BOOK REVIEWS 493 devenir, est formellement et de mani~re immtdiatement evident principe d'intelligibilitt , ~ moins de reduire l'etre au devenir, et de dire que tout devient historiquement " (my italics). This contrast of a domain of being (with its doctrinal principles) set over against the realm of history makes one wonder if the author is not enmeshed in the very net of "principles" which he so clearly identifies as the problem in Scotism. This is a work of philosophical polemic. By ignoring more recent work on Scotus, Ockham and later medieval philosophy, it conveniently presents the older theses of modern Neo-Thomism, which presented a historiography of philosophy in such a manner as to disenfranchise any philosophy, Franciscan or Augustinian. Even those early modern Thomist philosophers such as Cajetan and John of St. Thomas are seen to be infected with the same Scotist virus. Still, the author does acknowledge that the philosophy of St. Thomas did not dominate the late Middle Ages. The modern dominance of the philosophy of St. Thomas in the Catholic world and in some modern secular treatments of medieval philosophy is largely due to the polemics of the Reformation. One cannot conveniently separate "structures of thought" from historical realizadons of doctrine. That leads to an aprioristic phenomenological ahistorical world of pure essences. While there are many very valuable discussions of philosophy in this volume, the danger is that the complexity of the historically situated medieval debates will be ignored. For example, Gregory of Rimini is not just proto-Luther. And Scotus and Ockham are misread if they are seen as simply preparatory for later Reformation and Counter-Reformation polemics. And that means setting aside preconceived theses, fixed ideas, vague historical schemata. And it also means that one has to take into account the nitty-gritty of science, logic, and metaphysics in order to get a more real sense of the genesis of late medieval thought. Nevertheless, despite these reservations, this work does merit much study. And it should sharpen the present debate on the nature and significance of late medieval philosophy. JEREMIAH HACKETT University of South Carolina Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley, translators. William of Ockham: Quodlibetal Questions. Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, a99a. a vols. Pp. xxviii + 7oa. Cloth, Slot.to. In terms of both quantity and difficulty, an English translation of William of Ockham's Quodlibeta is a daunting enterprise. It is daunting for at least two reasons. It is, first of all, a very technical work. Secondly, it often carries the author's responses to arguments of Walter Chatton, a Franciscan confrere and opponent--arguments which are often not found in Ockham's text and must, therefore, be traced elsewhere (principally to Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum Primum et Prologus, ed. Joseph C. Wey, CSB). Despite these difficulties, however, this translation 494 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:3 JULY I994 is a most welcome work, since it presents to a wider audience the final fruits of Ockham's theological and philosophical career. For those accustomed to using Ock~m: Philosophical Writings, even in its newer version (Boehner-Brown), as their main sourcebook for the thought of the Venerable Inceptor, the comparison of translations at points of overlap will be inevitable. For the most part, both translations of Quod//beta passages are suitable English renditions of Ockham's Latin. There are points, however, where the Freddoso-Kelley rendering seems an improvement. Since in Quodlibet V, q. I Ockham is speaking about two different types of science--theology and natural science--Freddoso's "in different sciences" (399, line 2) seems superior to Boehner's "in different kinds of knowledge" (loo, line 2). Also, in Quodlibet/, q. 13, Freddoso-Kelley's "when a shield seems to change colors as one moves closer and farther away" (67, lines 13-14) seems preferable to Boehner's "when something like a many-coloured shield is viewed from a greater or lesser distance" (31, lines 19-2o). In the same q. 13, Boehner generally translates, somewhat awkwardly, "visio" as "look," while Freddoso-Kelley, somewhat more suitably , employ "vision." A careless reader might imagine...
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