Wrong Kind Of Reason Problem Research Articles

The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing

Abstract This paper offers a novel solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem that afflicts Fitting-Attitude analyses of value. I argue that we can distinguish reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind by being clear about what our reasons are for. In Wrong Kind of Reason cases, our reason to have a certain affective attitude is a reason for an action, and it is this category-mistake that is the source of the problem.

Constitutive Reasons and the Suspension of Judgement

This paper identifies a puzzle that emerges when recent work on the suspension of judgement is integrated with evidentialist solutions to the wrong kind of reasons problem: it looks like there is no such thing as a reason to suspend judgement. Two possible responses to this puzzle are considered: one recharacterizes the suspension of judgement as a mental action, and the other recharacterizes it as a second-order attitude. It is argued that these responses sidestep the puzzle only with unacceptable compromise to the view of suspension of judgement.

The right and the wrong kind of reasons

AbstractIn a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often calledthe right kind of reasons(henceforth, RKR) andthe wrong kind of reasons(henceforth, WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so‐calledbuck‐passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro‐attitudes and has been argued to face thewrong kind of reasons problem. But nowadays, it also gets applied in other philosophical contexts and to reasons for other responses than pro‐attitudes, for example in recent debates about evidentialism and pragmatism about reasons for belief. While there seems to be wide agreement that there is a general and uniform distinction that applies to reasons for different responses, there is little agreement about the scope, relevance, and nature of this distinction. Our aim in this article is to shed some light on this issue by surveying the RKR/WKR distinction as it has been drawn with respect to different responses, and by examining how it can be understood as a uniform distinction across different contexts. We start by considering reasons for pro‐attitudes and emotions in the context of the buck‐passing account of value (Section 1). Subsequently, we address the distinction that philosophers have drawn with respect to reasons for other attitudes, such as beliefs and intentions (Section 2), as well as with respect to reasons for action (Section 3). We discuss the similarities and differences between the ways in which philosophers have drawn the RKR/WKR distinction in these areas and offer different interpretations of the idea of a general, uniform distinction. The major upshot is that there is at least one interesting way of substantiating a general RKR/WKR distinction with respect to a broad range of attitudes as well as actions. We argue that this has important implications for the proper scope of buck‐passing accounts and the status of the wrong kind of reasons problem (Section 4).

Two Second‐Personal Conceptions of the Dignity of Persons

AbstractIn spite of the burgeoning philosophical literature on human dignity, Stephen Darwall's second‐personal account of the dignity of persons has not received the attention it deserves. This article investigates Darwall's account and argues that it faces a dilemma, for it succumbs either to a problem of antecedence or to the wrong kind of reasons problem. But this need not mean one should reject a second‐personal account. Instead, I argue that an alternative second‐personal conception, one I will call relational, promises to solve the dilemma by avoiding both the problem of antecedence and the wrong kind of reasons problem. More generally, distinguishing these two second‐personal conceptions of the dignity of persons is important to enrich the available philosophical accounts of human dignity.

A Fitting End to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem

This article uses a particular view of the basic emotions in order to develop and defend an account of paradigmatic emotion-linked evaluative properties. The view is that felt emotions are constituted by an awareness that one is about to behave in a certain way. This view provides support for a fitting-attitude account of certain evaluative properties. But the relevant sense of fittingness is not to be understood in terms of reasons. The account therefore sidesteps the well-known Wrong Kind of Reasons problem. Throughout the article, a contrast is made with the rational sentimentalism of Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson.

Idealization and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

I consider Antti Kauppinen’s recent proposal for solving the wrong kind of reasons problem for fitting attitude analyses through an appeal to the verdicts of ideal subjects. I present two problems for Kauppinen’s treatment of a foreseen objection, and construct a counterexample to his proposal as it applies to the wrong kind of reasons to admire someone. I then show how to construct similar counterexamples to his proposal as it applies to the wrong kind of reasons for other attitudes, including guilt and shame.

Reasons Wrong and Right

AbstractThe fact that someone is generous is a reason to admire them. The fact that someone will pay you to admire them is also a reason to admire them. But there is a difference in kind between these two reasons: the former seems to be the ‘right’ kind of reason to admire, whereas the latter seems to be the ‘wrong’ kind of reason to admire. The Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem is the problem of explaining the difference between the ‘right’ and the ‘wrong’ kind of reasons wherever it appears. In this article I argue that two recent proposals for solving the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem do not work. I then offer an alternative solution that provides a unified, systematic explanation of the difference between the two kinds of reasons.

FITTINGNESS, VALUE, AND TRANS-WORLD ATTITUDES

Philosophers interested in the fitting attitude analysis of final value have devoted a great deal of attention to the wrong kind of reasons problem. This paper offers an example of the reverse difficulty, the wrong kind of value problem. This problem creates deeper challenges for the fitting attitude analysis and provides independent grounds for rejecting it, or at least for doubting seriously its correctness.

Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem

According to fitting-attitude (FA) accounts of value, X is of final value if and only if there are reasons for us to have a certain pro-attitude towards it. FA accounts supposedly face the wrong kind of reason (WKR) problem. The WKR problem is the problem of revising FA accounts to exclude so called wrong kind of reasons. And wrong kind of reasons are reasons for us to have certain pro-attitudes towards things that are not of value. I argue that the WKR problem can be dissolved. I argue that (A) the view that there are wrong kind of reasons for the pro-attitudes that figure in FA accounts conflicts with the conjunction of (B) an extremely plausible and extremely weak connection between normative and motivating reasons and (C) an extremely plausible generality constraint on the reasons for pro-attitudes that figure in FA accounts. I argue that when confronted with this trilemma we should give up (A) rather than (B) or (C) because there is a good explanation of why (A) seems so plausible but is in fact false, but there is no good explanation of why (B) and (C) seem so plausible but are in fact false.

Aggregating Reasons and Persons: On Sorting Out the Logic of the Good, Royce’s Style

1. IntroductionRecent work (e.g. Rachels (1998, 2004), Temkin (1987, 2012)) on the logic of the 'all-things-considered-better-than' relation faces our contemporary axiologies with a repugnant, but forced choice (Rachels 2004), between thoroughly redefining value ordering, and dropping the transitivity axiom. Transitivity models our intuition that if p is better than q and q is better than r, then p is better than r. However, it looks like the essentially Archimedean way we compare and measure value, on a single additive scale, is incompatible with our skipping intermediaries (James 1981) in evaluative endeavours.Revisiting Josiah Royce's 'plan of life' account and principle of loyalty points towards a very fertile path in solving major difficulties encountered by contemporary axiology and opens new perspectives in rethinking the logic of value ordering.The classical, Moorean view, attempting to explain 'the right' in terms of 'that which produces the most good', faces insurmountable difficulties in meeting our moral intuitions in 'trolley'-like cases (Thompson 1985). Also, the 'internal view' on final value associated to Moore's framework seems incapable to explain relational value; that is, to account for our intuition that some things are finally valuable apart from their intrinsic properties, due to their relation with something else we find valuable.The upshot of this, in recent years, is an increased popularity of the contrasting view, according to which deontic categories are prior to, and explain, evaluative categories; the fitting-attitude analysis of value (FA) defines goodness in terms of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Thus, FA aspires to account for the good in terms of a deontic and an attitudinal component; this idea has been traced back to Franz Brentano, who defined the judgment that x is good by the judgment that a positive attitude towards x is correct (1969, 18).The virtues of the FA analysis are considerable: it demystifies value and explains why we are justified in our concern for valuable objects. However, FA is facing a powerful charge of under-specification regarding the reasons which are to be allowed to enter value judgments. The Wrong Kind of Reasons problem (WKR), roughly put, states that it can be fitting to have a pro-attitude towards something for reasons that have nothing to do with the value the thing has in itself. Furthermore, WKR makes FA vulnerable to Larry Temkin's (2012) intransitivity charges vis-a-vis value ordering; Temkin argues that, by allowing a large variety of reasons to enter value judgments, under a 'non-internal' axiological view, transitivity of 'all-things-considered-better-than' is bound to fail.Several proposals attempting to elude this charges have been put forth in the literature; however, none of them proved conclusive, as they were shown to imply further difficulties due to their over-restrictive nature.It is argued here that revisiting one of the early FA proposals might do the trick; though, after Brentano, FA disappeared from the center of debate for several decades, it did get a short mention in Rawls's A Theory of Justice, where it was applied to the attributive usage of good: (1999, 399). Here, Rawls explicitly refers to Josiah Royce's notion of 'plan of life' and adapts it in explaining goodness; in place of 'good', the schema he proposes substitutes 'has to a higher than average degree the properties it is to want a thing of the kind to possess', in accordance with one's rational plan of life.The purpose of this paper is to revisit Josiah Royce's 'plan of life' account and 'loyalty to loyalty' principle, as they strike me as offering a fertile ground for an FA substitution schema. Royce uses the notion of a plan to characterize the coherent, systematic purposes of the individual, what makes him a conscious, unified moral agent. Furthermore, Royce accounts for the goodness of the plan as such by arguing that, although loyalty to one's own cause is a prerequisite, it is loyalty to loyalty itself which is the chief human good. …

Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences

In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of reasons for pro-attitudes are reasons that would not still be reasons for pro-attitudes if it were not for the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.

The Right Version of ‘the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’

In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason problem’ (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang's suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang's suggestion for a solution to the WKR problem, they have not provided sufficient grounds for dismissing the kind of solution that Lang proposes. I show how a version of this kind of solution can be formulated so as to avoid both Olson's and Brunero's objections. I also raise some worries concerning an alternative solution to the WKR problem suggested by Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson.

How Not to Solve the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem

Recent debates in metanormativity have paid considerable attention to the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ (henceforth, WKR) problem that afflicts so-called buckpassing accounts of value. Let me very briefly introduce buckpassing accounts of value and what the WKR problem is about. Roughly, buckpassing accounts of value contend that for something to be valuable is to have other properties that give reasons for proattitudes. For example, a work of art might be valuable because it has certain properties (e.g. colourful, soft texture etc.) that give reasons to think it admirable. Buckpassing accounts, however, seem to run straight into the WKR problem. Roughly, the problem consists in the fact that agents may very easily have pragmatic reasons for proattitudes that may have to do with the instrumental value of having the attitude itself and nothing to do with epistemic reasons about the value of the object, act, event etc. itself. Thus, buckpassing accounts seem to allow for

Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason

This essay defends fitting-attitudes accounts of value against the wrong kind of reason problem. I argue for the skeptical view that putative reasons of the wrong kind are reasons to want and bring about certain attitudes but not reasons for those attitudes. The argument turns on the transmission of reasons: the familiar fact that there is often reason for one action or attitude because there is reason for another. I argue that putative reasons of the wrong kind transmit in a different way to the right kind of reasons and that this fact is best explained by the skeptical view.

What’s wrong with Moorean buck-passing?

In this paper I discuss and try to remove some major stumbling blocks for a Moorean buck-passing account of reasons in terms of value (MBP): There is a pro tanto reason to favour X if and only if X is intrinsically good, or X is instrumentally good, or favouring X is intrinsically good, or favouring X is instrumentally good. I suggest that MBP can embrace and explain the buck-passing intuition behind the far more popular buck-passing account of value, and has the means to avoid the wrong kind of reasons problem. Further, I counter the common suspicion that a Moorean account cannot make sense of deontological views such as Ross’s, and that it generally leaves no room for agent-relative reasons. In order to do this, I appeal to the idea that a Moorean account does not dictate the substantive view that values have to be maximized. In some cases, expressing them might be a better response. Finally I lay out and reply to a potentially devastating argument to the effect that a Moorean account makes oughts and reasons non-normative. I also criticize Scanlon’s attempt to favour his own buck-passing account via consideration of the open question argument. MBP thus emerges as a live option in the buck-passing debate.

The FA Analysis of Emotional Values and Practical Reasons

ABSTRACT: Confronted with the “wrong kind of reason problem”, several proponents of the fitting attitude analysis of emotional values have argued in favor of an epistemic approach. In such a view, an emotion fits its object because the emotion is correct. However, I argue that we should reorient our search towards a practical approach because only practical considerations can provide a satisfying explanation of the fittingness of emotional responses. This practical approach is partially revisionist, particularly because it is no longer an analysis of final value and because it is relativistic.

Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes

In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard’s version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value, and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard’s. In Section 3, I consider some ways in which Gibbard might attempt to avoid the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue that all of these ways fail to achieve their aim and further contend that the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem cannot be solved in a sufficiently convincing manner by the widely used method of making ad hoc distinctions among kinds of properties, kinds of attitudes, and kinds of reasons. In Section 4, I sketch my own version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness and show that it simply avoids the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem rather than attempting to solve the problem on a piecemeal basis.

Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang

In his article ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’, Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected.

Abandoning the Buck Passing Analysis of Final Value

In this paper it is argued that the buck-passing analysis (BPA) of final value is not a plausible analysis of value and should be abandoned. While considering the influential wrong kind of reason problem and other more recent technical objections, this paper contends that there are broader reasons for giving up on buck-passing. It is argued that the BPA, even if it can respond to the various technical objections, is not an attractive analysis of final value. It is not attractive for two reasons: the first being that the BPA lacks the features typical of successful conceptual analyses and the second being that it is unable to deliver on the advantages that its proponents claim for it. While not offering a knock-down technical refutation of the BPA, this paper aims to show that there is little reason to think that the BPA is correct, and that it should therefore be given up as an analysis of final value.

The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem

The so-called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon's ‘buck-passing’ account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant proposed solutions to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang's solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.