Victorious Power Research Articles

The Role of Social Investment in Human Capital Development

The role of social investments in the development of human capital in Ukraine has been studied. The social and economic reality of the category of human capital, its main warehouses, the significance of human capital for the economy, as well as the problems of its development in Ukraine are examined. The main problems of state-owned investment policy in direct investment of human capital are highlighted. Ways have been identified that can become a victorious power for the implementation of state policy to promote social investment in human capital. The role of social investments in the formation of human capital is analyzed. The main elements of human capital have been seen. The names of the benefits of investing in human capital for the practitioner, the pioneer of that power. The dotality of social investment in human capital and its significance for the development of welfare has been outlined.

The British Army, Upper Silesia, and European Diplomacy, 1920–22

ABSTRACT At the end of the First World War, Britain was at the limit of its capabilities, both militarily and diplomatically. Despite large reductions in the size of its armed forces, it had an increasing number of responsibilities as a victorious power. One of these responsibilities was to ensure the success of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. It had little desire to do this but was compelled to provide support in order to counter French influence in the region, having to do so with minimal expertise and manpower. This article explores the decision-making which occurred in relation to the British role in Upper Silesia, placing it within the wider context of British strategic and diplomatic policy in the years immediately after the First World War, while also assessing the use (or not) of British civilian and military experts on the ground. Belatedly taking a role in the region certainly helped to aid a situation which was spiralling out of control, but highlights how a short-term outlook on foreign policy and decision-making hindered British efforts to exert influence in the region and further afield.

How Peace Operations Did Not Emerge as a Norm after the First World War

The execution of international plebiscites and international administrations in post-World War I Germany was chosen as a case study because it is accepted as an early model of peace operations. It held promise for the emergence of a new norm for resolving territorial disputes according to the principle of self-determination. In order to understand why the norm failed in its early emergence stage process, the paper analyzes the discussions on Germany territorial disputes among the three main Powers − France, Great-Britain and the United States − during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as the constitutive stage. Then it compares it with the execution of international operations in Germany. The paper combines IR theory with international history. It shows that a ‘norm amalgamation’ is a precondition for a norm to emerge. The norm entrepreneurs have to amalgamate an ideational-constitutive process with an operational-appropriateness. In the case studies it shows that during the discussions of the victorious Powers there were several tensions and dilemmas: a tension between the ‘old norm’ and ‘new norms’. Moreover, The Powers were also divided concerning the process of operational-procedures.

Ghosts of war: China’s relations with Portugal in the post-war period, 1945–9

Abstract This article investigates the ways in which the legacies of the Second World War shaped Sino-Portuguese relations during the final years of Nationalist rule in mainland China. It argues that Portugal’s wartime neutrality exacerbated the ambiguities of its centuries-old presence in China and that these ambiguities were decisive in shaping political and diplomatic manoeuvring in the post-war period. As a victorious power China sought to affirm its sovereignty when dealing with Portugal on issues such as the handling of Japanese property, the extradition of suspects of war crimes and collaboration, and the abolition of extraterritoriality. Disagreements over these reflected both countries’ attempts to assert sovereignty through the ability to serve justice.

The Meaning of Resurrection Miracles in Pentecostal Theology

Abstract Early Pentecostal literature contains many narratives of miracles of individuals being raised from the dead. While attention has tended to their factual or evidential value, including to some extent in the narratives themselves, this article examines the interpretations given to such miraculous events in Pentecostal theology. Specifically, it finds four major trends in interpretation in the literature: first, the meaning of the resurrection miracle as evidential, as a ‘proof’; second, the miracle as a sign of God’s victorious power over death and/or his mercy for the deceased and his/her family; third, the resurrection as prefigured in earlier miracles, especially Jesus’ raising of Lazarus; and finally, the miraculous return to life as a return to the realm of death, in which it is clear this event is not the final victory.

Victorious Power and the Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination

Victorious Power and the Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination

Sovereignty under the League of Nations Mandates: The Jurists’ Debates

Abstract The mandate system took shape at an inflexion point in the evolution from an international system based on rule over territories to one based on rule over peoples. Political compromises made at the Paris Peace Conference resulted in the creation of a new political agent, the League of Nations Mandate, with no clear sovereign. In seeking to systematize this political outcome, jurists located sovereignty with the victorious Great Powers, the League itself, and with the peoples of the mandate territories. Yet they never achieved a consensus, which created an absence at the centre of the mandate system that politics would have to fill throughout the interwar period.

Constitutions Imposed with Consent?

Can a constitution be imposed with the consent of the peoples on which it is imposed? The conventional understanding of an imposed constitution — a constitution forced upon a people after war or conquest — rejects this possibility because the very nature of an imposed constitution denies that a community of peoples could divest itself of the power of self-determination associated with democratic constitution-making and -changing. Yet beyond contexts of war and conquest, we may consider constitutions to have been imposed also if they reflect some measure of heteronomy. Heteronomous constitutions are created, governed or adapted directly or indirectly by an external actor. This understanding of an imposed constitution accommodates both the conventional view of a constitution written or administered coercively by a victorious power for a vanquished state after war or conquest as well as those domestic constitutions born not of defeat but controlled in some way by an external actor exercising constitution-level decisionmaking authority. In this paper, I identify three categories of heteronomous constitutions imposed with consent — constitutions that are amended, adjudicated and interpreted by others — none quite the paradigmatic model of an indigenous constitution born of and governed by local actors but each one more a function of self-determined choice than a constitution imposed in war or conquest. Recognizing that a constitution can indeed be imposed with consent complicates our understanding of imposed constitutions and forces us to confront the reality that extraterritorial actors can sometimes be invited to occupy a central place in domestic constitutional law.

The Oxford handbook of European Islam

Europe/European Union JOCELYNE CESARI, ed., Oxford Handbook of (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Pp. 896. $ 95.00 cloth.This is a most welcome work for students of migration, and cultural encounters as well as for understanding the place of in Western Europe and some Balkan countries. editor and some of the best-known, relatively younger scholars, apparently both Muslims and non-Muslims, strive to provide a general picture of the manifestation and spread of in Europe after 1960. first part, Islam as a Postcolonial, Post-Second World War Religion in is dedicated to France, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries. Part 2, on The Arrival of as Post-1974 Migration, includes Greece, which probably should have been placed in part 3, The Old Land of Islam, dealing with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Russia and Bulgaria. Part 4, Islam and Secularism, covers the establishment of Islamic schools, the application of the shariah, mosques, associations, and publishing enterprises. This is a process of institutionalization that may start from the community or be suggested and helped by the authorities of the host country for a variety of practical reasons, including the adjustment of Muslims to the country of residence or as a means of control and integration and possibly assimilation. Part 5, Islam and Politics, deals with what may be called the political issues surrounding Islam's place in contemporary Europe, such as Islamophobia and radicalization.The book offers only partial insights into the total number of Muslims in Western Europe. A report of 2003 suggested that France had 3.5-5 million Algerians and North Africans although the actual number is much higher. Germany may have about 5 million Muslims (mostly Turks). rest of the approximate total of twelve million Muslims in Western Europe come from practically all the Muslim countries in Asia and Africa, most of which were former colonies of the Western countries. All in all, Muslims represent about 2.5 percent of the total population of immigrant-receiving countries. In addition, the Balkan countries contain about 10 million Muslim inhabitants, who form a majority of the population in Albania, Kosova and Bosnia-Herzegovina.The short concluding section of the volume ends with the editor's question, Is there a Islam? Western Europe's present encounter with is different from its very early encounter with and Judaism in Spain, where a rather unique multi-cultural, multi-religious society lasted roughly from 711 to 1492, after which the conquering Catholic kings forced the Muslims and Jews to migrate or convert. In the Balkans, by contrast, the three religions coexisted under the aegis of Muslim sultans from the fourteenth until the middle of the nineteenth century, when nationalism began to produce a series of national states whose political identity was based on religion and ethnicity and resulted in the domination of the titular religious majority and the exclusion of the Muslims or even the Orthodox minorities of different ethnicities. Part 3 on in the Balkans, therefore, may answer the query in more ways than one. There is, in fact, a type of in Southeastern Europe that rose mainly in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries through the force of socio-economic incentives, the preaching of dervishes, the appeal of victorious power, and relative freedom from the earlier feudal structures. But its Slavic, Albanian, Greek, and Vlach converts maintained their ethnic identities and languages and developed a flexible, worldly, pluralistic form of that can be called European or, to be more exact, Ottoman-Turkish, and differed from its Arab and Pakistani counterparts. …

Czechoslovakia and Spheres of Influence towards the End of the Second World War

MOST journalists, and even some historians, claim that Czechoslovakia was ceded to the Soviet sphere of influence within the framework of a Great Power accord towards the end of the Second World War. Because of such writing, this has also become an explanation of the country’s post-war ill fortunes that is accepted by most Czechs and Slovaks. Some leading politicians are only too willing to strengthen this view. In his address at a ceremony commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War at Prague Castle, President Vaclav Klaus stated: ‘The Yalta accords, whereby the victorious Powers delimited their spheres of influence, resulted in a renewed partition of the world in the first post-war hours and in the fact that the world was again preparing for a confrontation. As a result, Communist regimes were installed in our part of Europe.’ President George W. Bush even linked the ‘agreement at Yalta’ with ‘the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov– Ribbentrop pact’. Klaus, on his part, used the term ‘historical truth’ several times in his speech and warned also against any attempts at ‘rewriting history’. Naturally, thousands of academic papers put together do not have the impact of one or two presidential speeches. None the less, if the Yalta myth continues to be presented as an historical truth, then it is high time to join the process of rewriting history. In a more sophisticated version of this myth, the Allied Powers only allegedly agreed on their collaboration in solving European countries’ problems. The general nature of the Yalta accords then led Stalin to the conclusion that the Western powers recognized de facto Soviet control of central and eastern Europe, where he had a free hand to install Communist regimes. American and British consent to moving the Soviet frontier westwards and establishing

ORIENTALISM REVERSED: RUSSIAN LITERATURE IN THE TIMES OF EMPIRES

Susan Layton, Russian Literature and Empire: Conquest of the Caucasus from Pushkin to Tolstoy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, paperback version 2005; first edition 1994)Harsha Ram, The Imperial Sublime: A Russian Poetics of Empire (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003)In the last decades of the Russian Empire, Edward Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire made for favorite reading among the intelligentsia. Today imperial themes have become increasingly important in American academia; historians and literary scholars who study Russia are no exception. The two studies under review explore the spirit and the letter of the Russian Empire in the moment of boom and glory preceding its collapse. Published in 1994, Susan Layton's Russian Literature and Empire was the pioneering study of the subject. Published in 2003, Harsha Ram's The Imperial Sublime is so different from Layton's book that the differences, rooted in the American rather than the Russian imperial experience, deserve reflection in their own right. While Layton looked at the world through the emancipatory optic of postcolonialist and feminist movements, Ram manifests a different kind of sensibility, one which is alert to the scale and beauty of the victorious power. In a sad but understandable way, Susan Layton's ethical concerns give way to Harsha Ram's aesthetic ones.

Mission Delayed: The Russian Orthodox Church after the Conquest of Kazan'

Muscovy's active period of eastward expansion began with the conquest of the Khanate of Kazan’ in 1552. By the seventeenth century, one observer claimed that the conquest of Kazan’ was the event that made Ivan IV a tsar and Muscovy an empire. With this victory, the tsar claimed new lands, adding to his subjects the diverse animistic and Muslim population of Turkic Tatars and Chuvashes, and Finno-Ugric Maris, Mordvins, and Udmurts. The conquest of Kazan’ provided both the Metropolitan of Moscow and Ivan IV (the Terrible) an opportunity to transform the image of Muscovy into that of a victorious Orthodox power and to justify the title of its Grand Prince as a new caesar (tsar). Since the conquest was the first Orthodox victory against Islam since the fall of Constantinople, commemorations of it were immediate, including the construction of the Church of the Intercession by the Moat (St. Basil's) on Red Square.The incorporation of the lands and peoples of Kazan’ has served traditionally to date the establishment of the Russian Empire. Accounts of the conquest have emphasized the victory of Orthodoxy against Islam, with the Russian Orthodox Church and its Metropolitan as the motive force behind this expansion. The conversion of the Muslims and animists of the region is portrayed frequently as automatic, facing little resistance. More recently, scholars have criticized this simplistic account of the conquest by discussing the conversion mission as a rhetorical construct and have placed increasing emphasis on the local non-Russian and non-Orthodox resistance to the interests of the Church and state.

Vincent J Cirillo, Bullets and bacilli: the Spanish-American war and military medicine, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 2004, pp. xiv, 241, illus., US$55.00 (hardback 0-8135-3339-2).

The Spanish-American war of 1898 broke out after a period of deteriorating relations between the United States and Spain, following the brutal suppression of a nationalist insurgency in the Spanish colony of Cuba. The conflict, which lasted from April to August, ranged from the Caribbean to the Pacific, with US forces deployed as far afield as the Philippines. By the end of the war, the United States had sustained 385 combat deaths and 2,061 from disease, in addition to considerable financial costs. But as the victorious power, the USA annexed Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines, and Cuba became nominally independent. As Vincent J Cirillo shows in Bullets and bacilli, the medical significance of this “splendid little war”, as it was sometimes called in the USA, has been largely overlooked. The war may have been small but it had an impact on military medicine that belied its proportions, resulting in significant reforms in military hygiene and medicine, as well as improved training in these areas for combatant officers. For much of the nineteenth century, the status of medicine in the US army had been low. Most line officers had little confidence in their medical counterparts because they had little success in preventing and treating disease. The Civil War, which saw major losses from disease and widespread infection of wounds, was a case in point. Over thirty years later, this “Civil-War mind-set” was still dominant among American officers, and many were indifferent or hostile to medical recommendations. As medical officers were permitted only to advise (as in the armed forces of most other countries), this gulf between medical and combatant officers could have disastrous consequences. In 1898 there were 1,590 deaths in the US army from typhoid alone, most occurring when soldiers were concentrated prior to deployment overseas. Typhoid was also a problem during the campaign in Cuba, in addition to malaria, dysentery, and yellow fever. The entire 5th Corps had to be withdrawn from combat owing to sickness after just forty days in the field. The public outcry caused by what many perceived as “unnecessary” or “preventable” deaths culminated in some important reforms which included the establishment of the US army's Yellow Fever Board, which subsequently became famous for its work in Cuba, a Typhoid Board, and a Tropical Diseases Board. The Typhoid Board highlighted the need to educate combatant officers in the rudiments of hygiene, concluding that their lax approach to sanitary discipline had been the main reason for the outbreaks afflicting the army during the war. Indeed, many saw sanitation as beneath their dignity. As a result, medical education became part of the training of officers at the military academy at West Point. Other important reforms took place in the fields of army nursing, allowing the admission of qualified female nurses into the Army Hospital Corps. There were also improvements in rations following scandals over the prevalence of canned or refrigerated, as opposed to fresh, meat. The one real success of the war, from a medical viewpoint, was surgery. The use of the recently invented X-ray to locate projectiles, together with antiseptic and aseptic surgery, kept wound infection to remarkably low levels. As in the South African War, fought by Britain and the Boer Republics during 1899–1902, these innovations permitted methods of surgery far more conservative than in previous conflicts such as the US Civil War or the Crimean War, which became notorious for the number of amputations. However, there were problems with the use of early X-ray equipment, and some soldiers suffered and died from severe radiation burns. Cirillo has provided a very good account of this war and its significance for medicine. His book is well researched and considers military operations in the light of public opinion, which turned out to have a significant role in producing reforms of American military medicine. Also welcome is the extended comparison with Britain's experience in the near contemporaneous South African War, where similar scandals over typhoid and the breakdown of medical provisions led to important reforms. Rather more consideration of the public reaction to the losses from yellow fever would have been welcome, as would some more comparative material on the Spanish forces, but overall this is a very useful volume, and nicely produced.

Sculptures augustéennes du théâtre d'Arles

The purpose of this article is to offer a new study of the carved decorations of Arles theater during the Augustan era, focusing on key features, such as the Augustus statue and the two statues of Venus. This group of statues was erected during the construction of the monument. It aimed to glorify Augustus protected by Venus and to underline his filiation with the deifeid Caesar. These statues are also a tribute to the victorious power of Augustus and Apollo. The decoration of the frontstage, the pulpitum and the orchestra reminds the cosmic organization instaured by the Golden Age of Augustus. All the pieces of decoration reflect the iconographie program developed in Rome at the same period by the imperial power between 20 BC and the Ist century BC.

From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel (review)

From Catastrophe to Power: Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel, by Idith Zertal. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. 344 pp. $29.95. In the conventional retrospection that Nazi brutality occasioned, the past destruction of European Jewry is prologue to revival and the establishment of Israel in 1948 as a Jewish state. While acknowledging that no political development could literally and fully compensate for the massive numbers of deaths or the endless sadism of the death camps, Israel's political leaders insisted, quite boldly in earlier decades, that a Jewish state promised hope and the reconstitution of a people. In the vocabulary of the period, total destruction gave rise to absolute rebirth. The linkage between the savagery to which European society succumbed and the epic heroism of Israel's founding are not simply symbolic or a public relations image drawn by clever politicians. Holocaust survivors - part of the displaced persons permanently uprooted by war and the racialist hatred still lingering in local communities after Hitler's defeat - had no place but Palestine to call home. In the chaos of postwar Europe with its shifting zones of occupation subject to no single victorious power or policy, controlling the flow of people on the move and meeting the subsistence needs of millions of the verge of starvation generated a set of common interests between Zionists, on the one hand, and three of the four allied countries, on the other. For despite sensitivity to the unspeakable horror to which the Jews were subjected, most Western countries clung to immigration policies that denied access to Jewish refugees. Without options, then, these Jews were compelled to channel their will to survive into a determination to live in the land of Israel. Sympathy for Holocaust survivors, however, did not spontaneously generate the international pressure to meet Zionist demands for increased Jewish immigration. Zionist political leaders had to claim the refugees as their constituents and assert what they insisted was an inalienable right of all Jews to live in Palestine. These politicians, according to Idith Zertal in her exquisitely conceived book, turned a humanitarian issue into an international campaign with sufficient power to maneuver Great Britain out of its colonial possession and create a balance of global forces favorable to the idea of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Zertal's novel and provocative thesis starts by tracing the Mossad operations launched from ports in Italy, France, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Each country presented its own particular set of opportunities and obstacles. On the shores of Italy's Ligurian Sea, the Mossad could function with relative autonomy because a defeated government ruled without full authority amidst a population expressing considerable public shame over past collaboration in the deportation of Jews. For Mossad operatives in countries about to be enclosed by the Iron Curtain, conditions were dramatically different: domestic disorder arose from the imposition of a new governmental authoritarianism and not from the contradictions of opposing political structures as in Italy or from the clash of major policy orientations as in France. In Eastern Europe, Mossad handlers eventually managed to forge alliances with Soviet rulers and dragoon local communists into their maneuvers, actions which required the endurance to withstand a tangle of incomprehensible bureaucratic regulations and a series of unfulfilled agreements. Frequently cut off for long periods from their superiors stationed in Paris or their comrades in Palestine, these agents were also imbued with a genuine sympathy for the refugees themselves. …

ONE ARAB-JEWISH STATE: THE OTTOMAN EXPERIENCE AND AFTER

The text below was a paper submitted to an international conference at Lausenne University Svvitzerland on "One Democratic State in Israel/ Palestine." The theme of the conference and my paper were both responses to the painful failure of the ill-fated Partition resolution of the U.N. General Assembly, some six decades ago. The recommendation itself being largely the product of election strains in the domestic politics of the United States, the leading victorious power after the vvar, it vvas scrutinized then by a number of leading intellectuals, including some prominent Jevvs. Past expeıience in the historic land having brought bloodshed, mass exodus and vvars, today's circumstances urged many more thinkers and vvriters to accentuate the need for a single state, in one form or another, that vvill embrace ali those living in the vvhole Palestine. As the paper underlines, such coexistence vvas a reality during the Ottoman centuries. Although many sorrovvful events accumulated since then, it is an alternative, realizable either by the conciliation of the majorities on both sides, or through a democratic process to be based on the votes of the Palestinian Arabs, vvhether Muslims or Christians, vvho vvill constitute the majority in some future date on that land.

The Soviet World Faces West: 1945–1970

H TISTORY'S wheels have spun round several times since the Potsdam Conference of victorious Powers in 1945.1 The policies of the wartime allies have passed through several major revolutions, with one major factor remaining constant: their inability to come to terms on the future of Germany. Unable to agree on this central problem, the erstwhile allies have created bilateral and then multilateral alliances which have formalised the split between East and West; they have climbed escalation ladders to demonstrate their determination to hold fast in Central and Eastern Europe; and, in so doing, they have jeopardised the internal political stability and economic prosperity of their respective countries. Twenty-five years after the Second World War, however, some hope exists that the belligerents in that conflict and the rival Powers in the ensuing cold war may be groping toward an accommodation, with regard both to Germany and to the existing armed confrontation in Europe. To use the language of model builders, they may be ready to move from a major concentration on maintaining the cold war status quo to a strategy premised on interdependence. If this shift becomes a reality, however, the results will differ profoundly from the post-war arrangements envisaged at Yalta and Potsdam, for Germany will have become a partner and not just an area for the practice of East-West collaboration. Germany provided the raison d'etre of the Second World War alliance. If that coalition were to endure, the Big Three believed that Germany would have to remain its focal point. At Teheran and at Yalta they undertook to keep Germany demilitarised and disarmed, and to keep the peace through an international security organisation. In the months between the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, however, the allies began to fall out over the very principles on which agreement seemed to have been reached at Yalta. As their armies closed in upon the Third Reich, mutual suspicion and distrust mounted. Stalin seemed to fear that the West might use the secret negotiations on the Northern Italian front to obtain a conditional German surrender that would be utilised against Russia. The West objected to Moscow's policies directed towards

Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe

Previous articleNext article No AccessCollaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern EuropeJohn A. ArmstrongJohn A. Armstrong Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 40, Number 3Sep., 1968 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/240210 Views: 35Total views on this site Citations: 23Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1968 The University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:P. E. DIGESER Collaboration and Its Political Functions, American Political Science Review 116, no.11 (Aug 2021): 200–212.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000745Mykhaylo Buromenskiy, Vitalii Gutnyk International Legal Problems of Qualification of Armed Conflicts, Cuestiones Políticas 39, no.6868 (Mar 2021): 735–757.https://doi.org/10.46398/cuestpol.3968.47Eleonora Narvselius, Gelinada Grinchenko Introduction: “Formulas of Betrayal”—Traitors, Collaborators and Deserters in Contemporary European Politics of Memory, (Dec 2017): 1–27.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66496-5_1XOSÉ M. NÚÑEZ SEIXAS Unholy Alliances? Nationalist Exiles, Minorities and Anti-Fascism in Interwar Europe, Contemporary European History 25, no.44 (Oct 2016): 597–617.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0960777316000370Michael H. Fisher Collaborators and empire, (Jan 2016): 1–6.https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe206Oleksandr Zaitsev Fascism or ustashism? Ukrainian integral nationalism of the 1920s–1930s in comparative perspective, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 48, no.2-32-3 (Jun 2015): 183–193.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.009Olga Baranova Nationalism, anti-Bolshevism or the will to survive? Collaboration in Belarus under the Nazi occupation of 1941–1944, European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire 15, no.22 (Apr 2008): 113–128.https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480801931044Vladimir Melamed ORGANIZED AND UNSOLICITED COLLABORATION IN THE HOLOCAUST, East European Jewish Affairs 37, no.22 (Aug 2007): 217–248.https://doi.org/10.1080/13501670701430560 The Legacy of Two Totalitarianisms, (Jan 1999): 1–23.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-001 Historical Consciousness, Family Stories, and Nationalism, (Jan 1999): 25–46.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-002 Weak Nationalism in Slovakia, (Jan 1999): 47–56.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-003 Islands of History, (Jan 1999): 57–84.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-004 Organized Forgetting, (Jan 1999): 85–117.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-005 Nationalism without Nationalists? Democracy without Democrats?, (Jan 1999): 119–155.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-006 Politics in a Hall of Mirrors, (Jan 1999): 157–176.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-007 Conclusion, (Jan 1999): 177–183.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-008 Notes, (Jan 1999): 187–246.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-009 Bibliography, (Jan 1999): 247–261.https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822390671-010John A. Armstrong National liberation and international balance, Nationalities Papers 22, no.11 (Mar 1994): 11–25.https://doi.org/10.1080/00905999408408306John A. Armstrong National Liberation and International Balance, Nationalities Papers 22, no.11 (Nov 2018): 11–25.https://doi.org/10.1017/00905999408408306David R. Marples Wartime Collaboration in Ukraine: Some Preliminary Questions and Responses, (Jan 1992): 64–81.https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230376076_4John A. Armstrong Contemporary Ethnicity: The Moral Dimension in Comparative Perspective, The Review of Politics 52, no.22 (Aug 2009): 163–188.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500050336Stephan M. Horak, John A. Armstrong, Basil Dmytryshyn, Kenneth C. Farmer, George Kulchycky, John S. Reshetar, Orest Subtelny Ukrainians in World War II: Views and points∗, Nationalities Papers 10, no.11 (Oct 2007): 1–39.https://doi.org/10.1080/00905998208407927

The Atlas, Thor, and Titan

ALTHOUGH AN intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was among the several basic new weapons urgently recommended during the first postwar analysis of United States military needs, several factors combined to delay the start of actual development until 1954. Perhaps the chief of these was a compound of complacency and self delusion arising from the popular notion that possession of the atomic bomb and the means of its delivery conferred near invincibility on the United States, the only victorious power to emerge unscarred from World War II. That attitude was complicated by the conviction, expressed by some of the nation's most respected scientists and echoed by some of its most prominent military spokesmen, that the V-2 rocket missile was inherently an inaccurate, range-limited weapon, prohibitively expensive, and of slight military effectiveness, which Germany would have done well to forego in favor of improved conventional weapons-such as jet aircraft. General of the Armies Henry H. Arnold, certainly the most farsighted of all World War II allied leaders, was the first important military spokesman to endorse the need for an ICBM. For his pains he was subjected to the derision of leading civilian scientists, most of whom seemed content that logical extensions of existing weapons should remain the objectives of realistic military planning. There seemed slight cause for concern that a genuine need for an ICBM would develop within the predictable future. Two or three decades hence would be time enough.' By 1947 it was a precept of American folklore