World Trade Organization Adjudication Research Articles

WTO International Trade Dispute Settlement System and Benefits for Indonesia

International trade is one of the essential pillars of the global economy. International trade can improve people's welfare through increased productivity, diversified production, and lower prices of goods and services. In international trade, it is not uncommon for disputes to occur between business actors from different countries. This study examines the international trade dispute settlement system in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its benefits for Indonesia. This research uses normative legal research methods. The data collection technique used in this research is a literature study. The data analysis technique used in this research is qualitative analysis. The results show that the dispute settlement mechanism through the WTO is part of the WTO adjudication function as a world trade organization. The stages of dispute settlement involve consultations, panel formation, panel procedures, and ratification of panel reports, judicial review, and implementation. For Indonesia, participation in the WTO dispute settlement system brings several benefits, such as increasing legal certainty in international trade, protecting Indonesia's trade interests, and increasing the competitiveness of Indonesian products in the international market.

The right to regulate and the interpretation of the WTO Agreement

ABSTRACT In contrast to international investment tribunals, World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicators have been reluctant to acknowledge the inherent right to regulate under international law explicitly. Policy-based considerations arising from such a right have not been viewed as a standalone component under interpretive analyses in WTO dispute settlement. Instead, they have been integrated only to the extent they find expression in the treaty. This article explores how, on occasion, WTO adjudicators have departed from this orthodox approach by choosing to proactively interpret the WTO Covered Agreements in a way that presupposes a States’ right to regulate, even where this may seem contrary to, or unsupported by, the treaty text. In these cases, the question has not been whether such a right subsists within substantive WTO disciplines, but rather how such a right can be read into these disciplines in a manner that comports with the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation. While this unorthodox approach has resulted in interpretations that appear unclear and uncertain, these outcomes are ultimately explicable in terms of a general principle of regulatory autonomy that can form the basis for more principled interpretive choices.

Consensus Decision-Making and Legislative Inertia at the WTO: Can International Law Help?

The recent emergence of Joint Statement Initiatives (JSIs) – that is, negotiating initiatives among a subset of the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership – has reignited the debate over lawmaking in the WTO. As things stand, the WTO operates on the basis of a widespread expectation that consensus needs to be achieved for any decision to be taken. Agreements that produce rights and obligations only among a subset of the membership (‘plurilaterals’, or Annex 4 agreements) are also subject to the consensus rule and thus remain exceptional. Are JSIs the first move towards redressing the current equilibrium in favour of agreements among a subset ofWTO members and, if so, can they be integrated within the current regime absent amendments? Even though consensus decision-making does not necessarily lead to failed negotiations, it is undoubtedly a significant contributory factor when parties hold diverse and unaligned priorities. Contracts signed in the WTO involve increasingly heterogeneous players with diverse priorities. In this article, we argue that the first-best approach to moving away from the current legislative stasis at the multilateral level is to acknowledge that it is high time to consider how to allow an additional degree of ‘variable geometry’ within the multilateral trading system. A textual legal basis for this approach, however, is missing within the WTO legal order. An acceptable alternative would be to acknowledge that the WTO adjudicators (WTO panelists and Appellate Body members), and not the members, will be the ultimate gatekeepers deciding whether agreements among a subset of members can coexist as part of the current multilateral trade framework understood within the context of international law. A necessary precondition for this alternative approach to flourish will, of course, be the resolution of the current judiciary crisis of the WTO. In either scenario, what will matter at the end of the day is that inter se agreements (that is, agreements among a subset of the WTO membership) will not affect the enjoyment of acquired rights by non-participants nor frustrate the objectives of the multilateral trading system.

Beyond Multilateral Treaty Reforms

International trade law is primarily concerned with facilitating the flow of goods and services across national borders by minimizing tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. However, there is a nexus between international trade and the environment. First, international trade is reckoned to have destructive environmental effects. The liberalization of global trade results in increased economic activity, including industrial processes, manufacturing, innovation of new technology, and extraction of natural resources from the earth and the sea, which inevitably results in environmental externalities such as biodiversity loss, pollution, and climate change. Second, international trade law intersects environmental law whenever trade restrictive measures such as import bans, export control and border taxes are adopted by states as a means of achieving environmental goals.[1] Such measures condition market access on the fulfilment of environmental norms related to the characteristic of the product or the process of its production. The World Trade Organization (WTO) currently oversees the largest multilateral regime for international trade. WTO covered agreements expressly recognises some exceptions to trade liberalization commitments for environmental objectives, this policy space is subjected to a system of strict limitations and review procedures designed to protect the global trading system from arbitrariness and disguised restrictions on trade. This scrutinized policy space accounts for the contention that the multilateral trading system constrains environmental regulation and requires treaty reforms for the purpose of adapting to contemporary environmental concerns. Others have focused on a change of approach in the reasoning of WTO adjudicators in their review of trade-restrictive environmental measures. However, the process of multilateral negotiations for new agreements needed to effect rule change is notably complex and has been fraught with deadlocks in the last couple of decades. The stalemate over appointment of members of the Appellate Body has hampered the effective functioning of third-party adjudication in the WTO and the prospect of ‘pro-environmental’ approaches in the interpretation of WTO law on environmental measures. Meanwhile, numerous environment-related measures continue to be notified within the WTO. I argue that notwithstanding the absence of treaty reforms, international trade law continuously evolves through various formal and informal norm-generating practices by member states and trade stakeholders. Viewed through the lens of legal pluralism, these practices contest, modify and transform normative meaning in the multilateral trading system thereby creating a permissive setting for trade-restrictive environmental measures within the framework of extant international trade law.

Are the Fingerprints of WTO Staff on Panel Rulings a Problem? A Reply to Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc

Abstract By employing stylometric data analysis, Joost Pauwelyn and Krzysztof Pelc underpin the narrative of a power-mongering World Trade Organization (WTO) Secretariat. As ‘holder of the pen’ in writing WTO rulings, the Secretariat would absorb control over WTO adjudicators and the dispute settlement procedure. This reply disagrees. First, with stylometric analysis informing style rather than substance, this technique does not encrypt the intellectual ownership of WTO rulings, nor does it offer account of the deliberation between bureaucrats and adjudicators. Second, with public power typically deriving legitimacy from both political or judicial accountability as well as rational and de-politicized bureaucracies, an assertive WTO Secretariat under the direction of panellists is normatively desirable. Third, a WTO Secretariat pursuing consistent application of the growing WTO acquis does not impair the members-driven adjudication process.

‘Moral’ Determinations in WTO Law: Lessons from the Seals Dispute

ABSTRACT This article develops a conceptual framework for understanding the ambiguous concept of public morals in World Trade Organization (WTO) law. It reviews the jurisprudence and literature to suggest there are four main options for operationalizing this concept in a legal test. If WTO adjudicators opt for an empirical approach, they can test whether a certain belief is genuinely held within the regulator’s society (unilateralism) or whether it is shared more broadly by the global community (externalism). If WTO adjudicators prefer a ‘moral’ approach, they can interrogate the content of the regulator’s measure (normative inquiry) or whether it addresses a moral issue (meta-ethical inquiry). Each of these approaches suffers from important weaknesses. WTO adjudicators have taken an equivocal approach: they make amorphous statements alluding to all four approaches but do not settle on a clear public morals legal test. In Seals, they went further by establishing an equivocal characterization of the European Union’s (EU) policy objective, which failed to clarify what the EU’s seal products ban sought to achieve or even whether it was based on objective rational considerations. This use of fallacious reasoning by dispute bodies has important implications for WTO law with respect to indeterminacy, transparency, and judicial activism.

EU-Ukraine Arbitration: Will WTO Law Become More Deferential Outside the WTO?

The first dispute brought by the EU under its bilateral trade agreements, Ukraine – Export Restrictions on Wood, was in many respects a typical World Trade Organization (WTO) case. A panel of three arbitrators, including two prominent and highly experienced WTO adjudicators, was to rule on consistency of the respondent’s export bans with Articles XI and XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, incorporated by reference into the EUUkraine Association Agreement. The latter, moreover, explicitly requires that arbitrators rely on the WTO jurisprudence – which they, technically, did. Yet, the arbitration panel appears to have shown more deference to the respondent than any WTO panel ever has (or would). By contrasting the reasoning of the arbitration panel with that of WTO panels deciding similar issues, the article questions whether WTO law may take a more deferential path outside the WTO. WTO law, GATT, Article XX(b), EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, wood export ban, dispute settlement, judicial deference

From Integration Through Law to Global Community Law? Between Arbitration, Adjudication and Judicial Overreach

Claims of ‘judicial overreach’ currently disrupt the World Trade Organization (WTO), investor-state arbitration and multilevel judicial governance in the European Union. Section I discusses the postwar evolution from the neo-liberal ‘Washington consensus’ to the ordo-liberal ‘Geneva consensus’ promoting global human rights, multilateral trading systems and transnational rule-of-law based on UN/WTO law. The neoliberal US assault on WTO law and adjudication (discussed in Section II) and China’s totalitarian state-capitalism (Section III) challenge multilateral treaty systems and related adjudication protecting global public goods. The claims of ‘judicial overreach’ in multilateral trade, investment and European adjudication (discussed in Section IV) reveal systemic conflicts among regulatory and judicial approaches. Section V concludes that European Union law requires defending the ‘constitutional functions’ of ordo-liberal integration law through EU leadership for plurilateral WTO reforms; economic, environmental and human rights litigation in Europe confirm the need for participatory governance in multilevel legal and judicial protection of the UN/WTO sustainable development goals.

Sausage-Making at the WTO: Looking Behind the Curtain of Dispute Settlement Procedures Over Time

There often exists a gap between public perceptions about how the proverbial sausage is made, and the reality of sausage-making. Just as often, sausage-makers have an incentive to preserve this gap between fact and perception. This chapter considers the analogous incentives of the various sausage-makers in international judicial settings, with a focus on the World Trade Organization (WTO). First, I describe findings showing that WTO adjudicators are not the only, or even the main, authors of WTO rulings, and the WTO Secretariat plays a large role in the preparation and drafting of rulings. I then consider the implications: does it matter who the authors of rulings are, so long as adjudicators retain the final say over the direction of the ruling? Finally, I show how we are now able to identify, using available text analysis methods, the authors of Appellate Body dissenting opinions. The implications are considerable: insofar as judges rely on the anonymity of dissents to safeguard judicial autonomy, the loss of this nominal protection calls for a rethinking of the institutional design of international tribunals.

WTO Adjudication and the Security Exception: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed – Something Blue?

For twenty years, World Trade Organization (WTO) Members managed to avoid invoking the security exception before WTO panels, leaving unresolved the tension between the self-judging element explicit in its text and the compulsory jurisdiction of WTO panels. Then, in 2017 and 2018, a dozen panels were established after the respondent declared that it deemed the challenged measures necessary to protect its essential security interests. The first panel report to examine the issue, in Russia – Traffic in Transit, was adopted in April 2019 without appeal. Its interpretation of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXI significantly limits the scope of the self-judging element in the provision and devises a three-step legal test to be met by Members invoking the exception, with the declared objective of safeguarding ‘the object and purpose of GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreements more generally’. This article examines and discusses this interpretation and its effects over the role of the WTO in international trade relations, viewing it as the latest episode in the long-standing tension between mechanisms providing for compulsory international adjudication and the view that, where states deem their essential interests to be involved, the submission of disputes to adjudication remains subject to their sovereign determination.

Challenging Unwritten Measures in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Clear Legal Standards

ABSTRACT Disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO) involving the challenge of unwritten measures have increased in recent years. This trend may have been encouraged by the successful challenge of Argentina’s ‘managed trade policy’ as an ‘overarching unwritten measure’ in Argentina—Import Measures. Advancing a claim against an unwritten measure, however, is not an easy undertaking. These measures are not embodied in any law, administrative regulation or judicial decision. Their very existence and precise contours are, therefore, uncertain and must be proven with evidence, which may not necessarily be readily available. The uncertain nature of unwritten measures makes the dispute settlement process significantly more complicated for the complainant, the respondent and the WTO adjudicators. Despite the difficulties in challenging, defending and adjudicating unwritten measures, relatively little has been written on this subject. This article discusses the types of trade concerns that could be challenged as ‘unwritten measures’, and the different legal characterizations (analytical tools) that have been used to challenge these trade concerns in the WTO. The article further explores the practical difficulties that have been encountered in challenges against unwritten measures and how these difficulties have sometimes, but not always, been overcome. The article concludes that there is a lack of clarity as to the correct legal standard that must be applied in the challenge of different types of unwritten measures. There is more work to be done to clarify the applicable legal standards and the types of evidence required to substantiate the existence of unwritten measures.

When the Multilateral Meets the Regionals: Regional Trade Agreements at WTO Dispute Settlement

AbstractInteraction between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the multilateral trading system established by the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an issue of significance but nevertheless remains unsettled. This article aims to explore the influence RTAs have generated had on the WTO system, with particular focus on the approach adopted by the adjudicators when dealing with irreconcilable RTA–WTO conflicts. During the development of 20 years’ jurisprudence, WTO adjudicators offered responses to a number of critical questions. On the one hand, direct endorsement of RTA provisions with the effect of prevailing over the counterpart WTO rules appears to be very difficult, either through legal interpretation or application. On the other hand, unlike often being argued, a close review of WTO case law does not reveal a biased adjudicatory approach against regionalism, as compared to other sources of public international law. When dealing with RTA-related matters, the Appellate Body has been advocating an all-encompassing approach featured by the emphasis on the common intention during the interpretative exercise and the promotion for the WTO built-in mechanisms for valid modification. Such an approach is, to a certain extent, misleading in the RTA –WTO context and has led to certain ill-founded adjudicatory choice.

Reconciling Regulatory Space with External Accountability through WTO Adjudication – Trade, Environment and Development

AbstractThis article argues in favour of broadening the trade and environment debate in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to include a developmental perspective. WTO litigation involving environmental regulation touches upon the issue of global justice and the power asymmetries structurally embedded in the global economy. The recognition of the WTO as a legitimate global institution, therefore, depends on its ability to reconcile the respect for the right to regulate with the need to give due regard to the interests and concerns of foreign constituencies affected by domestic regulation. By imposing other-regarding obligations, WTO law can act as a mechanism of external accountability of powerful states vis-à-vis affected foreigners, especially where asymmetric relations and different stages of economic development are involved. The article applies this framework to analyze the legal reasoning of the Appellate Body in theUS-Tuna IIdispute between the US and Mexico – a dispute illustrating the complex intertwinement between economic, environmental and developmental issues. It concludes that the use of the concepts of ‘even-handedness’ and ‘calibration’ under Article 2.1 of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did not enable the Appellate Body to strike an adequate balance between the right to regulate and external accountability. While in the original report the Appellate Body used ‘even-handedness’ to impose only a minimal level of external accountability on the US, in the compliance report, the Appellate Body has gone too far by failing to defer to the US risk assessment amidst scientific controversy and uncertainty.

US–COOL: How the Appellate Body Misconstrued the National Treatment Principle, Severely Restricting Agency Discretion to Promulgate Mandatory, Pro-Consumer Labeling Rules

In United States–Certain Country of Origin Labeling Requirements1the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ruled that the United States’ country-of-origin labeling regulations (COOL) on beef and pork products violated the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade’s (TBT) National Treatment (NT) Principle.2 Aimed at promoting informed consumer choice, COOL required retailers to disclose the covered products’ origin. In prior decisions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article III:4, the AB correctly rejected protectionist rules that unnecessarily encumbered consumer choice, while adversely affecting conditions of competition for imports. In US–COOL, however, the AB formalistically transposed such GATT jurisprudence into TBT analysis, equating private action in compliance with neutral, transparency-promoting labeling rules to private action in compliance with capricious, opacity-inducing distribution rules. This article argues that, while GATT NT-jurisprudence should enlighten analysis under the TBT, WTO adjudicators should not allow exporting Members’ perceived entitlement to trade volumes – which may well be premised on continued opacity and uninformed consumer choice – to interfere with importing Members’ origin-neutral regulations. (JEL: F13, F53, K23, K41, Q13, Q17).

Clearing the Smoke: The Legitimation of Judicial Power at the WTO

What role, if any, does the search for judicial legitimacy play in judgments rendered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS)? And with which audiences, and through which judicial means does the WTO DSS try to communicate in order to sustain its legitimacy? Empirical evidence generated through semi-structured interviews with WTO practitioners demonstrate that since its inception, the interstate WTO DSS has been engaged in a continuing quest for legitimacy amidst multiple audiences, well beyond WTO Member States. This quest – prominent in the dispute-category known as ‘trade-and’ disputes – has manifested itself in both the rhetorical, procedural, and substantive judicial choices taken by WTO adjudicators. Also, this quest has not been static, but rather dynamic in nature, whereas in response to some audiences’ demands, jurisprudential, procedural and rhetorical readjustments have been made along the way. The article demonstrates these assertions through discursive analysis of the recent US-Clove Cigarettes dispute, while revisiting several earlier jurisprudential milestones on the DSS’ road to legitimacy. Coupling this analysis with insiders’ views, the article sheds a novel empirical light on how the DSS’ legitimacy challenges in ‘trade-and’ disputes are experienced ‘from within’, and the manner in which they are subsequently weaved into the choices taken by WTO adjudicators in their strategic judicial space. [M]ost adjudicators have a sense at an intuitive level as to what the main elements of ‘legitimacy’ are. One would be transparency, due process… consistency with existing case law, like arguments being treated the same way….And one of those things… would be understanding the audience… knowing who the audience is for a particular type of decision and drafting the decision, at least stylistically in some respects, in a way that the audience will perceive it as being legitimate, and the audience for a dumping case will be different from the audience for US-Clove Cigarettes. Interview with WTO official, 13 March 2012, Geneva

Seals and the Need for More Deference to Vienna by WTO Adjudicators

This paper asks how World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the Appellate Body (AB) take public international law (PIL) into account when interpreting WTO rules as a part of international economic law (IEL). Splendid isolation of the latter is not new; indeed it is intended by the negotiators of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). At the same time, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is quite clear when it provides the general rules and the supplementary means of treaty interpretation. Despite such mandatory guidance, WTO adjudicators (when given a choice and assuming they see the conflict) prefer deference to WTO law over deference to Vienna and take a dogmatic way out of interpretation quandaries. The AB and panels make abundant reference to Vienna, though less so to substantive PIL. Often times, however, they do so simply in order to buttress their findings of violations of WTO rules. Perhaps tellingly, however, none of the reports in EC – Seals contains even a single mention of VCLT, despite numerous references to international standards addressing indigenous rights and animal welfare. In the longer term, and absent a breakthrough on the negotiation front, this pattern of carefully eschewing international treaty law and using PIL just for the sake of convenience could have serious consequences for the credibility and acceptance of the multilateral trading system. Following the adage ‘negotiate or litigate’ recourse to WTO dispute settlement increases when governments are less ready to make treaty commitments commensurate with the challenges of globalisation. This is true even for ‘societal choice’ cases on the margins of classic trade disputes. We will argue here that it is precisely for cases such as these that VCLT and PIL should be used more systematically by panels and the AB. Failing that, instead of building bridges for more coherent international regulation, WTO adjudicators could burn those same bridges which the DSU interpretation margin leaves open for accomplishing their job which is to find a ‘positive solution’. Worse, judicial incoherence could return to WTO dispute settlement like a boomerang and damage the credibility and thus the level of acceptance of the multilateral trading system per se.

WTO Panelists Are From Mars, ICSID Arbitrators Are From Venus: Why? And Does it Matter?

At the 20th anniversary of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the WTO’s dispute settlement system is celebrated as one of the organization’s biggest achievements. Compare this to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), under heavy fire in both capital-importing and -exporting countries. How is it that today’s perception of two parallel processes of legalization of world politics, on two closely related subject matters of global economic affairs – cross-border trade and cross-border investment -- differs so much? The aim of this article is not to provide a comprehensive answer to this question. Instead, it focuses on only part of a possible explanation: The pool of individuals deciding WTO versus ICSID disputes. Based on new data, the article identifies striking differences between WTO panelists and ICSID arbitrators in terms of nationality, professional background, legal expertise, diversity, status and ideology. It then offers a number of factors that explain these differences centered on appointment rules and conditions and the broader institutional context of the WTO versus ICSID. The contribution this article makes is, first of all, empirical: based on data, demonstrating the differences between WTO and ICSID adjudicators. A second goal is explanatory: to highlight factors that rationally explain these differences. Thirdly, and finally, the article has a normative thesis: rule of law or legalization at the public international law level requires “voice” and political participation; in terms of adjudicators, representativeness, inclusiveness and trust tend to be more important than individual expertise and experience (the rule of law without necessarily the rule of lawyers). Prescriptively, this thesis expects relative continuity in the pool and attributes of WTO adjudicators; it foresees change in who will decide ISDS cases in the future.

Re-Assessing WTO Remedies: The Prospective and the Retrospective

The World Trade Organization (WTO) system of 'prospective' or 'forward-looking' remedies is often contrasted negatively with the 'retrospective' remedy of reparation traditionally granted by international courts. In this article, I argue that prospective remedies must be assessed having in mind their different functions when contrasted to reparation: inducing compliance ex post, rather than discouraging it ex ante. The object and purpose of WTO remedies is to ensure cessation within a reasonable period of time or, in the absence of cessation, to allow alternative legal responses by the organization and its members until compliance is achieved. Although it would be beyond the current powers of WTO adjudicators to grant reparation, this does not exhaust the possibilities of 'retrospective' remedies. When making use of the remedies provided for in the Dispute Settlement Understanding, panels, the Appellate Body and arbitrators must take into account the ultimate objective of WTO remedies in order to ensure that the absence of reparation does not imply an absence of legal consequences. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.

WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding Remedies Reforms: An African Perspective

The thrust of this paper centres on the inadequate structure of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) remedies from the perspective of African countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this paper, I attempt to highlight the rationale, whether economic or political, for African countries’ decisions to abstain from participating in these disputes or ‘free ride’ within the international trade dispute settlement arena. I argue that the incentives or disincentives affecting these decisions stem from the inability of these countries to retaliate against larger economies under the WTO DSU. The article presents the argument that developing countries and least-developed countries (LDCs), in particular, clearly lack sufficient incentives to seek redress within the system as they are unable to retaliate against stronger trading partners. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the low volume of trade emanating from the continent are also seen as significant impediments to African participation in the DSU mechanism. This paper argues that, despite these constraints, African countries must strive to participate more effectively in WTO adjudication and develop further capacity in this area. Such policies might serve as catalysts to enable African countries achieve meaningful concessions through litigation that have eluded them for so long at the WTO negotiating table.

The Limits of WTO Adjudication: Is Compliance the Problem?

Mainstream international trade law scholars have commented positively on the work of World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicators. This favorable view is both echoed and challenged by empirical scholarship that shows a high disparity between Complainant and Respondent success rates (Complainants win between 80 and 90 percent of the disputes). Regardless of how one interprets these results, mainstream theorists, especially legalists, believe more is to be done to strengthen the system, and they point to instances of member recalcitrance to implement rulings as a serious problem. This article posits that such attempts to strengthen compliance are ill-advised. After discussing prior empirical analyses of WTO adjudication involving primary rights and obligations under the WTO agreements (i.e. substantive adjudication), this article expands the empirical study into compliance disputes. It finds that 'enforcement' proceedings do protect the pro-free trade interests so overwhelmingly supported in substantive adjudication. Since that is the case, this article investigates the extent to which current levels of non-compliance might constitute a threat to this regime, and theorizes that the observed level is not only acceptable but a necessary feature of the system. I conclude by arguing that compliance-related issues must be viewed in a broader perspective that transcends narrow legalistic views and accounts for the multifaceted interests of, and differences among, WTO members. Oxford University Press 2011, all rights reserved, Oxford University Press.