Entrepreneurs Of Violence Research Articles

Forum: Militarization 2.0: Communication and the Normalization of Political Violence in the Digital Age

AbstractScholars of international relations frequently explore how states normalize the use of military force through processes of militarization, yet few have analyzed how new information and communication technologies impact on these processes. The essays in this forum address this gap, and consider the political significance of new technologies, new actors, and new practices that shape “Militarization 2.0” and normalize political violence in the digital age. The authors in this forum rely, to varying degrees, on common militarized tropes and dichotomies (such as authenticity, belonging, and (de)humanizing framings) that are key to militarization, including those devices that rest on gender, race/ethnicity, and heteronormativity. Moving beyond a military-centered approach to militarization, the authors’ questions cover ministries of foreign affairs; the embodied performances of celebrity leaders and insurgency groups; arms producers, the military video game industry, and private military and security companies; and violence entrepreneurs. The forum closes with reflections from Cynthia Enloe.

The Interaction between Local and International Peacebuilding Actors: Partners for PeaceHellmüller, SaraLondon, Palgrave Macmillan (2018), 233p., ISBN 978‐3‐319‐65300‐6

The Interaction between Local and International Peacebuilding Actors: Partners for PeaceHellmüller, SaraLondon, Palgrave Macmillan (2018), 233<i>p., ISBN 978‐3‐319‐65300‐6</i>

Turning ex-combatants into Sadris: explaining the emergence of the Mahdi Army

This article sets out to explain how the Sadrist movement targeted ex-combatant communities in their communication strategy to mobilize the Mahdi Army. The Mahdi Army was established by the Sadrist movement under the guidance of Muqtada al-Sadr in 2003. This article proposes that post-2003 Iraq experienced a demobilisation crisis, fostering segments of ex-combatant communities whose ingrained repertoires were prone to paramilitarisation. Contrary to many other paramilitary organisations around the world, the Mahdi Army was formalized through a bottom-up process by non-state actors, and only at a later stage was the Mahdi Army explicitly co-opted by the Iraqi state in 2005. The overarching argument of this article is that social networks with specific assets, skills and history are more vulnerable to paramilitarisation by entrepreneurs of violence than various other networks.

Vanguards in revolution

Revolutionary vanguards, their radicalism and coercive actions, and their interactions with ordinary citizens and the state are common threads in narratives of revolutionary movements. But what are the defining features of revolutionary vanguards? The literature is replete with terms that allude to some notion of a revolutionary vanguard (e.g., revolutionary entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs of violence, early-risers), but the essence of these conceptions and their implications for revolutionary process remain obscure. We identify and differentiate the two main notions of vanguards, the Leninist and “early-riser” notions, and develop a formal framework that captures their distinguishing features, deriving their implications for the likelihood of revolution. We then use this framework to study three related and overlooked topics: (a) state strategies in mitigating the vanguard's influence on citizens; (b) citizens' preferences for the degree of vanguard radicalism; and (c) the vanguards' use of coercion against citizens.

Weapons of mass participation: Social media, violence entrepreneurs, and the politics of crowdfunding for war

Since 2012, North American and European civilians have regularly engaged in combat operations against the Islamic State in the globalized and decentralized battlefields of Iraq and Syria. This article focuses on two aspects of this phenomenon. First, I argue that these combatants represent a different kind of fighter from both private military contractors and battlefield laborers profiled in the private security literature insofar as capital is a means rather than an end in the innovation of violence. I refer to these fighters as violence entrepreneurs. The relevance and limits of Schmitt’s writings on enmity and his theory of the partisan are examined in the context of these contemporary networks of security, mobility, and killing. My second argument centers on how online platforms for the distribution of small-scale donations to these fighters and their self-crafted missions facilitate hyper-mediated forms of patronage, where individual donors are both producers and consumers of security in ways that further distort distinctions between civilians and combatants. The imagined communities that support these combatants, both morally and financially, through the banal networks of Facebook and peer-to-peer funding platforms like GoFundMe suggest a radical deviation from conventional organizational structures and capacities for waging combat. Crowdfunding congeals these new geopolitical networks in the authorizing of individuals to determine their own singular forms of enmity, mutating the conditions of possibility for the sovereign decision.

Vanguards in Revolution

Revolutionary vanguards, their radicalism and coercive actions, and their interactions with ordinary citizens and the state are common threads in narratives of revolutionary movements. But what are the defining features of revolutionary vanguards? The literature is replete with terms that allude to some notion of a revolutionary vanguard (e.g., revolutionary entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs of violence, early-risers), but the essence of these conceptions and their implications for revolutionary process remain obscure. We identify and differentiate the two main notions of vanguards, the Leninist and “early-riser” notions, and develop a formal framework that captures their distinguishing features, deriving their implications for the likelihood of revolution and welfare. We then use this framework to study three related and overlooked topics: (a) state strategies in mitigating the vanguard's influence on citizens; (b) citizens’ preferences for the degree of vanguard radicalism; and (c) the vanguards’ use of coercion against citizens.

Violence Entrepreneurs, Law and Authority in Colombia

ABSTRACTLocal power in Colombia has been profoundly restructured since the mid‐2000s, with the partial demobilization of paramilitary groups and the state's direct presence at the local level. This has led to the articulation of claims to new rights by internally displaced people, paving the way for new conditions of access to property and citizenship. However, paramilitary groups and their political and economic allies remain a de facto power in some areas. This contribution argues that a situation of rupture, seemingly characterized by a re‐monopolization of state violence, does not necessarily lead to the marginalization of criminal actors but to a reconfiguration of the links between statutory institutions and unofficial networks. This argument is based on an ethnographical exploration of claims regarding citizenship and property rights. The analysis of the strategies of rights claimants sheds light on the formation of both political authority and political subjectivity.

Lebanon: The Refugee Issue and the Threat of a Sectarian Confrontation

This article highlights the many dimensions of the threat that exists nowadays in Lebanon regarding the impact of the Syrian uprising turning into a civil war. To do so, I will firstly focus on the issue of Syrian refugee in Lebanon. Recalling the Syrian-Lebanese complex relationship, the article delves in the collective memory of the Palestinian issue in Lebanon that pops up again as thousands of them are fleeing Syria to seek refuge in Palestinian camps. In the second part, the article addresses the related question of Sunnis/Shiites tensions that have become a significant factor in the Syrian civil war and that have been imported into Lebanon by major political parties and entrepreneurs of violence.

Second Chechen War: Causes, Dynamics and Termination - A Civil War between Risk and Opportunity?

The present survey deals with the causes, dynamics and termination of the Second Chechen war. At a preliminary stage, it offers a brief overview of the main theories applied for explaining the emergence of internal conflicts. Then, it deals with the formal outbreak of the Second Chechen war and examines whether the Second Chechen war does prima facie constitute a civil war. Afterwards, it focuses on the main causes that led to this conflict. In this respect, factors such as previous wars, fragile institutions as well as activities and interests of so-called entrepreneurs of violence are briefly discussed. Hereafter, it examines the financial and organizational opportunities of the Second Chechen war. The ideological transformation of the conflict is followed by the analysis of its dynamics and termination. In this context, issues concerning its weakening, the course to normality as well as the recourse to terrorist methods are to be examined.

A Leap of Faith: When and How Ex-Combatants Resort to Violence

Previous research has given scant attention to the issue of how and when ex-combatants resort to organized violence. This article fills this research gap by comparing ex-fighters in the Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. It holds that ex-combatant violence is the result of interaction between entrepreneurs of violence, military affinities, intermediaries, and selective incentives. Ex-combatants take to arms when they have access to entrepreneurs of violence. By offering selective incentives and utilizing existing military affinities, entrepreneurs can generate the enticements and trust needed to convince ex-combatants to resort to arms. However, as entrepreneurs have limited contact with ex-fighters, they are dependent on intermediaries to do the actual recruiting for them. Contrary to previous assumptions, this article finds that ex-fighters are largely risk-averse individuals and that ex-combatant violence is seldom triggered by the mere presence of small arms, lack of economic opportunities, or experiences of insecurity.

Mobilising Individuals to Collective Political Violence

In collective political violence, the processes through which the entrepreneurs of violence and their followers seal temporary loyalties around a violent enterprise need to be explored, recognising the complex heterogeneity of drivers of violent engagement. These include identity production, socio-economic factors and the activation of horizontal and vertical networks. A variety of factors shape armed groups’ behaviours over time, including explicit training, collective learning and violent socialisation. However, the evolution of armed groups also depends on outside influences, including civilians’ attitudes, and agencies’ and states’ actions. This implies there is room for intervention, but only if it is contextually informed.

External Democracy Promotion in Post-Conflict Zones - Evidence from Case Studies: Macedonia

Macedonia experienced a short conflict between the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and the Macedonian security forces, which took place between February and August of 2001. The following examination of the outcome of the international intervention encompasses the issues of democracy, state capacity, and security.Firstly, regarding the establishment of democracy, the two largest Macedonian political parties and the two largest Albanian political parties signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which put an end to hostilities in August 2001. Up to 2006, the Macedonian government had made significant progress in implementing the main components of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The adoption of a new law regarding territorial organisation initiated the process of decentralisation of competencies from the national to the municipal level. This granted municipalities a high degree of self governance in the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and health care. Moreover, the Ohrid Framework Agreement improved the access of ethnic minorities to state institutions by calling for a set of measures to improve equitable representation.Special new parliamentary procedures, the so called ‘double-majority’, ensured that laws which directly affected ethnic minorities could only be passed with a majority of the votes from those ethnic minorities. The Framework Agreement also improved the use of minority languages and symbols in state institutions. The NLA disbanded in 2001, and the NLA leadership created a new political party, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), which formed a government coalition with other Macedonian political parties between 2002 and 2006.Secondly, Macedonia implemented a process of decentralisation and public sector reform aimed at improving the capacity of state institutions. This process was promoted and supported by Macedonia as a move towards meeting the Copenhagen Criteria. As a result, the European Union granted Macedonia the status of a candidate country in late 2005, which was a great success considering that Macedonia had been on the brink of large scale civil war only four years earlier.Thirdly, in terms of security, the situation in Macedonia has remained largely peaceful since the end of conflict in 2001; although minor incidents of violence have taken place. The NLA ceased to exist, and the Macedonian government disbanded their paramilitary units, which had been created during the conflict in 2001.How can this outcome be explained? In order to understand the outbreak and the subsequent cessation of fighting in 2001, the impact of neighbouring countries and the spill-over effects have to be taken into account.The NATO intervention in 1999, and the subsequent establishment of an international protectorate in Kosovo, created an opportunity for the NLA to start an insurgency in Macedonia. The Kosovo War created a class of entrepreneurs of violence, who had gainedfighting experience in Kosovo, and who controlled illegal activities on the border between Macedonia and Kosovo. These entrepreneurs had the financial and political resources to attack Macedonian state institutions. The outbreak of hostilities in Macedonia also coincided with the outbreak of fighting in Southern Serbia.However, NATO, the CSCE/OSCE, the United Nations, and the European Union had a track record of almost a decade of conflict prevention in Macedonia. Consequently, the international community already had the structures in place to react quickly to the outbreak of conflict in early 2001. In addition, the international community could not afford to allow Macedonia to slide into civil war, because a large scale war in Macedonia would have jeopardized the political stability in neighbouring Kosovo.The international community appointed special envoys who were responsible for brokering the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The European Union made a clear commitment to granting Macedonia full membership, if Macedonia implemented the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the reforms required by the Copenhagen Criteria. This process was supported by international aid, which covered the bulk of the financial costs. The European Union, NATO, and OSCE also maintained missions in Macedonia which monitored and facilitated the implementation of the Framework Agreement.Finally, the Macedonian government argued that the international community had put pressure on it not to crack down on the Albanian insurgency. It also complained that it had to implement unpopular reforms regarding decentralisation and the use of minority languages, in order to meet the criteria for membership in the European Union. Metaphorically speaking, the international community played three roles: scapegoat, watchdog, and guide dog.

Gangs, Urban Violence, and Security Interventions in Central America

Urban violence is a major preoccupation of policymakers, planners and development practitioners in cities around the world. Public authorities routinely seek to contain such violence through repression, as well as through its exportation to and containment at the periphery of metropolitan centres. Yet, urban violence is a highly heterogeneous phenomenon and not amenable to reified diagnosis and coercive intervention. Muscular state-led responses tend to overlook and conceal the underlying factors shaping the emergence of urban violence, as well as the motivations and means of so-called violence entrepreneurs. This is very obviously the case of urban gangs in Central America, which are regularly labelled a ‘new urban insurgency’ threatening the integrity of governments and public order. This article considers both the shape and character of Central American gang violence and attempts to reduce it, highlighting the complex relationship between these two phenomena. We advance a threefold approach to measuring the effectiveness of interventions, focusing in turn on discursive, practical and outcome-based criteria. In this way, the article demonstrates how, contrary to their reported success in diminishing gang violence, repressive first-generation approaches have tended instead to radicalize gangs, potentially pushing them towards more organized forms of criminality. Moreover, although credited with some modest successes, more preventive second-generation interventions seem to have yielded more rhetorical advances than meaningful reductions in gang violence.

Chechnya: Russia's 'War on Tenor'. BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies, 34 by John Russell (review)

582 SEER, 87, 3, JULY 2OO9 Russell, John.Chechnya: Russia'sWaronTerror3. BASEES /Routledge Serieson Russianand East EuropeanStudies,34. Routledge,London and New York, 2007. xix + 247 pp. Map. Notes. Select bibliography. Index.¿75-00. Universityof Bradford'sJohnRussellhas outdonehimself in recent years. Extending fromhispreviousarticles concerning Russianpublicopinionon Russia'swar in Chechnya,his recently publishednew book on thesubject breaksnew groundin exploring thesituation surrounding theconflict. His approachtodefining thedifference betweena 'War onTerror'and a 'War of Terror'is conceptually meaningful farbeyondthesubstantive application of suchconcepts in regardto Russia'spoliciesin theCaucasus,having justificationin otherasymmetrical conflicts suchas theUnitedStatesstruggling to stayon the'right side'ofthosetwophraseologies in theIraq war. Russell'sconcentration not onlyfocuseson therealmof Russianpublic opinionand perceptions oftheChechenwar; he also seeksto examinethe human personalities of the conflict, what he calls the 'entrepreneurs of violence'.Acknowledging how all sides of the conflict have, to differing extents, blood on theirhands,Russellcompetently examineshowtheriseof the Kadyrovsand what is called 'Kadyrovization'of the Chechen war seemsto have littlepositive, and much negative, capacityfora successful denouement notonlyin Chechnya, butin theCaucasus as a whole. Furthermore, hisbookexplores thehistory oftheconflict andthoseavenues ignored byRussiawheretheconflict couldhavebeen different (usually with a morepositive outcome)had Russia'spoliciesbeenmoreintelligent, slightly morepractical, ora little moreflexible inregardtochanging events. Instead, as Russellpoints out,particularly inthecaseofthesecondChechenwar,there has often been thepresentation oftheconflict as a mortalthreat to Russian society, and one almostas impervious to healthydebate as a GeorgeW. Bush-level strategy. In theworldofBushand Putin,'youare either withus or againstus'. In thePutincase,thishas led to theperception thatyoumust choosebetweenthe'good',thatis theRussianstate,or the'bad', thatis the terrorist other.Russellcorrectly showsthatthepredominantly secularsecond Chechenpresident, AsianMaskhadov, was deliberately overlooked byRussia and forced intothehandsofthemoreradicalChechenwarlords, led at one timebyMaskhadov'spastopponentin Chechenpresidential politics, Shamil Basaev. Of course,thisfollowedfromthe Russian government's inability to accept a morerealistic recognition of the Chechen secularmovement's victory in thefirst war,butsuchopen-minded views,as usual,did not,and couldnot,prevailin Russia'srolling realpolitik in thepost-Soviet era. If thereis anyroomforcriticism, it is thatRussellengagesin theusual post-Politkovskaia-era moralist viewofmanycommentators surrounding the murdered journalist. Itistruethatherdeathbygunshot inherownapartment blockisa greattragedy but,as withother academicsandjournalists whohave written on theChechenwars,Russellsuggests greatshock,and beyondthat, surprise at thedeathofPolitkovskaia, and indeeddedicatesthebook to her memory. One cannotsay thather murderwas not truly terrible, and her REVIEWS 583 ongoingcriticism and potentialfuture writings willbe greatly missed.She was a greatfigure representative ofthehope fora Russianfreepressin her time. However, one could not reallybe surprised.Mysteriousthingshave happenedtomost journalists andmanyactivists whohavebuckedtheRussian government and attempted toprojecta truly independent viewofthewarin Chechnya.A morescepticalreadermightfindmoresubstantive a straightforward analysis (perhaps intheform ofa separatechapter) on whyitisopen seasonon hunting Russian journalists (for example, journalist AndreiBabitskii getsonlya quickmention regarding hisearlier'trade',i.e. hisdisappearance/ kidnapping and torture in,amongstotherplaces,a Russianfiltration camp) and nottheconcentration on one in particular, howeverexcellent Politkovskaiawas .Thisis,nevertheless, a minor quibblesinceRussellhasproducedthe bestbookon thesubjectoftheChechenwaryetpublished. It comeshighly recommended. Russellaccomplishes as thoughtful an analysis as ispossibleon thisongoingconflict. UCL SSEES J. Vaughn Kuhrt, Natasha. RussianPolicytowards ChinaandJapan: The EVtsinand Putin Periods. BASEES /RoutledgeSeries on Russian and East European Studies, 42.Routledge, LondonandNewYork,2007.x + 228pp.Tables. Maps. Notes.Bibliography. Index.£75.00. This book is an additionto theBASEES /Routledgeserieson Russianand East European studiesand, as the titlesuggests, examinesRussianforeign policytowardsChina andJapan. Giventhatthebook coversbothEl'tsin's and Putin'stimeas president, thebookencompasses theperiodfrom1991to 2007. The bookis dividedintoninechapters, withthefirst chapter providing an overallintroduction tothevolume.The secondchapter beginsthesubstantive analysisof the book, mapping out the progressionof Russian foreign policytowardChina fromgood-neighbourliness to constructive partnership through tostrategic cooperation. The third chapter examines the1991border agreement betweenRussia and China and the difficulties surrounding the implementation ofthisagreement in a post-Soviet environment, particularly objections totheprocessraisedbyRussia'seastern regions. The nextchapter places Russia'schangingrelationship withChina in thewidergeo-strategic context focusing on energy issues, CentralAsia,theKoreanPeninsula and the US/Japanese security alliance.Chapters five and sixswitch toRussia'sforeign policytowards JapanduringtheEl'tsinperiod.Chapterfivedetailshowthe disputed KurilIslandsnegatively affected political and economiccooperation betweenthesetwocountries. In a similar mannerto theprevious chapteron China,chapter sixexaminesthebroaderstrategic context and themannerin whichtheterritorial disputeinhibited cooperation on a widerscale. ...

Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985—99

This article argues that, contrary to received wisdom, political corruption is not necessarily associated with a higher risk of civil war in oil-rich states. Political corruption can be used to accommodate opposition and placate restive groups by offering private privilege in exchange for political loyalty. Since oil wealth is associated with large rents accruing in state treasuries, it provides an economic foundation for such clientelist rule. This article thus argues that oil-rich governments can use political corruption to buy support from key segments of society, effectively outspending other entrepreneurs of violence. Based on a logit analysis of civil war onsets, 1985—99, the article finds support for this `co-optation argument'. A negative and statistically significant interaction term between oil production and political corruption is consistent across different models and robust to a number of specifications. While both variables per se increase the risk of conflict overall, higher levels of corruption seem to weaken the harmful impact of oil on the risk of civil war. This finding suggests the need for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between natural resource wealth, governance and armed conflict. Political corruption has prolonged poverty and bred economic and political inequality in many oil-rich states, but it has also helped cement powerful alliances with a stake in the continuation of the corrupt regimes.

Obstacles to peace in Chechnya: What scope for international involvement?

Recognising the failure of both internal and external parties to achieve a peaceful resolution of the Russo – Chechen war, this article seeks to establish what scope remains for international involvement to end the violence in Chechnya. By applying theories from the disciplines of conflict resolution and counterinsurgency to the confrontation, distinctions are drawn between opportunities of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, as well as between legitimate ‘need’ and exploitative ‘greed’ at a time of ‘violent’ politics. Key findings include the scope for international assistance in addressing the root contradictions of the conflict and for curtailing the influence of the ‘entrepreneurs of violence’.

Rethinking the Greed–Grievance Nexus: Property Rights and the Political Economy of War in Sri Lanka

The literature on civil wars tends to understand greed and grievances in antagonistic terms of ‘either–or’. This article suggests that in the political economy of conflict, greed and grievances may be causally linked and reinforce each other: war (or shadow) economies of combatants and the survival economies of civilians are intertwined. Gains made by conflict entrepreneurs and war profiteers feed grievances about identity, economic inequality, and lack of political power. Once civil war is onset (for whatever reason), the political economy of war produces a self-sustaining logic of clientelism along the lines of perceived ‘friends’ and ‘foes’. These dividing lines get reinforced in everyday political networks of survival. This everyday clientelism, in turn, nourishes grievance discourses along the same lines. These grievances contribute to heighten the motivation for people to fight for ‘justice’. In this way, greed produces grievances, which in turn stabilize the war economy and offer economic opportunities for greedy entrepreneurs of violence. Case studies from Sri Lanka on local resource conflicts in the context of civil war support this proposition. They indicate that because of the civil war and the breakdown of state and civic institutions, ethnicity becomes a mechanism for civilian actors to access resources available largely through arbitrary power. Civilians thus become part of the ‘game’. In effect, this leads to ‘ethnicized entitlements’, where the ethnic groups are asymmetrically endowed with bargaining power to access resources, depending upon their affiliation with militant actors and their respective initial power resources. These ethnicized entitlements satisfy greed for some war winners and feed grievances among those at the losing end.