Despite all the warning signs, the world of finance was caught off guard by the collapse of the Mexican peso in December 1994. The ensuing devaluation was followed by the largest bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) until then, and by early 1995 Mexico was in its most serious depression since the 1930s (Barkin and Rosen, 1997: 24). Through 1995, Mexico endured significant negative rates of growth and waves of bankruptcies. In addition, the population experienced a decline of real wages, which dropped by 27 percent between 1994 and 1996 (EPI, 1997: 14). This led to a significant increase in poverty: an estimated 75 percent of Mexican families could not afford the basic goods required to raise them above the official poverty line (Barkin and Rosen, 1997: 24). Local manufacturing was also severely affected, as was evidenced by the increase of bankruptcies in the manufacturing sector. In stark contrast to the -6.2 percent growth rate for the overall Mexican economy, the maquiladora industryl expanded by 30 percent in 1995 (IMF, 1998; INEGI, 1997). In fact, the sector grew from 2,200 plants with 550,000 workers at the end of 1994 to over 3,000 plants employing over 800,000 workers in 1996 (INEGI, 1997).2 The stakes for Mexico in the success of the maquiladora industry are high, as the foreign exchange generated by the sector has become the largest source of foreign revenues, surpassing oil in 1999. This helps to explain Mexico's
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