For the last thirty years, the course of the Lao revolution has been closely tied to events in Vietnam. As Lao Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), Kaysone Phomvihan, has on more than one occasion explicitly recognized, Vietnamese aid and advice have been deeply influential in bringing the present r?gime to power in Laos. These close ties were formalized in the Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in July 1977, which has since provided not only directions for Lao foreign policy, but also the basis for Vietnamese involvement at all levels of Lao political and economic life. Throughout 1979, a constant flow of delegations on everything from agricultural co-operatives to public works construction moved between the two countries. Following the formation of the Lao Front for National Construction, a delegation of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front visited Laos. Vietnamese provincial delegations toured Namtha and Oudomxay provinces in June and October, as part of Vietnamese moves to supplant Chinese influence in northern Laos after the Chinese road gangs had been withdrawn. The close relationship with Vietnam, while of benefit to the present Lao r?gime, is also of considerable importance to Hanoi. From the Vietnamese point of view, it has always been essential that the country's long and vulnerable western border be adequately protected by the presence of friendly forces in Laos. But while the relationship may have been mutually beneficial, it has never been an equal one. On the diplomatic front, Vientiane's client relationship with Hanoi was evident in the support Laos provided for every Vietnamese policy statement from the justice of Hanoi's points for negotiation with Beijing (Peking) to the Vietnamese position on the refugee question. No attempt was discernible to forge Lao policies which differed from those of Vietnam, except in the special case of Thailand where that was in Hanoi's best interests. Vietnamese perceptions of their country's security and national interests have formed the parameters which have limited the independence of decision-making of the LPRP. Nowhere has this been m?re evident than when the security of Vietnam was believed by the leadership in Hanoi to rest upon decisions by their Lao comrades. At such times Lao freedom of action has been severely curtailed, to the point where decisions taken may not always have been in the best interests of the LPRP (as opposed to the ruling ?lite within the party), the Lao people, or the welfare and security of the nation. Nineteen seventy-nine was arguably such a time for, by taking sides with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in its dispute with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Lao leadership may well have placed the long term security of their country and even of their regime in jeopardy. As Vietnamese relations with the Pol Pot Government in Kampuchea continued to deteriorate during the course of 1978, so too did Hanoi's relations with Beijing. The Vietnamese leaders were well aware that their fateful decision to invade Kampuchea, made as early as mid 1978, would greatly exacerbate the situation. They turned, therefore, to the Soviet Union: a Treaty of Friendship was signed between the SRV and