PurposeThis paper aims to theoretically investigate an online company’s optimal decision on its offline expansion strategy. In the past five years, many large online retailers and internet-based companies such as Amazon, Google, Alibaba, Tencent and JD.com have expanded their offline market but it was observed that they adopted different expansion strategies. Specifically, some of them expand the offline market by acquiring offline retailers, while some do so by purchasing a portion of offline retailer’s stake. This difference leads to a quite different structure in post-expansion market, having an impact on profit, consumer surplus and social welfare. The goal of this paper is to model such expansion strategies in a general way and complete studies on profits and welfare.Design/methodology/approachBy constructing a Salop model with two offline retailers and one online company, this paper analyzes the case where the online company can expand its offline market by either acquiring or jointing (e.g. stakeholding) with one offline retailer. The former strategy (named Strategy A) allows the online company to fully control and capture residual claims of the offline retailer. With the adoption of the latter strategy (named Strategy C), on the other hand, the online company can obtain a fixed proportion of its offline partner’s quasi rent. In the price competition, the online company chooses its optimal offline expansion strategy by predicting its profit in the post-expansion market.FindingsThis paper found that the equilibrium crucially depends on the synergy effect due to online–offline integration, and such synergy also influences both consumer and social welfare. This study shows the various conditions on the synergy that affect an online company moves toward offline markets. Accordingly, this finding can assist online companies with or without retailing business to choose an optimal strategy when expanding offline markets. Moreover, by doing some necessary welfare analysis, this study shows that the online company’s offline expansion is not always benefiting consumers nor be socially desirable, which may shed some lights on the possible competition policy in the case where online companies practice in offline expansion.Originality/valueDifferent from conventional wisdom in online-offline integration, the theory indicates that the offline expectation of online company may not always benefit consumers nor be socially desirable. Moreover, the findings also shed some lights on the possible competition policy in the case where online companies practice in offline expansion.