Weapons Of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Articles

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions.

Effective Orchestration? The 1540 Committee and the WMD Terrorism Regime Complex

AbstractIn 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, the central international tool to prevent terrorism with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In spite of the resolution's strong mandate, its implementation body, the 1540 Committee, has remained weak in terms of enforcement powers, budget allocation and human resources. This article addresses this gap between mandate and implementation capacity. It examines specifically how the 1540 Committee has tried to overcome its structural constraints to achieve its objectives. This has led to two important findings: first, building upon theoretical insights from the management of regime complexes, the article shows that the 1540 Committee has resorted to the orchestration of intermediary actors in the form of other international organizations belonging to the so‐called WMD terrorism regime complex. This demonstrates that – contrary to what the current literature suggests – orchestration is used on a large scale in high profile cases of international security. Second, the analysis of the performance of the process of orchestration reveals significant variation. While a large number of intermediary actors have integrated the provisions of Resolution 1540 in their own agendas, the coordination of these actors by the 1540 Committee has remained largely ad hoc and lacked the systematic exchange of relevant information.

Should conventional terrorist bombings be considered weapons of mass destruction terrorism?

Since weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are typically thought of as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons, the designation of conventional bombings as WMD terrorism under US law has generated controversy and can affect how policymakers plan for future attacks. Using quantitative data on terrorist attacks, federal planning documents, and the academic literature, we argue that placing the conventional terrorist bombings in the same legal category as CBRN terrorism confuses two distinct terrorist threats with different risks of occurrence, casualty profiles, consequences, and emergency response requirements. We explore the logical and practical reasons why such threat conflation could create policy problems. We conclude that the current definition of WMD terrorism under US law that aggregates conventional terrorist bombings with CBRN terrorism should be revised.

Terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction: How serious is the threat?

This article examines the extent to which terrorist use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons poses a tangible threat to international security. In the literature on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) some analysts have tended to exaggerate the scope of the threat and assumed that large-scale terrorist acts involving WMD are only 'a matter of time'. In short, there is a tendency among observers to converge on analogous assessments at the higher end of the threat spectrum. In this article I argue that although WMD terrorism remains a real prospect, the ease with which such attacks can be carried out has been exaggerated; acquiring WMD capabilities for delivery against targets is a lot more problematic for terrorists than is generally acknowledged in the literature. However, this is not to say that the possibility of such attacks can (or should) be ruled out. The rise of a 'new' brand of terrorism that operates across transnational networks and whose operations aim to inflict mass casualties, coupled with the destructive threshold crossed on 11 September 2001, mean that terrorist attacks using WMD will continue to be a realistic prospect in the future.

Meeting the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism: Toward a Broader Conception of Consequence Management

As the importance of psychosocial issues in domestic preparedness has come to be better understood, it has become evident that there are significant conceptual limitations in existing approaches to weapons of mass destruction consequence management. This article identifies six problems: (1) most understandings of consequence management focus on short-term issues with longer-term recovery issues receiving far less attention; (2) while psychological issues are beginning to be introduced, social issues are generally not addressed; (3) although more attention is being paid to mental health issues, scenarios that are predominantly psychosocial in their effects are not generally considered; (4) social and behavioral science insights are not adequately incorporated; (5) despite the further inclusion of psychological issues, the overall approach is not sufficiently integrated or interdisciplinary; and (6) although psychological issues are receiving more attention, fundamental macro-level issues such as the re-establishment of trust after a weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident rarely receive significant attention. These limitations could seriously weaken efforts to address the consequences of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear terrorist attack. There is an urgent need, therefore, to re-think current approaches and to develop a broader conception of consequence management.

When Terror Strikes, Who Should Respond?

During the past decade, concerns about possible terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) led Congress and the President to adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism plan focused on preventing a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack and enhancing domestic preparedness. The agency of choice for domestic consequence management has been the Department of Defense. Of the $1.4 billion appropriated in the FY 2000 budget specifically for WMD response, over half went to DOD. [1] Overreliance on the military for domestic WMD protection, however, may diminish the military's warfighting capability and holds the potential for infringement of individual rights. Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), signed in 1995, and the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 are the cornerstones of the United States' WMD terrorism strategy. This strategy is divided into four elements: intelligence and warning; prevention and deterrence; crisis and consequence management; and acquisition of equipment and technology. While crisis management involves the criminal aspect of dealing with a WMD attack, consequence management (CM) involves treating victims of the attack, searching for survivors, ensuring the containment of victims who are infected or exposed, and cleaning up the attack area. A number of agencies are involved in domestic preparedness. The National Security Council is the interagency consequence management coordinator; the Justice Department, through the FBI, handles crisis management and is responsible for preventing an attack; the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for consequence management after an attack; and first-responders include local municipalities and state governments. But DOD has been assigned a disproportionate amount of domestic consequence management responsibilities. This is due to the national security threat of WMD terrorism and the historical reliance on the military to solve complex domestic issues. The assumptions that led to PDD-39 and the Federal Response Plan may no longer be applicable, however, as new information and analysis draw differing conclusions on the threat of WMD terrorism. This article will discuss the Defense Department's role in domestic consequence management following a catastrophic terrorist attack. Catastrophic terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and all refer to the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological agents to bring about a major disaster with death tolls of ten thousand or higher. [2] The scope of this article will be limited to the discussion of superterrorism and not include other types of terrorism, such as conventional terrorism or small-scale chemical or biological weapons (CBW) terrorism. Pan Am 103, Khobar Towers, and the East African embassy bombings were incidents of conventional terrorism, for example, and the Aum Shinrikyo's sarin attack in Tokyo was an example of small-scale CBW terrorism. While the threat is no less serious, the low probability and unique political circumstances of an incident of nuclear terrorism exclude such weapons from this discussion. [3] Bringing the Issue into Focus Four events of the 1990s significantly sharpened the nation's perception of chemical-biological warfare and catastrophic terrorism. First, Saddam Hussein used his intermediate-range Scud missiles to demonstrate the paralyzing possibility of operating in a contaminated environment during the Persian Gulf War. Second, the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 demonstrated that foreign terrorists could not only operate on American soil, but could launch a chemical attack. [4] Third, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 proved that domestic terrorists could harm the nation. And fourth, the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult made chemical warfare a reality. The United States responded to the threat of terrorism, particularly superterrorism, when President Clinton signed PDD-39 in June 1995, PDD-62 in May 1998, and the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act. …

Terrorism and the ethics of emergency medical care

The threat of domestic and international terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction–terrorism (WMD-T) has become an increasing public health concern for US citizens. WMD-T events may have a major effect on many societal sectors but particularly on the health care delivery system. Anticipated medical problems might include the need for large quantities of medical equipment and supplies, as well as capable and unaffected health care providers. In the setting of WMD-T, triage may bear little resemblance to the standard approach to civilian triage. To address these issues to the maximum benefit of our patients, we must first develop collective forethought and a broad-based consensus that these decisions must reach beyond the hospital emergency department. Critical decisions like these should not be made on an individual case-by-case basis. Physicians should never be placed in a position of individually deciding to deny treatment to patients without the guidance of a policy or protocol. Emergency physicians, however, may easily find themselves in a situation in which the demand for resources clearly exceeds supply. It is for this reason that emergency care providers, personnel, hospital administrators, religious leaders, and medical ethics committees need to engage in bioethical decisionmaking before an acute bioterrorist event. [Pesik N, Keim ME, Iserson KV. Terrorism and the ethics of emergency medical care. Ann Emerg Med. June 2001;37:642-646.]

Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption

Because of the importance of technology to the operations of modern terrorist groups, the factors that affect the technological sophistication of extreme organizations are of great interest. In this article, the process through which terrorist groups seek out and deploy new technology is examined by bringing to bear the deep literature that exists on technology adoption by commercial organizations. A framework is described that delineates not only the factors that influence a group's decision-making processes surrounding new technology but also the obstacles that stand in the way of the successful absorption and use of unfamiliar technologies by a terrorist organization. This framework, by taking a holistic view of the entire technology adoption process, sets out a methodology to both more reasonably predict the outcome of a group's technology-seeking efforts and to speculate about its future innovation efforts. Such a technology focused viewpoint provides a route to more fully inform risk assessment, especially with regard to the low probabilityhigh consequence technologies that have served as the focus of much recent counterterrorist deliberation. The lessons provided by the framework with respect to weapons of mass destruction terrorism and to novel counterterrorist routes are discussed.