Vote Maximization Research Articles

Party Change in the Post-Secular Age: The Case of Republican People’s Party in Turkey

The Republican People's Party (RPP) of Turkey is currently the main opposition party against the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP). While the RPP has usually been identified with a “rigid” understanding of secularism, the party has been experiencing a process of ideational change for more than a decade under the leadership of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. This study aims to describe and explain the party’s shift to a “softer” version of secularism. Under the light of party change literature, one internal and two external factors are identified. The impact of leadership change, the internal factor, is examined with reference to major strategic and ideational changes initiated by Kılıçdaroğlu. The first major external stimulus is the global and local hegemony of post-secularism, which refers to the idea and practice of a new balance between citizenship and difference, allowing a greater space for religious arguments and images in the public sphere. The second is the transition to presidential system in Turkey, which both forced and facilitated the RPP’s search for electoral alliances with conservative parties in a personalized winner-takes-all game. It is claimed that these factors have made the RPP reassess the effectiveness of its commitment to classical secularism in meeting the renewed party goal of vote maximization. Reverse pressures on the party will also be examined in the article, with an aim of foreseeing the RPP’s leaning in the near future.
 Key Words: Republican People’s Party, Secularism, Post-Secular Society, Party Change
 JEL Classification: Z1, D72, Y80

How Do Mainstream Parties Justify Their (Un)willingness to Rule with Populist Parties? Evidence from Twitter Data

AbstractParties usually argue in favour or against a government coalition based on party considerations in terms of projected policy implementation, power in office and vote maximization – that is, the ‘policy, office, votes’ triad. So far, however, it remains unclear which claims mainstream parties invoke to motivate their choice to rule or not rule with populist parties. Adopting the ‘policy, voter, office’ triad, this article examines mainstream parties' Twitter claims on ruling with populist parties in Austria, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (2006–2021, N = 1,919). Mainstream parties mainly reject ruling with (mostly radical right) populist parties. To justify unwillingness, policy-based motives referring to the populist parties' extremist nature trump motives on office-seeking and vote maximization. To justify willingness, predominantly office-seeking motivations are invoked. Party characteristics (ideology, incumbency status, size) and context, however, shape these claims. This study sheds light on mainstream parties' patterns of political communication on coalition formation with populist parties.

Municipal Government Form and Budget Outcomes: Political Responsiveness, Bureaucratic Insulation, and the Budgetary Solvency of Cities

AbstractOne of the fundamental questions in democratic governance is whether policies are best decided by elected officials or by appointed bureaucrat-experts. The study examines this issue in the context of how municipal government form influences government-wide budgetary solvency. Government form creates distinct incentives for executive action that shape budget outcomes. In mayor–council governments, the elected executive’s desire to be reelected increases responsiveness to voters’ preferences. Vote maximization incentivizes the adoption of policies that are popular among voters but can lead to budgetary imbalance. In contrast, the appointed executive in the council–manager form is interested in career advancement, which she achieves by building a reputation for leading a fiscally sound government. Insulated from the demands of voters, the manager can rely on expert knowledge and professional norms to choose policies that result in balanced budgets. Using data from audited financial reports for 655 mid-sized and large city governments in the United States from fiscal years 2006 to 2013, the econometric analysis shows that council–manager cities have stronger budgetary solvency compared with mayor–council cities.

An Analysis on the Effect of Direct Election for a Superintendent on School Finance

본 연구는 교육감 직선제의 시행에 따른 단위 학교회계의 변화를 분석하는 데 목적이 있다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 16개 시ㆍ도 교육청 내 단위 학교의 기본 정보 및 학교회계 정보를 제공 하는 학교알리미 데이터를 활용하여 교육감 직선제의 시행으로 인한 단위 학교의 교육비 규모및 세입・세출 항목들의 변화를 살펴보았다. 이를 위해 학교회계의 점증주의적 성격을 고려하여 부가가치모형(value-added model)을 활용하여 분석을 실시하였다. 분석결과, 교육감 직선제의 시행연수가 길어질수록 학부모부담수입의 감소와 함께 학생 1인당 교육비 규모 감소 현상이 나타났는데, 이러한 결과는 표 극대화모형에 따라 교육감 직선제가 유권자이자 교육수요자인 학부모들의 교육비 부담 경감에 유의하게 작용함을 의미한다. 또한 교육감 직선제를 통해 학교시설과 설비 관련 지출이 증가하는 것으로 나타났는데, 이는 재정 투입 효과의 발현 측면에서 단시간에 예산 투입 효과가 나타날 수 있는 시설 확충 관련 재정 투입이 늘어난 결과로 해석할 수 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 분석 결과를 바탕으로 지금까지는 교육감 직선제를 통해 지방교육자치 실현을 위한 제도적 토대를 마련하였다면, 향후에는 교육감 직선제가 의도한 정책 목표를 달성할수 있도록 보다 실질적인 노력이 이루어져야 함을 제안한다. 특히, 교육감 직선제로 인한 순기 능을 강화하고 역기능을 최소화하기 위해 기본적인 교육활동의 질을 안정적으로 보장하는 최소한의 기본적 교육활동비 확보와 관련된 기준 마련 등이 필요함을 정책적인 시사점으로 제시 하였다.The purpose of this study is to analyze empirically the effect of direct election for a superintendent on the change of revenues and expenditures of individual schools. For this purpose, we utilized the value-added model, exploiting EDSS data which provides comprehensive information of individual schools in the Republic of Korea. Our results first show the decrease of total educational expenditure and parents’ financial burden due to the implementation of direct election for a superintendent as time went by. These results can be analyzed according to the vote maximization model. Furthermore, after the implementation of direct election for a superintendent, the cost for school maintenance and attached facilities have increased Based on the results of this study, we recommended that it is necessary to prepare institutionally requirement that can be applied to the initial school activities so that the quality of the school activities of the school can be improved. With regard to this, we suggest policy implications that institutional change should be done to make it better.

Of goals and own goals: A case study of right-wing populist party strategy for and during incumbency

Using internal party documents and semi-structured interviews with over 200 activists of the Freedom Party of Austria, this article examines (anticipatory) adaptation in the intra-party and governmental arenas when this right-wing populist party switched its primary goal from populist vote maximization to office. It suggests such parties’ success will owe much to their leaderships’ capacity to identify and implement strategies and behaviours consonant with their new primary goal and to deal effectively with the inescapable tensions caused by the transition to incumbency. The article demonstrates how the FPÖ’s failures in these respects resulted in an own goal. Yet right-wing populists’ experience of incumbency is not necessarily doomed to failure. Agency remains an important determinant of success. Indeed, it appears supply-side factors may well be far better at explaining rapid shifts in the fortunes of such parties than the still predominantly demand-side approaches.

Estimating the effects of activists in two-party and multi-party systems: comparing the United States and Israel

This article presents an electoral model where activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties. These resources are then used by the party candidates to enhance the electoral perception of their quality or valence. We construct an empirical model of the United States presidential election of 2008 and employ the electoral perception of the character traits of the two candidates. We use a simulation technique to determine the local Nash equilibrium, under vote share maximization, of this model. The result shows that the unique vote-maximizing equilibrium is one where the two candidates adopt convergent positions, close to the electoral center. This result conflicts with the estimated positions of the candidates in opposed quadrants of the policy space. The difference between estimated positions and equilibrium positions allows us to estimate the influence of activist groups on the candidates. We compare this estimation with that of Israel for the election of 1996, and show that vote maximization leads low valence parties to position themselves far from the electoral origin. We argue that these low valence parties in Israel will be dependent on support of radical activist groups, resulting in a degree of political fragmentation.

Theoretical Approaches Explaining the Ethno-Political Conflict in Sri Lanka

This study examines the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. It employs the theories of primordialist, constructivist, pre-colonialists, colonial theorists, modernization, vote-maximization, and institutional decay to understand Sri Lanka's three decades old violent ethnic conflict. This paper gives focus, in the context of these theories, to how the vote maximization strategy of the Sinhala political elites marginalized the ethnic minorities, particularly the Tamils, who lost trust in the state and its institutions and eventually adopted a violent struggle for secession

How Politics Matter When Policies Change: Understanding Policy Change as a Political Problem

The paper presents a model of the decision-making process that can help to understand the politics of policy change and stability. The model takes as a starting point veto players. Since these actors are mostly political parties in Western democracies, their preferences can be modelled as policy seeking and vote maximization. Thus, governing parties try to adopt certain policies which differ according to their partisan orientation. The adoption of policies may, however, be impeded by electoral considerations unless the government is confronted with economic problems that put its re-election at risk. In addition, the existence of further veto players can make the adoption of reforms difficult. Policy change comes about if at least one element of the veto player constellation changes or if an external shock occurs. Both of these mechanisms are discussed in more detail, taking a change in the partisan complexion of government and globalization as examples.

The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers' Party in Brazil

Drawing on historical and rational choice institutionalism, this article seeks to explain the evolution of the Workers' Party as it moved from opposition to government between 1989 and 2002. The Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), a once radical and programmatic party, came to look more like its catchall competitors over time. This shift resulted from the heightened emphasis placed on immediate vote maximization after Brazil's adoption of market reforms rendered the party's socialist project unviable. Vote maximization made the PT more susceptible to the institutional incentives for building electoral and political support in Brazil, incentives that induce parties to weaken their programmatic positions, forge opportunistic alliances, and resort to patronage and even corruption. To grow, the PT ended up applying such tactics, which it had long condemned. Yet its adaptation was incomplete and uneven due to historical legacies that hindered change. The analysis thus suggests that institutions evolve in response to changing environmental conditions but in ways constrained by past trajectories.

Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists

Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral center. Empirical analyses discussed in this paper suggest that convergence of this kind is rarely observed. Here we examine a stochastic electoral model where parties differ in their valences – the electorally perceived, non-policy “quality” of the party leader. It is assumed that valence may either be exogenous, in the sense of being an intrinsic characteristic of the leader, or may be due to the contributions of party activists, who donate time and money and thus enhance electoral support for the party. Theorem 1 shows that vote maximization depends on balancing these two opposed effects. Theorem 2 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to the electoral mean when activist valence is zero. The paper then examines empirical electoral models for the Netherlands circa 1980 and Britain in 1979, 1992 and 1997 and shows that party divergence from the electoral mean cannot be accounted for by exogenous valence alone. The balance condition suggests that the success of the Labour party in the election of 1997 can be attributed to a combination of high exogenous valence and pro-Europe activist support.

Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty

After an election, when party positions and strengths are known, there may be a centrally located large party at the core position. Theory sug- gests that such a core party is able to form a minority government and control policy. In the absence of a core party, theory suggests that the outcome be a lottery associated with coalition risk. Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral cen- ter. This paper first presents an existence theorem for local Nash equilibrium (LNE) under vote maximization, and then constructs a more general model using the notion of coalition risk. The model allows for the balancing of office and policy motivations. Empirical analyses of elections in the Netherlands and Israel are used as illustrations of the model and of the concept of a structurally stable LNE.

Conservative party rationality: Learning the lessons from the last election for the next

The received view of the Conservative Party’s 2001 General Election campaign was that the party campaigned on the wrong issues and fought an extreme campaign, trading the goal of vote maximization for an appeal to the core vote. This article challenges existing arguments and evidence that the positions adopted by the party were extreme and sub‐optimal. Analysis of British Election Study cross section data reveals that voters placed the Conservative Party closer to their own views than suggested by politicians’ self‐placement. The perceived placement of the Conservative Party was closest to voters of other parties on Europe and close but not closest to voters of all parties on the taxation–public spending scale. Conservative voters were more euro‐sceptic but also more pro‐spending than the perceived position of the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party’s 2001 General Election campaign may have been sub‐optimal but this should necessarily not be attributed to the failure of the party to act rationally according to issue proximity models of vote‐maximizing behaviour. The party’s issue emphasis was also consistent with theories of rationality. An alternative interpretation of the constraints facing the party is therefore offered.

Fiscal Illusion, Intergovernmental Grants and Local Spending

ISLAM M. N. (1998) Fiscal illusion, intergovernmental grants and local spending, Reg. Studies 32 , 63-71. This paper provides some evidence of fiscal illusion of a reduced tax-price of public service, engendered by provincial grants to local governments. A model of fiscal response to grants, based on expected vote maximization approach, is tested on time series data as well as pooled time series and cross-section data for 39 upper-tier municipalities in Ontario over the period 1977-91. A generalized two-stage least square procedure is used to estimate the model, adjusting for autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity in errors and simultaneity between grants and expenditures. The results show that the fiscally-induced price effects of grants varies quite widely from one municipality to another and these variations can be attributed to differences in municipal characteristics and their institutional relations with the province. Additionally, the results show evidence of considerable tax exporting (and importing) to (and from) non-residents. ISLAM M. N.(1998) L'illusion fiscale, les primes intergouvernementales et les dépenses locales, Reg. Studies 32 , 63-71. Cet article fournit quelques preuves de ''l'illusion fiscale'' du prix des services publics assorti d'une réduction d'impôt, ce qui s'explique par l'octroi des primes régionales aux administrations locales. A partir de la façon fondée sur la maximisation des votes attendus, un modèle de la sensibilité de la fiscalitéaux primes se voit tester employant des données en série temporelle aussi bien que des données en série temporelle et par section représentitative mises en commun pour 39 municipalités du niveau supérieur en Ontario de 1977 à 1991. Une méthode des moindres carrés à deux étapes généralisée se voit employer afin d'estimer le modèle, en ajustant pour l'autocorrélation, la possibilitédes erreurs diverses et la simultanéitéentre les primes et les dépenses. Les résultats laissent voir que les effets-prix des primes provoqués par la fiscalité varient de façon non-négligeable suivant la municipalité et ces variations peuvent être attribuées aux caractéristiques particulières des municipalités et à leurs rapports institutionnels avec la région. Qui plus est, les résultats font preuve d'une ''exportation d'impôt'' (et d'une importation d'impôt) à destination (et en provenance) des non-résidents. ISLAM M. N. (1998) Finanzpolitische Illusionen, Zuschüsse auf verschiedenen Regierungebenen und örtliche Aufwendungen, Reg. Studies 32 , 63-71. Dieser Aufsatz legt Anzeichen 'fiskalischer Illusionen' herabgesetzter Steuerkosten öffentlicher Dienste vor, die durch Zuschüsse der Provinzialregierung an Ortsverwaltungen erzeugt werden. Ein Modell fiskalischer Reaktion auf Zuschüsse, das auf einem Ansatz zu erwartender Höchstabgabe von Stimmen beruht, wird sowohl auf Zeitseriendaten wie auf gemeinsame Zeitserien und Querschnittsdaten für 39 städtische Gemeindeoberverwaltungen in Ontario für den Zeitraum 1977- 1991 geprüft. Ein verallgemeinertes, zwei Etappen umfassendes Least Squareverfahren wird dazu benutzt, das Modell zu schätzen, wobei Angleichungen zur Autokorrelation, Heteroskedastizität bei Fehlern und Gleichzeitigkeit von Zuschüssen und Ausgaben vorgenommen werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß die fiskalisch herbeigeführten Preisauswirkungen von Zuschüssen von einer Stadtverwaltung zur andern sehr verschieden sind, und daß diese Abweichungen den Unterschieden im städtischen Charakter und ihren institutionellen Beziehungen zu der Provinz zuzuschreiben sind. Außerdem weisen die Ergebnisse Anzeichen beträchtlicher 'Steuerexporte' (und - importe) an (und von) nicht am Orte Ansässigen auf.

Nash equilibrium in multiparty competitionwith “stochastic” voters

Theoretical spatial models of electoral voting tend to predict either convergence to an electoral mean (when voting is probabilistic) or chaos (when voting is deterministic). Here, we construct an empirical model of voting for the Israeli Knesset in 1992 (based on a large electoral sample and on analysis of party declarations). The probabilistic voting model so estimated fits the known election results. We then use the same model to simulate the effect of expected vote maximization by the parties. Contrary to the usual results, there is no unique convergent Nash equilibrium under this objective function. We do infer, however, that the two large parties are “Downsian”, in the sense that they maximize expected vote (up to the margin of error of the model). We suggest that the empirical results are compatible with a hybrid model of utility maximization, where each party computes the effects of its policy declaration both in terms of electoral response and of post-election coalition negotations.

Equilibria in non-cooperative competition of political parties having a common rate of morality

There are two natural criteria a model-builder would like to prescribe to political parties in policy-making: either to maximize the mass of its supporters, or to minimize the dissatisfaction of its supporters with the policy of the party. In this paper the non-cooperative equilibria of such political systems is studied where the parties follow a convex combination of both of these criteria. The distribution of voters' political views is taken to be univariate, either uniform, or normal. The main conclusion is that by both distributions equilibria with non-coinciding policies exist if and only if the weight of vote maximization is strictly limited in policy-making.

Economic Efficiency, Political Institutions and Policy Analysis

The authors focus on the implications for policy research and advice if they adopt either a strictly economic perspective or if they extend theoretical modeling to include political behavior and to account for the existence of political institutions. They examine the nature of policy analysis in models centering on a social planner, on expected vote maximization, and on majoritarian choices subject to possible instability of outcomes. Special attention is given to the treatment of project evaluation, budget size, tax structure and reform in the different perspectives, and to the meaning of efficiency in a context that includes political behavior and institutions. Copyright 1993 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG

Alienation, indifference and the choice of ideological position

In this paper we describe a simple model of individual voting behavior and present its implications for the candidate positioning problem under both vote and plurality maximization. Under our assumptions, some voters at the extremes of the ideological spectrum typically will not vote because they are alienated by the equilibrium location of candidates. There will also be some voters in the middle of the ideological spectrum who will not vote because they are indifferent between the equilibrium locations of the candidates. Both the abstention from alienation and from indifference arise explicitly from utility maximization. Once we allow for alienation and indifference, the two alternative candidate objective functions (vote maximization and plurality maximization) yield different outcomes. In particular, we show that under vote maximization the Median Voter (or Minimum Differentiation) outcome will not arise. On the other hand, under plurality maximization, the Median Voter outcome may or may not hold, depending on the distribution of voter preferences.

INSTITUTIONAL PRESERVATION AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE

This paper explains and presents supporting evidence for the hypothesis that institutional preservation is the central motive for Federal Reserve decision makers' behavior. Welfare maximization can, under certain conditions (i.e., via a vote maximization motive or the direct attribution of socially desirable goals), be a part of the preservation hypothesis, but it is inconsistent with substantial parts of Federal Reserve behavior. This paper presents evidence of this inconsistent behavior that the preservation hypothesis can explain. Such evidence includes opposing better coordination with voters'choices, creating an internally authorized fund that makes foreign loans without congressional authorization, opposing better monetary control procedures, organizing lobbying campaigns to defeat legislation to audit the Federal Reserve and make its meetings open to public scrutiny, failing to take minutes after legislation was enacted, and impairing information dispersal about funding for the Watergate burglars. The paper analyzes, in terms of institutional preservation, the results of recent research on the relationship of central banks' independence from short‐run political forces and their anti‐inflationary monetary policies.

Contradictions in market models of politics: the case of party strategies and voter linkages

Abstract:Market models of politics are derived from economic theory where they were advanced in an age of political corruption to achieve four objectives: discipline, universality, liberty and unity in society; only later were such models imported into political discourse. The most pure form of the market model of politics is found in the vote maximization model; yet as a model for political parties and elections, the realism of its assumptions often is held inadequate. While more realistic assumptions generate the vote production model of party strategy, this model rapidly degenerates into the lazy monopolist model which contradicts the role of parties in democracy. The origins of these problems lie in the contradictions within the market ordering principle. Despite these underlying contradictions, market models of politics and parties have gained increasing acceptance both among intellectuals and the general public with numerous implications for the politics of liberal democracies.

Party Competition and Party System Change

A proper understanding of party system change demands a dynamic theory of party competition. This should integrate accounts of competition in the legislative party system, in particular coalition formation, with accounts of competition in the electoral party system, in particular vote maximization. Some of the implications of integrating the two facets of party competition are explored, with special attention to endogeneous changes in party systems produced as part of the process of competition. Such changes may operate in different directions in different parts of the system and the consequent damping effect may contribute to the relative stability of party systems.