Campaign In Yemen Research Articles

Implicature Analysis of Adel Al-Jubeir Political Interview on Yemen Campaign

Politicians use their political interviews to convey their thoughts towards their nations or others. This study aims to analyze conversation analysis and implicature of maxims being flouted by Adel Al-Jubeir regarding the Yemeni campaign, which started on 26th of March 2014. The study uses descriptive qualitative method. The data were institutional talk (Interview) conducted by Adel Al-Jubeir as IE (interviewee) and the journalist Wolf Blitzer as IR (interviewer) in the CNN channel in Washington. The data were analyzed according to Clayman and Heritage (2002) for conversation analysis and implicature of maxim based on Grice (1975). The results show two linguistic evidences. First, in institutional talks, conversation consists of three components, namely, opening, content, and closing. The opening includes the introduction, the content includes the announcement of the beginning of the campaign interface on Yemen and the Iranian nuclear program and its threat to Saudi Arabia, and the closing includes complete pairs (greetings). Second, for implicature analysis, the results show that Al-Jubeir being over-informative, stating more than required, represented with 82% of the quantity. He made a speech that he believed to be false, unjustified, and untruthful replies, representing 100% in the scale of quality. He gave irrelevant meaning to respond other participants’ utterances, representing 65% of maxim of relation. He gave unclear and indirect replies, representing 77% of maxim of manner. Besides, Al-Jubeir cooperated with IR. In addition, it can be summarized that he applied both particularized conversational and general implicature on political interview with some violation of the maxims as well.

Passive Mediation in Persian Gulf Conflicts: An Analysis of Pakistan’s Peace Initiatives

Pakistan is a highly significant country for the Persian Gulf due to its geostrategic location, large workforce, being the only Muslim nuclear power and centuries of religious and cultural affinity. It is the second largest security guarantor of Saudi Arabia after the US and shares a border with Iran. Islamabad not only helped the Arab countries in institution building during their formative years, but also provided them support during security crises in the 20th century. Since 2001, regional dynamics changed Pakistan’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan vis-à-vis Iran. Islamabad decided to adopt the role of a passive mediator in Persian Gulf conflicts. For this purpose, it decided to stay neutral in the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen in 2015, which was a highly unexpected decision for the Saudi and Emirati ruling elites. In 2016, Pakistan defused tensions between the two Persian Gulf rivals, i.e., Saudi Arabia and Iran. Later, Islamabad opted for neutrality in Qatar’s diplomatic crisis in 2017. With this backdrop, this study hypotheses that since 2001 Pakistan has successfully prevented conflict escalation in the Persian Gulf through ‘passive mediation’. The study will focus on the following questions: what are Pakistan’s peace initiatives in Persian Gulf conflicts? How have these initiatives helped to de-escalate tensions and averted armed conflicts? What are Pakistan’s limitations in its mediation efforts during these conflicts?

A ‘synchronised attack’ on life: the Saudi-led coalition’s ‘hidden and holistic’ genocide in Yemen and the shared responsibility of the US and UK

Since the Saudi-led coalition (Coalition) began its military campaign in Yemen in March 2015, upwards of 13,000 Yemen civilians have been killed, including nearly 2000 women and 3000 children. Additionally, Coalition aerial attacks have intentionally targeted Yemen’s civilian infrastructure, economic infrastructure, medical facilities and cultural heritage. Combined with the ongoing air and naval blockade, which has impeded the ability of Yemenis to access clean water, food, fuel and health services, the violence visited upon Yemen has created near-famine conditions. Furthermore, United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) predicts another imminent outbreak of cholera, with the potential to be as deadly as last year’s which infected more than one million children and killed a child every 10 minutes. Through engagement with genocide studies literature, this article applies a holistic conception of genocide to the Coalition military campaign. It finds that the Coalition is conducting an ongoing campaign of genocide by a ‘synchronised attack’ on all aspects of life in Yemen, one that is only possible with the complicity of the United States and United Kingdom.

Breaking the mold of small state classification? The broadening influence of United Arab Emirates foreign policy through effective military and bandwagoning strategies

ABSTRACTThis article asserts that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been able to break the mold of small state classification and broaden its regional and international influence through effective military coordination with the United States of America and bandwagoning with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It has been effective for two main reasons: the existential fear that the UAE has of Iran’s regional policies and the political and violent Islamism that have driven its search for regime and national security. The convergence of that threat perception following the election of President Trump in the United States and the rise of Mohammed bin Salman to the position of Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia has consolidated its influence further. Whether or not UAE foreign policy will remain effective depends on a host of factors, including: its economic resources, relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia, the success of its diplomatic campaign to isolate Qatar, and the outcome from the military campaign in Yemen.

The Destruction of Yemen and Its Cultural Heritage

After losing control of the capital Sanaa to Yemen's northern Houthi movement, which is aligned with forces loyal to the former president ʿAli ʿAbd Allah Salih, current Yemeni President ʿAbd Rabbu Mansur Hadi turned to Saudi Arabia for help. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and its coalition of nine states began a bombing campaign in Yemen, the poorest country in the Arab world. Prior to the conflict, Yemen was already 90-percent dependent on imported food and had been battling a severe water deficit. A twenty-eight-month-long siege of its civilian population has left the country in a situation that some humanitarian groups deem to be worse than the crisis in Syria. The media has barely covered Yemen's catastrophic crisis, partially because of overt censorship by the Saudi kingdom and a shielding of its systemic violations of international law by powerful allies including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. These countries are clearly more concerned with billion-dollar arms deals with the kingdom than with putting an end to what has been described as the worst food crisis since the establishment of the United Nations.

Cholera vaccination campaign in Yemen is dropped

Cholera vaccination campaign in Yemen is dropped

United States Strikes Houthi-Controlled Facilities in Yemen, Reaffirms Limited Support for Saudi-Led Coalition Notwithstanding Growing Concerns About Civilian Casualties

Since March 2015, the United States has supported a Saudi-led military coalition fighting a Houthi insurgency that seized control of Yemen's capital and governmental institutions in 2014. At the request of ousted Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the Saudi-led coalition launched an air campaign in Yemen to “defend Saudi Arabia's border and to protect Yemen's legitimate government.” To support these efforts, President Obama authorized the “provision of logistical and intelligence support to [coalition] military operations” and the establishment of a “Joint Planning Cell with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support.” The United States has disclaimed any direct offensive role in the conflict while acknowledging that it has provided support by refueling coalition warplanes, supplying targeting intelligence, and sending U.S. military personnel to assist the planners of the coalition's air campaign.

Влияние войны в Йемене на американо-саудовские отношения в 2014–2017 гг.

The article reveals the contemporary state of Saudi-U. S. relations with reference to the growing tensions in the Middle East region, mainly Yemeni civil war. The focus is on American authorities’ response to an ineffective and bloody military campaign in Yemen led by Saudi Arabia and coalition forces. In the meantime, the article reveals the background and main causes of the civil war. Authors hold thesis on the fact that initial support of Saudi Arabia by the United States was driven by their aspiration to soften Saudi resentment towards nuclear deal with Iran. Authors also insist on the fact that since the end of 2016 more and more American politics declaim against the observance of the previously closed arms deal and condemn Saudi Arabia’s abusive fighting methods on the foreign territory. In attempts to explore scale, depth and perspective of the seeming split between the two countries authors take into account soundness of the bilateral relationships between U. S. and Saudi Arabia, huge interconnection of their economic interests and regional strategic priorities. In that context authors suggest the high probability of overcoming the existing discord in Saudi-U. S. relations under the new President of the United States - Donald Trump.

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MOSQUE OF SINAN PASHA IN CAIRO

nian origin, born around 1520,' and raised among the elite group ofjanissaries, the devshirme. He attained high ranks at the Ottoman court and was appointed governor of many important cities in the empire. On 24 Shacban, 975 (23 February 1568), Sinan Pasha became wdli (governor) of Egypt.5 His first tenure was shortlived, lasting for only nine and a half months. On 13 Jumada al-Akhira, 9 6 (3 December 1568), he was re-called to take command of a campaign in Yemen to overthrow the Zaydis.6 Several years later, on 1 Safar 979 (25 June 1571), he was appointed wali of Egypt for the second time.7 This time he ruled for one year and ten months, until Dhu'l-Hijja, 981 (April 1573),8 when he was ordered to lead another campaign against the Spaniards at Halq al-Wadi in Tunisia. In the following year, he commanded a third successful campaign, this one against Georgia.9 These victories promoted Sinan Pasha to the position of Sadr al-azam (grand vizier), a post he was appointed to five times between 1580 and 1595.'0 In the same years he led two campaigns into Hungary and Wallachia.' Sinan Pasha died in 1595 at the age of eighty, and was