Verdict Choice Research Articles

Downstream Effects of Frayed Relations: Juror Race, Judgment, and Perceptions of Police

Building on research demonstrating significant differences in how Black and White Americans view law enforcement, this study assesses how those differential views shape potential jurors’ decision-making in the context of a federal drug conspiracy case in which the primary evidence against the defendant is provided by an FBI agent and an informant cooperating with the agent. A sample of 649 Black and White jury-eligible U.S. citizens were exposed to the case, in which a Black defendant is being tried, and where the informant-witness race (Black or White) was varied. Participants determined verdict, evaluated evidence, and completed additional measures. Results indicated that Black participants were significantly less likely to convict than White participants, especially in the White informant condition; rated the law enforcement witness as less credible, and viewed police more negatively across three composite measures. Exploratory analysis of how juror race and gender interacted indicates Black women largely drove racial differences in verdicts. Perceptions of police legitimacy mediated the relationship between juror race and verdict choice. We conclude that it is critical that citizens are not prevented from being seated on juries due to skepticism about police, given the risk of disproportionate exclusion of Black potential jurors. The legal processes relevant to juror excusals need to be reconsidered to ensure that views of police, rooted in actual experience or knowledge about the problems with fair and just policing, are not used to disproportionately exclude persons of color, or to seat juries overrepresented by people who blindly trust police.

Moral foundations and juror verdict justifications

ABSTRACT The purpose of this study was to examine the ways in which mock jurors justified their verdict decisions using moral foundations language. Participants read a trial transcript describing a second-degree murder charge featuring an automatism plea (which negates the physical volition of a crime). They then provided a two-to-three sentence rationale for their verdict choice, which we coded for the contextually-valid presence of words from the Moral Foundations (MF) Dictionary. Mock jurors were most likely to use harm-related language in justifying murder votes. A qualitative description also revealed differences in the content of the justifications.

Verdict spotting: investigating the effects of juror bias, evidence anchors and verdict system in jurors

The Scottish verdict of not proven represents a second acquittal verdict which is not legally defined. Existing research into the influence of the not proven verdict on jury decision making is modest. The main aim of the current study was therefore to investigate the influence of verdict systems (two vs three) on juror decision making. The effect of pre-trial bias and evidence anchors on juror judgements were also examined. One-hundred and twenty-eight mock jurors listened to two homicide vignettes and were asked to rate their belief of guilt of the accused and to give a verdict in both trials. The results suggest that pre-trial bias was a significant predictor of both verdict choice and belief of guilt, whereas evidence anchors were not a significant predictor of either. Finally, both guilty and not guilty verdicts were given with increased frequency in the two-verdict system when compared to the three-verdict system.

Race salience and attorney statements: the unique role of defense opening statements and closing arguments

The purpose of this study was to investigate how the race salience effect influences juror decision making when manipulated through defense attorney statements. The literature is unclear regarding the ability of attorney statements to manipulate race salience and the individual influence of opening statements and closing arguments in creating the effect. In the current study, 207 undergraduate White mock jurors participated in a simulated criminal assault case in which defendant race was made salient through defense attorney statements (through opening statements, closing arguments, or both). Results indicated a race salience effect for verdict choice when race was salient and suggested that closing arguments may be particularly important in creating this effect. Our results also suggest that race salience creates an outgroup favoritism effect rather than the equalizing effect identified in early research. Implications of these findings for the race salience and juror decision making literature are discussed along with implications for actual court cases.

“She Is his Girlfriend—I Believe this Is a Different Situation”: Gender Differences in Perceptions of the Legality of Intimate Partner Rape

Despite the alarming problem of intimate partner rape (IPR), there is a dearth of empirical data investigating how jury-eligible individuals perceive IPR in a courtroom setting. In particular, very little research has addressed IPR beyond the scope of marital rape. Thus, we investigated how community members perceived intimate partner rape involving both a married and non-married couple in a mock trial context. In Experiment 1, 129 participants (78 women) read a trial summary describing an intimate partner rape that differed as to whether the victim and defendant were married or in a cohabiting, non-marital relationship. In Experiment 2, which involved the same methods as Experiment 1, we gave 153 participants (79 women) four verdict options: not guilty, guilty of Rape in the First-Degree, Intimate Partner Rape, or Sexual Misconduct. In both experiments, women were more likely to render guilty verdicts than men and yielded more pro-victim/anti-defendant judgments. Participants did not perceive the case differently between the marital status conditions. In Experiment 2, the presence of other guilty verdict choices influenced both men and women’s guilt decisions. The proportion of women who found the defendant not guilty of any crime decreased by over 50% in Experiment 2, while the proportion of men who found the defendant not guilty remained stable across experiments. The results suggest that few men and women are willing to convict the defendant of Rape in the First-Degree—especially when presented with other, lesser sexual crime options—and that the victim and defendant’s intimate relationship is a mitigating factor causing mock jurors to view IPR as a lesser, sexual crime different to felony rape.

Considering Forensic Science: Individual differences, opposing expert testimony and juror decision making

Two experimental studies examined the effect of opposing expert testimony on perceptions of the reliability of unvalidated forensic evidence (anthropometric facial comparison). In the first study a...

Considering forensic science: individual differences, opposing expert testimony and juror decision making

ABSTRACTTwo experimental studies examined the effect of opposing expert testimony on perceptions of the reliability of unvalidated forensic evidence (anthropometric facial comparison). In the first study argument skill and epistemological sophistication were included as measures of individual differences, whereas study two included scores on the Forensic Evidence Evaluation Bias Scale. In both studies participants were assigned to groups who heard: (1) no expert testimony, (2) prosecution expert testimony, or (3) prosecution and opposing expert testimony. Opposing expert testimony affected verdict choice, but this effect was mediated by perceptions of reliability of the initial forensic expert's method. There was no evidence for an effect on verdict or reliability ratings by argument skill or epistemology. In the second experiment, the same mediation effect was found, however scores on one subscale from the FEEBS and age also affected both verdict and methodological reliability. It was concluded that opposing expert testimony may inform jurors, but perceptions of the reliability of forensic evidence affect verdict, and age and bias towards forensic science influence perceptions of forensic evidence. Future research should investigate individual differences that may affect perception or bias towards forensic sciences under varying conditions of scientific reliability.

Jurors’ Evaluations of a High School Bullying Case in which the Victim Attempted Suicide

Given the large number of criminal trials that occur annually, it is important to understand jurors’ verdict choices and punishment preferences. Recently, legislators have begun moving to criminalize school bullying, and therefore more such cases will likely be tried in courtrooms in the future. In the current study, undergraduates (N = 170; 75% female) evaluated a criminal trial involving bullying. We manipulated the victim’s age (14 or 18 years old) and the harm level (emotional distress that led to academic problems or a suicide attempt). We hypothesized that greater harm would produce more pro-victim judgments for the younger but not the older victim, and that this effect would be mediated by jurors’ inferences about each individual’s degree of responsibility. As predicted, when the victim was younger, a higher versus lower level of harm led to a greater proportion of guilty verdicts, higher probability of guilt estimates, and harsher sentence recommendations. In contrast, when the victim was older, an increase in harm significantly decreased probability of guilt estimates and did not affect verdicts or sentences. Jurors seem to interpret harm in a complex way, taking into account the victim’s apparent capacity to deal with his or her mistreatment.

The Effect of Electrophysiological Neuroscientific Deception Detection Evidence on Juror Judgments in a Criminal Trial

There are concerns that if neuroscientific deception detection evidence becomes admissible in court, jurors may weigh it inappropriately. We investigated whether mock jurors were influenced more by electrophysiological than behavioral evidence that a defendant in a criminal trial was lying. Participants’ perceptions of evidence quality predicted verdict choice, and quality ratings were higher for neuroscientific than for behavioral evidence. However, both types of evidence increased guilty verdicts similarly, and the inclusion of neuroimages had no additional impact. These findings suggest that neuroscientific evidence may be processed differently than other types of deception evidence, but it is not necessarily more persuasive.

Potential labeling effects: influence of psychopathy diagnosis, defendant age, and defendant gender on mock jurors' decisions

The present study investigated the impact of diagnostic labels and traits, age, and gender of the defendant on various mock juror decisions. Undergraduate students and members of the community (N=247) read a simulated trial transcript involving a case of aggravated assault. The transcript differed in terms of diagnosis (psychopathy vs. antisocial personality disorder (APD)/conduct disorder (CD) vs. no diagnosis), age (15 vs. 30), and gender (male vs. female) of the defendant. The effects of these variables on decisions regarding credibility, verdict choice, risk of future violence and recidivism, and treatment amenability were investigated. Results indicated that psychopathic defendants were rated as being less credible than defendants in the other diagnostic conditions. Defendants described as psychopaths and as having APD/CD were also more likely to be found guilty and were more likely to receive higher ratings of risk for future violence/recidivism regardless of their age and gender. There were no significant main effects or interactions concerning the age and gender variables. Implications for the use of psychopathy evidence within the Criminal Justice System are discussed.

Knowledge-telling and knowledge-transforming arguments in mock jurors' verdict justifications

According to the “story model” a juror constructs an implicit mental model of a story telling what happened as the basis for the verdict choice. But the explicit justification of a verdict choice could take the form of a story (knowledge telling) or the form of a relational (knowledge-transforming) argument structure that brings together diverse, non-chronologically related pieces of evidence. The study investigates whether people tend towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming, and whether use of these argument structure types are related to skilled argument and epistemic understanding. A sample of people on jury duty chose and justified verdicts in two abridged cases. Participants tended to display the same argument structure and argument skill across cases. Those using knowledge-transforming structures were more successful at the juror argument skills task and had a higher level of epistemic understanding. The discussion suggests that jurors approach their task with an epistemic orientation towards knowledge telling or knowledge transforming.

How do jurors argue with one another?

AbstractWe asked jurors awaiting trial assignment to listen to a recorded synopsis of an authentic criminal trial and to make a choice among 4 verdict possibilities. Each participant juror then deliberated with another juror whose verdict choice differed, as a microcosm of a full jury’s deliberation. Analysis of the transcripts of these deliberations revealed both characteristics general to the sample and characteristics for which variation appeared across participants. Findings were interpreted in terms of a model of juror reasoning as entailing theory-evidence coordination. More frequently than challenging the other’s statements, we found, a juror agreed with and added to or elaborated them. Epistemological stance — whether knowledge was regarded as absolute and certain or subject to interpretation — predicted several characteristics of discourse. Absolutists were less likely to make reference to the verdict criteria in their discourse. Those who did so, as well as those who made frequent reference to the evidence, were more likely to persuade their discourse partners.

Relative expertise in an everyday reasoning task: Epistemic understanding, problem representation, and reasoning competence

Experts in cognitive domains differ from non-experts in how they represent problems and knowledge, and in their epistemic understandings of tasks in their domain of expertise. This study investigates whether task-specific epistemic understanding also underlies the representation of knowledge on an everyday reasoning task on which the competent reasoners have neither expert domain knowledge nor training. 180 people on jury duty were assessed for epistemological understanding about the nature of knowledge and knowing in general, understanding of the specific task of the juror, and level of argument skill and evidence representation on two jury cases. Epistemic construal of the juror task and task-specific competent reasoning was found related to general epistemology, argument skills, and representation of the evidence. Additionally, estimations of the possibility of certainty in general and in a juror task predicted the participants' expressed certainty about their verdict choices. Implications for developing everyday reasoning competence are discussed.

The Biasing Effects of Memory Distortions on the Process of Legal Decision-Making

This article investigates the impact of memory limitations and memory distortions on the process of legal decision-making. I develop a simple framework in which jurors establish interim judgments, which are later used by a memory technology to reconstruct, in an inductive process, evidence related to those judgments. The resulting behavior matches a number of stylized facts that are inconsistent with the standard Bayesian framework. I show that beliefs in a given hypothesis may remain unchanged, and may even be strengthened, in the face of disconfirming evidence. This, in turn, implies that the beliefs of two jurors with different memory technologies may deviate further apart as they receive new information, accounting for heterogeneous, i.e. opposite verdict choices, and strongly held beliefs after a large amount of information is presented. Finally, I show that in this setup the probability of legal errors is highest for moderate strengths of evidence.

Guilty, not guilty, or …? multiple options in jury verdict choices

AbstractThree studies investigate the role and impact of alternative verdicts to the conventional choice between conviction and acquittal. The primary focus is on the Not Proven option, with a lesser charge alternative included for comparisons. The results contradict a commonly held view that the Not Proven option attracts jurors away from returning a conviction. Instead, Not Proven more often supplants outright acquittals. Judged probabilities of guilt from jurors returning Not Proven are mid‐range, in contrast to the markedly higher probabilities given by those returning conviction of a lesser charge (manslaughter) and lower probabilities from those returning an acquittal. Jurors returning Not Proven report greater decisional difficulty and conflict than those returning any other verdict, including conviction on a lesser charge. No direct evidence is found that third options function as a decision‐avoidant alternative to conviction or acquittal. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Cognitive Bases for Effective Participation in Democratic Institutions: Argument Skill and Juror Reasoning

Skills of argument are important for effective consideration of social issues and participation in democratic institutions. Such skills applied to a juror-reasoning task have been found to have a relationship with how well possible verdict choices might be considered. As justice in the jury system requires that jurors give full consideration to the evidence and can find the best fit between evidence and a verdict, the fostering of cognitive skill applied to everyday, non-schooled reasoning contexts is essential. This synthesis of findings from a juror-reasoning project, drawn from a sample of 180 people on jury duty, shows that skills of argument applied to the juror task can be identified and are consistent across contexts and with other skills. It also shows that education and the development of epistemological understandings play roles in variation found in informal reasoning and open-minded consideration of others' claims.

Evidence coverage and argument skills: cognitive factors in a juror's verdict choice

AbstractJuror reasoning and verdict choice have been explored variously as functions of argument skill and the overall story representation of the evidence on which verdict choices are based. This study investigates the proportion of testimony covered in the justification of a verdict choice and its relationship with argument skill, narrative explanation or evidence‐based argument, and certainty about verdict choice. Each of these variables was also compared with the verdict choice. People serving jury duty justified verdict choices in two abridged jury trials. Individuals were consistent in the relative amount of evidence used in both trials. Argument skills, evidence evaluation type, and evidence synthesis type all accounted for variance in the amount of evidence covered. Evidence coverage, along with argument skills, predicted verdict choice. As expected, those most certain about verdict choice did not use the most evidence. Implications regarding mediating factors in story construction and juror decision making are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

All-or-nothing verdict as a screening device

An adversarial model of criminal trial is considered with three verdict choices-innocent, guilty of moderate crime, and guilty of serious crime. Depending on the parties' access to evidence and initial beliefs in the courtroom about the possible crimes, the judge may agree to the defendant's request to eliminate the verdict of moderate crime from jury deliberation if the prosecution brings the charge of serious crime. Though this all-or-nothing verdict choice confers the defendant some manipulative power, it is shown that such verdict choice may also screen out an overstated charge of serious crime. Conditions are derived under which screening is effective and powerful enough to generate (ex-ante) efficiency gains.

The everyday production of knowledge: individual differences in epistemological understanding and juror‐reasoning skill

AbstractThis study investigated the untested assumption that people's everyday reasoning reflects different understandings of the nature of knowledge and knowing. The epistemological stances of 180 prospective jurors were assessed with an interview that probed the nature and source of the discrepant knowledge claims of two historical accounts. The researchers derived global epistemological levels from these interviews. The jurors also heard trials and offered justifications for their verdict choices. The researchers assessed these justifications for whether subjects could use various reasoning skills successfully. Epistemological level, but not educational level, age, or gender, predicted juror‐reasoning skills and degree of certainty about verdict choice. Epistemological level, mediated by the juror‐reasoning skills, was a better predictor of general argument skill than certainty about verdict choice and the amount of evidence used in arguing for a verdict. The results indicate that epistemological understandings underlie specific juror‐reasoning skills and overall argument ability. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Some individual differences in perception of the evidence and the verdict choice

For the last century, social research has provided evidence that contradicts the idea of objectivity in judicial procedure. As a result, research on jurors' potential bias has emerged. We propose an alternative to traditional jury, one in which social researchers collaborate with judges and lawyers, providing them with information on the juror bias. Legal authoritarianism is one of the characteristics of personality, which seems to be linked to juror verdicts. We present two studies, which develop a specific measure for this variable. The first study shows the relevance of legal authoritarianism as a variable to describe the psychological profile of juror-eligible respondents. The second study explores the relationship between legal authoritarianism and interpretation of the evidence, as well as the potential of this variable to predict verdicts.