During and after the 1982 Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas, several British pronouncements seem to have resulted from the perverse persuasiveness of the assumption that Argentina had always had a warlike approach to the conflict. Mrs Thatcher publicly argued, during an interview on BBC's Panorama as well as in the House of Commons, that signals from Argentina had always been warlike, even while negotiations had been cordial and successful. In a private communication with the author Mr Healey said he regarded Argentine behaviour in 1976 and after as warlike. In recent articles in The Guardian' Martin Walker stated that President Peron had ordered a march on the islands on 12 August 1948 and that events in 1966 would be regarded as warlike and serious. The disclosure of documents under the thirty-year rule also led to a reconstruction of events and words of 1951-2 which presents Peron as belligerent then. Lord Shackleton regarded the 1976 incidents as warlike. Finally, the Franks report has failed to analyse Argentine politics adequately, in spite of the unprecedented range of information at the disposal of the committee. Contrary, however, to this apparently prevalent British assumption, contemplation of the use of force has not been a permanent feature of the approach of the various very different Argentine political regimes to the dispute in the South Atlantic. The consequence of this mistaken assumption was an inability to notice the crucial differences between the signals coming from Buenos Aires early in 1982 and those of earlier years. Formal notes protesting at Britain's occupation of the islands were a constant feature of Argentine foreign policy even in the nineteenth century. The landowners who ruled Argentina between 1860 and 1916 were most concerned with nineteenth century notions of progress in their scarcely populated state (1 million according to the 1860 census); their highest priorities were immigration, railway building by the state, port building and dredging, setting up an army in undisputed control, pushing back and exterminating the Indians and financing mandatory primary education. Britain's position as Argentina's most important trading partner and provider of credit meant that the latter's claim to the islands was asserted only by means of protest notes, which were loftily ignored by the British Foreign Office. After 1916, however, the advent of wider franchise and improved-but not perfect-democratic practices, led to a variety of publications from many sources, some of them as well researched as Julius Goebel's The struggle for the Falkland Islands, in particular that by Groussac, covering most aspects of the Argentine claim and the dispute.2
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