Voting Cohesion Research Articles

An evaluation of the efficiency of Turkic cooperation in the United Nations General Assembly

This study investigates the dynamics of voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by conducting a comparative analysis of the European Union (EU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The research aims to assess the external voting cohesion of OTS member states in relation to the EU and CIS, utilizing the benchmark of collective voting in the UNGA as an indicator. The historical context underscores the significance of regional organizations in fostering collaboration among member countries, particularly in the realms of economics, security, and socioeconomic growth. The focus of this study on the OTS arises from the unique geopolitical and historical circumstances of Turkic-speaking nations dispersed globally. The methodology employs a comprehensive analysis of UNGA roll-call votes, utilizing data spanning from 1992 to 2019. The study employs the voting cohesion measurement proposed by Hosli et al. (2010), incorporating a scoring system to quantify cohesion. Results indicate that, compared to the CIS, the OTS demonstrates slightly higher voting cohesion, with a discernible increasing trend over the years. The EU, exhibiting the highest level of cohesion, provides a reference point for potential advancements in the OTS's institutional structures and collaborative efforts. The findings suggest that the OTS has the potential to achieve EU-level cohesion with continued improvements in institutional frameworks and enhanced cooperation among member states. In conclusion, this study contributes to the understanding of international cooperation dynamics, emphasizing the evolving role of regional organizations in shaping voting behaviour at the global stage. The findings underscore the potential for increased cohesion within the OTS, positioning it as a significant player in international diplomacy.

European Union Foreign Policy

This article examines the voting patterns of Nordic countries and the Netherlands in the UNGA, highlighting their longstanding alignment. Notably, Norway and Iceland are not part of theEuropean Union, which has been enhancing its foreign policy coherence since 1993. The central focus is to investigate if this integration has led to a divergence between EU member states and non-members. By calculating the voting cohesion rate among these countries in the UNGA from 1993 to 2021, the article found no significant variation in the cohesion rate, suggesting that European integration has not ended their historic alignment.

National Interest in the European Parliament: Voting Homogeneity of Slovak Members of the European Parliament

This paper analyses the voting behavior of all Slovak members of the European Parliament since 2004 when Slovakia entered the EU until June 2022. Scholarly work has shown that MEP’s voting behavior is traditionally driven mainly by political party group membership and not by national origin. Nationality still has its importance, however only a secondary one in MEP’s voting decisions. Our aim is to identify policy areas where Slovak MEPs tend to vote similarly on a national basis. We applied the agreement index formula on every roll-call vote of the European Parliament during 2004 - 2022 for Slovak MEPs and sort them into policy area categories. Results showed the highest voting cohesion in international trade, budget, and regional development. The lowest voting cohesion was demonstrated in gender equality, petitions, and development. In general, the economic policy areas tend to have higher voting cohesion of Slovak MEPs than other policy areas. This paper opens up a set of questions for further research about the causes of the voting behavior of Slovak MEPs.

Реализация концепции многовекторности во внешней политике Республики Казахстан на примере голосования по резолюциям ГА ООН

The concept of multivectorism is the basis of the foreign policy strategy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Multivectorism is also the framework within which Kazakhstan carries out its foreign policy in international organizations and integrational institutions. However, the implementation of this aspect of its foreign policy within the UN General Assembly has not yet been studied. To examine the concept of multivectorism, the author analyzes Kazakhstan’s voting cohesion with Russia, China, the USA, Turkey, and Germany in the UNGA from 2007-2022. The author also studies Kazakhstan’s behavior in situations where it voted opposite the way these countries voted. This article analyzes, among other things, the voting cohesion of Kazakhstan and the other countries in question on particular topics, such as disarmament, decolonization, human rights, development issues, armed conflicts, etc., as well as Kazakhstan voting patterns on key resolutions relating to armed conflicts involving the Russian Federation. As a result of quantitative and qualitative analysis of more than 1300 resolutions, the author comes to the conclusion that the main “vector” of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is China. Not Russia, despite Russia formally enjoying the status of Kazakhstan’s declared key ally. Kazakhstan shares the highest voting cohesion with China (to a lesser extent with Russia, Turkey, and Germany, and only minimally with the United States). Moreover, when China and the other countries under examination vote in opposition to one another, Kazakhstan’s votes were more often in accordance with the Chinese position. The author argues that Kazakhstan also avoids explicit support for the Russian Federation in voting on resolutions related to armed conflicts involving Russia. This is further manifested in the Republic of Kazakhstan’s voting on resolutions related to the conflict in Ukraine. However, the reasons for the high level of voting cohesion between China and Kazakhstan in the UNGA require further research.

U.S.-UK Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly: Important Votes (2001–2019)

The article analyzes US-UK voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly in 2001 – 2019 based on the annual lists of important votes drawn up by the US Department of State. Voting cohesion in the UNGA demonstrates the level of support for US policies in this representative international forum. Since most UNGA resolutions are not binding, countries have more room for maneuver compared to voting in the UN Security Council. Washington pays close attention to other countries’ voting behavior in the UNGA, especially when it comes to Israel-related issues. Whereas the Anglo-American Special Relationship has been extensively studied with the focus on the military and political aspects, US-UK interaction in international organizations, especially in the UN, deserves greater attention. Both countries use their permanent membership of the Security Council to promote their interests. Nevertheless, US-UK voting cohesion in the UNGA has not attracted much attention yet, although it can help to objectively assess the interaction of these powers in the world arena. Four groups of important resolutions were identified for comparison: human rights, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, nuclear non-proliferation and international security, as well as sanctions and development. In 2001 – 2019 U.S.-UK voting cohesion on important resolutions was relatively high. Nevertheless, under Republicans George W. Bush and Donald Trump it was lower than during Barack Obama’s presidency. Despite the special relationship, the UK often aligns itself with the EU countries when voting in the UNGA. We paid special attention to resolutions on which the countries diverged, although Washington did not vote in complete isolation. U.S.-UK cohesion was higher on non-proliferation and human rights. At the same time, there were differences regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and development, especially in those cases when the US and the EU disagreed. Divergences were apparent when the US was prone to act unilaterally.

One Obstacle among Many: The Filibuster and Majority Party Agendas

Abstract In today’s hyper-partisan environment, scholars and commentators contend that the filibuster poses a nearly insuperable obstacle to a Senate majority party’s agenda, limiting Congress’s output to non-controversial measures. Drawing on data about congressional majority party agenda priorities from 1985 to 2020 we identify when and how majority party legislative efforts fell short of success and take stock of the degree to which the filibuster was the primary culprit. Not surprisingly, our data confirm that the filibuster is a significant problem for majority party agendas. But an even more common cause of failure is the majority party’s inability to agree among themselves. Despite increased voting cohesion generally, parties in the polarized era still routinely struggle to bridge their own internal divides.

Temática del proyecto de ley y cohesión en la votación de las coaliciones en el Congreso de Chile, 2010-2017

Studies on the cohesion by legislators in roll call votes have reported an effect of being a member of the ruling coalition, the origin and relevance of the bill, the electoral cycle and other institutional design features. But the theory also links voting cohesion to the subject of the bill, an issue not sufficiently addressed on studies on party-level cohesion in Latin American presidential democracies. This article tests four hypotheses including the subject of the bill on the 6468 roll call votes in the Chamber of Deputies of Chile between 2010 and 2017 legislative years. Rightwing legislators are more cohesive in roll call votes on issues related to defense and citizen security. Contrary to expectations, leftwing legislators are not more cohesive on social issues or human rights. Ruling coalition legislators are less cohesive on budget votes. The subject of the bill seems more important for rightwing legislators than leftwing ones; although it is speculated that this might be due in Chile to the fact that the rightwing coalition is comprised by a smaller number of parties which shares more ideological homogeneity.

Gingles Unraveled: Hispanic Voting Cohesion in South Florida

The Voting Rights Act protects the ability of racial and language minority groups to elect candidates of choice by prohibiting states and localities from diluting those groups’ votes when drawing electoral districts. The Fair Districts provisions of the Florida Constitution include a similar ban on vote dilution, plus further protections against diminishing (retrogressing) existing minority voting strength. A key element of proving vote dilution or retrogression is that the minority group votes cohesively. Historically, minority voting cohesion has often been uncontested or easily proven in VRA suits. But in South Florida, Hispanic citizens are voting less cohesively than they used to. This Article investigates the legal issues that arise when the assumption of cohesion unravels. First, this Article investigates to what extent the Hispanic community in South Florida is cohesive. It then proposes several alternative approaches to the vote dilution and retrogression framework to better align doctrine with the real-world conditions of voters and communities.

Party Voting Cohesion in Mixed Member Legislative Systems: Evidence from Korea and Taiwan

How do mixed‐member legislative systems influence legislator voting? While the literature remains inconclusive, this article suggests party influence as an intervening variable. Through an analysis of roll‐call data from Taiwan and Korea, no deviation is evident between district legislators and legislators elected by proportional representation. Further disaggregation of what it means to vote against one's party again finds little evidence of a tier distinction, while party variables remain significant. The findings are suggestive of a contamination effect between tiers, consistent with the influence of parties.

Pre- and Post-Lisbon: European Union Voting in the United Nations General Assembly

This paper focuses on effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the coherence of EU behaviour at the UN General Assembly (UNGA). It theorises the EU’s presence at the UNGA in terms of a principal–agent model wherein the EU and its entire membership are considered to constitute a collective principal while the actors playing the role of the agent have varied in different phases. It then investigates, in the light of this framework, the voting cohesion of EU member states at the UNGA between 1993 and 2012, paying particular attention to differences before and after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The statistical analysis shows that EU voting cohesion has been increasing in general during the last decade, but the level of cohesion is not (yet) significantly different post-Lisbon as compared to pre-Lisbon.

The Unsolved Puzzle: Pacific Asia's Voting Cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly—A Response to Peter Ferdinand

Research Highlights and Abstract This article Offers a refined research design for analysing voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly; Demonstrates that ASEAN's integration process is unlikely to explain the observed high level of voting cohesion in Pacific Asia; Specifies the ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Japan alignment; Shows that the alignment of South Korea is closer with the USA than with North Korea in contested votes in the United Nations General Assembly. In this paper, we propose a refined research agenda for analysing voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly. Although we respond specifically to Ferdinand, our four points of critique and suggestions concerning the research design are applicable to a larger corpus of literature. First, we include a longer period of observation to interpret the effects of regional integration. Second, we demonstrate the necessity to control for the year of accession of member states. Third, we propose to look at time series rather than arithmetical means to compare changes in voting cohesion. Finally, we exclude nearly unanimous votes from our analysis to enhance the explanatory values of our cases. This refined design has important effects on the analysis of Pacific Asia's voting cohesion in the UNGA. We conclude from our findings that regional integration is unlikely to explain the high level of voting cohesion within ASEAN and the region.

From indications to indicators: Measuring regional leadership in the UN context

This paper explores the limits and opportunities of relying on voting data to measure regional leadership in the United Nations (UN) context. Choosing the European Union (EU)’s functioning at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) as case study, it shows that these opportunities are limited for various reasons, notably because of the functioning of both the former and the latter.The paper falls into two parts. The first part sets the scene; the second part formulates suggestions for measuring regional leadership at both the state and regional level. Presenting the status quo, section one reviews the main empirical and methodological conclusions regarding the use of voting cohesion in the study of the EU at the UN. Section two calculates the voting cohesion of the EU Member States for ten subsequent sessions of the UNGA covering the years between September 2002 and 2012 (i.e. Sessions 57–66). Taking a closer look at possible operationalizations for regional leadership at both state and regional level, sections three and four point at the importance of incorporating voting cohesion into more complex measurement instruments. The conclusion summarises the main findings and explores the way forward.

Parliamentary party cohesion

High levels of party voting cohesion are common in modern legislatures. Current explanations divide into sociological (based on norms and roles) and rational choice (based on systems of punishment and reward). The latter approach dominates, but cannot explain cohesion in systems with weak disciplinary sanctions, such as the British House of Lords. Social psychology has provided a great deal of insight into conformity in groups, but this has rarely been deployed in studying parties. Neuroscience now also allows us better to understand the physiological mechanisms underlying responses such as need to belong and fear of ostracism. This article outlines key theories and findings from psychology relevant to parliamentary party cohesion, and then explores these using survey data from the relatively ‘discipline free’ House of Lords. It is suggested that psychological factors such as social identity are important to the operation of party groups, and stronger interdisciplinary links are proposed between political science and psychology.

Public Good Provision and Legislative Voting Cohesion: An Experimental Study

Legislative paralysis stemming from tenuously-held or undisciplined coalitions haunts a large number of legislatures. Parliamentary democracies use the Vote of Confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 20% reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.

Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators

Are subnational political elites, such as governors, capable of affecting the voting behavior of national representatives even in the face of high legislative discipline? We address this question by estimating the exogenous causal effect of gubernatorial influence on the voting behavior of national legislators in Mexico, where constitutional provisions guarantee that the political survival times of governors and legislators are fixed and known ex ante and where we can thus know precisely which legislators will leave congress before their state governor’s term has expired. We posit that such legislators will be more willing to represent gubernatorial preferences because they expect the governor to find them employment upon finishing their stay in congress. We find that governors whose terms end after the term of the national assembly are able to systematically increase the voting cohesion of legislators from their own party and state and that these effects are substantively important.

Multicameral voting cohesion games

This work links two research branches regarding cooperative games: multi-cameral games and a priori coalitions. Regarding the former, many parliaments are based on a bicameral system where bills have to be approved by both chambers. The parties’ power indices are affected by it. In fact one certain political party for one certain coalition can be crucial in one chamber and not in the other. Usually the problem can be solved by building a unified game, related to two or more chambers, where the global power indices can be calculated. Concerning cohesion games, some coalitions among parties might be possible, but have a low probability of materializing if the parties involved have very different ideologies. It is necessary to take this into consideration when we compute the relative power indices. In this work, a model is built that takes into consideration both topics. An automatic calculation algorithm is elaborated and is applied to the current situations in Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania, considering the location of the parties on the left-right axis. This model is then applied globally to the European Union. In this work the model is applied to Politics, but its applications are not limited to that field. For instance, in Finance it can be applied to describe agreements for debt restructuring and corporate mergers.

An International Actor Under Pressure: The Impact of the War on Terror and the Fifth Enlargement on EU Voting Cohesion at the UN General Assembly 2000–05*

AbstractThis article examines empirically whether Iraq and the fifth enlargement affected EU voting cohesion at the UN General Assembly 2000–05. It poses the question of whether the entrants' willingness to co‐operate might have ameliorated the expected adverse effects of Iraq and an increase in the number of new members.

Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2006

AbstractThis article examines the relative importance of regional and national forces in shaping the behavior of Brazilian legislators at the national level. A widely held view is that national legislators respond to state pressures in making decisions, rather than pressures from the national government. Governors not only can influence national debates but also can determine outcomes by exerting control over their states' legislative delegations. This article examines a dataset of all roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2006 to isolate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on legislative voting. Spanning the terms of five presidents and five different congresses, the data show that the local influence is weaker than the national on the voting decisions of individual legislators and the voting cohesion of state delegations. Alternative institutional resources allow the central government to counteract the centrifugal pressures of federalism and other institutional influences.

The Role of Pressure Groups in British Legislative Politics, 1945-1989

This paper examines the relationship between pressure groups and British executive- legislative institutions during a period of increased government interventionism following the Second World War. In spite of a phase of tripartite institutions and practices, during 1961- 1979, the British system of interest representation remained largely pluralistic. Yet it stayed functionally dierent from its US counterpart. I oer an alternative explanation for the markedly dissimilar impacts of special interest groups in the UK parliamentary system and the US presidential system. A simple game theoretic model facilitates a comparative analysis of the political incentives faced by pressure groups in the two systems. I establish that con- centration of proposal power in the executive branch of government together with institutions that foster voting cohesion in the ruling coalition have made the parliamentary UK legislature less responsive to demands for protection from special interests; in a competitive, pluralist, system of interest representation, where organization is costly, fewer interests will organize into pressure groups. These predictions are consistent with survey data from several sources.

EU Actorness in the International Labour Organization: Comparing Declaratory and Voting Cohesion

This article presents data on the voting records of the European Union (EU) Member States and the frequency of EU common statements in both technical (standard-setting) and political (scrutiny) issues in the International Labour Organization (ILO) between 1973 and 2007. By contrasting voting cohesion to declaratory cohesion, it advances the literature by demonstrating that contrary to theoretically informed predictions, political coordination is more successful than technical coordination. It explores the reasons for this through an analysis of different forms of actorness, namely the opportunity to act within the ILO, the presence of the EU through its Member States, and the capability of the policy-making apparatus to produce cohesive outputs. It concludes that the socialisation of Geneva-based diplomats is the most important variable explaining the relative success of political coordination, while the unfamiliarity of seconded national officials to Geneva with EU coordination explains the reduced effectiveness of technical cooperation.