Nuclear verification includes confirmation measures of nuclear weapons and fissile material, which often rely on the detection of radiation signatures. It is an open research question whether these signatures are unique. Or in reverse, could a malicious actor imitate these signatures and compromise verification of disarmament processes by using hoax objects instead of real warheads? This article presents several warhead emission models and a simulation framework to assess the uniqueness of their passive gamma radiation signatures. A red team approach includes detailed simulations of three proposed confirmation systems: The Information Barrier eXperimental, and the Information Barrier eXperimental II, both developed at Princeton University, and the Trusted Radiation Identification System, developed at the Sandia National Laboratories. For these simulations, various hoaxes are analyzed: warheads using reactor-grade plutonium instead of weapon-grade plutonium, combinations of different gamma emitting isotopes, and combinations of neutron sources with radioactive isotopes. Our findings reveal that numerous radioactive signatures are not unique and may be susceptible to imitation. Moreover, confirmation systems based on passive gamma radiation signatures using low bin numbers demonstrate a limited ability to accurately handle warheads of varying ages.
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