Representatives Of Working Class Research Articles

Composition of the Lithuanian Komsomol in June 1940–June 1941

The Lithuanian Leninist Young Communist League (LLKJS) in Lithuania occupied by the Soviet Union was a political structure of the occupation regime, which provided a reserve and assistance to the ruling Communist Party and actively participated in the Sovietisation of the country and indoctrination of the youth in the spirit of Communism. In October 1940, the league was incorporated into the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League (VLKSM) and integrated to the USSR political system. Its aims were to extend the social base of the Communist Party, to exert political influence on youth, and to make the youth serve the occupation policy. With an aim of gaining social support and political influence among the youth, the Communist Party promoted the Komsomol. In summer 1940, fast and uncontrolled growth of its ranks was stimulated. In February 1941, LLKJS raised for itself a goal of making it into a massive organisation capable of embracing and exerting political control over youth. In order to improve the image of the Komsomol and to make its ethnic composition reflect that of Lithuania, joining the LLKJS was particularly promoted among workers, peasants, schoolchildren, Lithuanians, and Poles of Vilnius region. Between November 1940 and May 1941, a campaign of issuing the LLKJS certificates to its members took place, which was a cleansing campaign of the Komsomol on the basis of social and political criteria. This campaign was aimed at integrating the LLKJS into the VLKSM through the process of socio-political validation of its members and exclusion of those members, who were socially and politically hostile or unreliable to the occupation authorities. The campaign helped transform the LLKJS and make its composition similar to that of the VLKSM, and also make LLKJS a political structure, which complied with the needs of the occupation authorities and on which they could rely. Over a period of one year of the Soviet occupation, the ranks of the LLKJS increased 13-fold. Due to the political situation and wish to survive under the occupation, young people of various social groups and nationalities joined the LLKJS. Most of them chose cooperation with the Soviet regime and adaptation to its policies deliberately, others joined the ranks looking for employment or career opportunities, and yet others – seeking better learning conditions or being forced by other circumstances. Cleansing of the ranks of the Komsomol and regulation of its composition changed the social structure of the organisation. The majority of the members of the Komsomol were representatives of working class, peasants and Soviet officials who constituted the social backbone for the Communist Party. People of various nationalities joined the Komsomol. Initially, young people of certain ethnic groups, particularly Jews, actively joined the LLKJS. Later, in order to improve the image of the LLKJS and bring its ethnic composition to that of Lithuania, recruitment of Lithuanians into its ranks was particularly promoted. Although efforts were made for the LLKJS to grow, it did not become a mass organisation and its ranks remained sparse. It was a weak and non-influential political structure, unable to penetrate the youth and win them over. The attempts of the Komsomol to involve young people in the Sovietisation processes and to instil in them the Communist ideology was ineffective. Many young people were opposed to the occupation regime and its political structures. The spirit of opposition to the Soviet occupation was therefore active among the youth and resistance against it was imminent.

THE CONSTRUCTS OF MASCULINITY IN THE CULTURE OF RUSSIAN WORKING-CLASS YOUTH

Purpose: The study is aimed to research the means and patterns of masculinity constructing in the working-class culture of modern Russia. Both the practices of producing its multiple forms in daily interaction and the stable structures of social inequality, which consolidate gender order at the institutional level, have been considered. The article also provides an analytical review of current studies of the working-class masculinity regimes in post-industrial societies.
 Methodology: The empirical base of the research is represented by the mass survey of 1534 respondents living in the Ural Federal District of Russia. The participants were working-class young people aged 16 to 29 years and occupied in the field of industry, technical maintenance, and customer service. The processing of research results was carried out using a statistical package IBM SPSS Statistics Version 20.
 Main Findings: It was found that the remaining structural disproportion between sectors of the economy in the level of remuneration and the gender composition of workers determines translation and reproduction of the male breadwinner pattern that has power in the family on the basis of control over economic resources.
 Applications of this study: The results of the study can be used in the teaching of sociology, gender studies, and cultural studies; it can also be applied by local policymakers while developing social policy programs targeted on the regarded social group.
 Novelty/Originality of this study: In the current research we have examined a specific group at the intersection of three stratification features: social class (the working class representatives), gender (men’s and women’s view of the masculine construct) and age (the youth of three age cohorts). The attention was paid both to the cultural production of multiple forms of masculinity and to the continued dominance of social inequality and suppression’ structures.

Blue collars striking the Red Flag: formal and descriptive representation of the working class in the Belgian House of Representatives 1946–2007

In this article the effect of ideological changes in political parties (catch-all process) and in their recruitment patterns (professionalization) on the party affiliation of working-class politicians is investigated in Belgium, both for Members of Parliament (MPs) and for candidates. The disappearance of the link between the working class and social-democratic parties due to enlargement of the parties’ focus coincides with a decline in formal and descriptive representatives of that class in such parties. This could be problematic for the substantive representation of working-class interests. The relatively high number of working-class representatives in extreme right parties do not necessarily defend all working-class interests.