Volatility Of Economic Activity Research Articles

Self-Employment Trends and the Volatility of Economic Activity: Evidence from Puerto Rico

Self-Employment Trends and the Volatility of Economic Activity: Evidence from Puerto Rico

Economic capital for nonperforming loans

A portfolio of nonperforming loans requires economic capital. We present two models for forecasting the portfolio loss and its probability distribution. In the first model, the loss for each nonperforming loan entails a change in provision over the risk horizon. The risk determinants are the single-name concentration, measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschmann index, as well as a systematic factor and the idiosyncratic risk. Our second model allows for interportfolio diversification with a portfolio of performing loans because banks typically own both performing and nonperforming loans. In this model, the nonperforming loan is identified with its systematic risk. Both models allow for closed-form expressions of economic capital and for the capital charge of the single loan. We calibrate the macroeconomic model parameters statistically with a loss panel; the microeconomic parameters depend on the portfolio. The portfolio risk for nonperforming loans mainly depends on the volatility of the systematic economic factor. The dependence becomes more pronounced when interportfolio diversification is taken into account. The magnitude of interportfolio diversification is also marked. Finally, we calculate regulatory capital charges according to Basel II for past-due loans. The regulatory charges are on average smaller than our economic charges and, additionally, take the volatility of economic activity into account only implicitly.

Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels

We review evidence on the Great Moderation together with evidence about volatility trends at the micro level to develop a potential explanation for the decline in aggregate volatility since the 1980s and its consequences. The key elements are declines in firm-level volatility and aggregate volatility - most dramatically in the durable goods sector - but with no decline in household consumption volatility and individual earnings uncertainty. Our explanation for the aggregate volatility decline stresses improved supply-chain management, particularly in the durable goods sector, and, less important, a shift in production and employment from goods to services. We provide evidence that better inventory control made a substantial contribution to declines in firm-level and aggregate volatility. Consistent with this view, if we look past the turbulent 1970s and early 1980s, much of the moderation reflects a decline in high-frequency (short-term) fluctuations. While these developments represent efficiency gains, they do not imply (nor is there evidence for) a reduction in economic uncertainty faced by individuals and households.

Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels

Most advanced economies have experienced a striking decline in the volatility of aggregate economic activity since the early 1980s. Volatility reductions are evident for output and employment at the aggregate level and across most industrial sectors and expenditure categories. Inflation and inflation volatility have also declined dramatically. Previous studies offer several potential explanations for this “Great Moderation.” We review evidence on the Great Moderation in conjunction with evidence about volatility trends at the micro level. We combine the two types of evidence to develop a tentative story for important components of the aggregate volatility decline and its consequences. The key ingredients are declines in firm-level volatility and aggregate volatility—most dramatically in the durable goods sector. Surprisingly, this has occurred without a decline in household consumption volatility and individual earnings uncertainty. Our explanation for the aggregate volatility decline stresses improved supply-chain management, particularly in the durable goods sector, and, less important, a shift in production and employment from goods to services. We provide evidence that better inventory control made a substantial contribution to declines in firm-level and aggregate volatility. Consistent with this view, if we look past the turbulent 1970s and early 1980s much of the moderation reflects a decline in high frequency (short-term) fluctuations. While these developments represent efficiency gains, they do not imply (nor is there evidence for) a reduction in economic uncertainty faced by individuals and households.

Capital for Non-Performing Loans

A portfolio of non-performing loans needs economic capital. We present two models for forecasting the non-performing portfolio's loss and derive the probability distribution. In the first model, the loss for each loan is a Gaussian random variable, and the risk determinants are the portfolio concentration, as well as systematic and idiosyncratic risk. Our second model allows for diversification with a performing portfolio, because an investor typically owns a combination of performing and non-performing loans. This model is a mixture model. For both models, formulae for the economic capital and the fair contribution of a single loan are given. We calibrate the models with times series data and a benchmark portfolio. Our main finding is that the credit portfolio risk of non-performing loans depends on the volatility of economic activity, on the granularity of the portfolio and on the performing portfolio. Finally, we compare the economic capital charges for non-performing loans from our models with the regulatory capital charges of Basel II. The main difference is that our capital charges are sensitive to economic activity volatility, whereas the regulatory ones are not.

The Fed’s reaction to the stock market during the great depression: Fact or artefact?

A notable feature of the 1920s and 1930s is the volatility in several key macroeconomic aggregates, and this feature used to econometrically identify the reaction of the Fed to stock market developments. The volatility of economic activity may have contributed to deepening the divisions among policy-makers about how the Fed ought to respond to stock price developments. Relying on the technique of [Rigobon, R. 2003. Identification through heteroskedasticity. Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 777–792], volatility is used as an instrument to estimate the Fed’s response to the stock market. Other identification assumptions based on structural VARs produce compatible results. Fed behavior appeared to have changed following the stock market crash of 1929. Consistent with the Riefler-Burgess doctrine, interest rates and stock returns are negatively related. I conclude that, prior to the stock market crash of 1929, a form of benign neglect explains Fed behavior. Thereafter, the Fed reacts only slightly more aggressively to stock market developments.

The Fed's Reaction to the Stock Market During the Great Depression: Fact or Artefact?

A notable feature of the 1920s and 1930s is the volatility in several key macroeconomic aggregates, and this feature used to econometrically identify the reaction of the Fed to stock market developments. The volatility of economic activity may have contributed to deepening the divisions among policy-makers about how the Fed ought to respond to stock price developments. Relying on the technique of Rigobon (2003), volatility is used as an instrument to estimate the Fed's response to the stock market. Other identification assumptions based on structural VARs produce compatible results. Fed behavior appeared to have changed following the stock market crash of 1929. Consistent with the Riefler-Burgess doctrine, interest rates and stock returns are negatively related. I conclude that, prior to the stock market crash of 1929, a form of benign neglect explains Fed behavior. Thereafter, the Fed reacts only slightly more aggressively to stock market developments.

Understanding Changes in International Business Cycle Dynamics

The volatility of economic activity in most G7 economies has moderated over the past 40 years. Also, despite large increases in trade and openness, G7 business cycles have not become more synchronized. After documenting these facts, we interpret G7 output data using a structural VAR that separately identifies common international shocks, the domestic effects of spillovers from foreign idiosyncratic shocks, and the effects of domestic idiosyncratic shocks. This analysis suggests that, with the exception of Japan, a significant portion of the widespread reduction in volatility is associated with a reduction in the magnitude of the common international shocks. Had the common international shocks in the 1980s and 1990s been as large as they were in the 1960s and 1970s, G7 business cycles would have been substantially more volatile and more highly synchronized than they actually were.

Nonlinear effects of exchange rate volatility on the volume of bilateral exports

AbstractIn this paper, we investigate empirically the impact of exchange rate volatility on real international trade flows utilizing a 13‐country data set of monthly bilateral real exports for 1980–1998. We compute one‐month‐ahead exchange rate volatility from the intra‐monthly variations in the exchange rate to better quantify this latent variable. We find that the effect of exchange rate volatility on trade flows is nonlinear, depending on its interaction with the importing country's volatility of economic activity, and that it varies considerably over the set of country pairs considered. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.