Voluntary Conservation Agreements Research Articles

Impermanence and failure: the legacy of conservation-based payments in Sumatra, Indonesia

Projects that pay communities or individuals to conserve natural areas rarely continue indefinitely. When payments cease, the behaviors they motivate can change. Previous research on conservation-based payments recognizes the impermanence of conservation success, but it does not consider the legacy of payments that failed to effect change. This research assesses impermanence and failure by investigating the legacy of village-level conservation payments made through one of the largest Integrated Conservation and Development Projects in Indonesia. The Kerinci-Seblat Integrated Conservation and Development Project aimed to conserve forest area and promote local development through voluntary conservation agreements (VCAs) that provided payments for pro-conservation pledges and activities from 2000 through 2003. Project documentation and previous research find that payments failed to incentivize additional forest conservation, producing nonsignificant differences in forest-cover change during the project period. To examine the legacy of these payments in the post-project period, this research uses matched difference-in-differences and triple differences models to analyze forest cover change in villages (n = 263) from 2000 through 2016 as well as matched binary logistic regression models to assess enduring differences in household (n = 1303) livelihood strategies within VCA villages in 2016. The analysis finds that VCA villages contained significantly more forest loss than the most similar non-VCA villages outside the national park, and greater payments predict increased forest loss in the post-project period. In addition, farming high-value tree crops and cultivating private land were the most important attributes for modeling VCA affiliation among randomly selected households. These results demonstrate that, after payments ceased, project failures increased in severity over time.Those who design and implement conservation-based payments bear great responsibility to ensure their projects are informed by local voice, align with community preferences, and provide sufficient benefits, lest they result in a conservation legacy of increased failure.

Integration of social spatial data to assess conservation opportunities and priorities

Effective wildlife conservation requires consideration of ecological and social factors, including social acceptability of conservation actions. Using the threatened koala (Phascolarctos cinereus) as a case study, we demonstrate a novel, socio-ecological approach for identifying conservation opportunity that spatially connects landscapes with community preferences to prioritize koala recovery strategies at a regional scale. We conceptualize conservation opportunity as the spatial integration of three sustainability criteria—ecological potential, social acceptability, and economic feasibility. The social acceptability criterion was assessed using a crowdsourced spatial survey that identified spatial preferences for koalas and land uses that impact koala conservation. As a novel approach, we addressed important research questions regarding the design, collection, and analysis of crowdsourced mapping data for identifying socially acceptable conservation opportunities. Public preferences for koalas were mapped closer to home, in higher suitable koala habitats than expected, were more pronounced in conservation and natural areas on public lands, and were mapped less frequently in modified agricultural landscapes. When the multiple criteria (ecological, social, and economic) were included in the conservation assessment, we found the social acceptability criterion exerted the greatest influence on spatial conservation priorities. The systematic assessment of social criteria for conservation using spatial surveys provides information that can be integrated with ecological information to prioritize conservation opportunities. Potential enhancements include expanding survey recruitment efforts and using alternative social data collection methods to achieve greater geographic and socio-demographic representation, and augmenting the economic feasibility assessment with private property values and transaction data from voluntary conservation agreements with private landowners.

Policy Instruments and Incentives for Coordinated Habitat Conservation

Nearly half of imperiled species (IS) listed under the US Endangered Species Act have most of their habitat on private land. Management of IS therefore relies on engaging private landowners in conservation to avoid listing and the accompanying land use restrictions. Two types of voluntary policy instruments are used to incentivize conservation on private lands: subsidies and voluntary conservation agreements with assurances (VCAAs), under which landowners implement conservation practices in return for assurance that no land use restrictions will be imposed if the practices are maintained. No prior work compares landowners’ incentives for strategic behavior under these instruments. This is important because habitat quality is influenced by landscape size, connectivity, and composition. The probability that an IS becomes listed—and the economic risks facing landowners—depends endogenously on management decisions by multiple landowners. We use theoretical and experimental approaches to compare conservation effort, spatial allocation of this effort, and cost-effectiveness of species protection under each instrument when species protection requires spatially-contiguous coordination. We find that VCAAs with land use restrictions are no more effective than land use restrictions with or without subsidies in coordinating conservation effort, and they do not result in greater species protection. Land use restrictions—either alone or coupled with subsidies—improve coordination.

A Note on the Petroleum Industry's Participation in Conservation Agreements for the Lesser Prairie Chicken

This paper examines the petroleum industry's willingness to participate in conservation agreements for the lesser prairie chicken, a candidate for listing under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Voluntary conservation agreements with assurances (VCAAs) can incentivize habitat conservation and sustain economic development. Using data on oil and natural gas wells in Kansas and Oklahoma, I develop a discrete choice model to examine company preferences for locating wells and participating in VCAAs for the lesser prairie chicken. Participation in VCAAs is low, but I find participating wells are concentrated in areas with the most crucial habitat.

The Texas Conservation Plan has not slowed oil and gas well development in dunes sagebrush lizard habitat

Background: The dunes sagebrush lizard (Sceloporus arenicolus) is an imperiled species that is restricted to shinnery oak (Quercus havardii) sand dune habitats in southeastern New Mexico and West Texas, USA. This region is also a hotspot of oil and gas development that is a major threat to the species. Methods: Here we use well data and a natural experiment to test the effectiveness of voluntary conservation agreements for slowing or stopping oil and gas well approval in the lizard’s habitat in New Mexico and Texas. Results: We show that the Candidate Conservation Agreement (CCA) and CCA with Assurances in New Mexico, both of which contain strong avoidance mechanisms, are associated with a steep decline in oil and gas well approval in the New Mexico portion of the lizard’s range, but not outside the lizard’s range. By contrast, the Texas Conservation Plan (TCP), which does not include mandatory avoidance, is not associated with any decline of oil and gas well approval in the lizard's Texas range relative to the broader landscape. Conclusions: These results indicate that the TCP is insufficient to conserve the lizard in Texas, thereby jeopardizing genetic and geographic representation across the range of the species.

Increasing participation in incentive programs for biodiversity conservation

Engaging private landowners in conservation activities for imperiled species is critical to maintaining and enhancing biodiversity. Market-based approaches can incentivize conservation behaviors on private lands by shifting the benefit-cost ratio of engaging in activities that result in net conservation benefits for target species. In the United States and elsewhere, voluntary conservation agreements with financial incentives are becoming an increasingly common strategy. While the influence of program design and delivery of voluntary conservation programs is often overlooked, these aspects are critical to achieving the necessary participation to attain landscape-scale outcomes. Using a sample of family-forest landowners in the southeast United States, we show how preferences for participation in a conservation program to protect an at-risk species, the gopher tortoise (Gopherus polyphemus), are related to program structure, delivery, and perceived efficacy. Landowners were most sensitive to programs that are highly controlling, require permanent conservation easements, and put landowners at risk for future regulation. Programs designed with greater levels of compensation and that support landowners' autonomy to make land management decisions can increase participation and increase landowner acceptance of program components that are generally unfavorable, like long-term contracts and permanent easements. There is an inherent trade-off between maximizing participation and maximizing the conservation benefits when designing a conservation incentive program. For conservation programs targeting private lands to achieve landscape-level benefits, they must attract a critical level of participation that creates a connected mosaic of conservation benefits. Yet, programs with attributes that strive to maximize conservation benefits within a single agreement (and reduce risks of failure) are likely to have lower participation, and thus lower landscape benefits. Achieving levels of landowner participation in conservation agreement programs that deliver lasting, landscape-level benefits requires careful attention not only to how the program structure influences potential conservation benefits, but also how it influences landowners and their potential to participate.

Bridging the gap between forest conservation and poverty alleviation: the Ecuadorian Socio Bosque program

The Socio Bosque program is a national conservation agreement scheme of the government of Ecuador. Socio Bosque consists of the transfer of a direct monetary incentive per hectare of native forest and other native ecosystems to individual landowners and local and indigenous communities who protect these ecosystems, through voluntary conservation agreements that are monitored on a regular basis for compliance. Two years after its creation, the program now includes more than half a million hectares of natural ecosystems and has over 60,000 beneficiaries. The characteristics of Socio Bosque make it a good example of a national conservation agreement scheme from which important lessons can be drawn: it is part of a clear government policy, combines ecosystem conservation with poverty alleviation, incentivizes and monitors local socio-economic investment, is transparent and straightforward, and has generated nation-wide participation of local and indigenous communities and farmer households. Socio Bosque furthermore sheds light on how benefit sharing mechanisms for national REDD+ strategies could work in practice.

Landowners’ ability to leverage in negotiations over habitat conservation

Voluntary conservation agreements are commonly used to stem the impact of habitat destruction and degradation on terrestrial biodiversity. Past studies that aim to inform how resources for conservation should be allocated across land parcels have assumed the costs of securing conservation on sites can be estimated solely on the basis of the value of alternative land uses. However, in a voluntary negotiation, a landowner could hold-out for a higher payment based on a conservation group or agency’s willingness-to-pay by leveraging the value of biodiversity on the property. We examine landowners’ ability to leverage and the consequences for conservation planning. To explore this, we first use an analytical approximation that simplifies the situation to one where a conservation group prioritizes one site for acquisition. Landowners’ ability to hold-out for higher payments in this situation ranges from approximately 17% to 55% of the value of alternative land uses on the site. We show that landowners’ ability to hold-out for higher payments is more sensitive to variance in the value of alternative land uses than variance in the biodiversity value across properties and is highest when the two factors negatively covary. Next, we consider multi-site selection decisions accounting for community complementarity across parcels. We find that leverage potential can be significantly higher in this context, with a maximum increase of 237% of the value of alternative land uses, and that community irreplaceability is correlated with landowners’ ability to leverage. If one landowner holds out for a higher payment, it has implications for what other parcels should be priorities for protection.

Effectiveness of Voluntary Conservation Agreements: Case Study of Endangered Whales and Commercial Whale Watching

The use of voluntary approaches to achieve conservation goals is becoming increasingly popular. Nevertheless, few researchers have quantitatively evaluated their efficacy. In 1998 industry, government agencies, and nongovernmental organizations established a voluntary conservation program for whale watching in the northeast region of the United States, with the intent to avoid collisions with and harassment of endangered whales by commercial and recreational whale-watching vessels. One important aspect of the program was the establishment of 3 speed zones within specific distances of whales. We wanted to determine the level of compliance with this aspect of the program to gauge its efficacy and gain insights into the effectiveness of voluntary measures as a conservation tool. Inconspicuous observers accompanied 46 commercial whale-watching trips from 12 companies in 2003 (n= 35) and 2004 (n= 11). During each trip, vessel position and speed were collected at 5-second intervals with a GPS receiver. Binoculars with internal laser rangefinders and digital compasses were used to record range and bearing to sighted whales. We mapped whale locations with ArcGIS. We created speed-zone buffers around sighted whales and overlaid them with vessel-track and speed data to evaluate compliance. Speeds in excess of those recommended by the program were considered noncompliant. We judged the magnitude of noncompliance by comparing a vessel's maximum speed within a zone to its maximum recorded trip speed. The level of noncompliance was high (mean 0.78; company range 0.74-0.88), some companies were more compliant than others (p= 0.02), noncompliance was significantly higher in zones farther from whales (p < 0.001), and operators approached the maximum speed capabilities of their vessel in all zones. The voluntary conservation program did not achieve the goal of substantially limiting vessel speed near whales. Our results support the need for conservation programs to have quantifiable metrics and frequent evaluation to ensure efficacy.

Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation?

Voluntary conservation agreements are becoming increasingly important in implementing the Endangered Species Act on private land. We analyze when such agreements arise and what level of conservation they generate in the presence of uncertainty about future conservation benefits and irreversibility of habitat loss and species extinction. Our results suggest that the likelihood of an agreement and the resulting conservation levels depend on the background threat of regulation, the cost advantage offered by voluntary agreements, and the availability of assurances regarding future regulation. Under conditions likely to hold in practice, conservation agreements that offer assurances may generate higher levels of conservation and higher net social benefits than agreements that do not offer assurances. However, the resulting level of conservation will not be optimal, and may be lower than that attainable under regulation.

Voluntary conservation of endangered species: when does no regulatory assurance mean no conservation?

Voluntary conservation agreements are becoming increasingly important in implementing the Endangered Species Act on private land. We analyze when such agreements arise and what level of conservation they generate in the presence of uncertainty about future conservation benefits and irreversibility of habitat loss and species extinction. Our results suggest that the likelihood of an agreement and the resulting conservation levels depend on the background threat of regulation, the cost advantage offered by voluntary agreements, and the availability of assurances regarding future regulation. Under conditions likely to hold in practice, conservation agreements that offer assurances may generate higher levels of conservation and higher net social benefits than agreements that do not offer assurances. However, the resulting level of conservation will not be optimal, and may be lower than that attainable under regulation.

Lakes and Lakebed Cropping in the Western Division of New South Wales.

We developed an inventory of all lakes 100 ha or greater in area in the Western Division of New South Wales including information on source of water, salinity, water regime, lake area, and presence of cultivation permits. Number, area and distribution of different categories of lakes were summarised, and the use of lakes for cropping (lakebed cultivation) and water storage were analysed by category of lake. There were 567 lakes 100 ha or larger in area in the Western Division. The majority of these were mainly dry (includes dry lakes) (56%) or filled intermittently (40%), usually from river flooding. Just under 5% of lakes were perennial. Water regimes in most perennial lakes were controlled by local structures. Seventy lakes had lakebed cultivation permits. Twenty per cent of fresh lakes that filled from a river, rather than from local rainfall, in the Western Division of New South Wales were cultivated (i.e. cropped). Eighty per cent of fresh, riverine lakes larger than 2000 ha which flood and dry intermittently were cultivated. Lakebed cropping in the Western Division of New South Wales has focused on large, fresh, lakes which fill intermittently from rivers. Use of lakes as water storages has also focused on large, fresh lakes. Conservation strategies are recommended for large, fresh lakes that flood intermittently from a river, and are not cropped or used as water storages. These strategies should be directed towards developing voluntary conservation agreements with landholders. Key words: lakes, cropping, GIS, water regimes, conservation