World Bank Inspection Panel Research Articles

World Bank Inspection Panel Recommends Investigation of Harm Caused by the Nachtigal Hydropower Project in Cameroon

World Bank Inspection Panel Recommends Investigation of Harm Caused by the Nachtigal Hydropower Project in Cameroon

Mediation as an Improvement to the World Bank Inspection Panel

An analysis of how the introduction of mediation to the World Bank Inspection Panel process may improve accountability. The analysis of the Panel process sheds light on the formality of procedure which inhibits accessibility and the lack of involvement of the Panel at the Post- Investigation stage. The Panel faces various criticisms relating to independence, accessibility and remedy. Mediation at the Post-Investigation stage will provide a solution to the lack of involvement of the Panel at the remedy stage and avoids undermining the Grievance Redress System of the World Bank. The mediation process is best facilitated by the Panel who can appoint mediators subject to approval of all parties. However, the Panel’s lack of independence may inhibit it from providing binding accountability to end-users as the Bank has control over the establishment of any dispute resolution body.

WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: RESPONSABILITÀ E APPRENDIMENTO

l'Inspection Panel della Banca Mondiale è stato il primo meccanismo indipendente (IAM) finalizzato a ricevere denunce da parte di persone che lamentavano un danno derivante dalla potenziale mancanza di sostegno alle politiche e alle procedure delle istituzioni finanziarie internazionali. Dal 1993 il Panel ha trattato denunce riguardanti i progetti della Banca Mondiale su richiesta delle comunità interessate e ha contribuito a porre rimedio ai relativi danni. l'articolo descrive dettagliatamente questi risultati, con particolare riguardo all' "apprendimento istituzionale", soffermandosi inoltre sulla collana Emerging Lessons Series del Panel stesso, una serie di pubblicazioni recenti che riassumono le esperienze derivanti da casi relativi a: reinsediamento involontario, popolazioni indigene, valutazione ambientale, consultazione e divulgazione. l'articolo si conclude con una discussione dei recenti miglioramenti apportati all'attività del Panel, sottolineando il suo ruolo nel promuovere comportamenti responsabili attraverso le procedure operative adottate e il successivo "apprendimento istituzionale".

Beyond Accountability? Human Rights, Global Governance, and the World Bank Inspection Panel

This paper seeks to move beyond the usual accountability framework of human rights law, focusing on one case of the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP) to consider other aspects of the relationship between human rights and international organisations in global governance. In particular, the paper makes two novel analytical moves. First, it conceptualises international organisations such as the WBIP as complex assemblages comprising diverse elements, thereby drawing attention to the manifold practices that connect the innumerable actors involved in constructing, processing, and contesting a WBIP complaint. Second, the paper widens the frame to examine the dynamics of authority at play between the various actors in a WBIP case. In this perspective, human rights appear not so much as a fixed set of standards against which WBIP seeks to hold the World Bank accountable for its actions, but rather as one among a number of vocabularies of authority deployed by the sundry entities in a range of complex interactions. As such, human rights are continually constructed, defined, and distinguished from other modes of discourse and practice in the making (and unmaking) of global governance.

Disequilibrium in Development Finance: The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel

ABSTRACTThis article examines the dynamic nature with which independent accountability mechanisms operate. Focusing on the World Bank, the authors argue that its Inspection Panel evolves according to internal and external pressures. In seeking to achieve equilibrium, and protect its authority and independence, the Panel has gone through several distinct phases: negotiation, emergence, protracted resistance, assertion of independence and authority, renewed tension, and contestation. The core novelty of the article is its application of concepts from outside the field of development studies — notably institutional accountability from the governance literature, and judicialization from the legal studies literature — to the topic of the Inspection Panel. Examining the Panel in this way demonstrates that accountability mechanisms represent a hybrid of transnational governance influenced by a range of actors including project‐affected peoples, national governments, managers and development donors. Accountability in development finance is about competing interests as well as competing conceptions and expectations of accountability. In such a complex and multi‐scalar system, the Panel is not only concerned with delivering well‐researched investigation reports; it is also an entity seeking to ensure its own survival, as well as an arbiter of its own brand of legitimacy and accountability.

Cooperative or Inoperative? Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel

The World Bank remains the largest international financial institution in the world. This case study examines the effectiveness of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel. The Inspection Panel makes it possible for citizens and communities to challenge World Bank projects through an independently administered accountability process. Between 1994 and 2016, the World Bank Inspection Panel has received 112 requests for inspection across more than 50 countries. This case study analyzes the history, dynamics, benefits, and barriers to the Inspection Panel, including an assessment of World Bank projects spread across Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Cameroon, Chad, China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, India, Kenya, Lesotho, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Tibet, Togo, and Uzbekistan. On doing so, this case study highlights how Inspection Panels like the one operating at the World Bank can improve and enhance governance outcomes and result in more equitable decision-making processes. Yet there are also limits to what such independent accountability mechanisms can accomplish.

Monitoring the moneylenders: Institutional accountability and environmental governance at the World Bank’s Inspection Panel

This article discusses how Independent Accountability Mechanisms (IAMs) such as an Inspection Panel have the potential to improve both the legitimacy and environmental governance of multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank. The World Bank provides loans and credit to developing countries to stimulate social and economic development in an attempt to alleviate poverty, often investing in infrastructure projects such as pipelines, power plants, and oil and gas fields. With billions in annual lending, the World Bank is the largest international financial institution in the world. Between 1994, when it started operations, and June 2015, the World Bank Inspection Panel received 103 requests for inspection across more than 50 countries that resulted in 34 approved investigations. Based on a qualitative case study methodology, the study finds that institutional accountability has inherent value in improving the internal governance of an institution—in this case the World Bank—and its ability to achieve development and sustainability goals. Yet to be effective, such governance needs steered by committed and independent leaders on all sides, and there are limits to what IAMs such as the IP can accomplish. Understanding the internal dynamics, processes, and accountability mechanisms of the World Bank offers a rare chance to test the efficacy of institutional accountability in practice. Moreover, this study shows how attributes reflecting independence, impartiality, transparency, professionalism, accessibility, and responsiveness are crucial to improving governance outcomes and more equitable decision-making processes—themes highly relevant to public policy and development studies as well as environmental governance and the extractive industries.

EU accountability for the due diligence failures of the European Investment Bank: climate finance and involuntary resettlement in Olkaria, Kenya

A human rights impact assessment of a resettlement measure was conducted as part the ClimAccount research project.(1) The assessment looked specifically at the extraterritorial human rights obligations of the European Union in relation to its climate policies. The case in point was the resettlement of four Maasai communities due to the construction of a geothermal power plant, Olkaria IV, one of a number of large-scale renewable energy projects in Kenya. Olkaria IV was financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) amongst others. The subsequent resettlement was investigated by the EIB's institutional complaint mechanism and the World Bank's Inspection Panel. The alleged human rights violations, which can partly be attributed to due diligence failures of the EIB and the other co-financiers, are analysed. The analysis includes a discussion of the delegation of due diligence obligations between the co-financers and whether this was in accordance with human rights law. Finally, the article explores the legal basis for holding the EIB and its shareholders, the EU and its member states, accountable. Strategies to improve EIB's human rights performance are proposed.

Accountability in International Organizations: the case of World Bank Inspection Panel (1993-2015)

This paper argues that the concept of social accountability can be useful to explain the transparency and accountability policies adopted by international organizations (IOs). Social accountability is understood as the contributions of civil society actors in the functioning of IOs. In international politics, the recent development of IOs' accountability mechanisms has been challenged by the absence of a world government and the impact of inter-state power relations on the decision-making process of international organizations. The presence of civil society actors can reduce the gap between international organizations and citizens affected by their activities. This article resorts to a specific case study: the World Bank Inspection Panel. The analysis revealed the role of civil society actors in the creation, operation and outcomes of this institution. This analysis shows that the concept of social accountability can be adequate to explain not only the Inspection Panel, but other mechanisms recently developed by international organizations.

What's in a name? The politics of naming ethnic groups in Kenya's Cherangany Hills

ABSTRACTThis article analyses the politics of names and naming among the Sengwer–Cherangany community from Kenya's Cherangany Hills. Two requests submitted to the World Bank Inspection Panel (WBIP) by Sengwer and Cherangany leaders in 2013 in protest of alleged harms that resulted from a World Bank supported National Resources Management Project are the focus of the analysis. The requests articulated a dispute as to whether ‘locals’ were ‘indigenous peoples’, or ‘vulnerable and marginalised groups’, and whether they should be called ‘Sengwer’ or ‘Cherangany’. The struggle that ensued illustrates the local and extraversion strategies that are deployed to assert rights over cultural, socio-economic, ecological and political space through an insistence upon a specific ethnic label or brand. The case illustrates the extent to which names are imbued with cultural and legal meaning, and used to help legitimise certain engagements and interventions while delegitimising others. The analysis also highlights how bodies such as the WBIP can be used to protect and promote community interests through their recommendations and the production of ‘authoritative’ accounts or documentary archives.

Implementing Environmental Treaty Obligations in Project Finance Activities through an Accountability Mechanism: An Analysis of the World Bank Inspection Panel

The establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel is a crucial development in handling the negative social and environmental impacts of Bank-financed projects. It allows affected people to seek redress for the harms resulting from projects, by questioning the legitimacy of the Bank's lending decisions. The Panel has the mandate to examine whether the Bank has complied with its own safeguard policies in specific projects. Even though the substantive rules applicable in the Panel's investigation process (ie, the World Bank's Operational Policies and Bank Procedures) refer to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); the Panel has considered the borrowers' environmental treaty commitments extensively in its investigations on a few occasions. This paper examines the extent to which the World Bank Inspection Panel—as an accountability mechanism—has employed different MEAs to address environmental issues resulting from Bank-funded projects, thereby ensuring compliance with environmental treaty obligations in project finance activities.

Accountability in Global Governance: Civil Society Claims for Environmental Performance at the World Bank

International organizations frequently lack accountability to both states and civil society groups. States often face difficulties monitoring the actions of international organizations. Civil society groups do not often enjoy direct influence over decision-making within international organizations. To address these challenges, states have created accountability mechanisms for international organizations. Accountability mechanisms allow civil society groups to submit complaints about the performance of international organizations. They take the form of ombudsmen offices, accountability panels, and complaint procedures. Little is known about when and why these mechanisms constrain behavior by international organizations that runs counter to the mutual interests of states and civil society groups. Using the World Bank Inspection Panel as a test case, I show that monitoring by civil society groups alters lending at the World Bank when it enhances oversight by powerful states. By combining their abilities in sanctioning and monitoring, states and civil society groups can promote accountability at international organizations.

A Wall that Protect Internal Ends

Despite recent changes in practices, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) are failing to fulfil its duty to promote Accountability and Transparency. Here we examined the practices of three mechanisms, namely, the World Bank Inspection Panel, The Compliance Advisory Ombudsman of the International Finance Corporation and the Asian Development Bank Accountability Mechanism. To this end, it was analysed the claims heard by those institutions in Chile and Colombia. It was found that the growth and evolution of accountability mechanism in IFIs is characterised by a growing accumulation of power at the Institutional level as well as at different internal levels such as Management. The solution proposed in this paper as a crucial step to build strong accountability in IFIs is to encourage more independence of these mechanisms as well as to promote the development of a serious attitude of IFIs towards institutional reflexivity.

Generating power: debates on development around the Nepalese Arun-3 hydropower project

Contested since 1990, the Arun-3 dam in Nepal has so far generated more heat than hydropower involving a host of complex negotiations between its advocates and critics on the local, national and transnational levels. Cancelled after a complaint before the World Bank Inspection Panel in 1995, work is soon to be resumed. An Indian public sector company interested in exporting the electricity to India will finance it. This paper focuses on how local communities have experienced the decade-long uncertainties concerning the project and the approach road to be built. Their hopes of access to markets, electrification and a modern lifestyle will be explored in the context of an understanding of development as a desiring machine and governmentality studies. I will argue for a parallel application of the two approaches to conceptualize the entanglement of desires for development and a deep sense of local powerlessness vis-a-vis external actors.

A. Naudé Fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight. In Search of the “Judicial Spirit” in Public International Law

A. Naudé Fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight. In Search of the “Judicial Spirit” in Public International Law

Designing accountability, international economic organisations and the World Bank's Inspection Panel

Over the last two decades, demands for greater international economic organisation (IEO) accountability have been both prominent and vitriolic. This article demonstrates how an influential IEO, the World Bank, took up concerns of its lack of accountability through creating the Inspection Panel in 1993, in response to civil society pressures and member state demands. Drawing loosely on John Campbell's argument that ideas operating in the ‘foreground’ and ‘background’ influence policy decisions, it traces how the idea of external accountability gained strength, leading to the Inspection Panel's emergence. This contrasts with competing rational design explanations that derive 16 conjectures to explain why states design the institutions they do. The article proceeds in four parts: first, the basis for examining IEO and World Bank accountability is outlined, before detailing how a rational design argument would apply to the establishment of the Inspection Panel. A constructivist account of how ideas of accountability emerged and shaped the policy formation process is then provided, which establishes a comprehensive explanation of how and why the Inspection Panel was created the way it was and not otherwise. The conclusion then reflects on the importance of the formation of external accountability mechanisms for IEOs and of ideas in shaping international institutions.

The MDGs Archeology, Institutional Fragmentation and International Law: Human Rights, International Environmental and Sustainable (Development) Law

Why have we not done better, given that the MDGs have been part of human rights law for six decades? This essay points to the fragmented nature of the international institutional framework - or international governance structure - as a factor that has contributed to our failure. This fragmented institutional setting has led to a fragmented approach to international law. Finally, this essay considers how international law, despite its fragmented nature, might further the integrated approach evident from the MDGs. It suggests that by developing procedures such as the World Bank Inspection Panel and the Aarhus Compliance Mechanisms integrated approaches to the application of international can be developed by enabling the law to be applied in context.

Democratizing Global Governance? Non-State Participation in the World Bank Inspection Panel and NAFTA

This article discusses the role non-state actors may play in the democratization of global governance. It is argued that the nature of international power in a globalizing world requires a redefinition of democracy that is more expansive than the traditional notion of electoral representative democracy. Within this context, non-state actors can play important roles in democratizing global governance because they can potentially represent a range of interests in ways that transcend national boundaries. Two case studies are considered: the World Bank Inspection Panel and non-state participation under NAFTA. These case studies demonstrate that while non-state participation can lead to more democratic governance, it can also lead to governance that is less democratic, particularly if corporate actors are allowed to dominate or if important stakeholders are excluded. While the participation of non-state actors in global governance is potentially problematic, the development and implementation of an appropriate policy framework could help to mitigate the potential risks of non-state actor involvement in international affairs. Framing the participation of non-states within the context of democracy is therefore important. Since democratic values are widely supported by powerful policy makers, understanding the participation of non-state actors within the context of democracy would lend support to government reforms to empower civil society actors in ways that could lead to more representative decision-making at the international level.

Making Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need for Reform

The Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is the first global market mechanism in international environmental law. It has been much lauded for its success. However, doubts whether the CDM governance structure is robust enough to meet the challenges of regulating an international market mechanism in the long term are emerging. The Executive Board (EB)’s decision-making practice is often not predictable and many of its decisions have come as a surprise to project participants and technical project experts. Members of the EB often have multiple responsibilities which result in a complicated situation of conflicting interests. Finally, private sector participants in the CDM who have been aversely affected by EB decisions have no right of recourse and essentially little if any due process rights. This article argues that incorporating mechanisms to promote procedural fairness and creating an appeals process for aggrieved CDM participants will promote transparency and accountability in the CDM decision-making processes. This is essential for the sound operation of the CDM regulatory regime which will have a direct positive effect on the international carbon market. After conducting a comparative analysis of other regimes in which international bodies take decisions that directly affect individuals, most notably the system of targeted sanctions of the UN Security Council and the Anti-Doping Regime, as well as examining the World Bank Inspection Panel and the European Ombudsman as models of international review mechanisms, the authors set out proposals for reform of the CDM, including professionalizing the EB and the panels, securing better and more consistent funding, the elimination of political interference, and the introduction of administrative law-like processes.

Problems in Connection with the Efficiency of the World Bank Inspection Panel

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