Weakness Of Political Parties Research Articles

The Reality of Political Reform in Jordan and its most Prominent Obstacles in the Period (1989-2019)

The study aimed to uncover the reality of political reform in Jordan and its most prominent obstacles in the period (1989 - 2019). To achieve this goal, a functional structural approach was adopted, which was developed by Talcott Baresons, and David Estion and Gabriel Almond, which looks at the political system as several buildings that perform Multiple and necessary functions. The study was divided into a preamble dealing with the concept of political reform and the most prominent theories explained to it in Arab and foreign literature, while the topic dealt with the reality of political reform in Jordan in the period (1989 - 2019) and the most prominent indicators of reform covered by the study period, and finally, the second topic addressed the most prominent obstacles to reform Political, whether related to parties or the social structure of Jordanian society. The study concluded that political reform in Jordan always comes after a certain crisis occurred. The reforms that Jordan witnessed in 1989 came as a result of the economic crisis that Jordan suffered from at the time, while political reforms in 2011 came as a result of the events in the Arab region during the Arab Spring revolutions. The study also showed that the weakness of political parties, in addition to the prevailing social culture in Jordanian society, which promotes loyalty to the clan or family, are among the main obstacles to political reform in Jordan.

Non-party ministers and technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia

ABSTRACT Non-party ministers and technocrats have emerged as leading political actors in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Five heads of government out of eight appointed between 2011 and 2020 were not affiliated to any political party. Technocrat-led governments were appointed amidst acute political crises due to their ostensible technical expertise and non-partisan profile. Despite their prominent role in government, existing studies on post-revolutionary Tunisia have largely neglected the role of non-party ministers and technocrats, treating them as relatively marginal actors. The article situates their emergence along a decades-long technocratic turn started under Ben Ali, which opted to replace the professional politicians of the Bourguiba era with technocrats hailing from the public administration. After 2011, a combination of demand- and supply-side factors have contributed to their increased participation in government. In particular, the article argues that the institutional autonomy of the technocratic apparatus, weakness of political parties, a preference for technical expertise and consensual politics, and pressures from international financial institutions were key to the rise of non-party ministers and technocrats in post-revolutionary Tunisia.

Флоркросинг: особливості партійних перестрибувань в Україні

The paper considers the meaning of the term “floor-crossing”, its basic kinds, legislative regulation and features of party switching in Ukraine since its independence. It has been found out that crossing the floor, change of political orientations and, as a consequence, adjustment of pre-election promises, the reality the Ukrainian politician face. Floor crossing in the Ukrainian Parliament has become a phenomenon that altered coalitions, generated opportunism and political corruption. It has been established that in modern practice there are two possible ways of influencing the process of inter-party switching: a legislative ban or a purely formal condemnation of the deputy’s/party’s actions on the part of the electorate and party members. To reduce the number of switching between factions, Ukraine has a so-called imperative mandate (a special version of it). It applies only to the deputies who are elected from the lists of political parties. Consequently, the problem lies in the partial legislative regulation of the problem of “floor-crossing”, which should be enshrined in new regulations /normative acts/. This acquires particular significance in the context of Russian military aggression and possible subversive activity of pro-Russian politicians, whose activities should be ruled out by such legislative acts. Any attempts to discredit the country on the part of deputies, making advances to the aggressor, should have legal consequences and the possibility for the electorate to influence the politician being elected. It has been found that frequent party switching discredits electoral and parliamentary system and shows flaws in the selection of personalities and why they go into politics; in addition, it can also indicate the strength or weakness of political parties. It has been proven that excessive and nontransparent motivated floor-crossing of deputies is becoming rarer with each new convocation, indicating a positive trend in the qualitative selection of candidates for deputies among party members. The final consolidation of the proportional system with open lists in the Electoral Code and the legislative regulation of inter-party/inter-factional switching should be the basis of qualitative deputy composition and commitment to declared political ideas.

Is the Low Electoral Turnout of Indigenous People a Myth? Evidence from Subnational Elections in Chile, 2012-2017

Abundant evidence exists of the low electoral turnout of indigenous people. Among the reasons that explain this result are the weakness of political parties in representing indigenous people, the economic circumstances of ethnic minorities, and their experiences of discrimination. In general, these findings are based on analyses of national elections, and it is unclear if they hold equally at the subnational level. This study of the Mapuche ethnic group in Chile analyzed the electoral turnout in Chile’s 345 municipalities for the national elections of 2013 and 2017 and the subnational elections of 2012 and 2016. The study found the following. First, the electoral turnout in municipalities with the highest concentration of Mapuche is above the average for subnational elections and comparable to the average for national elections. Second, the electoral turnout in these municipalities increases in those subnational elections in which candidates with Mapuche surnames compete. Third, the electoral turnout increases even more in those municipalities in which Mapuche mayoral candidates win in subnational elections.

Populist leaders and political parties

AbstractPopulism is a particular type of constitutional pathology; a brand of groupthink in which a leader establishes a direct connection with the people and, by virtue of this connection, is able to govern outside the established constitutional processes of the state. This Article reflects on the interaction between populism and political parties. It argues that one of the roles of political parties is to act as a medium between political elites and the people; a medium that can, or should, enable the people to exercise control over this elite through their membership of parties. Populism therefore presents a threat to the proper operation of political parties, and the proper operation of political parties correspondingly threatens populism.This Article begins by reflecting on the nature of populism. It does not pretend to provide a complete account of that phenomenon, but rather aspires to identify one strand of populist rule: A particular type of connection between the leader and her people. Second, the paper reflects on the constitutional role of political parties. Whilst political parties have often been treated critically in British constitutional scholarship, it will be argued that they are essential to the success of the democratic process: Modern representative democracy cannot function in their absence. Finally, these two sections of the paper will be drawn together: One explanation for the rise of populism is the weakness of political parties, and one way of combating, or mitigating, populism is for the state, and the citizenry, to support and facilitate parties. This Article suggests a correlation between the decline of political parties and the rise of populism, but it cautiously avoids making claims of causation. It could be that the decline of political parties leads to the rise of populism, as voters who are faced with a choice of superannuated parties turn, instead, to charismatic individuals. Or it could be that the rise of populism leads to the decline of political parties, as voters develop a direct relationship with leaders and, as a result, cease to engage with each other within the context of parties. Or, perhaps, these interactions might occur together, forming a feedback loop, with the decline of parties leading to the rise of populism which, in turn, hastens party decay.

Low-Intensity Democracy and Peru’s Neoliberal State: The Case of the Humala Administration

The election of Ollanta Humala in 2011 did not lead to a radical break from neoliberalism as many expected. His administration continued and deepened Peru’s conservative political and economic regime, its “low-intensity democracy.” His lack of a shift has been attributed to electoral dynamics, his leadership style, and the weakness of political parties. However, these readings overlook the structural impediments to any left government in Peru and Humala’s readiness to adapt his politics to this neoliberal reality. The power of Peru’s neoliberal political elite, the United States, economic groups, and transnational capital have all helped to constitute a structure of elite rule strong enough to prevent a radical shift.La elección de Ollanta Humala en el 2011 no condujo a una ruptura radical con el neoliberalismo, a diferencia de lo que esperaban muchos. Su administración mantuvo y profundizó el régimen político y económico conservador del Perú, su “democracia de baja intensidad”. La falta de cambio se ha atribuido a la dinámica electoral, su estilo de liderazgo y la debilidad de los partidos políticos. Sin embargo, estas interpretaciones ignoran los impedimentos estructurales existentes en Perú para cualquier gobierno de izquierda, así como la predisposición de Humala a adaptar su política a esta realidad neoliberal. El poder de la élite política neoliberal del Perú, los Estados Unidos, los grupos económicos y el capital transnacional han ayudado a construir una estructura de poder elitista lo suficientemente fuerte como para prevenir un cambio radical.

Indonesia. Indonesia's ascent: Power, leadership, and the regional order Edited by Christopher B. Roberts , Ahmad D. Habir and Leonard C. Sebastian Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Pp. xxiv + 372. Figures, Tables, Index.

Indonesia. Indonesia's ascent: Power, leadership, and the regional order Edited by Christopher B. Roberts , Ahmad D. Habir and Leonard C. Sebastian Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. Pp. xxiv + 372. Figures, Tables, Index. - Volume 48 Issue 1

الترشيح الحزبي وأثره على السلم الأهلي الجزائر نموذجاً

The majority of the political parties in Algeria including the ruling ones, have lost their credibility among the masses, and despite what these parties are enjoying (power and money), they failed miserably in providing qualified candidates that enjoy the respect of millions of Algerian voters at the level of the parliament and municipal councils. These paper focuses of the reality of political action in the Algerian political parties and the role these parties play in the political development process. It is vital to address de various social needs and the economic development of society to deal with the various conflicts and urgent demands of the society. Equality through political participation and the transition from a culture of submission and clapping, to a culture of participation and monitoring through public election, or by increasing the areas of political mobilization, in addition for the core issue of competence based public office candidates a important issues to deal with. The weakness of political parties in Algeria, and the lack of effectiveness have contributed to underdevelopment poverty and ignorance. Studies and statistics indicate that political parties failed to build a strong, active system. Progress will only take place through the nomination of qualified members whatever their convictions and affiliations. Development of laws and regulation that can lead society towards modernity and urbanization as well as the restructuring of public and political are necessary. The next step is to discuss loyalty, affiliation and participation on all levels to inspire individuals and groups. The responsibility of the political parties in finding an outlet for the country is represented in enabling qualified people to lead the community. This is not less important than providing medicine, food and housing for the community. At present, members of the political parties have absolute power and freedom (in the absence of law binding regulation), but do not have the best interest of the people in mind. The recent elections in Algeria, has been the last nail in the coffin of democracy and positive political practice. This research paper will focus on: first, reading the structure and orientation of the active political parties in Algeria nowadays; secondly, efficiency and fairness between partisan rhetoric and personal loyalties; thirdly, the impact of policies and practices in the short and long terms; and finally, the reco.

The influence of political parties on the Constitution

This brief review analyses the impact of political parties on the institutions of the Fifth Republic. Parties affect the role of the presidency and parliament. They affect the functioning of the presidential election. Successful presidential candidates need the support of a large party, though they also need to build alliances as well. Following the election, parties tend to support the president. Indeed, the presidentialized system depends on the structural weakness of political parties. Recently, though, attempts have been made to revitalize the role of parliament and there are some signs that the majority party is now more willing to challenge the president.

Searching for the Electoral Connection: Parliamentary Party Switching In the Ukrainian Rada, 1998–2002

Studies of legislative behavior almost universally begin with the assumption that legislators desire reelection. For scholars who study the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, this assumption is perhaps tenuous, given the weaknesses of political parties and the significant party switching. Yet an analysis of party switching between 1998 and 2002 using a new method that controls for selection bias demonstrates that, although turnover among parties was high, this turnover followed an electoral logic: deputies changed parties, in part, to secure reelection. Thus, the electoral connection, assumed in so much of the legislative behavior literature, existed even in the chaotic Rada.

The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil: Interests, Identities, and Institutions in Comparative Politics. By Barry Ames. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 352p. $59.50

Students of Brazil, of various disciplinary and theoretical persuasions, have long sought to explain the seeming inability of the country's political leadership to transcend patronage politics and develop coherent policies suitable for transforming the country's enormous potential into sustained economic growth and greater social equity. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil by Barry Ames, is the most recent major work in this tradition. Grounded in rational choice principles, the book's core argument is that political institutions—namely, open-list proportional representation in districts of high magnitude, coupled with federalism and the executive's long-standing reliance on patronage and pork—are at the heart of Brazil's governability problems. The proliferation of veto players, the continued weakness of political parties, legislative obstructionism, and corruption are among the most pernicious effects of the system.

Central Governing Incapacity and the Weakness of Political Parties: Russian Democracy in Disarray

Political parties can be an important mechanism by which to better integrate states in the developing world. Despite this, in Russia parties continue to penetrate provincial politics only weakly and thus do not help to integrate the state and enhance its abilities to govern in the periphery by extension. Drawing on evidence of weak central-state capacity to govern in the Russian provinces and correspondingly weak political party penetration, emergent political and economic actors have little interest in building political parties and increasing state integration and capacity as a result. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the argument and analysis for the future of Russian political and economic development. M ore than ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to enjoy flickering developmental success. Despite the declarations of Russia's second popularly elected president, Vladimir Putin, and his institutional innovations designed to strengthen the Russian state and push reform further, it is unclear that he yet possesses the institutional weaponry with which to accomplish these formidable tasks. Putin quickly diagnosed one of Russia's clear afflictions-a weakly integrated state-and he has put forward a variety of institutional cures. He has, however, so far ignored an important, but often overlooked factor that contributes to Russia's weak integration-the underdevelopment of its party system in the provinces. The article is divided into four sections. Part one briefly discusses Putin's attempts to reintegrate the Russian state. This section makes a case for the importance of political parties as sources of political integration and centralstate capacity to exert its authority beyond the Kremlin. Part two presents empirical evidence showing the degree to which the Russian state is poorly integrated (as manifested by the center's faltering abilities to implement policy in the regions during the 1990s) and the corresponding weak penetration of Russian political parties into regional politics. Part three presents some competing explanations for party weakness in Russia and argues that emergent political and economic actors have little interest in building political parties and in increasing state integration and centralAUTHOR'S NOTE: This article was prepared with generous support from the Smith Richardson Foundation. The author would like to thank Sheri Berman, Philip Roeder, and one anonymous reviewer for especially useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. The author also thanks Karen Dawisha for referring this piece to Publius: TheJorunal of Federalism and Michael Pagano for putting this special issue together.

On shaky ground: concerning the absence or weakness of political parties in Iran

Why have large scale and durable political parties, representing broad socio-economic interests and seriously concerned with assuming political power through democratic constitutional means, not emerged in Iran? And why have even State-sponsored parties failed? These important questions have received virtually no serious scholarly attention. What follows is a preliminary attempt to address them by considering the configuration of those groups or collectivities normally identified as political parties, exploring their inadequacies, and highlighting the main factors which have accounted for the failure of party politics in twentieth-century Iran.The Early YearsWith the introduction of constitutional arrangements in Iran in 1906, the newly established National Consultative Assembly (Majlis) became the major arena for public debate among constitutionalists on how best to identify, consolidate, build upon and institutionalize the new political achievements. The difficulties of reconciling political order and constitutional accountability provoked pronounced differences of opinion and discord.

How Much Political Power do Economic Forces Have? Conflicts Over Social Insurance Reform in Brazil

ABSTRACTThe failure of attempts at neoliberal social security reform in Brazil since 1990 demonstrates the limited political influence of seemingly powerful economic forces, especially private business and international financial institutions. Besides power-dispersing constitutional structures, the fragmentation of social forces, the weakness of political parties, and the internal segmentation of the state apparatus have hindered the efforts of Brazilian governments to gain the political support necessary to cut entitlements and thus stem the rapid rise in pension spending.

Knocking on Newsroom Doors: The Press and Political Scandals in Argentina

This article examines the causes for the rise of political scandals in Argentina in the early 1990s. Available explanations fail to provide a satisfactory answer, mainly because they ignore the interplay of forces that produce media revelations of government wrongdoing. Argentine scandals cannot be reduced to arguments about official corruption but rather require a consideration of political and media developments. Media exposes in Argentina have resulted from particular political dynamics coupled with the increasing opposition of some news media to the Menem administration. Political dynamics such as democratic stability, a strong executive, and the weakness of political parties as policymaking and communication institutions have contributed to reinforcing the role of the press as an alternative arena for acting out political confrontations. The fact that two dailies have adopted a muckraking ethos and conducted investigative reporting, unusual for Argentine media standards, also accounts for the growing...

India Under the Impact of Western Political Ideas and Institutions

HEREAS, IN EARLIER TIMES, the East was the fertile womb of great religions, spawning them across the face of the world, in these times Western political ingenuity is reciprocating in an awesome compliment by transmitting to the politically infertile East viable political ideas and institutions. The phenomenon of liberated, underprivileged peoples seizing upon the political institutions and ideals of their former Western masters has become commonplace-so common that the significance of it needs analysis. A commentary par excellence on this political impact of West on East is the fact that all former colonial countries have embraced the outward forms of Western representative institutions. The departing captains and kings may or may not have left a legacy of enmity behind, but they have always left an admiration for their political talent. This largess to the Asian and African by the West is the great impact of these times. Hardly without exception, these freed people are creating constituent assemblies, writing constitutions, electing representative parliaments, making laws, organizing political parties, debating the merits of federal vs. unitary systems, separation of powers, ministerial responsibility, universal suffrage, human rights, independent judiciaries, economic planning and foreign policy.1 As often as not these political amateurs encounter a diversity of difficulties grafting imported political institutions onto indigenous customs and traditions and making them work. The absence too often of a strong sense of national unity, the paucity of democratic experiences, the weakness of political parties, and the impotence of other voluntary political groups plague them. The insidious interplay in a world of bipolar powers competing for allies and subverting new regimes before they are firmly set on their courses all contribute to the political instability so much in evidence today. Were it not that the prolonged struggles for freedom from alien Western rule have proven fruitful in breeding familiar Western instruments of revolutionary action there would be even more disorder.2