Virtue Of Meaning Research Articles

TRUTH(MAKING) BY CONVENTION

Abstract A common account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is that while the former are true solely in virtue of meaning, the latter are true also in virtue of the way of the world. Quine famously disputed this characterization, and his skepticism over the analytic/synthetic distinction has cast a long shadow. Against this skepticism, this paper argues that the common account comes close to the truth, and that truthmaker theory in particular offers the resources for providing a compelling account of the distinction that preserves the basic ideas behind it, and avoids the standard criticisms facing the distinction. In particular, it is argued that analytic truths are truths that ontologically depend in no way whatsoever upon what exists.

Concepciones metafísicas de la analiticidad

<p class='p1'>Este trabajo examina la cuestión de si una noción de analiticidad definida en términos semánticos, lógicos u ontológicos tendría el efecto de que las verdades analíticas fueran verdaderas de algún modo menos sustancial que otras verdades. Aunque la idea simple de verdadero en virtud del significado es insostenible, puede definirse una noción de significado suficiente para la verdad; sin embargo, de ahí no se sigue que una verdad con un significado tal sea insustancial, a menos que se asuma independientemente que la necesidad a la que se alude en la definición sea insustancial. De manera similar, una verdad analítica-Frege (que es sinónima de una verdad lógica) no tiene que ser insustancial, a menos que se asuma independientemente que las verdades lógicas son insustanciales. Se concluye que las explicaciones metafísicas de la analiticidad no apoyan la idea de que haya una categoría no vacía de verdades analíticas insustanciales.</p>

The original analytic/synthetic distinction: Still no cause for concern

In her 2007 survey of the topic, Gillian Russell stipulates five criteria that any adequate account of the analytic/synthetic distinction must meet. These criteria include the charge that the distinction must provide an account of the objects of the distinction, render the distinction non-trivial, explain why analytic truths are necessary and a priori, explain away our intuitions regarding some apparently contingent analytic truths, and finally explain why some truths that are true in virtue of meaning alone fail to seem analytic. In this paper I argue that a species-genus hierarchy interpretation of Kant's version of the distinction can meet all five these criteria. I argue further that Kant's distinction provides an interesting escape from Quine's charge that the distinction relies implicitly on a vicious circularity. The aim of this paper is to showcase the continuing strength of Kant's presentation of the distinction, despite the widespread contemporary charges of obscurity.

Analyticity and Context-Sensitivity. On Gillian Russell´s Account of Truth in Virtue of Meaning

An objection is made to Gillian Russell’s (2008) attempt to give an account of analyticity in its metaphysical understanding —that is, that a sentence is analytic just in case it is true in virtue of its meaning. The objection focuses on the semantic aspects of the account, arguing that the kind of context sensitivity envisaged in it ends up yielding the disastrous result that no sentence is analytic in the intended manner. Two possible replies to the objection are analyzed and rebutted.

Semantic and Metasemantic Notions of Analyticity

In this article the evolution of main conceptions of analyticity is analyzed. Kant’s criteria for analytic/synthetic distinction are discussed. Frege and Carnap notions of analyticity are set out. It is shown that Frege and Carnap shifted the criteria of analyticity to the justificatory status of judgments. The notion of truth in virtue of meaning and its criticism is exposed. Critical arguments against analyticity by W. V. O. Quine are discussed. Williamson’s arguments against traditional notions of analyticity are formulated. Williamson maintains that analytic truths are reduced to truths of other base classes-necessary, semantic or logical. It is shown that the stipulative definition of analyticity is vulnerable to Williamson’s argument. Russell’s conception of truth in virtue of reference determiner is exposed and evaluated. It is defended that the notion of truth in virtue of reference determiner is immune to many standard objections against analyticity.

Kant and Bolzano on Analyticity

Abstract: The history of speculation on a notion or notions called analyticity, now usually characterized as truth in virtue of meanings and independently of fact, is often viewed from the perspective of the Quine-Carnap dispute. Previous characterizations, due to Kant, Frege and others, are then seen as being of a piece with Carnap’s various definitions of analyticity, and thus open to Quine’s objections. Seen from this point of view, Bolzano’s claims about analyticity appear downright bizarre: for on his conception, analyticity is not only non-linguistic, but also independent of both apriority and necessity. In this paper, it is argued that the problem lies not with Bolzano, but rather with the received historical account, especially its interpretation of Kant.

Russell, Gillian. Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. xv+232. $65.00 (cloth).

Russell, Gillian. <i>Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction</i>. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp. xv+232. $65.00 (cloth).

Analyticity and Justification in Frege

That there are analytic truths may challenge a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Unlike standard conceptions, in which analyticity is couched in terms of “truth in virtue of meanings”, Frege’s notions of analytic and a priori concern justification, respecting a principle of the homogeneity of truth. Where there is no justification these notions do not apply, Frege insists. Basic truths and axioms may be analytic (or a priori), though unprovable, which means there is a form of justification which is not (deductive) proof. This is also required for regarding singular factual propositions as a posteriori. A Fregean direction for explicating this wider notion of justification is suggested in terms of his notion of sense (Sinn)—modes in which what the axioms are about are given—and its general epistemological significance is sketched.

Truth in Virtue of Meaning. By Gillian Russell

Truth in Virtue of Meaning. By Gillian Russell

Analyticity and Possible-World Semantics

Standard approaches to possible-world semantics allow us to define necessity and logical truth, but analyticity is considerably more difficult to account for. The source of this difficulty lies in the received model-theoretical conception of a language interpretation. In intuitive terms, analyticity amounts to truth in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. solely in virtue of the interpretation of linguistic expressions. In other words, an analytic sentence should remain true under all variations of ‘extralinguistic reality’ as long as the interpretation is kept constant. However, the received conception of an interpretation as a mapping from language to a model frame hinders keeping the interpretation constant while varying other components of the model. To make room for analyticity, the concept of an interpretation should therefore be revised. The latter should be made richer in content than it has usually been assumed. As a by-product, this revision also gives us a one-dimensional analogue of the influential two-dimensional account of a priori. We are thus able to map out the network of formal connections between the notions of analyticity, apriority, logical truth and necessity.

Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell.

Truth in Virtue of Meaning, by Gillian Russell.

Truth in virtue of meaning

Truth in virtue of meaning

Truth in Virtue of Meaning

In recent work on a priori justification, one thing about which there is considerable agreement is that the notion of truth in virtue of meaning is bankrupt and infertile. (For the sake of more readable prose, I will use ‘TVM’ as an abbreviation for ‘the notion of truth in virtue of meaning.’) Arguments against the worth of TVM can be found across the entire spectrum of views on the a priori, in the work of uncompromising rationalists (such as BonJour (1998)), of centrist moderates (such as Boghossian (1997)), and of uncompromising empiricists (such as Devitt (2004)). My aim is to dispute this widespread opinion.The outline is as follows: first, §§II-III consist of preliminary stage-setting. Then, in §IV I will argue that some of the most prevalent arguments against the worth of TVM — in particular, one which is given clear expression by Quine (1970), and is recently reinforced by Boghossian (1997) — do not engage with the core idea motivating TVM. After deflecting this charge of incoherence, the aim of §§V-VIII is to work toward developing a useful conception of TVM.

IN DEFENCE OF METAPHYSICAL ANALYTICITY

AbstractAccording to the so‐called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion of ‘independence of (extralinguistic) facts’. If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truthmakers of analytic truths no longer follows. Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument. The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open.1

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Teaching &amp; Learning Guide for: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Analyticity and Katz's New Intensionalism: Or, if You Sever Sense from Reference, Analyticity is Cheap but Useless

Jerry Katz has observed that much of twentieth century philosophy of language turns on the Fregean thesis that sense determines reference. For example, he suggests that this thesis underwrites the widespread understanding of ‘analyticity’ (what he calls “the standard view”) as (necessary) truth in virtue of meaning alone. In addition, Katz argues that the Fregean thesis is a necessary premise in widely accepted arguments for externalist conclusions about the semantics of natural kind terms and semantic knowledge. But, precisely because it plays a pivotal role in arguments for these widelyheld positions, Katz thinks the Fregean thesis is an error of tremendous import. He argues that rejecting the Fregean thesis not only corrects a misimpression about the relationship between sense and reference shared by almost all semanticists in the post-Fregean tradition, but also clears the way for a novel understanding of ‘analyticity’ not vulnerable to Quinean attacks, and allows for a “rationalist/internalist” conception of reference and semantic knowledge of the kind Putnam and Kripke have convinced many is unattainable. As Katz is at pains to emphasize, these consequences challenge directly some of the most widelyand dearly-held positions in philosophy of language. For these reasons, it seems that quite a lot hangs on the viability of Katz’s proposal. Therefore, the question whether his program can be sustained is of considerable philosophical ∗Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. †Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, joncohen@ruccs.rutgers.edu 1Moreover, whether Katz’s internalist recasting of ‘analyticity’ is defensible will be of interest to theorists (including not only philosophers but also linguists and psychologists) attempting to explain the analyticity of sentences/thoughts solely in terms of what’s inside the heads of competent speakers/thinkers. Many theories of lexical and conceptual meaning would satisfy this description, including meaning-postulate accounts in the tradition of [Carnap, 1956], (cf., [Partee, 1995], 328), inferential-role accounts (e.g., [Block, 1986], [Harman, 1982], [Rosch, 1978], [Smith and Medin, 1981]), and so-called theory-theory accounts (e.g., [Keil, 1987], [Carey, 1991], [Gopnik, 1988]).

Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics

Contemporary philosophy standardly accepts Frege's conceptions of sense as the determiner of reference and of analyticity as (necessary) truth in virtue of meaning. This paper argues that those conceptions are mistaken. It develops referentially autonomous notions of sense and analyticity and applies them to the semantics of natural kind terms. The arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke concerning natural kind terms are widely taken to refute internalist and rationalist theories of meaning. This paper shows that the counter-intuitive consequences about the reference of natural kind terms depend as much on Frege's conceptions of sense and analyticity as on what such theories of meaning say about the senses of natural kind terms. Rather than refuting the internalist and rationalist theories of meaning, the arguments of Donnellan, Putnam, and Kripke are best recast as refutations of their own Fregean assumptions. The paper also shows how autonomous notions of sense and analyticity enable us to reconstruct such theories, formulate an internalist/ rationalist account of semantic knowledge, and preserve Donnellan's, Putnam's, and Kripke's insights about reference.

State-spaces and meaning relations among predicates

It has often been suggested that the meaning of terms is theory dependent. Bas van Fraassen has proposed a particular way of inferring which sentences are true in virtue of meaning, given a theory in so-called “state-space format”. I examine his claims by means of simple examples.