Voluntary Disclosure Strategy Research Articles

Voluntary information disclosure of an e-commerce platform under reselling, marketplace, and hybrid selling

This study investigates an e-commerce platform's incentive to voluntarily disclose demand information to an upstream manufacturer. In contrast to previous studies that emphasize the platform's mandatory (or ex-ante) information disclosure, this study examines voluntary (or ex-post) information disclosure, which allows the platform to selectively decide whether to perform information disclosure based on the level of forecast demand. The typical online selling channels in which the platform or the manufacturer (or both) play the role of seller are identified as reselling, marketplace, and hybrid cases. In each transaction case, the interactions between the platform's information disclosure strategy, the level of forecast demand, the platform's forecasting capability, the degree of demand uncertainty, and channel substitutability are analyzed. We find that information on good market demand should be withheld in the reselling case, information indicating a slightly below-average market condition should be withheld in the marketplace case, and information on good or poor demand should be withheld in the hybrid case. The platform is more likely to perform information disclosure as the forecasting capability or the degree of demand uncertainty increases. Moreover, both the platform and the manufacturer can benefit from a well-formulated voluntary information disclosure strategy. Our findings show e-commerce platforms how to better exploit demand forecast information in a voluntary disclosure setting and provide an explanation for practices such as their focus on improving their forecasting capability and market potential.

How to tell the crisis: effects of stealing thunder by self-disclosing corporate violations

ABSTRACT Tensions between legal counsel and crisis teams are well established. Crisis management best practices in marketing communication urge for quick and full disclosure in the organization and society’s interest. Further, governments encourage organizations to voluntarily report misdeeds. However, organizations often hesitate on quick and full disclosure or even resort to silence, fearing social and legal ramifications of a spokesperson’s words and proactive actions. This study investigates crisis communication outcomes of a voluntary disclosure strategy referred to as stealing thunder to manage a crisis caused by legal violations. The results of a series of moderated serial mediation analyses show that perceived crisis severity and anger serially mediate the relationship between the stealing thunder x CSR history interaction to influence (a) attitudes toward the company, (b) perceived company ethics, and (c) investment intentions. Results add to recent theory building surrounding stealing thunder in crisis communication while pragmatically supporting a transparent approach to marketing communication practices.

Impact of risk disclosure on the volatility, liquidity and performance of the UK and Canadian insurance companies

PurposeThis paper aims to investigate the impact of risk disclosure practices (voluntary, mandatory and risk disclosure index) on stock return volatility, market liquidity and financial performance for insurance companies in the UK and Canada, before and after the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption.Design/methodology/approachThe panel data analysis covers 14 insurance companies in the UK and 12 in Canada over a six-year period, three years before and three years after the implementation of IFRS. The authors collected risk disclosure data manually from the annual reports and analyzed it through QSR NVivo software for each country. The other variables are secondary data collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon and Datastream.FindingsThe results reveal that mandatory risk disclosure practices positively influence stock return volatility for UK insurers but not Canadian ones. Moreover, both mandatory and voluntary risk disclosures increase market liquidity for UK insurers. The outcomes also show a negative influence of risk disclosure practices on financial performance for both the UK and Canadian insurers. The adoption of IFRS enhances the impact of risk disclosure practices in both countries on market liquidity and financial performance.Research limitations/implicationsThe findings rationalize the impact of risk disclosure practices on volatility, liquidity and financial performance of UK and Canada insurers, and the effect of IFRS in triggering those results.Practical implicationsThe findings highlight the diverse effects of voluntary and mandatory risk disclosure practices in enhancing market discipline and mitigating information asymmetry problems to investors. Regulators and policymakers could rely on the findings to amend and develop disclosure standards more frequently to assure their effectiveness. The authors also offer insights to managers to determine the levels of mandatory and voluntary disclosure practices and disclosure strategies to gain their stakeholders’ confidence.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the literature of risk disclosure in the insurance industry for both the UK and Canada where scarce studies are conducted. It also offers interesting implementations to investors, managers and policymakers.

Voluntary Disclosure and Relational Connectivity – The Case of the Polish Bond Market

The purpose of our research is to evaluate the voluntary disclosure strategy and effective communication between issuers and investors on the Polish bond market Catalyst. We conducted a questionnaire among issuers on the Catalyst. To evaluate the data and find answers to the research questions, we used the Qualitative Comparative Analysis. As our analysis shows that management board engagement seems crucial for effective communication, we claim that in relatively smaller capital markets, personal engagement of board members in preparing voluntary disclosure should be considered a proxy of a high disclosure strategy quality. We prove that companies use dialogue with investors in private rather than in public to understand their communication expectations. This finding indicates the essential limitations of previous research evaluating relational connectivity through social media. We point out the existence of many paths to achieve a high level of companies’ perception of investors’ voluntary disclosure needs and companies’ relational connectivity regarding voluntary disclosure. We developed a new approach to measuring relational connectivity, which can be successfully applied to other markets and stock exchanges, allowing verification of previous findings and the development of a new approach to conducting research. We claim that it is necessary to put more pressure on the management board’s engagement in preparing the financial report as it is crucial for understanding investors’ voluntary disclosure needs. Our conclusions question the growing societal pressure on engaging in activity in social media as a key concept of effective communication.

The impact of platform restriction on manufacturer quality transparency in the blockchain era

ABSTRACT This study investigates a supply chain comprising of a manufacturer and a retail platform, wherein the former decides the quality information transparency strategy of products and the latter determines whether or not to implement price parity clauses (PPCs). The manufacturer can directly sell the end-of-season product to the end-consumer market and indirectly via the retail platform. Specifically, this study considers two quality information transparency strategies (i.e. ex-ante blockchain-adoption and ex-post voluntary disclosure) that differ on whether the manufacturer’s decision on quality information transparency strategy is made before or after observing the actual product quality. Results show that the manufacturer may prefer the ex-ante blockchain-adoption strategy in specific conditions but maintains the flexibility of information disclosure under ex-post voluntary disclosure strategy. Moreover, the implementation of PPCs significantly reduces the manufacturer’s incentive to disclose a large extent of quality information transparency when the effort cost is high or the service effect coefficient is low. By contrast, the manufacturer is more likely to adopt information transparency strategies under PPCs when the effort cost is low and the service effect coefficient is high. More interestingly, contrary to theories of harm from PPCs, the implementation of PPCs may simultaneously benefit the manufacturer and retail platform, achieving a ‘win-win' situation.

When do firms highlight their effective tax rate?

This study examines GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) visibility as a distinct disclosure choice in firms’ financial statements. By applying a game-theory disclosure model for the voluntary disclosure strategies of firms, in a tax setting, we argue that firms face a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions. On the one hand, firms have an incentive to enhance their ETR disclosure when the ratio offers shareholders ‘favourable conditions’, for example, higher expected after-tax cash flows. On the other hand, the disclosure of a favourable low ETR could attract the attention of tax auditors and the public and ultimately result in disclosure costs. We empirically test disclosure behaviour by examining the relation between disclosure visibility and different ETR conditions that reflect different stakeholder-specific costs and benefits. While we find that unfavourable ETR conditions are not highlighted, we observe higher disclosure visibility for favourable ETRs (smooth, close to the industry average, and decreasing ETRs). Additional analyses reveal that this high visibility is characteristic of firm years with only moderately decreasing ETRs at usual ETR levels, while extreme ETRs are not highlighted. Interestingly and in contrast to our main results, a subsample of family firms does not seem to highlight favourable ETRs.

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.

Signaling Under Threat: Evidence of Voluntary Disclosure in Contested Takeovers

We investigate voluntary disclosure strategies in contested takeovers and the associated economic consequences. Using a difference-in-differences research design and propensity score matching, we find that, relative to friendly takeovers, target management in contested takeovers provides more earnings guidance and conveys more good news during the takeover. Moreover, voluntary disclosure helps contested targets negotiate a better offer, and the results are stronger for targets with more information asymmetry. Collectively, targets adopt voluntary disclosure and alter their strategies under the threat of contested takeover to enhance their bargaining power. Voluntary disclosure by contested targets serves as a negotiation tactic that potentially benefits target shareholders.

When Do Firms Highlight Their Effective Tax Rate?

This study examines GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) visibility as a distinct disclosure choice in firms’ financial statements. By applying a game-theory disclosure model for the voluntary disclosure strategies of firms, in a tax setting, we argue that firms face a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions. On the one hand, firms have an incentive to enhance their ETR disclosure when the ratio offers shareholders “favourable conditions”, for example, higher expected after-tax cash-flows. On the other hand, the disclosure of a favourable low ETR could attract the attention of tax auditors and the public and ultimately result in disclosure costs. We empirically test disclosure behaviour by examining the relation between disclosure visibility and different ETR conditions that reflect different stakeholder-specific costs and benefits. While we find that unfavourable ETR conditions are not highlighted, we observe higher disclosure visibility for favourable ETRs (smooth, close to the industry average, and decreasing ETRs). Additional analyses reveal that this high visibility is characteristic of firm years with only moderately decreasing ETRs at usual ETR levels, while extreme ETRs are not highlighted. Interestingly and in contrast to our main results, a subsample of family firms does not seem to highlight favourable ETRs.

Inducing Consumer Online Reviews Via Disclosure

In this study, we investigate a seller's voluntary disclosure strategy when serving two groups of consumers who arrive sequentially and are reference dependent with respect to product quality. Consumers may be naive or sophisticated, depending on whether they can make rational inferences from the seller's disclosure behavior and an experienced consumer's quality review. We show that when consumers are naive, the seller can strategically withhold high‐quality information and disclose low‐quality information to boost the reference‐dependent early adopter's subjective quality review, which in turn enhances the follower's quality expectation and allows the seller to extract more surplus in the second period. However, when consumers are sophisticated, it is difficult for the seller to enhance their quality expectations by designing his disclosure strategy to manipulate the early adopter's quality review. The seller discloses all the quality information to consumers. When the market contains both naive and sophisticated consumers, the seller is able to withhold relatively low‐quality information in advance. In such a situation, the seller exclusively serves naive customers in the first period by charging a high retail price. The earlier results are quite robust, regardless of whether the review rating is bounded or whether consumers possess heterogeneous preferences with respect to product quality.

Inducing Supply Chain Transparency through Supplier Encroachment

This study investigates a supplier’s voluntary disclosure strategy when it can encroach on a retailer’s operations by selling directly to final consumers. The establishment of a direct sales channel expands market potential, induces the supplier to adopt a more frequent disclosure strategy, and ultimately leads to a higher level of information transparency in the supply chain. Since more quality information is revealed in the presence of a dual channel, the retailer is able to free ride on the supplier’s disclosure to enhance consumers’ quality expectations. In most cases, such a free‐riding effect is positive and can even create a higher ex ante payoff for the retailer in face of the supplier’s encroachment. Conversely, more transparent product quality information does not necessarily benefit the supplier, who can then no longer hide negative quality information from consumers due to the potential change in the channel structure. Thus, we show that the supplier’s ex ante payoff may become lower with encroachment and that the supplier may commit not to encroach on the retail market, even when it has a free option to open a direct sales channel.

Corporate voluntary carbon disclosure strategy and carbon performance in the USA

PurposeThis study aims to examine whether good carbon performers disclose more carbon information overall than poor performers, and if yes, how firms select different types of carbon information to signal their genuine superior carbon performance.Design/methodology/approachThe level of disclosure is measured based on content analysis of Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) reports. The study sample consists of 487 US companies that voluntarily participated in the CDP survey from 2011 to 2012. The authors use the t-test and multiple regression models for analyses.FindingsThe results consistently indicate that firms with better carbon performance disclose a greater amount of overall carbon information, supporting the signalling theory. In addition, in contrast to previous studies that merely consider the overall disclosure level, the authors also investigate disclosure of each major aspect of carbon activities. The results show that good carbon performers disclose more key carbon items, such as goods and services that avoid greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, external verification and carbon accounting, to signal their true type.Research limitations/implicationsThis study has some limitations. The authors rely on CDP reports for analysis and focus on the largest companies in the USA. Caution should be exercised when generalising the results to other countries, smaller firms or voluntary carbon information disclosed in other communications channels.Practical implicationsBecause carbon disclosure has already been moving from a voluntary to mandatory requirement in many jurisdictions, the format and content of CDP reports might be considered for a formal standalone GHG statement. Based on the results, the authors believe that there should be industry-specific disclosure guidelines, and more disclosure should be made at the project level.Originality/valueIn the context of climate change, this study provides support for the signalling theory by utilising the relationship between voluntary carbon disclosure and performance. The study also provides empirical evidence on how companies may use different types of carbon information to signal their underlying carbon performance.

Political connections and voluntary disclosure: the case of Canadian listed companies

Business and politics are now more connected than ever. In Canada, more than 50% of listed companies have political connections through the board of directors or top management. These ties can give companies the resources they need to achieve their goals and possibly even confer a substantial advantage that results in better financial performance. To this end, political connections must influence the various choices and behaviours of politically connected companies, such as their voluntary disclosure strategy. As this type of influence has rarely been investigated in the literature, the current study looks at the impact of board and top management political connections on the voluntary disclosure behaviour of Canadian firms. Four types of voluntary disclosure—environmental, social, governance and total—are analyzed. Results show that politically connected companies make broader voluntary disclosures than non-connected firms do. Board and top management political connections are positively and significantly related to total voluntary disclosure, and board political connections are positively and significantly related to governance disclosures. In addition, top management political connections are positively and significantly related to voluntary environmental and social disclosures. This study is the first to shed light on the link between political connections and the voluntary disclosure of Canadian listed companies, as well as the first to confirm that not all political connections are equal. The impact of these connections on companies’ choices and behaviours can differs according to the politically connected actor’s position in the company, including on the board of directors or in top management. This difference could be explained by the fact that while board are generally concerned about strategic issues, top management deal with operational aspects. Consequently, they may not have the same behaviours and choices.

Is cost stickiness associated with management earnings forecasts?

Purpose The literature suggests that management discretion to adjust resources in response to changes in sales can create asymmetric cost behavior and management incentives to move stock prices can influence its decision to release management earnings forecasts (MEF). The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between a firm’s degree of cost stickiness and its propensity to release MEF. The authors propose that both MEF and cost stickiness are influenced by management strategic choices and provide two possible explanations along with supportive evidence. First, when management is optimistic about future performance, it tends to increase both cost stickiness and is willing to disclose the optimistic expectations through MEF. Second, cost stickiness increases information asymmetry between management and investors, thus management tends to issue earnings forecast to mitigate the perceived information asymmetry. Design/methodology/approach The authors collect firm-level fundamental data from the COMPUSTAT database, and market data from the CRSP database during 2005 and 2016. The data used to measure variables related to institutional ownership and financial analysts are, respectively, obtained from the Thomson Reuters and the I/B/E/S databases. The quarterly MEF data are from two databases. The authors obtain the data before 2012 the from Thomson First Call’s Company Issued Guidance database and manually collect the data between 2012 and 2016 from the Bloomberg database for the largest 3,000 publicly traded US companies. The measurement of cost stickiness is based on the industry-level measurement developed by Anderson et al. (2003) and the firm-level measurements developed by Weiss (2010). The authors construct two measurements, management’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF, to capture management’s voluntary disclosure strategy. Findings The analyses of a sample between year 2005 and 2016, indicate that the firm-level cost stickiness is positively associated with the firm’s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, the authors find that the level of cost stickiness is associated with more favorable earnings news forecasted by management. Additional tests suggest that both information asymmetry and managerial optimism may explain the relationship between cost stickiness and MEF. Finally, the authors find that the association between cost stickiness and MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the resource adjustment cost is high and when the firm efficiency is high. The results are robust after using alternative measurements of cost stickiness and MEF. Originality/value First, this paper attempts to build a bridge between managerial accounting and financial accounting by providing evidence of managerial incentives and discretions that affect both cost structure and earnings. The authors contribute to, and complement, prior studies that primarily disentangle the complicated accounting information system by focusing on either the internal information system or the external information system. Second, the paper complements prior studies that examine cost stickiness and its determinants of asymmetric cost behavior by providing additional evidence for the value-relevance of cost stickiness strategy and its link to MEF releases in mitigating information asymmetry. Third, the findings are also relevant to current debates among policymakers, academia and practitioners regarding modernization of mandatory and voluntary disclosures through discussing the managerial incentive behind the managerial disclosure strategies as reflected in MEF releases (SEC, 2013). Fourth, the authors provide evidence regarding management’s role in influencing cost asymmetry and MEF releases, which support the theoretical argument that management discretions affect the firms’ cost structure and MEF disclosures.

How do industry peers influence individual firms’ voluntary disclosure strategies?

This paper investigates how industry peer firms influence the voluntary disclosure strategies of individual firms. Our 2SLS regressions on an empirical sample of management earnings forecasts show that the disclosure strategies of individual firms are significantly influenced by their peer firms’ disclosure behaviors. Specifically, the increased disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon of their industry peers encourage individual firms to increase their disclosure frequency and disclosure horizon. Moreover, firms with S&P credit ratings, higher profitability, larger size, and/or a higher market-to-book ratio tend to be more sensitive to their peer firms’ voluntary disclosure frequency, and react more strongly to peer firms that are of dissimilar size or profitability. Finally, we find that the leader–follower relation does not influence the effects of peer firms’ disclosure strategies. Additional tests suggest that signaling theory and litigation risk provide stronger explanations of why firms mimic their peers than herding theory and free rider theory. This paper contributes to the accounting literature by providing new evidence on the effects of voluntary disclosure. Our findings are also of relevance to industry practitioners, and they shed light on the recently proposed voluntary disclosure regulations.

Inducing Consumer Online Reviews via Disclosure

In this paper, we investigate a seller's voluntary disclosure strategy when serving two groups of consumers who arrive sequentially and are reference dependent with respect to product quality. Consumers may be naive or sophisticated, depending on whether they can make rational inferences from the seller's disclosure behavior and an experienced consumer's quality review. We show that when consumers are naive, the seller can strategically withhold high quality information and disclose low quality information to boost the reference-dependent early adopter's subjective quality review, which in turn enhances the follower's quality expectation and allows the seller to extract more surplus in the second period. However, when consumers are sophisticated, it is difficult for the seller to enhance their quality expectations by designing his disclosure strategy to manipulate the early adopter's quality review. The seller discloses all the quality information to consumers. When the market contains both naive and sophisticated consumers, the seller is able to withhold relatively low quality information in advance. In such a situation, the seller exclusively serves naive customers in the first period by charging a high retail price. The above results are quite robust, regardless of whether the review rating is bounded or whether consumers possess heterogeneous preferences with respect to product quality.

Competing Information Sources

ABSTRACTThis study analyzes corporate voluntary disclosures to the capital market in the presence of competing information sources, from which traders can subsequently obtain additional public and private information. The analysis demonstrates that the anticipated access of traders to additional information sources may significantly alter the voluntary disclosure strategy of firms. It may explain a deviation from the conventional full disclosure equilibrium to equilibrium with partial and selective disclosure. It may also lead to an untypical equilibrium shape, where any information content can be disclosed and can be withheld with a positive probability, and where the stock price reflects a pricing discount upon disclosure rather than in its absence.JEL Classifications: D82; G10; M41.

Voluntary Disclosure of Environmental Performance

Public and private differences have been a central topic in public administration research. This study explores electric utilities’ voluntary disclosure of environmental performance and examines if private (investor-owned) and public (government-owned) utilities have different drivers for voluntary disclosure. In particular, this study analyzes the panel data on electric utilities’ participation in the Department of Energy’s Voluntary Greenhouse Gas Registry program (VGGR) from 1995 to 2005 and attempts to explain the different participation patterns between public and private utilities based on two perspectives—public–private distinction and corporate environmentalism—which probes private firms’ voluntary environmental actions in particular. The findings show that private utilities tend to participate in the VGGR program when they have better performance, higher consumer interaction and market pressure, and also when they anticipate further regulations on greenhouse gas emissions. This is consistent with the existing theoretical and empirical studies on corporate environmentalism, which suggests private firms under intensive government regulation and market pressure actively use voluntary disclosure strategy to preempt future regulations and to gain economic benefit or legitimacy. On the other hand, it is found that public utilities tend to participate in the VGGR program when other related mandatory rules exist. This suggests that public utilities’ voluntary disclosure is primarily being driven by other mandatory requirements.

How do auditors view managers’ voluntary disclosure strategy? The effect of earnings guidance on audit fees

The objective of this study is to examine the relation between attributes of earnings forecasts issued by managers and audit fees. Although there is an extensive literature on managers’ disclosure of earnings forecasts, there is a paucity of research on how auditors incorporate information from these voluntary disclosures. We find that the issuance of an annual or quarterly management earnings forecast in the prior period is positively associated with the current period audit fees. Our results indicate that on average, audit fees are higher by about 7% for firm-years associated with an annual forecast. Among the firms that issue earnings forecasts, we find no association between audit fees and likelihood of updating a previously issued earnings forecast, indicating that auditors do not view such behavior negatively. Further, we find audit fees to be positively associated with the error and the bias (or optimism) in the forecasts for annual forecasts but not for quarterly forecasts. Overall, these results suggest that management’s forecast behavior captures higher business risk for the auditor via greater risk of earnings management or litigation risk.

Voluntary Disclosure Strategies and the Cost of Capital of Italian Blue Chips

How do the Italian blue chips actually deal with disclosure about their business model? Does their disclosure strategies affect the cost of capital through a reduction in information risk premia? Performing a cluster analysis on the contents reported in annual reports, investor relations and press releases, the study firstly identifies four different disclosure strategies. Subsequently it uses an original model to extract the information risk premia from time series of stock prices and trading volumes time. The level of information risk premia is split between market-related and firm-specific drivers in order to compute their correlation with trading volume and the different disclosure strategies identified. Overlaps from results in cluster analysis and information risk premia determinants let us conclude that broad and exhaustive financial communication allows reduction of the cost of capital.