World Communist Movement Research Articles

CCCР – Колумбия: межпартийное измерение отношений

The author analyzes the history of the development and evo-lution of inter-party relations between the CPSU and the Co-lombian Communist Party in the post-Comintern period. Par-ticular attention is paid to the role of the International De-partment of the CPSU Central Committee in conducting the foreign policy of the USSR in Latin America. The author con-cludes that inter-party relations between the CPS and the CPC were built primarily around global issues on the agenda of the world communist movement, with the issues of Soviet-Chinese and Soviet-Chinese-Cuban rivalry and the topic of armed struggle in the Latin American region especially high-lighted.

Not going 'pop': the aesthetic criticism of early British Maoism

If people think about Maoist/anti-revisionist groups in countries such as Britain, they are often seduced by an impression of exoticism and the incompatibility of such groups with a more humdrum native left-wing culture. What is also significant about such groups is the depth of their ideological inheritance from the Soviet-inspired world communist movement. This is particularly clear in relation to such groups' cultural criticism. Cultural products such as folk or pop music tended to be reduced to simplistic class designations (i.e.bourgeois art) and were often ruthlessly dismissed, sometimes for an apparent propensity to lead to fascism. Maoists called for a more political, communist art as an alternative, focused on serving the struggle for proletarian revolution. It's important to grasp that such criticism wasn't set apart from previous inner-CPGB debates on cultural issues, where the oppositional left that had been apparent in the party since the Second World War had retained the thrust of the Zhdanov doctrine emphasised by the party majority in the immediate post-war years. This article explores the aesthetic responses of a number of groups that developed during the first wave of international Maoism in the 1960s and measures them against inner-CPGB differences on art and culture.

“We Will Not Change Our Attitude Towards You, Until You Change Your Attitude Towards Us”. How Washington Considered the Reaction of Western European Communist Parties to The Events in Afghanistan, 1978–1985

The invasion of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan at the end of 1979 caused a mixed reaction among the Communist parties in Europe. Some of them subject the actions of the USSR leadership to sharp criticism. The article reveals to what extent the US administration was aware of the critical attacks against the USSR and the CPSU by the most powerful Western European Communist parties to determine how the factor of Eurocommunism influenced the Afghan vector of the US policy in 1979-1982 and how the American course turned out for the Communist parties themselves. The study is based on published documents (including electronic collections) of the Administration of the President of the United States J. Carter, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, as well as unpublished documents of the Central Committee of the CPSU from the funds of the Russian State Archive of Modern History, press materials and memoirs. It is concluded that 1) the invasion of Soviet military units into Afghanistan provoked a fierce battle of superpowers on the periphery of the Cold War, and in fact, became its peak; 2) one of the results of the Soviet operation was a deeper split in the world communist movement with its subsequent decline; 3) the United States sought to take advantage of the escalated disagreements between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the largest communist parties in Western Europe (especially Italian, to a lesser extent Spanish and French) and encouraged the actions of the European Communists aimed at distancing themselves from the CPSU and severing relations with the USSR. At the same time, Washington avoided public statements and actions that could look like a manifestation of solidarity with the Communist parties of Western Europe (primarily with the ICP), including the relation to the USSR policy in Afghanistan, giving priority to the policy to exclude completely the possibility for communists to participate in the governments of NATO states. Such a policy, against the background of the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the decline in the USSR's international prestige, contributed to the isolation of the European communist parties in their countries and the weakening of their electoral opportunities.

Направления деятельности агентов Коминтерна в Европе в 1921–1925 годах (по материалам французских архивов)

This article dwells on the topic little studied in Russian and foreign historiography, namely, the intelligence work of foreigners in European countries in favour of the Communist International. The research involved documents from the Historical Service of the French Ministry of Defence and the French National Archives, in particular, the court cases of three French activists (J. Sadoul, A. Guilbeaux and R. Petit). The materials of the court cases were formed on the basis of the information gathered by the French intelligence about the activities of these people in European countries. The author of the paper, having analysed the above court cases, determined the chronological framework of this activity (1921–1925) and identified six areas of the Bolshevik agents’ work aimed to promote the communist movement in European countries. These areas included campaigning through organization and distribution of the Soviet press abroad; restoration of the cultural ties between the countries of Western Europe and Soviet Russia; propaganda measures in the occupied territories of Germany; establishment of additional contacts with representatives of the French Communist Party; attempts to revitalize the communist movement in Czechoslovakia and Turkey; and establishment of a link between the Comintern and the Italian and Swiss communists. The author comes to the conclusion that the agents’ activities in these areas had positive results. This example of cooperation between the European communists and leaders of the Comintern through French agents is a new page in the history of communism. It demonstrates the collaboration between the Bolsheviks and representatives of the opposition parties in France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland, actively mediated by French citizens, and personifies this aspect of the development of the world communist movement.

The sino-soviet border conflict in the middle of the XX century

The article is devoted to the analysis of the peculiarities of relations between the USSR and the PRC in the middle of the XX century. The authors analyze the circumstances of the deterioration of relations between the two countries since Nikita Khrushchev assumed leadership of the USSR and the condemnation of the cult of personality of Joseph Stalin. The nature of "cartographic aggression" and "great power chauvinism" is revealed. Besides, typological rhetoric, common and specific features in mutual accusations of the Soviet and Chinese sides are shown. The illegality of the territorial claims of the PRC, the betrayal of socialist ideals by its leadership, attempts to discredit the Soviet Union in the international arena, and the desire to undermine the world communist movement used to be the main theses in the research of the Soviet historians of the 1960s-1980s. It is concluded that the interpretation of Sino-Soviet relations in Soviet historiography was primarily propagandistic and closely related to the state interests of the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict in the Middle of the XX Century

The article is devoted to the analysis of the peculiarities of relations between the USSR and the PRC in the middle of the XX century. In a short historical period, two countries with a similar ideology and political system shifted from relations of friendship and mutual assistance to military-political confrontation, which culminated in the armed conflict on Zhenbao (Damansky) Island in March 1969. A special interest of the Chinese side in good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union at the initial stage of the existence of the PRC (1949-1955) is described. The authors analyze the circumstances of the deterioration of relations between the two countries since Nikita Khrushchev assumed leadership of the USSR and the condemnation of the cult of personality of Joseph Stalin. Special attention is paid to the border issue in the relationship between the two countries. It presents the different views of the PRC and the Soviet Union on the tsarist treaties with China concluded in the second half of the XIX century. Moreover, the problem of ideological confrontation between the Soviet and Chinese leadership is considered; the publications of Soviet historians which assess the actions of the PRC leadership against the Soviet Union are analyzed. The nature of "cartographic aggression" and "great power chauvinism" is revealed. Besides, typological rhetoric, common and specific features in mutual accusations of the Soviet and Chinese sides are shown. The illegality of the territorial claims of the PRC, the betrayal of socialist ideals by its leadership, attempts to discredit the Soviet Union in the international arena, and the desire to undermine the world communist movement used to be the main theses in the research of the Soviet historians of the 1960s-1980s. It is concluded that the interpretation of Sino-Soviet relations in Soviet historiography was primarily propagandistic and closely related to the state interests of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Researchers on the Middle East: Ahead of Their Time

In the mid-1950s-1960s the Soviet Orientalists were facing serious challenges. The collapse of the colonial system, the growth of national liberation movements, the entry of new forces that did not fit into the rigid framework of the Communist ideas about the revolutionary process, demanded realistic explanations of what was happening. The article attempts to consider some breakthrough ideas and assessments of historical events in the Middle East put forward by the Soviet experts. The review is primarily based on the publications of Soviet specialists published in the 1970’s. Among those who studied the new trends and tried to explain their further development were Soviet Arabists. At that time their circle was small. Among those who were engaged in political problems of the Arab world, one can name I.P. Belyaev, E.M. Primakov, G.I. Mirsky, A.M. Vasilyev. They had different backgrounds, but all had managed to form in their studies a fairly complete picture of political trends and state-building in the Arab world. Despite the domination of the official dogmas the leading Soviet researchers were able to present a realistic picture of the region, although their «untimely meditations» were presented in a form acceptable to the Communist ideology.The primitive division of society into the bourgeoisie, the proletariat, peasantry and landlords and the hopes for eventual development of communist parties worldwide both did not reflect the realities in the Third World countries and did not leave room for the Soviet Union there. Due to ideological reasons the USSR could not support nationalist movements abroad. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership passed the first test for the ability to reassess their ideological stereotypes in the early 1950s, when the leaders of the Egyptian revolution turned to the USSR for military assistance. In order to justify the pragmatic choice in favor of supporting the new Arab nationalist leaders, the Soviet scholars developed the concept of three consecutive and co-dependent revolutionary flows: first, the national liberation movement overthrowing the colonial system; second, the world labor movement overthrowing the capitalist system politically; and, third, the world communist movement overthrowing the capitalist system in economic terms.It was also important for the Soviet leaders to explain the orientation of the young decolonized nationalist regimes towards the USSR, without using the argument of just political expediency. Such an explanation was the theory of the non-capitalist path of development or socialist orientation. It posed that capitalism cannot solve any of the problems of developing countries. Their interest in rapid overcoming of backwardness and maintaining national sovereignty cannot be combined with the choice of a capitalist development model. The theory of socialist orientation was based on original ideas of Marxism founders and further developed by Lenin who insisted that economically underdeveloped countries can with the help of the proletariat from advanced countries go directly to socialism bypassing capitalism.The reality of revolutions without the proletariat and the desire to take advantage of the anti-colonial struggle to establish full-scale presence of the USSR in the Middle Eats made the Soviet leadership more tolerant of scientists' attempts to realistically analyze regional trends and developments.For instance, in the Soviet era, politicians were tempted to explain all conflicts in the regions of the Third world, and particularly in the Middle East exclusively by the workings of imperialism. However, Soviet scholars, E.M. Primakov among them, warned in their studies of the dangers of such simplified estimates. Still relevant today also is G. Mirsky’s explanation of the major role the army plays in the politics of the Middle East. He argued that in the traditional societies of the region the army was the only modern, nationwide institution.The works of the Soviet scholars can help better understand contemporary trends. Their studies of driving forces of the revolutions in the Arab world, of the nationalistic regimes, of regional conflicts have not lost their relevance today. They warn the modern generation of researchers against simplistic conclusions, a temptation of politicized assessments and of ignoring the complexity of regional issues.

Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959 by Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia

Reviewed by: Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959 by Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia Olavi Arens Shen, Zhihua, and Yafeng Xia. Mao and the Sino–Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015. The authors provide a well-researched volume on a crucial decade-and-half period in Chinese history that centers on the relationship of Mao Zedong and the Peoples' Republic of China with the Soviet Union. Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, who previously have written extensively on the subject matter, have used both Chinese and Russian archival material for the study and have critically assessed existing western literature on the topic. At Yalta, Stalin obtained concessions from Roosevelt at the expense of China as the price for the Soviets entering the war against Japan. Among the concessions were the Chinese Changchun Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), Dalian (Dairen), and Lüshun (Port Arthur). As a result of joint US and Soviet pressure, the Chinese Nationalist government of Jiang Jieshi was forced to agree to the concessions when it signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (1945). Shortly after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Mao visited Moscow, where he was able to renegotiate with Stalin a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in which Stalin renounced Russia's traditional points of interest in Manchuria. In return, Stalin gained Chinese recognition for the independence of Outer Mongolia. In an interpretation that I have not encountered previously, the authors suggest that Stalin's interest in Korea and his authorization of Kim Il-sung's plan to attack South Korea played a role in Stalin's decision to concede control of Manchuria to China. During the Korean War, Chinese intervention was supported by massive Soviet aid in the forms of military equipment and Soviet air force units to provide air cover [End Page 222] for Chinese forces. The war cemented the Sino-Soviet alliance. However, the figures the authors cite (that the Soviet air force shot down 1,097 enemy planes and that Soviet anti-aircraft downed 212, while Soviet losses amounted to 335 airplanes and 120 pilots) are questionable (p. 87). The heyday of Sino-Soviet cooperation occurred during the early years of Nikita Khrushchev, who was willing in 1954–1958 to aid Chinese economic development in a major way. Soviet aid in credits amounted to $1.3 billion (other sources say $2.65 billion). A major part of the aid was military—through advisers and equipment, the Soviets enabled China to build a navy and an air force. The aid eventually included the initiation of a peaceful nuclear energy program in 1954 that blossomed when Khrushchev agreed to provide aid for a Chinese nuclear weapons program (1957). In 1958, Khrushchev had second thoughts and pulled back the aid. The authors do not see the 1956 Secret Speech by Nikita Khrushchev and Mao's reaction to it as the beginning of the rift between the two nations (Mao said of the speech that Stalin was 30 percent wrong and 70 percent right). Indeed, the Chinese played a role in helping the Soviets pacify Eastern Europe in 1956. Mao was becoming an increasingly important political actor in the world communist movement. The relationship between the two began to deteriorate after the Moscow Conference of 1957. Personality played a role. Mao clearly felt superior in intellect to Khrushchev. Khrushchev was the head of a recognized great power that conducted world diplomacy with the United States and espoused a policy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition with the capitalist countries. Mao's Peoples' Republic of China was still unrecognized by many states, including the United States. Because of China's history of struggle and civil war, Mao saw revolutionary struggle against world capitalism as natural. At this point, Mao foolishly embarked on the Great Leap Forward and the Peoples' Commune Movement, which were advertised as distinctly Chinese shortcuts to communism. The failure of these approaches only embittered Mao toward the Soviets. Foreign policy issues with regard to Taiwan and India exacerbated tensions even further. Mao horrified the Soviets and the East Europeans by nonchalantly dismissing the destructiveness of nuclear war...

Additional evidence on the final break between Moscow and Tirana in 1960-1961

Disagreement between Khrushchev and Enver Hoxha, leaders of the Soviet Union and Albania, had been ripening since the mid-1950s. Until the spring of 1960 the leadership of the small country did not show readiness to challenge the Soviets perceived as the great power at the head of Socialist bloc countries and the world Communist movement. But when the Chinese leadership indicated their disagreements with official Moscow in the spring of 1960, Albania joined them without fearing the inevitability of open confrontation with the Soviets. The article reveals the further course of events in chronological order during the deepening rift between the two leaders and their entourage, and analyses the Soviet decision-making process at the highest level consulting newly-declassified documents from the Russian State Archives of Contemporary History in Moscow. By the end of 1961, within less than two years, relations between the Soviet Union and Albania sank to their lowest. The Soviet leadership, presumably Khrushchev himself, failed in their attempts to stop another growing conflict in the Soviet bloc by discussing controversial issues face to face with the Albanian leadership. Researchers have already accumulated considerable knowledge about these processes, but substantial gaps are yet to be filled. Many relevant Soviet documents from Russian archives are not yet declassified. Nevertheless, the already available ones allow researchers to take a broader look on the developing Soviet-Albanian rift and to establish how, in parallel with the collapse of Soviet-Albanian connections in the early 1960s, Soviet-Yugoslav contacts intensified.

The evolution of the idea of world revolution in Soviet politics (the rise and collapse of the world socialist system)

Turning socialism into a system on a global scale was the Soviet Union’s highest point for policy of a revolutionary renewal of the world. By the mid 1950s the ever mounting difficulties compelled the Soviet leadership to make a turn toward normalcy; i.e. to acquiesce to a partial scrapping of some of their revolutionary doctrines and moving on to a policy of peaceful co-existence with capitalism. Yet, the spiraling of the world-wide socialist system into crisis was picking up. There occurred some loosening of the hegemony of the Soviet Communist Party accompanied by a drastic politico-ideological polarization within the world communist movement. In fact, the course on advancing the world revolutionary process and simultaneously the policy of peaceful co-existence were clashing with each other constantly. By the mid 1980s the race against capitalism had been lost, whereas the effects of western soft power had been steadily growing. Perestroika and glasnost helped free the minds of the masses but did not resolve the crisis of the Soviet system. This opened the way to a series of bourgeois revolutions and the disintegration of the USSR and of the world socialist system.

How the world Communist movement celebrated the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia. On the history of November meetings of the communist parties in 1957

How the world Communist movement celebrated the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia. On the history of November meetings of the communist parties in 1957

И.Г. Старинов и подготовка кадров для «мировой революции» в 1933-1935 гг.

The article analyzes the development of ideas of “world revolution†in Russia, 1917–1935 gg. as a factor determining foreign policy. One of the mechanisms for the implementation of foreign policy during this period was the III Communist international. An important aspect of the military policy of the Comintern was a secret military-political school Karol swierczewski, where he taught I. G. Starinov. Practical training of participants of the world Communist movement in the military sphere is revealed through the teaching of I. G. Starinov. His students will play an important role in military conflicts and national liberation movements of the twentieth century.

THE IV CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ON WAR AND PEACE

Цель. В статье рассматривается проблема войны и мира в документах IV конгресса Коммунистического Интернационала. Этот форум был призван выработать научно-обоснованную стратегию мирового коммунистического движения в условиях завершения становления Версальско-Вашингтонской системы международных отношений. Анализируется не только сложившийся в начале 1920-х годов мировой порядок, но и теоретические и тактические установки IV конгресса по вопросу «империалистических», национально-освободительных, революционных и гражданских войн, а также проблема сохранения мира и создания Соединенных Штатов Европы и Азии. Методологическую основу исследования составляют принципы объективности, историзма, критического подхода к использованным источникам и всестороннего анализа поставленной проблемы. Результаты. В статье прослеживается взаимосвязь теоретических представлений руководства Коминтерна о войне и мире с идеей мировой революции; отмечается, что отказ от нее и поворот «вправо» в решениях IV конгресса связан с внешнеполитическими интересами Советской России; анализируются два различных сценария развития событий, предложенных теоретиками Коммунистического Интернационала. «Правым» лидерам Коминтерна, ориентированным на интеграцию Советской России в мировую экономическую систему, удалось одержать на конгрессе временную победу над «левыми», нацеленными на новое «революционное наступление». Была предпринята попытка сближения с европейской социал-демократией. Выдвинут лозунг «единого фронта». Область применения результатов. Результаты работы могут быть использованы для дальнейших исследований в области истории и политологии, а также в ходе преподавания этих дисциплин в вузе.

The Reinvention of Communism: Politics, History, Globality

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the term communism has returned to the theoretical and historical agenda with a striking force and a surprising novelty. In a wide range of fields of knowledge, the questions of the actuality and the history of the world communist movement, the theoretical tendencies of communist thought, and the current political possibilities of new developments of communism have been revisited and addressed anew. We can only be struck by the degree to which it now seems that communism, far from the dead end of the twentieth century it was long assumed to be, may be something profoundly of the twenty-first century, an idea and field of concepts whose time has come. But what is also striking is the link between this return of communism and its site of return: the field of “critical theory.” What makes this site peculiar and remarkable is that it too has been in a long retreat since the 1980s in the fields of knowledge production. Theory’s impulse toward the politicization of knowledge, the immanent critique of the university, and its inherent globality, the fact that theory has long provided a common language beyond the regime of national language, has been the target of an intense reconquest by institutional neoliberalism, conservative politics, and positivist knowledge work. Yet it is no surprise that the return of the communist idea—and the new developments of revolutionary politics around the world in recent years—should exert a decisive force on the character and function of theory itself. But we ought to also emphasize that this theoretical conjuncture—the historical moment of the emergence of a communist critical theory—corresponds to a real situation of new political significations, a new historical and social sequence.

Autonomy and Ideology: Brezhnev, Ceauşescu and the World Communist Movement

AbstractOne of Leonid Brezhnev's primary goals when he acceded to party leadership in the Soviet Union was to restore Moscow's control over the world communist movement, severely undermined by the Sino-Soviet dispute. Nicolae Ceauşescu of Romania was determined to prevent this, in order to consolidate his country's autonomy in the Communist bloc. The Sino-Soviet dispute offered the political and ideological framework for autonomy, as the Romanian Communists claimed their neutrality in the dispute. This article describes Ceauşescu's efforts to sabotage Brezhnev's attempts to have China condemned by an international meeting of Communist parties between 1967 and 1969. His basic ideological argument was that unity of world communism should have a polycentric meaning.

Is the World Social Forum the Privileged Space for Reinventing Labor as a Global Social Movement?

Th e World Social Forum (WSF), represents a global pressure-cooker of contemporary progressive and emancipatory social movements and ideas. Th is is the case also for the international trade union and labor movements, regardless of their still somewhat marginal position within the WSF. What follows are reflections on such matters, including, eventually, the reasons for distinguishing between ‘progressive’ and ‘emancipatory’, ‘unions’ and ‘labor’ – and for the ‘relative marginality’ of labor and unions at the WSF. A couple of days (daze?) into the simultaneous stimulation and confusion of the 7th World Social Forum, Nairobi, January 20–25, 2007, I had a background item on labor, written prior to the forum, published in the semi-official Forum daily, Terra Viva.1 Th e article suggested a tension between a dominant trade-union tendency, propagating ‘Decent Work’, and a marginal one that I dubbed the ‘Emancipation of Labour’.2 Reading my piece, in cold print, in Nairobi, I had a flashback to the World Festival of Youth and Students, Moscow, 1957, 50 years earlier . . . . . . these festivals were organized by the World Communist movement, of which the International Union of Students was a prominent part. Aged

Sino-Cuban Relations during the Early Years of the Castro Regime, 1959–1966

China's relations with Cuba in the first half of the 1960s—when the Sino-Soviet split was rapidly intensifying—were important to both Beijing and Havana as well as to the world Communist movement. The Sino-Cuban relationship during this period moved from one of intimate comradeship to deterioration and finally a bitter separation. Although Fidel Castro's ties with Mao Zedong survived the immediate start of the Sino-Soviet rift, Castro's dependence on the Soviet Union ultimately doomed his courtship of China. Castro's vehemently anti-Chinese speech in March 1966 marked the end of Sino-Cuban amity. The Sino-Cuban case sheds valuable light on the tensions that bedeviled the international Communist movement after the Sino-Soviet divide flared to the surface.

Mobilisation and Class Struggle: A Reply to Gall

AbstractWhen I began writing Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and Long Waves during the mid-1990s, die leadership of die British trade-union movement had already begun its romance with the class-collaborationist ideology of ‘social partnership’, successor to the ‘new realism’ of the 1980s. The Labour Party leadership was already moving to the right and was well on the road to consummating its marriage with neoliberalism, epitomised most starkly by Tony Blair's positive endorsement of two decades of Conservative anti-trade-union law. What remained of the world Communist movement was still reeling from the earth-shattering events of 1989. These developments exerted a growing influence amongst the intellectual community which studies ‘industrial relations’ (employment relations might now be a more appropriate term). Both in Britain and the US, the intellectual agenda shifted towards labour flexibility and competitiveness, variously represented in the literature as the study of labour-management ‘co-operation’, ‘social partnership’ or ‘human resource management1. Rethinking Industrial Relations was a re-assertion of the continuing relevance of Marxist theory at a time when it had become distinctly unfashionable, and it is fitting that the extended review in a recent issue of this journal should have been written by another Marxist active in the field of industrial relations.

Earl Browder: The Failure of American Communism

Normal 0 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Earl Browder, the preeminent 20th-century Communist party leader in the United States, steered the CPUSA through the critical years of the Great Depression and World War II. A Kansas native and veteran of numerous radical movements, he was peculiarly fitted by circumstance and temperament to head the cause during its heyday.Serving as a bridge between American Communism s secret and public worlds, Browder did more than anyone to attempt to explain the Soviet Union s shifting policies to the American people in a way that would serve the interests of the CPUSA. A proud and loyal follower of Joseph Stalin, Browder nevertheless sought to move the party into the U.S. political mainstream. He used his knowledge of domestic politics to persuade the Communist International to modify Popular Front (1935-1939) tactics for the United States.Despite his rise in the hierarchy, he possessed an independent streak that ultimately proved his undoing. Imprisonment as he neared age 50 left permanent psychological damage. After being released with the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Browder lost his perspective and began entertaining delusions of grandeur about his status in American politics and in the world Communist movement. Still, he could never quite bring legitimacy to the CPUSA because he lacked the vision and moral courage to separate himself totally from the Soviet Union. Ryan concludes that Browder was not so much insincere as deluded. His failure contributed to the demise of the popularity of the Communist party in the United States.In preparation for this book, the author consulted the Browder Papers at Syracuse University and U.S. Government documents, particularly the F.B.I. files. In addition, he traveled to Russia for research in the Soviet Archives when recently opened to Western scholars, including the records of the former Communist International and a collection of American Communist party files, 1919-1944, shipped secretly to Moscow long ago. Indeed, until 1992, the existence of the CPUSA collection was only rumored.

Heinz Timmermann. The Decline of the World Communist Movement: Moscow, Beijing, and Communist Parties in the West. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. xix, 275 pp. $32.50 (paper).

Heinz Timmermann. The Decline of the World Communist Movement: Moscow, Beijing, and Communist Parties in the West. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. xix, 275 pp. $32.50 (paper).