Volunteer's Dilemma Research Articles

Welfare in the Volunteer's Dilemma

Welfare in the Volunteer's Dilemma

Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment

This study explores asymmetric volunteer dilemma games in which players incur different costs for volunteering. Diekmann (1993) conjectures that a player with less cost is more likely to contribute at the equilibrium if it is risk dominant. We have re-examined this hypothesis theoretically and experimentally and found that even when focusing on risk-dominant equilibria, the explanatory power of the theory is not universal. An econometric comparison among several behavioral models including regret aversion shows that quantal response equilibrium best explains the data.

The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study

We examine how repeated interaction can facilitate coordinated turn-taking in a two-player infinitely repeated Volunteer's Dilemma. We conjecture that repetition creates an environment for players to coordinate on the Pareto efficient, but asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game by taking turns volunteering. We consider three cost treatments: both players have the same cost; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is constant; one player has a higher cost and this cost assignment is random. We find that turn-taking is the dominant play when costs are symmetric. When costs are asymmetric, the low-cost player is more likely to volunteer. However, contrary to predictions, asymmetric randomly allocated costs do not perfectly coordinate turn-taking. When costs are asymmetric and constant over time, behavior is markedly heterogeneous.

Guppies in large groups cooperate more frequently in an experimental test of the group size paradox.

The volunteer's dilemma, in which a single individual is required to produce a public good, predicts that individuals in larger groups will cooperate less frequently. Mechanistically, this could result from trade-offs between costs associated with volunteering and costs incurred if the public good is not produced (nobody volunteers). During predator inspection, one major contributor to the cost of volunteering is likely increased probability of predation; however, a predator also poses a risk to all individuals if nobody inspects. We tested the prediction that guppies in larger groups will inspect a predator less than those in smaller groups. We also predicted that individuals in larger groups would perceive less threat from the predator stimulus because of the protective benefits of larger groups (e.g. dilution). Contrary to prediction, we found that individuals in large groups inspected more frequently than those in smaller groups, but (as predicted) spent less time in refuges. There was evidence that individuals in intermediate-sized groups made fewest inspections and spent most time in refuges, suggesting that any link between group size, risk and cooperation is not driven by simple dilution. Extensions of theoretical models that capture these dynamics will likely be broadly applicable to risky cooperative behaviour.

Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment

Pro-social risk-taking involves the willingness to commit resources to initiatives and opportunities with a social benefit, as well as a risk of costly failure. These situations often occur in an environment in which groups compete for resources. In these contexts of intergroup conflict, often individuals make personal sacrifices on a voluntary basis, involving considerable risks of failure. We study the context of pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict by extending the volunteer's dilemma along both of these dimensions. We introduce a novel group competition treatment to identify the effect of intergroup competition without providing with an additional collective prize like the majority of past laboratory experiments. We find evidence that intergroup competition significantly increases the rate of providing a public good, and mitigates the negative impact of risk on intragroup cooperation. Regarding individual heterogeneity, we explore and discuss the impact of risk aversion and gender, and its implication for parochial altruism.

Asymmetric interaction and diverse forms in public goods production in volunteer dilemma game

Theoretical prediction of classical evolutionary games shows that public goods is contributed either by strong players in asymmetric games or by all of the involved players in symmetric games. However, it is inconsistency with experimental observations that weak players could also contribute to public goods in real cooperation systems. To reconciling these conflicts, we here study an evolutionary volunteer's dilemma game by assuming different roles can be interchangeable. In this model, not only the existence of multiple equilibria is possible but also the evolutionary result of the system depends on initial conditions, which can be interpreted as the production modes of public goods under different circumstances. Specifically, we found that the survival of strong individuals with mixed strategies is associated with two different outcomes: one is similar to Selten's model, that is, public goods are produced by strong players if the defectors are weak players and strong defectors are scarce in the initial condition; and the other is that the weak individuals with mixed strategies produce public goods if the defectors are strong individuals, where the strong cooperators are absent in the initial condition. Moreover, the weak individuals with mixed strategies produce public goods while strong individuals mainly display defection if the cooperation of strong players is absent in the initial condition. Our main results may help to explain the emergence of diverse forms of cooperation in asymmetric evolutionary games.

The foreign language effects on strategic behavior games.

The present study examined foreign language effects on the decisions made in a series of strategic behavioral games (e.g., the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Oligopolistic Competition, and the Volunteer's Dilemma). We recruited 154 native Chinese-speaking university students, with English as their second language, as participants. They were asked to make decisions while playing four simple behavioral games in either Chinese or English language version and to complete a Language History Questionnaire. The results showed that 1) the participants in each language group performed differently in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game and in one condition of the Volunteer's Dilemma Game which involved a relatively high level of uncertainty; and 2) foreign language proficiency, frequency of application and cultural identity triggered by the corresponding foreign language moderated the foreign language effects. This pattern of results is consistent with the Cultural Accommodation Hypothesis and the risk-aversion preference to use one's native language.

Greed and fear: Competitive and charitable priming in a threshold volunteer's dilemma

AbstractIn the “k‐volunteer's dilemma” benefit accrues to all members if at least k members volunteer, and receive nothing otherwise. We use experiments to examine (a) volunteering behavior when threshold k increases from 1 to 2, and (b) whether volunteering behavior shifts toward norms associated with one of two primed identities—charitable or competitive. We find that increasing the threshold increases an individual's probability of volunteering, but the likelihood of good provision is lower. Neither priming affects volunteering behavior when k = 1, but competitive priming effectively increases volunteering when k = 2. Both greed and fear of non‐provision appear to affect volunteering.

The Role of Certainty in a Two-Person Volunteer’s Dilemma

In the standard volunteer’s dilemma (VoD), a single prosocial act (i.e., volunteering) yields the optimal overall outcome. Whereas the volunteer’s outcome is certain, the defector’s outcome depends on what others do. This research addressed the confounding of prosocial responses with uncertainty avoidance in the standard VoD. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 102) considered 18 hypothetical one-shot two-person VoD scenarios with certain, risky, and uncertain outcomes when volunteering. In Experiment 2, participants (N = 496) considered three hypothetical one-shot two-person VoD scenarios; a certain VoD and two uncertain VoDs of which one had a lower expected collective outcome of volunteering than the certain VoD and the other a higher one. Results suggest that volunteering does not reflect a desire to avoid uncertainty but to maximize expected collective outcomes, reinforcing the assumption that the high volunteering rates we see in a standard VoD are due to social/moral preferences and social projection.

The Infinitely Repeated Volunteer's Dilemma: An Experimental Study

The Infinitely Repeated Volunteer's Dilemma: An Experimental Study

The effect of probabilistic incentives to promote cooperation during the pandemics using simulation of multi-agent evolutionary game

Social dilemmas describe conflict situations between immediate self-interest and longer-term collective interests. In these situations, it is better that all players work together to attain a common goal, but individuals may threaten the best payoff of the group by free-riding. Human behavior in a pandemic is one example of a social dilemma but wait-and-see games and relying on herd immunity to get a free ride generates a threat of continuing the pandemic. This study aims to use probabilistic incentives given by a third party as a mechanism to inhibit free-riding behavior by promoting cooperation in the volunteer dilemma game. For more realistic human behavior simulation, we use an agent-based model of network topology. When the parameters of the problem change gradually, an abrupt jump in the cooperation rate may happen and lead to a significant shift in the outcome. Catastrophe theory is a valuable approach to survey these nonlinear changes. This study tries to give some managerial insights to the decision-makers to find the minimum level of necessary effort in which the cooperation dominates the defection.

Who incurs a cost for their group and when? The effects of dispositional and situational factors regarding equality in the volunteer's dilemma

The “volunteer's dilemma” (VoD) is a group situation in which one member needs to incur a volunteering cost to provide public goods to the group. Considering that efficiency conflicts with equality in the VoD, we investigated how dispositional and situational variables regarding equality affect volunteering behavior in the VoD (specifically, in repeated VoD). We conducted an online VoD game comprising a new “lever-pulling paradigm,” and participants were grouped with two other participants to play the game iteratively. The results showed the effects of the dispositional factor (i.e., justice sensitivity; JS); those sensitive to suffering from inequality (i.e., those high in JS-Victim) were unlikely to volunteer, whereas those sensitive to benefiting from inequality (i.e., those high in JS-Beneficiary) were likely to volunteer. We also found the effect of the situational factor (i.e., previous relative volunteering rate); those who had volunteered more than others became less inclined to volunteer, and vice versa. This research shows that both dispositional and situational factors regarding equality play a crucial role in repeated VoD, while posing future questions and directions to understand their interaction effects.

Social rewards in the volunteer’s dilemma in everyday life

In everyday life, we often face a “volunteer’s dilemma (VoD)”—a group situation in which one member has to incur the cost of providing a public good. In the VoD, members of a group may wait for each other to volunteer, and thus, the group may fail to achieve the public good. Previous research has examined the probability of this failure and found that it was lower than theoretically expected. This discrepancy may have been because only material (e.g., money) and not social rewards (e.g., favourable evaluations) were considered in the theoretical expectations. To investigate whether and how people gain social rewards or are evaluated favourably by others in the VoD in everyday life (specifically in workplace contexts), we conducted a scenario‐based experiment (N = 582). The results showed that people were evaluated as more moral and competent when they volunteered than when they did not. Furthermore, this was the case especially when all the other group members shirked and when the evaluator was also willing to volunteer. These findings contribute to our current understanding of the way people perceive volunteers and shirkers in the VoD. They also have an implication on people’s motivation to incur a cost for their group in such a situation.

The emergence of conventions in the repeated volunteer's dilemma: The role of social value orientation, payoff asymmetries and focal points

Conventions are arbitrary rules of behavior that coordinate social interactions. Here we study the effects of individuals' social value orientations (SVO) and situational conditions on the emergence of conventions in the three-person volunteer's dilemma (VOD). The VOD is a step-level collective good game in which only one actor's action is required to produce a benefit for the group. It has been shown that if actors interact in the payoff-symmetric VOD repeatedly, a turn-taking convention emerges, resulting in an equal distribution of payoffs. If the VOD is asymmetric, with one “strong” actor having lower costs of volunteering, a solitary-volunteering convention emerges by which the strong actor volunteers earning less than others. In study 1 we test whether SVO promotes turn-taking and hampers solitary-volunteering. We find that groups with more prosocials engage less in turn-taking and no effect of SVO on the emergence of solitary-volunteering. In study 2 we test whether making one actor focal is sufficient for solitary-volunteering to emerge. We find instead that payoff asymmetry with one strong actor is a necessary precondition. We discuss explanations for our findings and propose directions for future research.

Financial contracts as coordination device

AbstractWe study the use of financial contracts as bid‐coordinating device in multi‐unit uniform price auctions. Coordination is required whenever firms face a volunteer's dilemma in pricing strategies: one firm (the “volunteer") is needed to increase the market clearing price. Volunteering, however, is costly, as inframarginal suppliers sell their entire capacity whereas the volunteer only sells residual demand. We identify conditions under which signing financial contracts solves this dilemma. We test our framework exploiting data on contract positions by large producers in the New York power market. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we show that the contracting strategy is payoff dominant and provide estimates of the benefits of such strategy.

Volunteers Dilemma Game Inspired Broadcast Scheme for Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks

Multi-hop broadcast communication is one of the main schemes for supporting message dissemination in vehicular ad hoc networks. In this paper, we propose an efficient receiver-oriented broadcast scheme in which the receiving vehicles' probability of forwarding is modeled by the symmetric volunteer's dilemma game. Based on this game, the vehicles that receive the broadcast message are players. At least one of the players should pay a cost and be a volunteer to rebroadcast the message, and then all will benefit from this volunteering. Utilizing fuzzy logic techniques and considering information from the network layer about local density and probability of transmission, the contention window size at the MAC layer will be adjusted. We develop ns-3 simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed volunteer's dilemma inspired broadcast (VDIB) scheme in terms of reachability, number of rebroadcasts per covered vehicle, number of bytes sent per covered vehicle, and per-hop delay. VDIB performance is compared with that of the distance-to-mean broadcast method, broadcast component of contention-based forwarding, distribution-adaptive distance with channel quality, statistical location assisted broadcast, fuzzy logic-based broadcast, bandwidth efficient fuzzy logic assisted broadcast, and intelligent hybrid adaptive broadcast protocols in both highway and urban environments.

Snake alarm calls as a public good in sooty mangabeys

Transmitting information about the location of a predator in social animal species can be seen as an investment in a public good, where information is the resource and group members benefit from reduced fatalities of kin and cooperation partners in their community. As few empirical tests of this idea exist in natural settings, we conducted a field experiment using snake models in wild sooty mangabeys, Cercocebus atys atys. We tested sooty mangabey alarm-calling patterns when exposed to viper models, investigating whether individuals called to signal fitness, to warn specific group members, or when information about the threat is not public, as would be predicted by public goods games. Strong interindividual differences in the likelihood of alarm calling existed. We found that overlap between callers was rare. Individuals were more likely to call if fewer individuals were present at the encounter site and if they had not heard other alarm calls before arriving at the site, indicating that alarm calls extended the information about the threat to following group members. This group size effect is in line with predictions of the volunteer's dilemma, a public goods game. We found no indications that individuals called specifically to warn ignorant individuals, kin or cooperation partners. Calling when information about the threat was not public allowed individuals to warn following group members while avoiding redundancy. Public goods games have not been employed widely in studies of the evolution of primate cooperation and animal communication in general but may provide useful models for understanding group level cooperation.

Adaptive alert content dissemination protocol inspired from volunteer's dilemma game for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks

Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) can serve to guarantee road safety and comfort for drivers. This is done using broadcasting which is the most used technique to disseminate data. If done blindly, it leads to the famous broadcast storm problem. The broadcast storm problem occurs when a huge amount of messages is sent, which increases resource consumption. Therefore, to solve this problem, it is important to find the compromise between minimizing the number of rebroadcast messages while maintaining good latency, throughput, and reachability. In this work, we opt for a non-cooperative forwarding, which is a valuable technique enabling vehicle nodes to cover the network with a minimum amount of rebroadcasts. We modeled this behavior using game theory through a volunteer dilemma approach. This paper presents a novel broadcasting protocol called the Nash Equilibrium Scheme (NES), which investigates how a volunteer dilemma approach can be implemented in the context of VANETs. This is aiming to mitigate the storm problem. Using this approach, we successfully solved the content and alert incident messages dissemination problem. Simulations were performed using NS2 while considering two scenarios (a highway and a grid). The performance simulation shows that our implementation outperforms prior work in terms of several metrics.

Cooperation and coordination across cultures and contexts: Individual, sociocultural, and contextual factors jointly influence decision making in the volunteer's dilemma game

AbstractWhat factors promote or hinder volunteering within organizations and groups? This paper simultaneously explores the impact of individual, contextual, and sociocultural variables on decision making in a special type of social dilemma: the volunteer's dilemma game (VDG). The VDG provides a controlled experimental method for studying volunteering behaviors in an anonymous interactive environment. We developed six variations of the VDG and administered them to economics students in five different cultures (Ntotal = 603). Among other things, these VDGs varied whether the potential benefits of volunteering were certain or uncertain. Although the overall level of volunteering did not vary substantially across most cultural groups, we found that culture interacted with the size and (un)certainty of the benefits associated with volunteering, to influence volunteering decisions. We also found that religiosity (but not religious affiliation per se) increases volunteering and that men are less likely to volunteer when the returns to doing so are certain. These results extend our knowledge of behaviors in the VDG, and their potential drivers, with clear implications for understanding how culture, individual characteristics, and context jointly influence prosocial behavior and coordination.

The positive and negative effects of justice sensitivity and justice-related emotions in the volunteer's dilemma

We frequently face situations where only one person in a group is required to incur a cost to solve a problem for the entire group; if someone volunteers, everyone benefits, but if nobody does, everyone pays a cost greater than the cost of volunteering. This is known as the volunteer's dilemma (VoD). In the VoD, some are likely to volunteer, while others are not. Through a scenario-based experiment, we found that individuals' willingness to volunteer is substantially predicted by their justice sensitivity (JS), indicated by individual differences in reactions toward unfairness or injustice. Specifically, those who are sensitive to unjustly suffering an unfavorable outcome (high in JSVictim) are less willing to volunteer, and those who are sensitive to unjustly receiving a favorable outcome (high in JSBeneficiary) are more willing to volunteer. We also investigated the effects of justice-related emotions and found that anger at the expectation of being the only volunteer in the group mediates the negative effect of JSVictim on willingness to volunteer, while guilt at the expectation of letting somebody else volunteer is not a robust mediator of the positive effect of JSBeneficiary on willingness to volunteer.