REVIEWS 375 victory,when Fidesz threatenedto mobilize millions of demonstratorsagainst the change (p. 4). Zigzags in public assessmentsof the Communist past reflect the pattern of alternatingsocialistand centre-rightgovernmentsin Hungary since I990 but, at a deeper level, link to ambiguous attitudes towards Hungary's comparativelyliberalpost -I956 Communistregime. It is interestingthat Fideszfelt that millions could be mobilized on this issue.James illustratesthe mixed opinions of ordinaryHungarianswith referenceto an opinion poll askingBudapesters to name people they associated with I956. Although most mentioned Imre Nagy, only 56 per cent considered him a 'positive' actor. Discussing the controversyover Tam'asV'arga'sstatueof the executed PrimeMinister,James explores why it is that Nagy has not achieved the status of 'postcommunist foundationalhero' (p. I47)despite the extraordinarysymbolic significanceof his public reburialinJune I989. James also discusses many dilemmas which are not specific to Hungary. There is the issueof whether some crimesaremore heinous than others are Fascistatrocitiesunderrepresentedin the House of Terror?The desirabilityof a dispassionateapproachis also implicitlyquestioned:the even-handednessof the official I956 exhibit in the MilitaryMuseum is contrastedwith the more moving but partisan approach of Gergely Pongratz in his private I956 museum. Although its main focus in on post-Communism, the book includes many vignettes of the Communist period -the terrorof the unfortunatesculptors commissioned to design the Stalin statue, or the ironic attitude of the public towardsgrandiosememorialswhich were given irreverentnicknamesand used as meeting places and landmarks. The book is generously illustrated,with forty-two photographs, sited in relevant sections of text. Many of the outdoor photographswere taken in the snow, making them particularlystriking. Department ofEuropean Studies andModemLanguages ANNE WHITE University ofBath O'Shea,Brendan.7heModern rugoslav Conflict I99I-I995: Perception, Deception andDishonesty. Cass Contemporary Security Studies Series. Frank Cass, London and New York, 2005. xii + 244 pp. Notes. Select bibliography. Index. ?6s.oo. IN September 1994, BrendanO'Shea, a formerlong-servingofficerin the Irish Defence Forces,joined the European Community Monitor Mission (ECCM) in the formerYugoslavia.Afterservingas a Monitor, he was attached to HQ Staff in Zagreb with responsibilityfor 'evaluatingand reporting on the war in Bosnia' (p. i). This book has come out of that experience, but it is not an account based primarily on the author's active role in the field with the ECCM. The bulk of it comprises five chapters, each titled simply by year (I99I-95), and he joined the ECCM only towardsthe end of the period dealt with in the book. It is important to be clear on this point, because O'Shea 376 SEER, 84, 2, 2006 writesmostly about events, and the personalitiesinvolved, of which he has no first-handknowledge, nor does he claim it. This is an interpretativework of history,not a personal memoir. O'Shea writeswell enough on the militaryaspects of the Bosnian conflict, but his strengthis as an analystof the politicalcontext. He was in post during the crucialfifteenmonths leading up to the Dayton Agreements,in December 1995, and this experience informsthe whole book. He was able to observe at close quartershow businessbetween the warring sides and Western agencies was done, or mostly, in fact, failed to get done. Hopes of reaching agreement on a ceasefirein Bosniawere continuallyscupperedby malevolent competing nationalismsand appallingblunders(orwere they part of a deliberatepolicy?) perpetrated in the name of the Realpolitik dictated from Washington. His account of how a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) failed at the final stages, in December I994, gives a remarkableinsight into the way in which personalitiesand circumstancescombined to ruin a promising peace initiative, leaving the misery to continue for another year. In a compressed way, it says an awfullot about everythingthat went wrong in Bosnia. O'Shea's telling of this episode is notable for its generous assessmentof the part played by Radovan Karadzicin nearlybringing COHA to fruition,and he questions the justice of tryingto convict the Bosnian Serb leader of genocide under international law. This even-handedness runs through the book as a whole. The massacreat Srebrenicais recounted in all its unrelievedand inexcusablehorror,but O'Shea is scathingabout comparisonswith the Holocaust , and points out that the expulsion of the Krajina Serbs was the biggest single act of ethnic cleansing during the Balkanwars. There are no heroes. Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milos'evic'are presented as perfidious, amoral clones, and O'Shea is...
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