Virtue Of Justice Research Articles

Balancing self-interest and public interest: Virtues and the pandemic context

This article explores how the external conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic have affected individuals’ moral psychology. We will argue that challenging contexts like the pandemic are external conditions that shape human moral behavior. Supported by Adam Smith’s theory of virtues, it is argued that individuals can balance self-interest with concern for others, even in challenging circumstances, through the virtues of justice, benevolence, prudence, and, most importantly, self-control. We will conclude by stating that, even in challenging contexts, individuals need to balance private and public interests to develop appropriate moral action.

An empirical support of Schopenhauer's ethics: A dynamic panel data analysis on developed and developing countries

This paper covers all main theoretical features of Schopenhauer's ethics (i.e., life satisfaction arising from art, compassion based on virtue of justice or virtue of loving, and compassion leading to asceticism) in an analytical model, it translates this analytical model into a statistical model by referring to empirical variables (i.e., household expenditures in recreation and culture for art, the Gini index for compassion based on virtue of justice; percentages of people nationally defined as poor for compassion based on virtue of loving; percentages of believers in Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism; governmental enrolments and expenditures in primary, secondary and tertiary education; and inter-generational equal access to Earth resources for compassion leading to asceticism), and it estimates this statistical model by using panel data at a country level for 99% of the world's population (i.e., 18% in 34 OECD developed countries and 81% in 128 non-OECD developing countries) from 2000 to 2020. Statistical results about reliability show that Schopenhauer's ethics is supported by observations (i.e., all predictions are confirmed within an each individual perspective with reliable variables depicting compassion based on virtue of justice, Christianity, and primary education) and it can explain the observed decreasing life satisfaction within an average individual perspective (i.e., believers in developed countries are showed to be decreased from 86% to 73% and compassion based on virtue of justice, art, and tertiary education turn out to be reliable). Mathematical results about feasibility show that some reliable principles of Schopenhauer's ethics can compensate for the decreasing life satisfaction at a cultural individual level (i.e., compassion based on virtue of justice, Christianity) and some of its reliable principles can compensate the decreasing life satisfaction at a representative individual level (i.e., compassion based on virtue of justice, art). Therefore, the methodological contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it provides an example of interdisciplinary science (i.e., contextual rather than topical, abductive rather than inductive, observational rather than experimental). Second, it highlights (theoretical and empirical) synergies between social (behavioural) sciences and (moral) philosophy: Schopenhauer's ethics turn out to be not only a normative philosophy (i.e., it suggests individual behaviours) but also a positive philosophy (i.e., it explains individual behaviours), within its virtue approach; Schopenhauer's ethics can explain the observed dynamics of life satisfaction at global level, if an utilitarian rather than a virtue approach is adopted.

Is the Camino Just? Conclusions Drawn from the Survey Conducted Among Polish Pilgrims

Familiarising the reader with the range of factors connecting Polish pilgrims with others on the Way of Saint James (Spanish: Camino de Santiago) will be grounded on the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas on the virtue of justice which will put in order encounters of the Slavic pilgrim with others on the way. The analysis will also be based on the author’s own empirical research on the experience of Polish pilgrims on the Way of Saint James, namely, in-depth interviews conducted in the summer of 2019 in Santiago de Compostela (n=50). The virtue of justice will be shown as the empowering of the pilgrim’s will, thanks to which he can be guided by right principles in his actions and his behavior is good, as well as he is able to give everyone what is rightly due to him under the law. The entire argument will be confronted with manifestations of injustice leading to conflict, discomfort and judgment resulting from significant discrepancies in experiencing the Camino pilgrimage.

Whose work? Which markets? Rethinking work and markets in light of virtue ethics

AbstractNeo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics applied to work and business theory have received increasing attention due to Alasdair MacIntyre's philosophy. At the same time, this approach has been accused of being inapplicable, a romantic nostalgia for an ideal world far from the reality of today's markets. Moreover, the more this theory evolves, the bigger the gap seems to become, as if good work were at odds with its economic dimension. This paper aims to address this gap by explaining how MacIntyre's neo‐Aristotelianism conceives of the economic dimension of good work. In particular, we claim that it is consistent with MacIntyre's philosophy that said economic dimension of work can be defined in terms of excellence and virtue, particularly in accordance with the virtues of justice and unity of life. However, for these virtues of good work to be practicable, a reconsideration of market practices performed under the logic of giving and receiving is needed. Hence, defining and sustaining an economic dimension of good work in MacIntyre also depend on the possibility of market practices being defined as excellent.

Aristotle’sNicomachean Ethicson the Sameness of Friendship and Justice

AbstractIn theNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that friendship and justice are the same, apparently flouting the not uncommon contrast between friendship and justice. I start by assessing Aristotle’s principle of equality: friends of equal standing engage in exact reciprocity in goods and friends of unequal standing engage in proportional reciprocity. In a number of ways that have gone unnoticed, the equalization principle is a requirement for understanding the sameness of friendship and justice. Just relations and friendship share the same domain, that is, the same relationship of a corresponding community. Moreover, asking how to be just to someone is the same as asking how to be a friend to that person, indicating that the virtue of justice and the virtue of friendship are also the same.

Perspective of ethics on developing human personality characteristics

Almost all social psychologists believe that attitude are learned by ethics of a belonging society. People need to learn to motivate themselves and re-motivate as necessary. People need to give their mind the right tools. Like other determining factors, the ethics of a particular culture potentially influences the development of personality traits. A sound personality undeniably requires strong commitment to some set of values, principles and ethics. It is certainly the influence of the inner conscience that makes an individual behave well and justly with his fellow beings no matter how knowledgeable and powerful he might be. The virtues of justice and humanity are not readily practiced by one and all. Justice is a particular and relative rather than an absolute concept. There is no such thing as less or more just. One may be either just or unjust. Humility is also not easy to practice. It requires sacrifice of the self in terms of credit, recognition, appreciation, merit and even self-satisfaction. In this paper, I endeavour to explicate the variegated values that make up an individual’s personality and the significance of ethics in accomplishing this goal.

‘Mapping’ Moral Engagement in the Solution-Focused Approach Through MacIntyre’s Model of Practice

I attempt to answer Trish Walsh’s two questions about the ‘maps’ that might exist for moral engagement in the ‘helping’ professions and how these might relate to the Solution-Focused Approach (Walsh, 2010). I seek to do this by exploring the narrative of the emergence of the Solution Focused Approach from the perspective of Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of a ‘practice’ (MacIntyre, 1985) with the aim of providing the basis for ‘map’ for moral engagement by Solution-Focused Practitioners. To this end I attempt to interpret the Solution Focused Approach as a MacIntyreian ‘practice’ in which virtues (as ‘human qualities’) emerge out of collective activity through distinctive narratives and skills which are oriented towards the internal goods of the Solution-Focused Approach as a practice. Next, I evaluate the institutions that host and nurture the Solution-Focused Approach in the light of MacIntyre’s theory to gauge whether they have a positive or negative effect in promoting the internal goods of the practice. Finally, I consider how practice demonstrates MacIntyre’s ‘essential’ virtues of justice, courage and honesty in its initial development and in subsequent codes of practice developed by associations that promote the Solution-Focused Approach (SFA). My analysis and discussion should furnish a sketch for a ‘map’ for practitioners that will support them in their moral engagement both in ‘helping’ situations with clients and in building, relationships, alliances, and institutions with colleagues. I conclude with suggestions for further study and research around this topic, including a second article in which I intend to identify some virtues specific to the Solution-Focused Approach.

Editors' Introduction to the Special Issue: The Virtues of Justice: Rethinking Crime and Punishment.

Editors' Introduction to the Special Issue: The Virtues of Justice: Rethinking Crime and Punishment.

Economics of the community mechanism

This paper discusses the importance of the community mechanism that complements the market and power mechanisms in an economic system during an era of crisis, defined as a mechanism for resource allocation by which at least one person proposes voluntary cooperation, and the proposal is not rejected. While this community mechanism can function alongside homo economicus in win–win situations, it can be further activated with social preferences for altruism and reciprocity and with norms or worldviews that encourage cooperation. Other factors that relate to these include the character strengths that contribute to community and society known as virtues, with the concept of wellbeing related to virtues being known as eudaimonia. Some aspects of the acquisition of virtues can be viewed as changing preferences, and there is empirical evidence suggesting changes in trust relate to changes in preferences. Leadership is an example of the virtue of justice, and servant leadership seems important for the community mechanism, as does perspective taking. For evaluating policies, normative economics based only on consequentialism may not be sufficient, and virtue ethics seems essential when the community mechanism is important.

Saña y codicia como conceptos rectores de la miscelánea castellana del ms. Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1877

Abstract Salamanca, University Library, MS 1877 (1469–1470) is a miscellany made up of genetically independent works, all in Castilian: the Fuero real by Alfonso X; a translation of the Barlaam et Josaphat; sayings of the desert fathers taken from the Vitae patrum of Pelagius and John; a translation of John of Rupescissa’s Vade mecum in tribulatione; segments of three French Arthurian romances (Libro de Josep Abarimatia, Estoria de Merlín and Lançarote); a short catechism with no known direct source. But it is also miscellaneous because, as usually occurs in these compilations, the collected works belong to different textual genres: code of law; oriental didactic literature; hagiographic and apocalyptic discourses; Arthurian romance; catechetical compendium. Taking materialist philology as a theoretical framework, this article will propose a unitary reading of the manuscript from the hypothesis that among its dissimilar components there are semantic ties that give it a specific coherence and meaning. We will claim that the codex explores a series of exemplary variations destined to reprove the excess of irascible (saña) and concupiscible (codicia) appetites that those who dedicate themselves to active life tend to experience against the virtues of justice and prudence that are essential to access contemplative life.

The Virtues of Justice: Toward a Moral and Jurisprudential Psychology.

Within the theoretical literature on crime control and offender therapy, little has been written about the importance of virtue ethics in the experience of human justice and in the evolution of the common good. As a theory of being, the aretaic tradition extols eudemonic existence (i.e., excellence, flourishing) as a relational habit of developing character that is both practiced and embodied over time. What this implies is that virtue justice depends on a set of assumptions and predispositions-both moral and jurisprudential-whose meanings are essential to comprehending its psychological structure. This article sets out to explore several themes that our integral to our thesis on the virtues (i.e., the being) of justice. We reclaim justice's aretaic significance, critique the common conflation of justice and law, discuss how the dominant legalistic conception of justice is rooted in a particular view of human nature, suggest how justice might be more properly grounded in natural moral sensibilities, and provide a tentative explication of the psychological character of justice as a twofold moral disposition. Given this exploratory commentary, we conclude by reflecting on how individual well-being, system-wide progress, and transformative social change are both possible and practical, in the interest of promoting the virtues of justice within the practice of crime control and offender therapy.

Institutional justice and the virtue of gratitude

This paper explores the relationship between justice, institutions, and the medieval virtue of gratitude. It does this by focusing on a thirteenth-century account of the virtue of gratitude in the work of Thomas Aquinas. It argues that institutions, both formal and informal, provide a helpful framework for considering the relationship between gratitude and a number of important benefactor and beneficiary relationships within the hierarchy of virtues that make up the cardinal virtue of justice. This paper first explores Thomas’ account of the virtues of justice and gratitude. It then looks at recent literature in theology and ethics of institutions showing how formal and informal institutions can help cultivate gratitude.

Platon Felsefesinde Adalet, Düzen ve Yasa

Platon, bireysel ve toplumsal bir erdem olarak gördüğü adaleti Devlet ve Yasalar adlı eserleri başta olmak üzere çeşitli eserlerinde soruşturmuş, onun ne olduğunu ve önemini ortaya koymaya çalışmıştır. Adaletin ne olduğu meselesi güç bir meseledir ve onun ne olduğu konusunda anlaşmazlıklar mevcuttur. Bu nedenle Platon, onun ne olduğu sorusuna yanıt ararken, onun ne olmadığını da ortaya koymuştur. Öncelikli olarak o, adaletin güçlünün iradesinin tezahürü olduğu veya yalnızca özçıkarın korunması için bir araçtan ibaret olduğu görüşlerine karşı çıkmıştır. Adalet ne güçlünün iradesinin tezahürüdür ne de özçıkarın korunması için bir araçtan ibarettir. Adalet, tanrıların bile üstünde yer alan bir ilkedir. Platon’a göre adalet, tıpkı iyi ideası gibi bir ideadır. Platon için adalet bir idea olmanın yanı sıra ayrıca bir erdemdir ve bir erdem olarak diğer erdemlerden kopuk değildir. Onun varlığı diğer erdemlerin varlığıyla ilişkilidir. Adaletle beraber ölçülülük, cesaret ve bilgeliği de birer erdem olarak gören Platon, bu erdemleri ruhun üçlü yapısıyla ilişkilendirmiştir. Üç parçalı ruh anlayışını benimseyen Platon’a göre ruhun akıllı kısmı dışında, akıllı olmayan, arzulayan ve öfkelenen kısımları da bulunmaktadır. Ruhun akıllı kısmının erdemi bilgelikken, diğer kısımlarının erdemleri ölçülülük ve cesarettir. Adalet, bir kimsede bu üç erdemin bulunmasıyla kendiliğinden ortaya çıkan bir erdemdir. Bu nedenle onun ruhta tekabül ettiği herhangi özel bir kısım yoktur. Platon’a göre insan ruhu gibi toplumlar da üç kısımdan oluşurlar ve her bir kısım, insan ruhundaki bir kısma tekabül eder. Üretici sınıf insan ruhunun arzulayan kısmına, koruyucu sınıf ruhun öfkelenen kısmına, yönetici sınıf ise ruhun akıllı kısmına karşılık gelir. Toplumu oluşturan bu sınıfların sergilemesi gereken erdemler de ruhun karşılık geldikleri kısımlarına uygun erdemlerdir. Bunun anlamı üretici sınıfın ölçülülük, koruyucu sınıfın cesaret, yönetici sınıfının ise bilgelik erdemine sahip olması gerektiğidir. Tüm sınıflar kendileri için gerekli erdeme sahip olarak toplumsal rollerini eksiksizce yerine getirdikleri takdirde, o toplum hem düzen kazanacak hem de adil ve mutlu bir toplum haline gelecektir. Toplumun bu niteliklere sahip olabilmesi için toplumu aklı temsil eden bilge kimselerin yönetmesi gerekmektedir. Çünkü ancak bu kişiler bir bütün olarak toplumun iyiliğini gözetebilirler. Yalnızca bilgelik sahibi yöneticilerin idare ettiği toplumu adil bir toplum sayan Platon, devlet biçimlerini toplumların sahip oldukları erdemler açısından değerlendirir. İdeal devletten uzaklaşan toplumlar aşama aşama diğer erdemleri de yitirecek ve adaletten de adım adım uzaklaşacaklardır. Platon açısından topluma adalet sağlayacak olan yöneticinin en önemli görevlerinden biri de yasamadır. Yasalarla devlet idaresinde yer alan görevliler ve bunların görevleri belirlenerek devletin işleyiş mekanizması ortaya konur. Bunun dışında yasalar toplumun erdemli olmasını sağlayan araçlar olarak işlev görürler. Yasaların amacı toplumun erdemi, iyiliği ve mutluluğudur. Akıl kaynaklı olması gereken yasalar, yurttaşların erdem kazanmasına hizmet ederler. Yasalara itaat eden insanlar birbirleri ile dostane ilişkiler kurabileceklerdir. Bu çalışmada başta Platon’un adalet, düzen ve yasadan ne anladığı, sonrasında ise bu kavramları birbirleriyle ve erdem, bilgelik, mutluluk, ceza gibi ilgili diğer kavramlarla nasıl ilişkilendirdiği gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Platon’un gerek adalet, gerekse de erdem ve siyaset ile ilgili görüşlerine ilişkin çok sayıda çalışma olmasına rağmen onun adalet ile düzen, yasa ve ceza gibi kavramları nasıl ilişkilendirdiğine dair doğrudan bir çalışma Türkçe literatürde bulunmamaktadır. Bu çalışma, bu bakımından literatürde bir boşluğu doldurma iddiasındadır. Çalışmada öncelikle Platon açısından adaletin ne olmadığına ve önemine değinilmiş; sonrasında adalet, bireysel ruhta ve toplumsal boyutta düzen olarak ele alınarak bireysel ve toplumsal adaletin nasıl sağlanacağı sorularına yanıt aranmıştır. Platon’a göre adalet erdemi olmadan bireysel ve toplumsal mutluluğa ulaşılamayacağı, adalet için bilgeliğin bir gereklilik olduğu, yasaların ise adalete ulaşmada birer araç olduğu sonuç olarak ortaya konmuştur.

Aristotle’s Virtue of Justice as an Ethical Solution to Political Corruption: Analysis and Reflection

This paper attempts to discuss Aristotle’s concept of justice as an ethical solution to political corruption. The goal of this paper is to present corruption as a form of injustice that deprives the majority from a common good. This paper is very important because it provides ethical solution to grand corruption whereby unscrupulous individuals divert funds meant for development of the entire society into private hands. Due to grand corruption the poor masses are deprived of quality basic needs. The paper focuses on corruption as an immoral act through the lens of Aristotle’s ethical and political insights. The virtue of justice in Aristotle’s ethical and political works are spelled out. The methodology used in this paper is analytical and applied. It is analytical because it analyses Aristotle’s understanding of virtue of justice in his moral theory especially in his book entitled Nicomachean Ethics and justice in his political theory. Finally, the paper makes subsequent applications of Aristotle’s virtue of justice in the realm of ethical solutions to the problem of corruption.

Sentimentos e utilidade: uma investigação da moral em bases humeanas

The article main purpose is to develop an argument concerning the central problem of Hume's practical philosophy. The initial approach consists in determine the influence that reason and sentiments have on how moral judgments are ordinarily made. It will be argued that the base of moral distinctions is found in sentiments, with reason having an instrumental role in the process. In order to explain which principle offers a north to sentiments and is the moral compass of individuals, the second point developed in this article converges to investigating moral sentiments and utility from the humean argument about the natural virtue of benevolence and the artificial virtue of justice. To answer these questions, the argument will be grounded essentially on the Investigations on the Principles of Morals, using the Treatise of Human Nature and Hume’s commentators when is necessary to reinforce or clarify a specific point.

İBN SÎNÂ DÜŞÜNCESİNDE BİR ERDEM OLARAK ADALET ve SOSYAL YANSIMALARI

Bu makale, İbn Sînâ’nın bir erdem olarak adalet anlayışını ve sosyal alanda yansımalarını incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. İbn Sînâ, Platoncu erdem şemasını kabul eder, buna göre temel erdemler dörttür; hikmet, şecaat, iffet ve bu üç erdemin toplamı olan adalet. Adalet dışındaki her bir erdemin altına tâli erdemler koyar. O, tâli erdem tasnifinde ahlak geleneğine tabi olan filozoflardan farklı bir sıralama yapar. Ona göre adalet erdeminin altında iki temel ilke vardır: Birincisi ifrat ve tefrit arasında orta olanın bulunması; ikincisi davranışın sırf iyiyi hedeflemesidir. Sosyal ilişkilerde adalet, hak edilenden fazla vermek ile hak edileni vermeme arasında orta olandır. O, adil bir toplumun temellerinin kurulmasında sosyal işbirliği ve uzlaşının önemine dikkat çeker. O, yönetenlerin/iktidarın baskıcı tutumu karşısında sistemi dengelemek için aşağıdan yukarıya eylemci bir yaklaşımı önerir. Ona göre adil bir alış-veriş için kumar, kuralsız kazanç, faiz ve fazla kazanma iştahı önlenmelidir. Ayrıca o, ictihadın işlevselliğine ve değişime ayak uydurmanın önemine dikkat çeker.

Ahlâk ve Siyasetin Belirleyici İlkesi Olarak Adalet: Mâverdî Merkezli Okuma

Bu makalede Mâverdî’nin ahlâk ve siyaset düşüncesi bağlamında adâlet anlayışının irde-lenmesi hedeflenmektedir. İslam düşünce geleneğinde adâlet, genellikle felsefî/teorik içeriğiyle değerlendirilmekle birlikte pratik hayatta uygulanış şekline dair kaleme alınan eserler sayıca azdır. Bu çalışmada Mâverdî’nin kendi eserlerinden hareketle onun ahlâktan siyasete, devlet yönetimine kadar adâletin pratik hayatta nasıl uygulanması gerektiğine dair yaklaşımının izlerini süreceğiz. Mâverdî’nin düşünce dünyasında adalet erdemi paydasında birleşen ahlâk ve siyaset, birbirini tamamlayan iki temel alan olarak kabul edilir. Bir ahlâk kavramı olarak adâlet başlı başına bir erdem olmasının yanında erdemlerin kendisinden çıktığı ana erdemdir. Mâverdî adalet ile itidal (denge) arasında ilişki kurmak suretiyle kişinin öncelikle kendine karşı adaletli olması gerektiğini vurgular. Bu ise kişinin aşırılık ile eksiklik/yetersizlik arasında dengede durması, kendisini iyi ve güzel olana yönlendirmesi, kötülüklerden alıkoymasıyla mümkündür. İnsanın davranışlarında dengeli olanı tercih etmesi adâlet olduğundan dolayı kendinde iyi ve güzel davranışları gösteremeyen kimse kendine zul-metmiş olur.Mâverdî adâleti kişinin kendisine ve başkasına olmak üzere ikiye ayırır. Kişinin kendisine karşı adâleti doğru yolda olması, çirkin şeylerden uzak durması ve davranışlarında sınırı aşmaması vb. sıralanabilir. Başkalarına karşı adâlet ise insanların sosyal yaşam/görgü kurallarına uygun dengeli davranması anlamına gelir. Yöneticinin vatandaşlarına karşı yaklaşımında adaletli olması da bu kapsamda değerlendirilir. Zira siyasette adâlet birey-birey, birey-devlet, devlet-birey ilişkisini düzenleyici esasları belirleyen temel ilkedir. Bir arada yaşamanın vazgeçilmez ilkesi adâletin bireyin söz ve eylemlerinden hukukun üs-tünlüğü ve gelir dağılımı gibi hususlara kadar pek çok yönü vardır. Siyasetin ahlâka duyduğu ihtiyacı fark eden Mâverdî, siyasette ahlâkî ilkelere dayanan etkili ve gerçekçi bir yönetim teorisi kurmayı hedeflemiş; bunun için adâleti devlet yöne-timinin en birinci ilkesi olarak görmüştür. Bu yönüyle adâlet ahlâkî bir erdem olmasının yanında devletin temel bir görevi olarak yöneten-yönetilen arasındaki ilişkinin kuralları belirleyen temel bir ilke olarak görülür. Mâverdî, adâletin hukuk devleti çerçevesinde toplumun tamamını kuşatması için kapsamlı adâlet ilkesine vurgu yapmıştır. Ayrıca o, adâleti iktidarın gücü ve meşruiyeti için dengeleyici bir unsur olarak görür. Ona göre herkesi kuşatan adâlet toplumda düzenin ve birliğin tesisini sağlayan önemli bir ilkedir. Kapsamlı adâlet sayesinde halkın yönetime bağlılığı artar, ülke bayındır hale gelir, böyle-likle yönetici güven içinde olur. Bu şekilde adâlet siyasal yönetimin icraatlarının meşrulu-ğunu temin eden bir araç haline gelir. Adâleti iktidarın gücünü dengeleyici unsur olarak gören Mâverdî yönetimde adâletin ideal uygulamasını dinî değerlerle ve yöneticinin sahip olduğu niteliklerle ilişkilendirir. Devlet yönetiminin sağlıklı ve amaca uygun bir şekilde işleyebilmesi için kurumlardan ziyade ilkelere önem veren Mâverdî adâleti icra edecek devlet organlarının adâletin dağıtımı konusunda ilkelerden vazgeçmemesi gerektiğini belirtir. Yönetici kendisinden başlamak üzere eşitlik ilkesine göre hareket etmeli, adâletin dağıtımını icra edecek kadı-ların tayinine ve yargılamanın hızlandırılmasına dikkat etmelidir. Aynı şekilde Mâverdî, adâleti yöneticinin yetkilerini sınırlayan bir ilke olarak görür. Bu yönüyle adâlet yönetici-nin halkına yaklaşımının sınırlarını belirleyen dengeleyici ve iktidarın meşruiyetini sağ-layıcı önemli bir unsurdur. Mâverdî’nin bu yaklaşımı kimi siyaset filozofları tarafından üretilen güce dayalı otorite yerine hakka dayalı bir otorite tesis etmeyi hedeflediğinden dolayı değerlidir. Sonuç olarak eserlerin her yerine adâlet vurgusunun nakşedilmiş oldu-ğunu gördüğümüz Mâverdî’nin metinlerinde adâletin bireysel hayattan devlet idaresine kadar her alanda anahtar niteliğinde değişmeyen temel bir erdem olduğunu anlamamız mümkündür.

Justice as a Personal Virtue and Justice as an Institutional Virtue: Mencius’s Confucian Virtue Politics

Abstract It has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

In Adam Smith\u2019s Own Words: The Role of Virtues in the Relationship Between Free Market Economies and Societal Flourishing, A Semantic Network Data-Mining Approach

Among business ethicists, Adam Smith is widely viewed as the defender of an amoral if not anti-moral economics in which individuals’ pursuit of their private self-interest is converted by an ‘invisible hand’ into shared economic prosperity. This is often justified by reference to a select few quotations from The Wealth of Nations. We use new empirical methods to investigate what Smith actually had to say, firstly about the relationship between free market institutions and individuals’ moral virtues, and secondly about the further relationship between virtues and societal flourishing. We show with more quantitative precision than traditional scholarship that the invisible hand reading dramatically misrepresents both the nuance and the sum of Smith’s analysis. Smith paid a great deal of attention to a flourishing society’s dependence on virtues, including the non-self-regarding virtues of justice and benevolence, and he worried also about their fragility in the face of the changed incentives and social conditions of commercial society.

The Virtue of Justice and the Justice of Institutions

Justice, according to Thomas Aquinas, is a personal virtue. Modern theorists, by contrast, generally treat justice as a virtue of social institutions. Jean Porter rightly argues that both perspectives are necessary. But how should we conceive the relationship between the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions? I address this question by drawing from Aquinas’s account of the role of the convention of money in mediating relations of just exchange. Developing Aquinas’s account, I defend two conclusions and raise one problem. The conclusions are: (1) Aquinas does presuppose the need for just institutions in just relations; (2) Aquinas highlights the importance of an underappreciated consideration: the way institutions mediate just or unjust relationships. The problem, which naturally arises from bringing together the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions, is whether and how individuals can act justly in a context of structural injustice.