Violence In Post-Conflict Societies Research Articles

Choosing Women in Postwar Elections: Exposure to War Violence, Ideology, and Voters’ Gender Bias

AbstractThe level of women’s parliamentary representation often increases after armed conflict, but do voters in postwar societies actually prefer female electoral candidates? We answer this question by analyzing a unique data set containing information on nearly 7,000 candidates running in three elections with preferential voting in postwar Croatia. Our analysis demonstrates that voters’ gender bias is conditional on the local electorate’s ideology and exposure to war violence, with voters of right-wing parties and voters in areas more affected by war violence being more biased against female candidates. These effects of ideology and exposure to war violence also exhibit a strong interactive relationship, suggesting that bias against women is strongest among right-wing voters in areas exposed to war violence and reversed among left-wing voters in areas exposed to war violence. Our findings highlight the need to better understand the relationship between gender, ideology, and violence in postconflict societies.

The Talat-Tehlirian Complex: Contentious Narratives of Martyrdom and Revenge in Post-Conflict Societies

AbstractThe assassination of Talat Pasha by Soghomon Tehlirian on 15 March 1921 in Berlin, as well as Tehlirian’s trial and acquittal on 2–3 June 1921, have contributed to the formation of conflicting legacies of the Armenian Genocide. Though minuscule in terms of violence and legal ramifications, these events and their reimagination in contentious narratives have shaped a dominant prism of sensemaking in Turkish-Armenian relations. In the imagination of rival groups, Talat and Tehlirian compete for the very same normative categories of hero and victim at once and each are demonized as a villain and perpetrator. Moreover, it is each figure’s embodiment of martyrdom and revenge that explains why their heroizations have proved so enduring and effective across time and space. This mutual framework of sensemaking, which I call the Talat-Tehlirian complex, ultimately denies the chances of historical reconciliation. In terms of its theoretical implications, this case study explains how a martyr-avenger complex can continuously demand solidarity, sustain grievances, and sacralize violence in post-conflict societies. Based on a thick description of what happened in Berlin in 1921 and its contentious narratives across different generations, this paper calls for a transition to a post-heroic age in Turkish-Armenian relations.

Displacement and the expectation of political violence: Evidence from Bosnia

How do different degrees of displaced people’s hardship shape their expectations of peace and violence in post-conflict societies? We develop a novel explanation and empirically examine it using survey data collected in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2013. The displaced may suffer by being the target of the hostility of opposing groups and/or by receiving little support from, or being mistreated by, their own groups and international actors. As a result, they develop negative opinions about these actors, friend and foe alike, become pessimistic about the possibility of cooperation, and see post-conflict peace as unsustainable. We find those who have suffered greater hardship during displacement are more likely to foresee political violence. Hardship during displacement is also a stronger predictor than the experience of violence. Our analysis implies that, while violence does have an impact as suggested by the literature, other hardship during displacement, such as the lack of support, also matters.

Violence after War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States, by Michael J. Boyle

Reviewed by: Jeff Bridoux, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, UKIn explaining his concept of dual perspective, Antonio Gramsci states that power has two faces which are both necessary for the life of a state: 'two things are absolutely necessary for the life of a State: arms and religion ... force and consent, coercion and persuasion, State and Church, political society and civil society, politics and morals ... law and freedom, order and discipline ... violence and fraud.'[1]In Violence after War , Michael J. Boyle is squarely focused on the dark side of power and provides an insightful and comprehensive analysis of the reasons behind resurgence of violence in post-conflict societies. He begins by wondering why policymakers so often get it wrong when assessing the likelihood of a resurgence of violence in such environments. There are no simple answers. Boyle's main argument is that patterns of violence in post-conflict societies are multiple, varied, intricate, and hence complex: 'no single logic can explain all incidents of violence because of the sheer variety of actors and motives for violent action present in post-conflict states' (8). To tackle this complexity, Boyle positions his work within the literature that focuses on strategic violence as explanatory. Yet, he argues that it is necessary to adopt a more comprehensive definition of strategic violence 'in which multiple actors can engage in violent bargaining with each other for a diverse range of purposes' (9). Those purposes include the traditional contestation of a peace settlement or an intention to resume hostilities through high-profile acts of violence (e.g. terrorism, insurgency, etc.), as well as a range of non-macro-leverage motivations. Such motivations translate into low-intensity types of violence (e.g. assassination, reprisal, intimidation, etc.) whose cumulative effects can change the balance of power in the state. Boyle's objective is to develop a theoretical framework that allows for a multi-layered analysis of violence in post-conflict societies to explain the variations in levels of strategic violence.Boyle develops his conceptual framework in two stages. In chapter 2, he presents a typology that classifies acts of violence in three broad categories (expressive, instrumental, and strategic) and two categories of victims (individual and categorical) (31-32). While not covering for all possible types, this typology allows for the differentiation between violent acts susceptible to having a strategic impact on the peace process. To his credit, Boyle then engages in a fascinating discussion about the limits of studying political violence in an environment of limited information. His conceptual framework attempts to mitigate the inevitable methodological limitations through a clear identification of acts of violence, their motivations, and how political and criminal violence interact and potentially reinforce each other in threatening the newly established peace (32-44). Methodologically, Boyle suggests that it is possible to empirically detect strategic forms of violence that jeopardize the peace through 'contextual analysis of crime statistics and of existing narratives and first-hand accounts of the attacks' (45). Boyle then relies on two pathways to explain the emergence of strategic violence in post-conflict states: a direct pathway (the peace settlement is contested through violence similar to violence during the war) and an indirect pathway (strategic violence is the result of new fault lines due to political and organizational changes experienced by armed groups following a settlement). This differentiation is followed by a comprehensive discussion of the environments in which violence can resume. Here, Boyle defines post-conflict states and notes that conditions and characteristics vary from one post-conflict state to another. Nevertheless, there are common contextual characteristics that can be identified (52-55). …

‘When does the end begin?’ Addressing gender-based violence in post-conflict societies: case studies from Zimbabwe and El Salvador

This article analyses gender-based violence in the country contexts of Zimbabwe and El Salvador, where distinct periods of conflict and turbulence led to nominal peace, but no recognisable reduction or improvement in the status of women. Women in these two societies continued to experience high levels of gender-based violence. We outline the experience and strategies of Oxfam America along with national partners in addressing gender-based violence in these post-conflict societies. The article draws from Oxfam America's experiences in El Salvador and Zimbabwe, where a campaign and advocacy approach promoted new policy responses and legislation as a result of changes in societal and political attitudes to gender-based violence. It outlines the strategies and partnerships used by the Zimbabwe and El Salvador campaigns, including community outreach, mass mobilisation, and legislative lobbying, to achieve a positive shift in national policies and practices, to prevent gender-based violence.

The Prevalence of Violence in Post-Conflict Societies: A Case Study of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa

After war — so the common definition suggests — comes peace. Recent research, however, shows that post-conflict societies sometimes experience levels of violence comparable to those in times of civil war. What changes are the labels under which violence is recorded and discussed. Political, conflict-related violence between armed groups, the government and civilians becomes ‘ordinary crime’ after conflict is officially resolved. This article argues that the divide between ‘violence’ and ‘crime’ is of conceptual rather than empirical nature. It employs a strictly empirical analysis of forms of violence in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa) to show how certain manifestations of violence persist long after armed conflict is over. The study concludes that, instead of being treated as an inevitable consequence of apartheid history and enduring socioeconomic ills, violence needs to be an immediate focus of post-conflict development agendas.

Localising peace: The young men of Bougainville’s ‘Crisis generation’

Postconflict societies are often plagued by violence long after formal declarations of peace. There is a need to understand why peace often remains elusive. This article develops a theory of participation in peace and violence in postconflict societies, which it understands as being rooted in interactions between local structures and agency. Evidence to inform this theory comes from a study of young men in postconflict Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. We find that young men seek pathways to achieve positively valued and contextually relevant goals. However, difficulties with trauma, education and work, achieving social standing, and escaping from cultures of violence limit the capacity of young men to participate peacefully in society. Disenfranchised and marginalised, some young men may turn to acts and displays of violence. We argue that peace occurs when individuals choose to make and sustain it, and so, if the end of conflict does not bring with it changes in the structures which constrain the capacity of individuals to choose peaceful pathways, the risk of violence remains.

Oligopolies of Violence in Post-Conflict Societies

In post-conflict societies, security is provided by a broad range of actors including the state as well as various non-state formations. The paper identifies three types of post-conflict societies and analyses dynamics of the security market in cases where international troops have intervened. A comparison of seven countries shows that intervention forces were able to establish themselves as market leaders when a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program was successfully conducted in the immediate post-conflict period. Such a program should be embedded in an inclusive peace agreement that is backed up by a credible and robust troop commitment from the international community.