West European Countries Research Articles

Unevenly Unequal Responsiveness: Public Opinion and Redistributive Policy Shifts in Western Europe Since 2008

Recent studies puzzle over why it is that democratically elected governments have not responded to rising inequality by engaging in more redistribution. While some scholars argue that low- and middle-income citizens have not responded to rising inequality in the way we would expect, others argue that policymakers are not responsive to the demands of these citizens. We argue that both solutions to the “lack-of-redistribution puzzle” leave something to be desired and that variation across policy domains sheds new light on the issues at stake in this debate. Based on an original 2019 survey replicating questions asked by the European Social Survey in 2008, we show that support for progressive income taxation and more egalitarian unemployment insurance has increased in most West European countries since 2008. Tax policy has moved in the same direction as public opinion, but unemployment policy has not. We conclude that public opinion should be conceived as a constraint on policymakers motivated by political-economy considerations rather than a driver of policy developments.

Can more CVD prevention increase life expectancy in Germany? Analysis with European data 2000-2019

Abstract Background Life expectancy (LE) in Europe is increasing since long - while mortality from cardiovascular diseases (CVD) declines, attributed to advances in therapy and prevention. Whether this is still applies the last 20 years is unclear. Recently, Germany’s low LE compared to other Western European countries (2019: 81.3 yrs; Spain: 84, Italy 83.6) was seen as result of high CVD mortality due to insufficient prevention. This led to the establishment of the German Federal Institute for Prevention and Education in Medicine, aimed at reducing CVD and -in the long term - narrowing the gap in LE. We explore whether data on CVD mortality and morbidity support this idea. Methods With data from OECD, WHO and IHME (GBD 2021), we calculated the mean annual change in LE and in age-standardised mortality (ASM) for CVD for 2000-2019 for European countries by sex. We estimated the linear association (adj R²) between the mean annual change in LE and ASM for CVD for West- and East-Europe, and -country-specific- between incidence and ASM from CVD. Results For 2000-2019, mean annual change in LE was lower in West- than in East-Europe: 0.25 yrs vs. 0.30 in men and 0.17 vs 0.22 in women; for ASM in CVD, it was about half as large: -6.6/100.000 vs. -11.1 for men and -4.1 vs. -8.0 for women. Similarly, the adj R² for the association between mean annual change in LE and in ASM for CVD was lower in West- compared to East-Europe: 0.43 vs. 0.24 in men and 0.21 vs. no association (adj R² -0.01) in women. Courses of CVD incidence were heterogeneous (linearly or wave-shaped in- or decreasing, stable or u-shaped). In Germany, it decreased wave-shaped, with an adj R² for linear association with ASM for CVD of 0.79 in women and 0.63 in men. The association between LE and ASM for CVD is low in West-European countries. Even if amplified prevention lowers CVD mortality, a positive effect on LE is questionable. Differences in LE are stable since long. Non-morbidity related factors might decisively effect LE. Key messages • Life expectancy in Europe-and it’s mean annual change since 2000 is not associated with age-standardised CVD mortality in women, and only moderate in men in West-Europe, in contrast to East-Europe. • Course of CVD incidence is country-specific and very heterogeneous and reveals no overall association with CVD mortality rates.

Forecasting migration movements using prediction markets

Migration forecasts are crucial for proactive immigration and integration management. While the demand for accurate migration forecasts continues to grow, the current state of migration forecasting is still unsatisfactory, because they tend to lack precision. We introduce an alternative method to forecast migration movements: prediction markets. While prediction markets are mainly unknown in migration studies, they are established in the political economy of forecasting election outcomes. For its application to a complex phenomenon in a more constrained information environment such as migration movements, we argue that prediction markets allow to balance complementarities of current qualitative and quantitative approaches if they provide solutions to avoid thin trading and integrate expert knowledge into the market. We apply the prediction market to forecast immigration in four West European countries in 2020 and find encouraging results. We discuss the strengths and limitations of prediction markets to migration forecasting, including ethical considerations, and guide its future application.

Are women more progressive than men? Attitudinal gender gaps in West European democracies

We assess gender gaps in attitudes to several important and distinct policy areas, including economic left–right issues, gender equality, immigration, environmentalism and traditional ‘moral issues’. Drawing on comprehensive survey data from 14 established democracies in Western Europe, we document that women have more progressive attitudes than men do on all the five attitudinal dimensions that we consider. These patterns are similar (albeit not identical) across West European countries, despite cross-country differences in political cultures and systems. We also elaborate on potential implications of our findings for other political outcomes of interest, including voting behaviour and the functioning of representative democracy, and point to avenues for future research in detailing the mechanisms that contribute to the observed gender gaps.

Looking around the neighborhood: how subnational electoral politics affects voters’ perceptions of parties’ positions

ABSTRACT Local context has been shown to influence political attitudes and behaviors. We extend this research to argue that when a party performs better in a voter’s region or the region is more competitive, she will have more information on the parties and be better able to correctly identify the party’s positions. In addition, we argue that the strategy the party takes will also have an effect. To test our argument, we combine individual- and party-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and data on the party’s regional electoral performance from the European NUTS-Level Electoral Database from 1996 to 2021 for five federal or quasi-federal West European countries. Our results confirm our expectations. Our findings have important implications for understanding the multilevel nature of representation more generally, and how a voter’s local context shapes how she perceives parties’ positions and how parties can use local context to their advantage, more specifically.

Populist attitudes and vote for the radical right. A comparative analysis of five West European countries

ABSTRACT In recent decades, radical right-wing parties have gained significant prominence in Europe, attracting considerable academic attention. The electoral support for these parties has been linked to ideological principles such as nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. However, the connection between populist attitudes and voting for the radical right has been insufficiently addressed, either due to the lack of available empirical material or because populism has been taken for granted within this party family. To fill this gap this paper analyses the role of populist attitudes in the electoral support for the radical right in five West European countries (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Germany). The results reveal that, with the exception of Italy, populist attitudes play a significant role in the explanation of voting for the radical right. They also confirm the importance of nationalism in general and nativist attitudes in particular. By contrast, other orientations play a minor and often inconsistent across-countries role in the decision to vote for the radical right.

A modal age at death approach to forecasting adult mortality

Recent studies have shown that there are some advantages to forecasting mortality with indicators other than age-specific death rates. The mean, median, and modal ages at death can be directly estimated from the age-at-death distribution, as can information on lifespan variation. The modal age at death has been increasing linearly since the second half of the twentieth century, providing a strong basis from which to extrapolate past trends. The aim of this paper is to develop a forecasting model that is based on the regularity of the modal age at death and that can also account for changes in lifespan variation. We forecast mortality at ages 40 and above in 10 West European countries. The model we introduce increases forecast accuracy compared with other forecasting models and provides consistent trends in life expectancy and lifespan variation at age 40 over time.

Labour market flexibility as a factor in economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic has largely undermined most economies in the world. To a significant extent the reasons behind this economic nosedive are rooted in the sphere of labour market. The imposed restriction measures made many workers stay at home, and part of them even lost their jobs. The speed of economic recovery in different countries varied depending on how quarantine restrictions were eased. One crucial factor in this process is labour market flexibility and its ability to adapt to changing economic conditions. The purpose of the paper is to explore the relationship between the labour market flexibility and the speed of GDP recovery when the pandemic was waning and the quarantine restrictions were being removed. Methodologically, the study relies on labour economics. The methods are multivariate and logistic regression analysis. The data for the study is sourced from the World Bank and Eurostat and comprises statistics for assessing labour market flexibility and GDP in various countries for 2020–2021. The findings indicate a reverse relationship between the speed of GDP growth recovery during the post-COVID period and the share of part-time employment. Yet taking into account that part-time employment is not only an indicator of the labour market flexibility, but also reflects a general slowdown in production and unemployment, we can attach low speed of recovery to a greater weakness of an economy. The obtained results are insufficient to reject the hypothesis that a more flexible labour market accelerates the recovery of a national economy. At the same time, the study demonstrates that the West European countries generally got over the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis faster than other EU countries. The research contributes to understanding the transformation processes in the labour market under the pandemic as well as provides support for labour market policy development and implementation.

Gender roles and political ideology in the pandemic: experimental evidence from Western Europe

The economic shutdown and national lockdown following the outbreak of COVID-19 forced families to take on tasks themselves that were previously outsourced, like child care and housecleaning. These tasks were, and to a degree still are, traditionally performed by women. The concern is that the pandemic placed these burdens again primarily on their shoulders. In this study, we examine how the lockdown-imposed difficulties to the outsourcing of essential household tasks affected views on who in the family should sacrifice their career to cope with new challenges, and how these views interacted with ideological commitments. Analyzing data collected from an experiment embedded in a representative survey of nearly 4,000 residents from five West European countries, we find that the pandemic reduced the ideological polarization between the political left and right with regards to gender roles and household tasks. However, this reduced polarization is primarily found among female respondents.

RomaniLanguage, LinguisticRightsand«Antigypsyism»

The article analyses the forms of «antigypsyism»towards the use of Romani language, education of Roma children in their mother tongue and the linguistic human rights of Roma. After defining the «hate speech» and «antigypsyism», «antiziganism», «online hate» given by different authors, research with some Roma communities in Slovakia is presented. The «antigypsysim» is expressed directly or online towards Roma. The forms of personal/individual, institutionalized antigypsyism,institutionalized personal antigypsyismare discussed. Romani is in daily use mainly in the segregated Roma settlements. However, neither in the segregated nor in the special schools are the children offered lessons to build formal literacy in their mother tongue. The attitudes of the teachers towards the use of the Romani language at school are often not positive and they do not have any activities supporting the use and development of Romani. They do not recognize that such children have a right to acquire literacy in their home language. It is not viewed as an asset but precisely the opposite: the teachers think that they do not need their mother tongue and that the official school language is more important. The official languages used by the children are also an object of hate speech in social media and society, because often they use a variety of the official language called «ethnolect», and not the official language. Applying the insights of Auduc (2006), Iconcluded that the discrimination against young Roma is even stronger when they are highly qualified. The antigypsyism is much greater towards educated Roma who are fighting for their language and identity rights. That is because in their countries of origin this category of human capital, e.g. educated Roma, cannot be integrated, and most of them emigrate to West European countries to find their professional realization. Keywords: Roma, linguistic human rights, education, antigypsyism

Heterogeneous Naturalization Effects of Dual Citizenship Reform in Migrant Destinations: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Europe

Does dual citizenship acceptance increase immigrants’ propensity to naturalize and, if so, for whom does this matter most? We exploit exogenous variation in citizenship legislation in 200 migrant-origin countries to identify the effect of destination country policy reform. We hypothesize that the value of the origin country citizenship moderates the reform effect. We test our identification strategy in two West European countries with contrasting reforms: a canonical liberal reform in Sweden (2001) and an atypical restrictive reversal in the Netherlands (1997). We apply a staggered difference-in-differences model employing administrative data on complete migrant populations. We find reform effects remarkably similar in effect size and heterogeneity, with liberalizing reform increasing naturalization rates by 6.7 percentage points and restrictive change decreasing rates by 6.4 percentage points. The effect is concentrated among immigrants from EU and highly developed countries. Our quasi-experimental evidence informs naturalization scholarship and public debate on migrant political integration.

Can We Rely on Projections of the Immigrant Population? The Case of Norway

Demographic forecasters must be realistic about how well they can predict future populations, and it is important that they include estimates of uncertainty in their forecasts. Here we focus on the future development of the immigrant population of Norway and their Norwegian-born children (“second generation”), grouped by three categories of country background: 1. West European countries plus the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand; 2. Central and East European countries that are members of the European Union; 3. other countries. We show how to use a probabilistic forecast to assess the reliability of projections of the immigrant population and their children. We employ the method of random shares using data for immigrants and their children for 2000–2021. We model their age- and sex-specific shares relative to the whole population. Relational models are used for the age patterns in these shares, and time series models to extrapolate the parameters of the age patterns. We compute a probabilistic forecast for six population sub-groups with immigration background, and one for non-immigrants. The probabilistic forecast is calibrated against Statistics Norway’s official population projection. We find that a few population trends are quite certain: strong increases to 2060 in the size of the immigrant population (more specifically those who belong to country group 3) and of Norwegian-born children of immigrants. However, prediction intervals around the forecasts of immigrants and their children by one-year age groups are so wide that these forecasts are not reliable.

Comparison of nitrogen fertilisation recommendations of West European Countries

AbstractNitrogen (N) budgets at farm level are influenced by N fertilisation recommendations. In this study, we reviewed and analysed the underlying principles and methods of N fertilisation recommendations in 10 West European countries, to identify similarities and differences, and develop suggestions for reconsideration and improvement. An analysis of national official documents on N fertilisation recommendations revealed that there were three main categories of calculation methods: (i) ‘N mass balances’ (France, Italy, Spain), (ii) ‘Corrected standards’ (Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg), and (iii) ‘Pre‐parameterised calculations’, which rely on a soil N supply typology (United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium). In total 16 variables were identified in the calculation methods. The more complex methods use 10 (Italy, France), while the simplest only rely on 3 (Luxembourg). The most common variables include the availability of N in manure, the N uptake by a crop, and the N released by crop residues. Few countries explicitly consider N losses to ground and surface waters or to the atmosphere in the calculation methods. In some countries, the N fertilisation recommendation has a voluntary status, and in other countries, a legal one (caps on maximum allowable N rates). We compared the N fertiliser recommendations for a wheat crop grown on a farm with livestock, and for a farm with a diverse arable crop rotation without livestock. Across the 10 countries, large differences in the N fertilisation calculation methods and resulting N recommendations existed for the two management scenarios, ranging from almost no fertilisation to 135 kg N ha−1, and from 111 to 210 kg N ha−1, respectively. The differences were not accounted for by the complexity of the equations used, but rather resulted from contrasting reference values for N availability in manure, N uptake by crop and N leaching. However, the study concluded that standardisation of the method to calculate N fertilisation recommendations is likely to be counterproductive as there are no objective reasons to favour one method more than the others. Nonetheless, improvements in N use efficiency are necessary. Farm scale mass balance, combined with parameters such as minimum residual soil mineral N test at harvest, was suggested as being an important consideration.

5.C. Skills building seminar: Leveraging local government policies to improve food systems for public and planetary health

Abstract Changing food systems is one of the most promising and impactful ways to address nutrition and health, climate change and environmental degradation. The International Network for Food and Obesity/NCDs Research Monitoring and Action Support (INFORMAS) developed the Healthy Food Environment Policy Index (Food-EPI) to measure the extent of implementation of healthy food environment policies by governments compared to international best practice. The Food-EPI provides a mechanism to assess government policies and infrastructure support to create healthy food environments. The Food-EPI tool covers seven food policy areas, including composition, labelling, promotion, prices, provision, retail and trade, and six measures of infrastructure, including leadership, governance, funding, monitoring, platforms and health-in-all-policies. The Food-EPI process includes the drafting of a comprehensive evidence document on the implementation of policies, verified by government stakeholders and the assessment of those policies, as well as identification of priority policy actions by an expert panel at the national level. The tool and process were pilot tested and implemented in New Zealand in 2014 and then again in 2017 and 2020. Since 2014, about 50 countries have implemented Food-EPI at the national level, including more than 10 European countries. There is increasing demand for a similar monitoring tool and process which can be used at the municipal/city government level to assess government actions addressing food systems for both public and planetary health. Local governments can often make more rapid progress than national governments, but on the other hand may not have jurisdiction in all critical policy areas. INFORMAS recently developed a new Food Systems Policy Index, based on a compilation of international recommendations for good practice government policies to address food systems and a scoping review on the potential effectiveness of the recommended good practice policies and interventions to improve nutrition and environmental sustainability outcomes. The new index covers policies addressing food supply chains and food environments, and is being implemented in a range of West and East African and European countries and cities. The purpose of the workshop is to discuss the role and potential of local level government (cities and municipalities) policies in addressing food systems to improve both public and planetary. The workshop will have several key presentations, some with a more global perspective and some with a very practical local perspective. Together with the panelists and the audience, the key opportunities and challenges will be discussed for European cities and municipalities to address food systems, as well as the role of monitoring and benchmarking policy implementation to increase local actions on food systems. Key messages • Monitoring and benchmarking the policy implementation to address food systems to improve public and planetary health by governments is key to increase accountability for action. • A better understanding on the role and potential of local government policies in addressing food systems can be beneficial to accelerate and innovate policy implementation.

When Do Citizens Consider Political Parties Legitimate?

AbstractResearch on negative partisanship and affective polarization shows that wholesale rejections of individual parties are a common and growing phenomenon. This article offers a novel perspective on assessments of parties by considering citizens' legitimacy perceptions of political parties as institutional players. Combining research on political parties and public opinion, I develop a theoretical framework that explains how parties' characteristics shape their perception as legitimate institutional players. I argue that governing experience, age, ideology, and democratic behaviour provide informational cues to citizens about how democratically dangerous a party is. To test my argument, I fielded a cross-sectional survey in seven West European countries and a large-scale survey experiment. The results consistently show that citizens use party-level cues such as ideological moderation and democratic behaviour to form party legitimacy perceptions. The findings have important public opinion implications for political parties and their institutional role in democracies.

Free Movement versus European Welfare States? Variations of the Fiscal Effects of EU Migrants across Welfare State Regimes

Strong claims have been made about the incompatibility between large-scale migration and advanced welfare states. The free movement of workers within the European Union (EU) offers an interesting case for the study of the fiscal effects of unrestricted labor migration in different types of welfare states This article therefore investigates the alleged tension between advanced welfare states and liberal migration policies by analyzing how the fiscal effects of EU migrants vary across European welfare state regimes. In contrast to arguments commonly made in public debates, we argue and explain why theoretical reasoning should lead us to expect limited differences in fiscal effects of EU migrants in different welfare states. The empirical analysis, covering twenty-nine countries during 2004–15, shows that the net fiscal impact of EU migrants in the different welfare state regimes of West European countries is positive, and we find no major differences in the fiscal impacts of EU migrants across Western regimes. These results from the EU case cast doubts on the claim that advanced welfare states are incompatible with large-scale immigration because of adverse fiscal effects, and on the idea that broad institutional characteristics of welfare states have substantial consequences for the fiscal impact of migration.

“Her Language Must Be the Language of Figures”. Medical Statistics of the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia: A Comparative Perspective

This article examines the history of the establishment of departmental medical statistics in the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia in the first half of the nineteenth century. Starting from M. Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality, historians have studied the medical and statistical mechanisms for representing “public health” in England, France, and other West European countries in some detail. The case of the Russian Empire remains unexplored in this respect. Researchers have predominantly turned to hygienic statistics and data on mortality and fertility in Russian cities of the late imperial period, while the early period has long remained untouched. Moreover, these data have been analyzed apart from the transnational context of their creation. This article seeks to fill this gap partially. By comparing the introduction of two key medico-statistical indicators in Prussia and Russia (the nomenclature of diseases and the indicator of causes of death by disease), it has been argued that the Russian authorities, in their governing practices, followed mainly the Prussian path. In addition, both countries came to the same statistical model of representing the “public health” of the nation/empire. However, in the case of the Russian Empire, this transition was stretched over many decades and was carried out haphazardly. The article analyzes the main causes of this uneven implementation. In conclusion, it discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each country’s medical and statistical models.

Aspiration Versus Apprehension: Economic Opportunities and Electoral Preferences

AbstractRecent studies take increasingly refined views of how socioeconomic conditions influence political behaviour. We add to this literature by exploring how voters' prospective evaluations of long-term economic and social opportunities relate to electoral contestation versus the stabilization of the political-economic system underpinning the knowledge society. Using survey data from eight West European countries, we show that positive prospects are associated with higher support for mainstream parties (incumbents and opposition) and lower support for radical parties on all levels of material well-being. Our results support the idea that ‘aspirational voters’ with positive evaluations of opportunities (for themselves or their children) represent an important stabilizing force in advanced democratic capitalism. However, we also highlight the importance of radical party support among ‘apprehensive voters’, who are economically secure but perceive a lack of long-term opportunities. To assess the implications of these findings, we discuss the relative importance of these groups across different countries.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the expansion of the mortality gap between the United States and its European peers.

The mortality gap between the United States and other high-income nations substantially expanded during the first two decades of the 21st century. International comparisons of Covid-19 mortality suggest this gap might have grown during the Covid-19 pandemic. Applying population-weighted average mortality rates of the five largest West European countries to the US population reveals that this mortality gap increased the number of US deaths by 34.8% in 2021, causing 892,491 "excess deaths" that year. Controlling for population size, the annual number of excess deaths has nearly doubled between 2019 and 2021 (+84.9%). Diverging trends in Covid-19 mortality contributed to this increase in excess deaths, especially towards the end of 2021 as US vaccination rates plateaued at lower levels than in European countries. In 2021, the number of excess deaths involving Covid-19 in the United States reached 223,266 deaths, representing 25.0% of all excess deaths that year. However, 45.5% of the population-standardized increase in excess deaths between 2019 and 2021 is due to other causes of deaths. While the contribution of Covid-19 to excess mortality might be transient, divergent trends in mortality from other causes persistently separates the United States from West European countries. Excess mortality is particularly high between ages 15 and 64. In 2021, nearly half of all US deaths in this age range are excess deaths (48.0%).

Toward electoral (ir)relevance of moral traditionalism? Religious decline and voting in Western Europe (1981–2017)

AbstractThis article tests two contrasting hypotheses about changes in the electoral relevance of moral traditionalism–progressiveness, which pertains to attitudes toward matters of procreation, sexuality, and family and gender roles. While the “cultural turn” literature expects the electoral relevance of moral traditionalism to increase over time alongside that of all other cultural issues, studies inspired by secularization theory rather predict a decrease in its relevance—due to religious decline. Analyzing the data from the European Values Study (1981–2017) for 20 West European countries, we find empirical evidence for a decrease and no indication of an increase in the electoral relevance of moral traditionalism. Religious decline weakened the effect of moral traditionalism on religious and conservative voting over time due to the most traditionalist voters shifting away from these parties. Our findings, therefore, highlight the need to differentiate between different types of cultural motives behind voting choice in Western Europe.