Weimar Triangle Research Articles

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BURY OR GIVE A NEW LIFE? THE BENEFITS OF THE COALITION OF THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE COUNTRIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION The article seeks to answer the following question: does building a Weimar coalition, understood as agreeing on a common policy position on EU legislation, increase the bargaining success of the Weimar Triangle (WT) countries when adopting EU secondary law? For this purpose, a statistical analysis was carried out to empirically test the hypothesis that Germany, France and Poland are more successful in realizing their preferences when they form a coalition. The following results were obtained. First, the possibilities of building a Weimar coalition in the EU legislative process are limited. In the years 2004-2019, WT countries held a common position on only 25% of EU legislative files, while the country that most often broke the Weimar coalition, was Poland. Second, despite its low frequency, building a Weimar coalition is generally very profitable. When WT countries form an alliance, the average bargaining success of these countries taken together increases compared to the absence of such a coalition. Third, building a Weimar coalition is not equally beneficial for all WT members treated individually. While it increases the bargaining success of Poland and France, this relationship does not exist in the case of Germany.

Algorithmic Failure? The Weimar Triangle as a Subregional Emulation of Global Governance Structures

This article addresses the issue of discontinuity in the context of the multilevel nature of global governance and the relationship between the determinants of continuity and the sustainability of (sub)regional institutional arrangements. The main purpose of the discussion is to better understand continuity disturbances in the Weimar Triangle. These disturbances are expressed not only in fluctuations in the cooperation levels within the Triangle, but also in increasingly long periods of institutional inertia. The study is based on the assumption that the main reason for the disturbances in the continuity of the Weimar Triangle is the suboptimal emulation of the operating algorithms developed in the G7, that is, the sequences of principles, practices, and knowledge that Germany and France had internalized through their long-term socialization in the G7, and then transferred to the subregional level in order to ensure adaptability and receptiveness in the functioning of the Weimar Triangle.

The Weimar Triangle and its Role in the European Integration after the end of the Cold War

The Weimar Triangle and its Role in the European Integration after the end of the Cold War

Economic Potential of the Railway Engineering Industry of Ukraine in the Context of Post-War Recovery and European Integration

The study of the set of problems of Ukraine’s post-war restoration and derivative issues of the state’s European integration course involves, first of all, substantiation of the optimal strategic directions of the relevant restoration policy. Generalization of the world experience in the development and implementation of post-war restoration policy serves as an epistemological and scientific-practical basis for the following strategic directions of Ukraine’s restoration: the creation of a transport and logistics cluster based on the expansion of the international alliance – the Lublin Triangle cooperation platform. Expansion of the Lublin Triangle provided that Ukraine takes the necessary measures, is quite realistic by adding to Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine the Czech Republic, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria (later, perhaps, also Slovakia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan). In the article, the authors elaborate on their idea, which is substantiated in the Ukrainian and foreign scientific literature, to create the mentioned transport and logistics cluster using a network of transport logistics hubs in the context of the proposed expansion of the Lublin Triangle. Another new historic chance for Ukraine in this area (and in a broader institutional and economic sense) may be the expected invitation to join Germany, France, and Poland in the Weimar Triangle alliance. Based on the analysis of the economic, scientific, and technical state of domestic railway engineering enterprises, the problems and prospects of their wide cooperation with enterprises of Poland, the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Germany, and France in the sub-sectors of production of locomotives and rolling stock, wagons and special equipment are considered. The appropriate regulatory regime that can ensure the practical implementation of the proposed cooperation (as well as in the broader context of the practical implementation of Ukraine’s post-war restoration policy) should be the creation of a network of special economic zones.

The Weimar Triangle: France, Germany, Poland in the Middle East. United Arab Emirates Perspective

The article’s scientific goal is to investigate the Weimar Triangle countries’ relations with the United Arab Emirates. Therefore, the author asks the research question. Are the Weimar Triangle states’ role and significance increasing in the external dimension of the European Union? Based on the example of the United Arab Emirates, the research adopted a hypothesis. It is the statement that after Brexit, the Weimar Triangle countries have a chance to improve their importance in the EU external activities. Apart from case studies, to revise the hypothesis, the author performed a meticulous comparative analysis. Moreover, the research implemented International Practice Theory as an appropriate tool to investigate the presented issue. This empirical research and its findings resulted from over ten years of the author’s direct observation, analysis, and participation in many initiatives, both in the European Union and in the United Arab Emirates.
 The Middle East for the Weimar Triangle countries is more significant than just from a trade potential perspective. The situation in this region is also affecting Europe, as well as global security architecture. For this reason, one should develop a coherent and comprehensive EU foreign and security policy towards the region, and the Weimar Triangle formula should be one of its pillars.

WEIMAR TRIANGLE STATES MARINE FORCES

In the paper shows general information about the Organization and the Weimar Triangle States as well as analysed legislation on cooperation within the framework of this organization. In the following subsections, the author has analyzed the potential of marine forces in Poland, Germany and France

Income and Poverty in Households in Selected European Countries

Incomes of population and poverty are key elements of the EU cohesion policy which aims at reducing disparities between the levels of development of individual regions. The traditionally appropriate study to evaluate the convergence of the Member States is the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU‑SILC). However, this is not the only source of information on income distribution and social inclusion in the European Union. In this article, the basis for calculations are the results of the fourth European Quality of Life Surveys (EQLS), whose purpose is to measure both objective and subjective indicators of the standard of living of citizens and their households.
 The aim of the paper is to assess the diversity of distributions of household incomes and the level of income poverty due to the selected socio‑demographic characteristics of the respondent or household in selected European countries in two periods: 2007 and 2016. Countries of the Visegrad Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) were selected for the analysis, along with the Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany, and France). Such a selection allowed us to compare the financial situation of households in Western Europe with those in Central and Eastern Europe. Poland becomes a natural link between all these countries.
 The article uses modelling methods of income distribution, indicators of distance (overlapping) of distributions and aggregate indicators of the scope, depth and severity of poverty. Those ratios were determined on the basis of the use of relative. In order to ensure comparability of incomes of households with different demographic compositions, the analysis used equivalent incomes.
 As a result of the preliminary analysis, differences were noted regarding the measured position, variation and asymmetry of equivalent incomes in the studied households. The applied gap measurements showed a significant disparity between the distributions of income in Western European countries (Germany, France) and the countries of the Visegrad Group, but the size of that differentation de creased significantly in 2016 relative to 2007. Important differentiation was also noted in terms of income poverty risk within the Visegrad Group: the highest proportion of households at risk of poverty exists in Poland and the lowest in the Czech Republic.

Państwa Trójkąta Weimarskiego wobec przyszłości integracji europejskiej

Państwa Trójkąta Weimarskiego wobec przyszłości integracji europejskiej

Trójkąt Weimarski po rozszerzeniu UE – niewykorzystany intstrument polskiej polityki zagranicznej

Following the enlargement of the European Union, Poland was expected to become a significant creator of European policy in the Community, and an equal partner to Germany and France. This was supposed to translate into intensified activity by Poland in the Weimar Triangle. New Weimar projects were expected to provide a new core for the EU, thus sparking a European integration process. However, over the five years of Poland’s membership in the EU, the inter-governmental Weimar initiative has diminished in importance, despite diplomats’ assurances of its useful character. On the other hand, trilateral ventures in social, cultural and regional areas have blossomed. The paper analyzes external and internal factors affecting the activity of the Weimar Triangle. The unused mechanisms of the Triangle and potential cooperation fields are discussed. This is done against the background of considerations on the change in priorities of Polish foreign policy after 2004, and Berlin and Paris’s search for strategic partners in an enlarged EU. The conclusion presents the answer to the question of whether the Weimar Triangle can still be included in the arsenal of instruments of Polish diplomacy, and what prerequisites might herald its revival in the near future.

Indispensable Partner or Significant Other? German and French Media Portrayals of Poland after 25 Years of Weimar Triangle

With the intention of the German, French and Polish foreign ministers to bring their countries closer together after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Weimar Triangle was founded in 1991. This setting has enabled an institutionalised regional cooperation on the governmental level as well as between the respective civil societies. However today, in a Europe of permanent crises and protracted uncertainty, a risky divergence between Germany, France and Poland seems to emerge. Since the Polish national elections in October 2015 has brought the right‑wing, nationalist Law‑and‑Justice‑party (PiS) into power, we are also witnessing a rising relevance of domestic political determinants for mutual contacts. Facing this new period of tension, where more closeness and trust would be required, discursive attitudes and strategies of ‘othering’ might gain ground and lead to increasing alienation. Based on the assumption that the portrayal of a country could be both the first step towards creating and obtaining a more inclusive or exclusive identity, this paper aims to find out the following: in how far are German and French media about to pre‑cook patterns of asymmetry and alienation? Or follow they rather an inclusive and comprehensible approach towards Poland? These questions are exemplified by the biggest centre‑left and centre‑right German and French daily newspapers Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Le Monde and Le Figaro, whereas the corpus of data is limited to the period of the year 2016. By making use of the critical discourse analysis, this paper provides information about to what extent Poland is considered to be a close and indispensable partner as well as to where we can identify mechanisms of putting the country aside as a significant other.

Dialogues, Trialogues and Triangles: The Geometry of Germany's Foreign Policy of Trust-Building

This article explores three formats for interstate relations developed by, or at least significantly influenced by Germany in the post-Cold War period: the Petersburg Dialogue, the German–Russian–Polish Trialogue and the Weimar Triangle. An examination of the form and function of each of these formats is followed by a discussion of what these formats have in common and why they are worthy of further study. The paper addresses whether this ‘variable geometry’ of Germany's foreign policy of trust-building is likely to survive a period of turbulent relations or changes in leadership and, furthermore, how the effectiveness of dialogues, trialogues and triangles might be evaluated.

Polish and German press reports on cooperation between the foreign ministers of both countries in resolving the conflict in Ukraine (February-June 2014)

Polish-German relations in the first half of 2014 were dominated by the Ukraine crisis. This study is an attempt to answer the question of how Polish and German press assessed the cooperation of both countries in resolving the conflict in Ukraine; to what extent the most widely read magazines associated themselves with the decisions of their politicians and the feelings of their own societies and how much understanding they showed for the arguments of their EU partner. The analysis focuses on the unprecedented mission of the Weimar Triangle foreign ministers to Ukraine in February 2014, which led to an agreement between the Ukrainian opposition and President Viktor Yanukovych. A turning point was the visit paid by Radoslaw Sikorski and Frank-Walter Steinmeier to St. Petersburg in June 2014. The next meetings agreed on by EU partners were held without inviting the Polish partner. In view of the speed of events in the selected time interval, the articles subjected to analysis were taken from the most widely read online editions of national daily newspapers in Poland and Germany.

DONETSK BASIN NEGOTIATION FORMAT IS CHANGING

(By Tatyana Ivzhenko. Nezavisimaya gazeta, Aug. 30, 2016, p. Complete text:) German and French foreign policy chiefs Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Jean-Marc Ayrault have for the first time discussed Ukraine issue with their Polish counterpart Witold Waszczykowski. The meeting took place on Sunday [Aug. 28] in Ettersberg (near Weimar) on occasion of 25th anniversary of foundation of Weimar Triangle. Poland is not a member of Normandy format [France, Germany, Ukraine, Russia] of negotiations on a [political] settlement in Donetsk Basin, so its inclusion in mediators’ conversation could pave way for a surprise as soon as early September. ... Readers will recall that an informal meeting of foreign ministers from [nations in the] Organization for Security and Cooperation in followed by an informal European Union summit, are due take place. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin will hold talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande. All of them will discuss prospects for a settlement in Donetsk Basin. ... Vitaly Kulik, director of [Ukrainian] Center for Civil Society Studies, told NG that in this context a meeting of the French, German and Polish foreign ministers is of principal importance Ukraine. On settlement issues, Warsaw supports Kiev’s line. Despite difficulties that have emerged in [Ukrainian-Polish] relations, [Polish President] Andrzej Duda’s arrival in Kiev on [Ukraine’s] Independence Day has demonstrated that Poland remains our reliable partner on strategic matters. At same time, Poland is a leader in Eastern Europe, he said. According expert, Western European leaders have indicated that they intend listen Polish leadership’s position. And this is extremely important in Donetsk Basin settlement process. ... After all, until now situation has remained in a stalemate, since Ukraine on one side and Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics on other have diametrically opposed positions on the purpose and objective of Minsk agreements [for a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine; see Current Digest, Vol. 66, No. 37, pp. 3 - 6 and Vol. 67, No. 7, pp. 3 - 7 - Trans.]. Kiev is convinced that their implementation should result in elimination of DPR/LPR and region’s return Ukrainian control. The republics, on the contrary, are convinced that aim of Minsk agreements is to formalize and recognize [their] special status, independent from Ukraine. ... It is impossible harmonize or coordinate those positions. None of sides is willing make concessions. It is noteworthy that last Sunday (Coalminer’s Day and Donetsk Day), Ukrainian President Pyotr Poroshenko, addressing Donetsk Basin residents, assured them that their region was, is and will remain Ukrainian. Meanwhile, Donetsk people’s republic leader Aleksandr Zakharov talked about cynicism and brutality of Nazi power in Kiev, took pride in fact that the city did not succumb the enemy, and called Donetsk an outpost of Russian world and a symbol of struggle for freedom. ... The intensity of shelling attacks in Donetsk Basin has been increasing throughout summer, and now their number per day is comparable most heated periods of military confrontation. The [Trilateral] Contact Group discussed situation during a meeting last weekend in OSCE special representative Martin Sajdik stated after talks that all parties agreed it is necessary to fully observe ceasefire***in connection with the start of academic year on Sept. 1. But will that actually happen? ... Since June, participants in Minsk negotiations have been trying reach an agreement on sides’ withdrawal from line of contact in at least two or three areas. For starters, towns of Petrovskoye (Donetsk Province) and Zolotoye (Lugansk Province) were chosen. However, at last meeting, parties failed to reach an agreement. The republics suspected Ukrainian side of manipulation. Denis Pushilin, Donetsk people’s republic representative at Minsk talks, told Donetsk News Agency (DAN): At this stage, we also see inexpediency of taking the first steps (in withdrawing troops from line of contact - NG), which were not clearly spelled out, not clearly formalized in documents that were endorsed, initialed and signed at a high level in Minsk. ... The republics are outraged by fact that Ukrainian delegation often cites need approve decisions within the Normandy format. In particular, this concerns issue of amnesty for defenders of DPR/LPR. Commenting on Ukraine’s position, DPR acting foreign minister Natalya Nikonorova told DAN: We have to remind Kiev again that Normandy format will not replace the Minsk format. Our representatives, with whom all modalities and drafts should be agreed on, participate only in Minsk [format].

ГЕРМАНО-ПОЛЬСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ И “ВЕЙМАРСКИЙ ТРЕУГОЛЬНИК”

ГЕРМАНО-ПОЛЬСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ И “ВЕЙМАРСКИЙ ТРЕУГОЛЬНИК”

Germany in a Changing World

Germany in a Changing World

Visegrad Group Co‐operation and Russia*

AbstractMuch thought has been given of late to how national preferences impact upon European Union‐level policy‐making towards Russia and it is widely accepted that discrepancies in Member State attitudes can undermine consistent and effective multilateral policies. So far there has been no attempt to ascertain whether subregional groupings that exist inside the EU (which represent a potential in‐between layer of policy‐making between the bilateral and multilateral) are inclined or able to attempt to co‐ordinate their positions on Russia. This article focuses on the Visegrad Group (VG), which would appear to be an obvious candidate, but actually has virtually no co‐operation agenda vis‐à‐vis Russia (the other main groupings are the Benelux Economic Union, the Nordic Council and the Weimar Triangle). The article argues that it is difficult to accommodate Russia in the current VG foreign policy framework due to the focus on ‘low’ politics and integration assistance. It also contends that limited capacity and intra‐VG divergence on key aspects of relations with Russia mean that the VG is unlikely to expand its agenda so as to attempt more co‐operation on Russia in the future.

The Weimar Triangle - Between a Moderate Regional Success and an Uncertain Future: Where Does it Come from? What is it? Where is it Going?

The Weimar Triangle is soon to celebrate its twentieth anniversary. With a mixed record of relevance (due often to the leaders themselves) and a relatively strong level of cooperation as regards regional and local actors, it is in a process of redefinition. Through policies adopted at its February high level summit (EU budget, ESDP, etc.) and its prospective integration of Russia it might become a viable and highly influent organization at the European level.

Book review: “Trójkąt Weimarski w Europie”, Klaus–Heinrich Standke (ed.), Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010, pp. 951

The signifi cance of the Weimar Triangle as a platform for cooperation and solving the most important problems of continental Europe has been changing since the day it was established. Despite a number of signifi cant and spectacular achievements and answers given to the most crucial questions, there are still a lot of controversial issues in which the agreement cold not be achieved.