Weak Win Wars Research Articles

How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. By Ivan Arreguin-Toft. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 250p. 29.99 paper.The question of asymmetric conflicts or, more precisely, wars between two states of unequal power capabilities is an important one, but it has received scant scholarly focus, especially in the international relations field. More importantly, the subject of weaker actors winning wars against stronger adversaries has received limited attention. This is especially puzzling since during the Cold War, both superpowers experienced defeat or stalemate at the hands of weaker powers. In the case of the Soviet Union, an ill-fated asymmetric war in Afghanistan contributed to its demise as a state. America's failure in Vietnam had a major impact on U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy behavior for years to come. It affected American strategy regarding war in the developing world, encouraging the development of and reliance on new precision-guided weapons systems and strategies that would preclude ground combat. The failure of France in Indochina and Algeria also point to the significance of the phenomenon of asymmetric war. The Israeli and American withdrawals from Lebanon in 1982 and 1983 and India's pulling out from Sri Lanka in 1990 are other instances of stronger powers failing to make gains against their weaker adversaries. In the post-9/11 world, asymmetric conflicts have increasingly received the attention of military strategists as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have not received commensurate attention from IR scholars.

How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (review)

Reviewed by: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict Jeremy Black How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. By Ivan Arreguín-Toft. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0-521-54869-1. Tables. Figures. Appendixes. Notes. References. Index. Pp. xv, 250. $29.99. A political scientist with a background of service in the U.S. Army, including as a military intelligence analyst, Dr. Arreguín-Toft sets out to offer a theoretical perspective on why the weak win wars. He does so by means of a theoretical section which is then followed by five case studies: Russia in the Caucasus, 1830–59, the Second Boer War, the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–40, the U.S.A. in Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. A number of variables that might explain the contrasting success of strong states in asymmetric conflicts are evaluated, for example "democratic social squeamishness". Arreguín-Toft concludes that the strategic interaction thesis best explains the situation: "According to this thesis, the interaction of the strategies actors use during a conflict predicts the outcome of that conflict better than competing explanations. If . . . when [End Page 297] actors employ similar strategic approaches . . . relative power explains the outcome . . . when actors employ opposite strategic approaches . . . weak actors are much more likely to win" (p. 18). The case studies are each examined from the perspective of the overall thesis. For example, as far as Afghanistan is concerned, the author argues that strategic interaction explains why the Soviets failed in 1980–82—by pursuing a conventional attack strategy against a mujahideen guerrilla warfare strategy. In 1983, however, the Soviets switched to a barbarism strategy, but, Arreguín-Toft argues, still failed because the mujahideen were able to rely on intelligence and logistical support from foreign powers. Much of the discussion will not surprise military historians, and some may be dismayed by the heavy emphasis on the theoretical model, rather than detailed research on operational and strategic issues, not least the decisionmaking processes of the combatants. Some readers may also dissent from the conclusions as applied to current American security concerns and foreign policy: If it wants to win the peace . . . it must support its resort to arms by eliminating foreign policy double standards and by increasing its capacity and willingness to use methods other than violence to resolve or deter conflicts around the world. So long as the United States continues to support corrupt and repressive regimes in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, terrorists and insurgents will continue to frustrate US interests in global peace and prosperity. (p. 227) This appears a simplistic account of the politics of much of the world, of American policy and of the response to it, each of which is over-determined to accord with a model. More generally, it is valuable to think in theoretical terms and Arreguín-Toft raises an important point when he demonstrates that strong states have become less effective with time. However, rather than differentiating between causal factors, it is more pertinent to argue in favour of multifactor explanations that cannot be readily separated. Much scholarship fails to address theoretical factors explicitly but, nevertheless, implicitly rests on a theoretical base. It may well be better to discuss the theories explicitly, but to do so it is best not to adopt an overly rigid approach. Jeremy Black University of Exeter Exeter , England, United Kingdom Copyright © 2007 Society for Military History

A Strategy for Success: How the Weak Defeat the Strong

How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. By Ivan Arreguin-Toft. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 274 pp., $75.00 cloth (ISBN: 0-521-83976-9), $29.99 (ISBN: 0-521-54869-1). How do the weak prevail in conflicts with significantly stronger opponents? This is the central question in Ivan Arreguin-Toft's How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict . According to Arreguin-Toft, the basic presumption that power trumps all other factors in determining who is victorious in battle is historically untenable. With increasing frequency, the weak have been defeating the strong. As Arreguin-Toft notes (pp. 5–6, 20), the field of international relations has failed to produce any systematic explanation for this empirical puzzle. How the Weak Win Wars is an attempt to fill this lacuna in the security studies literature, while providing policymakers and political analysts some insights into the conditions that make asymmetric conflicts tremendously costly in terms of political legitimacy and human life. Arreguin-Toft begins by building upon Andrew J. R. Mack's (1975) seminal discussion of small wars, in which Mack argued that relative interest is the deciding factor in wars between the strong and weak. Because weak actors are fighting for survival, they are systematically more motivated to absorb the costs of long wars than their stronger adversaries. In turn, the combination of low interests and high costs puts a strong actor's ruling elite in a position of political vulnerability, and eventually they succumb to domestic pressures to end the war short of victory. Although Arreguin-Toft agrees that the proximate cause of strong actor defeat is political vulnerability, he cites (pp. 14–15) three critical shortcomings in Mack's interest-asymmetry argument. First, power is a poor predictor of resolve. Because of alliance commitments or the prevalence of domino rationales, a strong actor may view a materially insignificant conflict as a matter of life and death and, thus, will be highly motivated to win. Second, to operationalize political vulnerability, Mack assumes that wars between the strong and weak are …

How the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict

How the weak win wars: a theory of asymmetric conflict

How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

List of figures Preface Acknowledgements List of abbreviations 1. Introduction 2. Explaining asymmetric conflict outcomes 3. Russia in the Caucasus: the Murid War, 1830-59 4. Britain in Orange Free State and Transvaal: the South African War, 1899-1902 5. Italy in Ethiopia: the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-40 6. The United States in Vietnam: the Vietnam War, 1965-73 7. The USSR in Afghanistan: the Afghan Civil War, 1979-89 8. Conclusion Appendix References Index.