still modest and tentative compared to the security activities and overseas military postures of other great powers, the 21st-century activities of China's armed forces go well beyond the PRC's borders and immediate periphery. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy now routinely transits the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden, and PLA Navy vessels regularly appear in more distant bodies of water. China joined the club of great powers that possess overseas military bases with its first official military facility beyond PRC borders formally established in Djibouti in 2017. And for twenty years the PLA has regularly conducted ground, air, and maritime exercises with other militaries in locales both within China and around the globe. China has also been dispatching soldiers to serve in UN peacekeeping missions far afield since the 1990s. But China's increased military activism during the past decade or so signals a sea change in Beijing's disposition and thinking. China long proclaimed that it did not station a single soldier overseas or occupy an inch of foreign soil. But with a military base abroad, Beijing can no longer say this. What accounts for this dramatic change? The book describes the 2011 unraveling of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya as the watershed event. Beijing was caught by surprise and had to scramble to evacuate some 36,000 Chinese workers from the chaos (p. 1). The operation was coordinated by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs mostly using chartered commercial shipping via the Mediterranean to remove PRC citizens from harm's way. The involvement of the military in this operation was almost [End Page 160] a sideshow—limited to four PLA Air Force Ilyushin Il-76s flying out 1,655 Chinese (p. 229) and a single PLA Navy vessel, the frigate Xuzhou, serving as an escort for an armada of civilian ships ferrying the evacuees out of Libya (pp. 223–24). According to Ghiselli, "a crisis in a third country had never impacted Chinese interests abroad as much as this one" (p. 1). In an era where great-power competition is the dominant rubric and the myth of Chinese omnipotence seems pervasive in the policy community, two key findings of Protecting China's Interests Overseas merit special attention. First, Ghiselli finds that China's greater security presence beyond its own immediate Asia-Pacific neighborhood is defensive—driven by a "powerful" impulse (p. 1) to protect its burgeoning interests overseas—rather than propelled by an offensive strategy to wrest global supremacy from the United States. The author concludes that the "deployment of Chinese soldiers in critical regions like the Middle East or North Africa…has not been motivated by a desire to erode American supremacy in those regions" (p. 241). Ghiselli's point is that not everything Beijing does is about great-power competition with Washington. Of course, the United States looms large for China's leaders and factors into almost every decision they make. But the PRC is pursuing its own destiny and advancing its own interests, not all of which involve the United States. A policy implication of this finding is that there is potential for cooperation, or at least coexistence, with the PRC on the global stage. However, China's "interest frontiers" are expanding and, when combined with Beijing's own zero-sum thinking, notwithstanding China's "win-win" propaganda rhetoric, there is no guarantee that this potential will be realized. Second, Ghiselli's research reveals that most "events related to China's interest frontiers were hardly the result of a well-thought-out plan" (p. 242). This finding calls...
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