Western Solidarity Research Articles

‘Rojava’: Evolving Public Discourse of Kurdish Identity and Governance in Syria

Abstract The Syrian conflict has contributed to major debates in culture, media and politics around transitions linked to borders, ethnicity and identity. Against this backdrop, this article explores the use of ‘Rojava’, a keyword referring to Kurdish-majority areas in the country. It examines the term’s changing meanings and usage against the evolving backdrop of the governance project led by Kurds since the post-2011 power vacuum in North(eastern) Syria. The article identifies how the term has been both operationalized and later abandoned and replaced by other nomenclature while highlighting the implications of these changes on public and political discourse. The term ‘Rojava’ traces its origins to the context of (pan-)Kurdish nationalism, with its literal meaning of ‘western’ (Kurdistan) implying a notion of trans-border Kurdish identity. From this point of departure, the author considers how it has been popularized in anarchist and Western solidarity circles as well as through international media in expressions such as the ‘Rojava experiment’ and ‘Rojava Revolution’. The article unpacks how it has become shorthand in Western media for an ideology of women’s liberation and leftist grassroots governance, as well as considering the term’s less favorable reception in the Arab press, where the word ‘Rojava’ itself is treated as a foreign, and sometimes threatening, concept. Finally, the article presents how from 2016 the Kurdish-led authorities in this region of Syria sought to formally distance themselves from the term they had introduced. This change was due to realpolitik imperatives to re-brand their governance project under the ‘Syrian Democratic’ banner when incorporating non-Kurdish-majority territories (Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor and Menbij). In the context of its official abandonment, the term has nonetheless retained currency in the media as well as popular everyday contexts among Kurds on street level.

The West Papuan liberation movement, Indonesian settler colonialism and Western imperialism from an international solidarity perspective

ABSTRACT Getting solidarity right, as West Papuans struggle against a colonial genocide, is crucial. Distilling a non-Papuan UK citizen’s experience of several years working with the West Papuan liberation movement, this article offers a historical, anti-imperialist framework for thought and action in solidarity with West Papua. Counter-posing its approach to the depoliticised framework of leading Western human rights organisations, the article places three terrains of the struggle – the Indonesian settler colonial state, the West Papuan liberation movement, and Western solidarity networks – in a global historical perspective, examining the dynamic interactions between them in order to unravel the ties that bind the Indonesian state to West Papua. The collaborations and connections between Indonesian elites and dominant Western sections are counter-posed to the possibility of an alliance between West Papuans and poorer Indonesians – but only if Western solidarity organisers are attentive to the role Western (neo)imperialism plays in structurally determining the genocidal form Indonesia’s colonisation takes.

Mountains of Memories: “Visibilizing” Solidarity and Multivocality in Central American Women’sEncuentros

Postwar encuentros from women in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala reveal important tactics for building and maintaining solidarity across national, economic, and sexual borders. Encuentros are a genre of conferences and their proceedings where the values and methods of organizations are discussed, debated, and developed. Specifically, I argue that postwar encuentros from the Central American women’s group Las Dignas successfully document women’s critical commitment to achieving revolutionary goals without vertical leadership styles or androcentrism, and they model multivocal horizontal feminist practices in the early stages of organizing a women’s movement. At the same time, encuentros craft innovative, heterogeneous testimonials that have yet to be assessed for their literary significance. Their egalitarian textual practices permit sustained and fruitful dissent, which has helped them overcome regional, ideological, and classist barriers between members, and, through a rhetoric of visibilizar (to visibilize or make visible), they challenge the literal disappearances and gendered erasure of the revolutions. Even though they lack the international readership of the testimonio, with which they can be contrasted in terms of authorial mediation, circulation, popularity, narrative structure, and critical reception, late twentieth-century feminist encuentros are critical for understanding the importance of women’s organizing in Central America. Additionally, although research about “Central American feminist solidarity” typically focuses on Western solidarity with this region, not on these women’s own strategies of engaging each other across national boundaries, encuentros model critical and instructive innovations in feminist testimony and the praxis of solidarity.

UKRAINE AMIDST THE WAR: MAIN IMPLICATIONS

This paper explores the challenges that Ukraine faces during the Russian invasion, focusing on the political and economic implications of the war. Apart from the humanitarian crisis, the war has produced political, economic, and social tribulations, which must be addressed. The more stubborn the Ukrainian resistance becomes, the more likely Russia will implement more aggressive tactics. Ukraine has already acknowledged its inability to join the transatlantic alliance, and recent peace talks with Russia have become more realistic and plausible for its future. Early planning of post-war recovery gained significance against this backdrop, as it proved to be successful when led by ‘indigenous drivers’. While this approach placed local actors, institutions, and resources at its center, it also recognized the crucial role of external aid. This paper argues that the war is a 'resilience test' for European solidarity and the EU’s crisis management competency. This paper inquires into the challenges of Ukraine’s post-war recovery and concludes that national consolidation, along with Western solidarity, is critical to addressing the ‘Russian problem’ of Ukraine.

Stumbling among Giants: Europe's Frustrated Solidarity with Guatemala, 1979–1996

In the 1980s, Central America became the Cold War's centre stage as Western solidarity committees rushed to shine a global spotlight on the region's revolutionary movements. Drawing on archival research and activist testimony, this article explores the uncharted European solidarity movement with Guatemala (1979–1996) and its transnational structural weaknesses. Additionally, this contribution aims to revisit recent transnational approaches to solidarity movements that highlight the purposive role of actors of the Global South in generating and shaping solidarity. Instead, it argues that restricted political spaces severely constrained Guatemalan agency domestically, affecting the strategies and tactics deployed on the international front.

Different Approaches to Russia: The German–American–Russian Strategic Triangle

Russia has been both a divisive and a unifying force in the German–American relationship. It has been the focal point in this relationship since the end of World War II. During the cold war, the Soviet threat held Washington and Bonn together despite some important divergences in interests and policies. During the 1950s Adenauer's ‘policy of strength’ emphasised western solidarity and a strong military approach based on NATO and the European Community (EC), reinforced by the stationing of over 200,000 American military personnel in West Germany and West Berlin. Adenauer believed this policy of western solidarity would allow West Germany to draw East Germany (DDR) toward unification through the magnetism of western economic success combined with its military resolve. A corollary to this was the Hallstein Doctrine which barred the Federal Republic from having diplomatic relations with any country which recognised the DDR.

The Geopolitics of the ‘Future Return’: Britain's Century-Long Challenges to Norway's Control over the Spitsbergen Archipelago

ABSTRACTWithin the context of Arctic geopolitics, the article focuses on British policies toward Spitsbergen or Svalbard over the past century. The 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty accorded Norway sovereignty over the archipelago, but it gave other signatories, including Britain, non-discriminatory access to its natural resources. It is argued that while geopolitical interests have played a role in Britain's policy-making, its main rationale has been a determination to use international law to protect pre-existing mining rights and potential future oil rights in the Svalbard area. Apart from Russia, Britain has been most active in challenging Norway's interpretation of its sovereign rights, especially the view about the treaty's non-applicability to Exclusive Economic Zones and continental shelves. It is shown that the Britain's economic focus was tempered during the Cold War by the need for Western solidarity and for supporting Norway's resistance to Soviet Spitsbergen claims. But having been instrumental in watering down Norway's sovereignty provisions in the negotiations on the Spitsbergen Treaty, Britain has never been prepared to abandon its interpretation of the treaty's stipulations on natural resources and equal access to the archipelago's maritime areas.

Western solidarity with Pussy Riot and the Twittering of cosmopolitan selves

AbstractThis article aims to explain the widespread attention to contemporary protesting artists among Western audiences by focusing on the case of Pussy Riot. Social movement scholarship provides a first step into understanding how Pussy Riot legitimately protests Russian politics through its punk performances. It then turns to the concept of cosmopolitanism as a performance in everyday life to explain Pussy Riot's appeal among Western audiences. By collecting and analyzing 9001 tweets through a thematic hashtag analysis and topic modeling, this article analyzes how audiences talk about Pussy Riot and shows how Twitter affords users to perform cosmopolitan selves by sharing their ideas and experiences on Pussy Riot with others. Although we distinguish between four types of cosmopolitan selves, the results clearly show Pussy Riot is mainly reflected upon in a media context: Twitter users predominantly talk about Pussy Riot's media appearances rather than readily engage with its explicit political advocacy.

The Transnational Scope of Western Labour's Solidarity with Solidarność

Western solidarity with Solidarność had a surprisingly limited transnational scope. It was mainly organized within particular nation states and coloured by domestic factors. If there was international collaboration, this was mainly bilateral with Poland, and not multilateral between different Western countries. International organizations involved in the solidarity campaign, such as the ICFTU, the WCL, and the ILO, could hardly break open borders within the Atlantic world (see abbreviations at the end). The limited transnational character of the solidarity with Solidarność is in contrast with the scope of other social movements focusing on an international issue. The anti-apartheid movement, for instance, has even been called a key factor in the development of present-day global politics. Two possible reasons for this contrast are explored. A first major difference is that anti-apartheid was a grassroots movement, while solidarity with Poland was coordinated by old social movements, such as Church organizations, and, especially, trade unions. The article argues, however, that this hardly accounts for the different transnational scope. A much more important explanation is the fact that anti-apartheid, focusing on the South, did not cause much controversy, while solidarity, focusing on the East, interfered with Western trade unions' programmes and contacts. As a consequence, the amount and nature of support for Solidarność differed between the different countries. The same applies other East–West movements, such as the peace movement.

The Limits of Alliance: Cold War Solidarity and Canadian Wheat Exports to China, 1950–1963

Abstract Although Canada was a committed member of the western alliance and publically supported Washington, DC’s efforts to isolate communist China, Ottawa embarked on large-scale wheat sales to Beijing in the late 1950s in the face of sustained US opposition. Drawing on a broad range of archival records, this paper explores the three main factors that encouraged the Canadian government in this course: growing doubts about the wisdom of isolating communist China; mounting anger at Washington, DC’s use of subsidized wheat sales to capture traditional Canadian markets; and a surging sense of Canadian nationalism that sought a distinct role for Canada on the world stage. Clearly, as was so often the case in postwar Canadian foreign economic policy, a narrowly defined national interest easily trumped the ideological pressures of western solidarity.

The Limits of Alliance: Cold War Solidarity and Canadian Wheat Exports to China, 1950-1963

Although Canada was a committed member of the western alliance and publically supported Washington, DC's efforts to isolate communist China, Ottawa embarked on large-scale wheat sales to Beijing in the late 1950s in the face of sustained US opposition. Drawing on a broad range of archival records, this paper explores the three main factors that encouraged the Canadian government in this course: growing doubts about the wisdom of isolating communist China; mounting anger at Washington, DC's use of subsidized wheat sales to capture traditional Canadian markets; and a surging sense of Canadian nationalism that sought a distinct role for Canada on the world stage. Clearly, as was so often the case in postwar Canadian foreign economic policy, a narrowly defined national interest easily trumped the ideological pressures of western solidarity.

Restructuring in an enlarged Europe: challenges and experiences

This article presents historical and aggregate data on restructuring in central and eastern Europe, and some examples from multinationals in Poland and Hungary. It shows how the violent structural readjustment process of the 1990s has left important social, political and psychological legacies which affect current approaches to restructuring. The new EU Member States, faced with relocations both to the west (in capital-intensive industries) and further east (in low-skill labour-intensive industries), therefore need employee participation mechanisms, cross-border information and western solidarity to ensure the social acceptability of change.

The Further Shore

IN CANADA THE VIETNAM WAR is primarily remembered as an episode in domestic politics - riots, protests, dissent - or as a peculiarly unfortunate period in Canadian-American relations. In some ways, this is appropriate. The war was, above all, a public phenomenon, in which diplomacy came up against the force of public opinion and lost. 'Quiet diplomacy,' as far as Canadian-American relations were concerned, was a lost cause, as politicians desperately tried to shore up their standing with an aroused and irritable public opinion. There was no policy choice except expedience and no alternative but surrender to the loud demands of many Canadians. It was, in some respects, the well-intentioned diplomat's worst nightmare.That story is true enough, as far as it goes, but it applies mostly to the second half of Canada's involvement with Vietnam, from 1965 until the fall of Saigon to the communists in 1975. It does not describe the first half of the Canadian experience in Southeast Asia, from 1954 to 1965. That episode was just as interesting because it, too, brought together contradictory elements in Canada's external policy. On the one hand was Western solidarity, surely the touchstone of Canadian foreign relations from the 1940s through the 1990s, and perhaps still. On the other was the sense of a world beyond the cold war - the emerging nations of Asia and later Africa - and that the Western position in the cold war might be damaged or imperilled unless the interests of the poor and populous countries of Asia were taken into account.Professor of History, University of Toronto. The author is at present working on histories of Canadian foreign relations and of the impact of the Vietnam experience on Canada.The 1950s thus witnessed the first serious engagement of the Canadian government in Asia. The Liberal government of Louis St Laurent and his foreign policy advisers was not indifferent to the logic of population statistics. China and India and the countries in between accounted for half of humanity, and they were steadily growing. With China overcome by chaos and then communism, it made sense to pay attention to India. Canada was linked to India through the shared history of the politics and culture of the British Empire and through the British Commonwealth.The story of that early experience is depressing as well. In 1954 Canada undertook to help clean up the aftermath of a colonial war that seemed to pit East against West, North against South, communism against democracy, and the emergent nationalism of the Third World against the colonial hangovers of European imperialism. The Canadian government of the day, Liberal in politics and liberal in temperament, was a firm member of the Western alliance. Yet it also defined itself as untainted by European - even British - colonialism and as unmoved by the sometimes hysterical and always strident anti-communism that in the 1950s disfigured American public life. At the time, these qualities were considered moral assets, and they were deployed in 1954 in formerly French Indochina. But vision and good intentions took policy only so far, for experience in Vietnam showed that Canadian-Indian differences were far greater than convergences.ORIGINSCanada's involvement in Indochina and its tangled diplomacy dated back to the collapse of French power in World War Two. Canadian policy during that war and after was to sustain French resistance and then restore France as a major component in the international system. As Canadian diplomats discovered, that meant accepting what the French government believed to be necessary for the restoration of French power. That in turn meant coming to terms with French policy in Indochina.(f.1)Indochina was the jewel of the French colonial system. Before the Second World War, it was exotic, isolated, and remote, and the French governed it with an iron hand. Its three components, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, were ruled either directly by French proconsuls or indirectly through local, powerless, monarchs. …

Western Democracies at a Crossroads

WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AT A CROSSROADS Jahangir Amuzegar T,he summer of 1990 will long be remembered as a very active period in global diplomacy. A series of summit meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, the European Community (EC) in Dublin, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in London, and the Group of Seven (G-7) industrial countries in Houston followed within a few weeks of each other. These historic conferences marked the end of the 45-year Cold War, the eclipse of communism as an ideological and moral doctrine, and the decline of the Soviet Union as both a global superpower and the world's last empire. The breakup of the Eastern bloc, the absence of a Soviet threat, and the end of the arms race should hold forth the hope of a more promising relationship among the industrial democracies. The West's ideological, strategic, and economic victory over the communist camp logically should pave the way for closer economic cooperation, in lieu ofthe past emphasis on political and military alliance. Yet, ironically, the potential for such an outcome cannot be taken for granted. Constant vigilance is still needed to maintain Western solidarity in the political and economic arenas. Chances are that, without proper foresight and intelligence, divergent national objectives and interests might stifle the type of cooperation strategy needed to ensure world peace and prosperity. Although the demise of the old politico-military bipolarity may open opportunities for Jahangir Amuzegar is an international economic consultant, a former executive director of the International Monetary Fund, and a former member of the SAIS faculty. 27 28 SAIS REVIEW expanded trade, investment, and exchange of technology, the perils of intensified economic factionalism and rivalry must not be ignored. The checkered history of economic cooperation among the G-7 in the past two decades gives a clear warning of the potential for political conflicts, economic clashes, and trade wars. Dissension in Houston Early signs ofsuch divisions could already be detected at the Houston summit. With respect to almost all major issues on the summit's agenda—agriculture, aid to the Soviet Union, relaxation of economic sanctions against China, debt reliefto the Third World, and environmental protection—the leaders were deeply divided. Summit strategists chose to focus on areas of easily attainable consensus while papering over contentious issues by allowing individual nations to go their own way. On some points, private reservations were in sharp contrast with seemingly unqualified public support. The carefully crafted final summit communiqué, with masterful vagueness and judiciously selected code words, spoke confidently of the substantial progress achieved in recent years in promoting a stronger world economy, supporting income growth and job creation, expanding international trade, and reducing imbalances in Japan and the United States. Continuing high unemployment levels in some countries, the lingering threat of inflation in others, and the danger of protectionism, according to the communiqué, required that deficit countries (meaning the United States) reduce fiscal deficits, encourage private savings, and increase competitiveness. Surplus nations (meaning Germany and Japan) were once again called upon to stimulate domestic demand and to promote domestic investment. A successful outcome to the Uruguay Round oftrade negotiations—to be concluded by the end ofthe year—was given the highest priority on the international economic agenda. To this end, members were asked to agree to greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and progressive reduction in support and protection of farm products. Free flows of direct foreign investment, special attention to the plight of the neediest countries, debt reduction and relief for nations implementing reforms, and new loans by public and private agencies were among the other economic prescriptions. Finally, there was renewed commitment to preserve the environment for coming generations.1 1. For the full text of the communiqué, see The New York Times, July 12, 1990. WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AT A CROSSROADS 29 Public reaction to these high-minded declarations was a combination of skepticism, caution, and anticipation. More than anything else the communiqué was considered a political statement, falling short of any sanctioned commitments. Specific agreements on a vast array of key economic issues were reduced to a set of compromises that helped preserve a semblance of...

Obstacles to European Unification

The desire for unification is deeply rooted in European thought, and the concept has gained in importance and acceptance over the centuries. At the close of World War II, Europe lay in shambles which were the culmination of strife, misrepresentation, and hatred. Separated from its eastern portion and faced with the Communist menace, West ern Europe had the choice of co-operation or going under. Co- operation was chosen. Obstacles to practical unification, some of them formidable, remain, but they can be overcome. The divisive forces which exist—and which Communist leaders hope to exploit in order to break Western solidarity—include geogra phy, racial myths, language barriers, history, religion, cultural differences, psychological factors, nationalism, economic com petition, problems of minorities, and divergent foreign-policy objectives. The split of Europe into East and West means that unification can be discussed in immediate terms only for Western Europe and, indeed, for only a part of that. Expect ing too much too fast in Europe cannot but lead to disillusion ment, yet the progress toward European community since World War II has been little short of phenomenal, and the obstacles which challenge unification are no cause for despair. —Ed.