Velayat-e Faqih Research Articles

The ruling ideology or shared identity? The underlying causes of Iran’s influence in Iraq

ABSTRACT This article examines the role of both ideology and identity in Iran’s policy in Iraq. In each society, there are competing self-images such as ethnic, ideological, and religious perceptions that impact foreign policy. Which begs the question whether identity or ideology has more influence? I argue that shared religious identity in two different countries is more important than ideology in mobilizing segments within multi-confessional societies. In addition, these forces become operational after the collapse of the state. The existence of a formidable central state thwarts the mobilization of counter identity and ideology, but when it weakens the door opens for sub-identities. The Islamist ideology of the Iranian revolution, for example, galvanized Muslims from different sectarian backgrounds. However, these ideological precepts gave away to shared identity. The Iraqi Shia today do not believe in the precepts of velayat-e faqih as much as shared Shia identity with Iran.

Ակնարկ Այաթոլլահ Ռուհոլլահ Խոմեյնիի «Վելայաթ-ե ֆաղիհի» հայեցակարգի շուրջ / An overview of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's concept of ''Velāyat-e faqīh''

The concept of 'Velāyat-e faqīh' as a form of Shia Islamic rule became popular after the Islamic revolution in Iran and is the most important and dominant institution in the system of governance of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic revolution was a radical and far-reaching change in Iranian society, aimed at overthrowing the Shah and establishing a new system of government based on both Sharia and civil law. The political, economic, and cultural future of the state was determined by Shia clergy after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini established a social society based on Islamic religious principles and developed a theory of state development. After the victory of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini put forward the theory of defending "Islamic power" as a religious priority, thereby strengthening the foundations of the religious state. The concept of 'velayat-e faqih' was an opportunity for a solution to the crisis of legitimate state authority in Shi'ism. It has enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and is the basis of the state structure of the country and has the closest connection and similarity with the Imamate system.

Правовое регулирование стратегического планирования в Исламской Республике Иран

The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter — IRI) is a unique state in terms of the form of government. This is the only Islamic republic in the world that bases its statehood on Shia Islam of the Jafarite persuasion. The consequence of this is the specificity of the institution of the head of state in Iran. Despite the presence of a president regularly elected in direct, general elections for a term of 4 years, the head of state in Iran is the ruling theologian for life - the Supreme Leader (Rahbar) in accordance with the principle of «velayat-e faqih» (the rule of the theologian), enshrined in the Iranian Constitution. The article contains an analysis of the authority of the Supreme Leader to adopt general policy strategies in agreement with the Expediency Discernment Council (hereinafter referred to as the Assembly) in accordance with Part 1 of Art. 110 of the Iranian Constitution. The author concludes that strategies are one of the sources of law in Iran, and in terms of hierarchy they are higher than the laws adopted by the parliament. The article shows a specific mechanism for monitoring the implementation of the provisions of the strategies in the activities of the state bodies of Iran.

История принятия Конституции Исламской Республики Иран

The article contains an analysis of the process of adoption of the Iranian constitution after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, as well as the influence of its features on the content of the adopted constitution. The author considers the legal basis and activities of state bodies and officials within the framework of this process. The article concludes that the original draft of the constitution did not stipulate that the head of state should be the most trained and authoritative theologian, thus, it lacked the most important principle for the modern Iranian state of ‘Velayat-e Faqih’. The author gives an analysis of this project, showing that according to it, it was assumed that the form of government of Iran would be a semi-presidential republic. As a religious specificity, it was proposed to establish religious qualifications for individual officials and create a body of theological control over adopted laws. The article also concludes that the Iranian constitution was formed on the basis of the constitution of the 5th republic in France, and as a result, it contains a significant number of elements similar to it at the present time.

SHAH MOHAMMED REZA PAHLAVI AND AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI: IN LIGHT OF SHI'I HISTORY

The Iranian Revolution talks about to happenings involving the rebellion of the Pahlavi dynasty under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who was held up by the United States, and its subsequent removal with an Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was helped by various leftist and Islamist organizations and Iranian student movements. The Iranian Revolution was a mainstream, nationalist and Shi’a Islamic revolution that ousted an autocratic kingdom with a theocracy built on “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists” (or velayat-e faqih). This research goes to light the relationship between Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, in the context of Shi'i history. This research paper hypothesizes three types of human relationships which are grounded on, the exchange system, the integrative system, and the threat system. Reza Khan (the father of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) had established it through a military coup d'etat in 1921; the threat system looked to lead in Iran throughout the Pahlavi rule which was finished in December, 1979 by Ayatollah Khomeini. Under threat system, detachment and legality occur as major variables. Actions, events, writings, and vocalizations of main community figures are engaged to establish the inequality between intent and outcome of the Shah's policies, and between world views and consequent activities of the Shah and Khomeini. This paper also argues the nature of the rule of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, and into the role of Ayatollah Khomeini as voice of the opposition, charismatic leader, and as "prince" who legitimates his own threat system.

IRAN'S ANTI-COMMUNIST RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES AND THEIR IMPACT ON SOVIET IRANIAN RELATIONS 1979-1989

This research sheds light on the study of the role of religious ideology in Iranian foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, and how Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to export the principles of his Islamic revolution towards all countries of the world, including the Soviet Union with a communist orientation, according to the issue velayat-e faqih, until 1989.

ایران و جنبش عدم خشونت در آستانه قرن حاضر

One of the developments coinciding with the turn of the century in Iran that has shaped the society’s political culture and revolutionary discourse is the shift towards a non-violent method of political struggle, which is clearly seen in the mode of thought and behavior of post-revolutionary generations. This shift has also been accompanied by a change of orientation from state to society, as well as increased attention to women and gender, which has been evident in the protest movements in the last two decades. In addition, the prevalence of non-violence as a political philosophy among political activists and civil rights advocates has disburdened the revolutionary left of the past tradition of violent struggle, thus contesting the equation between radicalism and violence advanced by conservative circles. This turn towards non-violence is indicative of a new political realism wherein change, unlike during the 1979 Islamic revolution, is neither identity-oriented nor ideological, but demand-driven. From this perspective, the shift to non-violence is related to a new discourse for dealing with systematic repression that seeks changes in legal, cultural, socio-economic, and gender terms on a national scale. This discourse aims at uniting diverse groups of people against the institution of velayat-e faqih through a conceptual appeal to human honor. Historical parallels may be seen in the way that the idea of a House of Justice (Edalat Khaneh) functioned during the Constitutional era as a central and unifying concept across diverse groups. This paper asseses how, at the threshold of a new century, Iran might achieve historical political change through non-violence, especially with reference to excluded and marginalized groups. This prospect is discussed with particular reference to Mohandas Gandhi and Judith Butler and especially engages strategic and philosophical views of non-violence from secular and radical perspectives.

FUNCTIONING Soft Power Diplomacy in Foreign Policy: Iran as a Case Study

Objectives: The concept of soft power is considered one of the most important fundamental variables in the field of regional and international relations. Soft power played a major role in implementing the foreign policies of international regional actors, including Iranian foreign policy The research paper aims to study the impact of employing soft power in implementing Iranian foreign policy by focusing on studying the foundations of Iranian soft power, the role of that power in Iran's foreign policy orientations and the opportunities that support its success In order to move forward with the policy of Iranian influence in the Arab popular milieu, Iran established many cultural and social centers, in many African and Latin American countries, in addition to establishing many religious and cultural activities, and establishing many civil society organizations in Arab countries such as Iraq. Syria and Lebanon have many satellite channels, newspapers, magazines and radio stations, most of which are funded by Iranian embassies and consulates abroad, and most of them aim to market the Shiite image mixed with Iranian nationalism, and to attract many. Arab and African youth Methods : The study adopts an analytical, inductive approach that relies on uncovering facts by starting from the details, then proceeds gradually to laws, general rules, and the college, where the parts of the conceptual framework of soft power will be discussed. At the same time, we explained the challenges that stand in the way of escalating the role of soft power in Iranian foreign policy, and the recent scene in the reliance of Iranian foreign policy in the future on the concept of smart power as a strategy to face the challenges that hinder the achievement of Iranian foreign policy goals regionally and internationally Results: Our research treatment of the issue of the impact of employing soft powers on Iranian foreign policy as one of the main engines of implementing Iranian foreign policy An objective analysis was carried out accompanied by a scientific investigation and logical conclusions based on the method of analysis away from repetition and repetition and came out with several conclusions, including the following: Should Iran's strategy toward the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and North Africa be a strategy of military superiority only, or a bilateral strategy based on employing both soft and hard powers through deep engagement? Conclusions : The debate about the success of the strategy of employing soft power in Iranian foreign policy is based on a logical and objective excuse that it lacks solid experimental ground Including the dedication of two phenomena: The first: Promoting the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih through public diplomacy in African and Latin American countries, and this was done through Iran's ambassadors abroad, as well as cultural consulates and political relations with Islamic organizations and movements, as they serve as important power centers in Iranian public diplomacy, and they reinforce the theory of Wilayat al-Faqih After Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the notion of velayat-e faqih was enshrined into the Iranian constitution, with Khomeini taking on the role of supreme leader until his death in 1989. Today, velayat-e faqih is the sole source of political and religious authority for Iran’s supreme leader, now Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei The second: The religious factor was one of the most prominent obstacles in the way Iran uses its soft power, because (the principle of the jurisprudence of the jurist) was an obstacle to its goal of regional leadership or in generating sufficient soft power to enable it to achieve its regional leadership, or to achieve this goal without relying on hard power. In fact, this element (the principle of the jurisprudence of the jurist) has often played a negative role in achieving the regional isolation of Iran, especially in the Arab Gulf region. And when Iran intends to rely on the sectarian factor to mobilize the Shiite minorities in the region and is unable to prove that it does not deal with sectarian politics in many stations, and the tension in the Bahraini-Iranian and Saudi-Iranian relations is the best evidence of the rejection of Iranian proposals based on the principle of exporting the Iranian revolution abroad, especially In the Arab Gulf region Rather, Iran failed miserably in Iraq and Syria as a result of its reliance on sectarian policies that were rejected by both peoples in these two countries and adhered to the principle of citizenship and loyalty to its homeland instead. Keywords : FUNCTIONING . Soft Power Iran . Diplomacy . Foreign Policy. ‫ * DOI: 10.7176/EJBM/13-6-02 Publication date: March 31 st 2021

The Constraints of Infallibility

There has been persistent confusion among European and US diplomats over the public statements of Ayatollah Khamenei on matters of foreign policy. Despite significant Iranian pragmatism in negotiations, Khamenei’s pronouncements are consistently combative. P Sadeghi and Jack Watling examine the evolution of the concept of velayat-e faqih, which underpins the position of the Supreme Leader, and how it has been promulgated, and argue that Khamenei has developed a narrative of infallibility. This, combined with the obligations pertaining to his office as an Ayatollah, have made him uniquely constrained in his ability to publicly alter his language. At the same time Khamenei has worked to centralise power around his office, thereby creating a paradox by which the most powerful decision-maker in Iran is unable to offer clear public leadership for fear of being proven wrong.■

‘Uncontested’ view of Shi’i networks: a reply to Corboz

The starting point for Corboz’s article ‘Shi’i Clerical Networks and the Transnational Contest over Sacred Authority by challenging assumptions that velayat-e faqih is an ‘uncontested’ position: Dynamics in London’s Shi’i Triangle’ is a proposal that gives emphasis to a transnational contest between maraji’ and the Iranian Supreme Leader over sacred authority. Corboz’s core argument seeks to undermine the view of the velayat-e faqih being the only relevant ‘model’ of clerical authority in today and future Shi’i worlds by exploring Shi’a networks in London. In response, I argue that the political and religious authority of velayat-e faqih cannot be contested with the religious functionality of marja’iyya in Shi’ism. Second, the notion of a ‘Shi’a Crescent’ as well as the accusation that Iran is orchestratings the Shi’a groups – via which the authoritarian regimes ensured their survival during the Arab Springs – should be rejected by accepting that even the most pro-Iranian groups do not necessarily tend to repeat the Iranian model of leadership. Finally, I emphasise that challenging the power to rule as a feature of velayat-e faqih by holding Iran’s Supreme Leader in the Islamic Republic of Iran with marja’iyya does not provide an adequate understanding of the multidimensional dynamics of Shi’ism.

Մեկ հեղափոխություն ողջ աշխարհի համար․ Այաթոլլահ Խոմեյնիի ջանքերը միավորել աշխարհի մուսուլմաններին

One the main goals of the ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the Islamic Revolution in Iran was the unity of all Muslims of the world in the framework of that revolution. The theory of “Velayate Faqih” that was in the cornerstone of the revolutions philosophy was perceived as a universal prescription for all the Muslims both Shia and Sunni in order to have just government and unity among the Muslims. The article examines the discourse and diplomatic steps of ayatollah Khomeini in order to reach the abovementioned unity.

Shiite Clergy in Iran’s Political Life

The article is devoted to the role of Shiite clergy in the Islamic revolution and in the political life of Islamic Republic of Iran. The author attempts to analize the possibilities of the Islamic regime’s survival in the context of modernizing society. IRI is a special model of the state system that embodies the idea of the Islamic rule of Imam Khomeini. Its political, socioeconomic, legal spheres are based on Islamic principles. The clergy managed to establish almost absolute control over secular institutions. At the same time, the Iranian regime can not be regarded as the only theocratic. It combines Islamic ideas with republican principles and admits democracy as a form of political participation. Iran’s political system combines elements of the modern Islamic theocracy with republican principles. Over nearly 40-years of its existence (since 1979), the political system underwent certain transformations which were caused by the economic and sociocultural development of the society and external factors. The liberalization of the economic sphere and the development of political parties put on the agenda political changes. Liberal-minded clergy relying on the ideas of religious modernism support the strengthening of democratic elements within the Islamic Republic. Some of them are ready to abandon the principle of “velayat-e faqih” or to reduce the authority of the leader in political sphere. They initiated reforms in political and public sphere.However, the clergy standing on the positions of fundamentalism, is not ready to reduce the Islamic component. They condemn the modernization trends intensified in Iranian society in recent years and are trying to bring the country back to the first post-revolutionary decade. However, the society is not ready to share such approaches. During the recent election campaigns Iranians have supported the liberal forces. The events of early 2018 demonstrated the protest potential of the society.This shows the desire of the citizens for further democratization of the political system and secularization of the public life. Although, there are calls for overthrowing the dictatorship of the clergy among the opposition groups in the West and inside the country. Hopes for the democratisation of the regime have not been lost. If external factors do not have a destructive effect, then the implementation of the Iranian model of modernization can become a reality.

Theocracy in Iran: From an Ideology to an Islamic Republic

This essay seeks to answer the question of whether Islam can be an ideology. The argument is premised on Islam being a belief system which encompasses the personal, social and political aspects of the society and its adherents. It is built on the assertion that systems of beliefs can be turned into an ideology that elites can exploit for political mobilization. As in the case of Iran, this essay argues that an ideology can emerge from the fusion of religion and politics. When religious beliefs are utilized in pursuit of political power, a political ideology is formed which can bring about changes in people and the different groups that intend to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events. To illustrate this point, this essay discusses Khomeini's Governance of Jurist (Velayat e-Faqih) and its function in the establishment of theocracy in Iran.

One Bed and Two Dreams? Contentious Public Religion in the Discourses of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati

Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati are seen as twin pillars of revolutionary Islam in contemporary Iran. This article contextualizes and compares these radical discourses in three sections. It first problematizes the transformation of Khomeini as a quietist cleric into a revolutionary ayatollah. While Khomeini’s theory of velayat-e faqih was a radical departure from the dominant Shiite tradition, its practice has contributed to a new era of post-Khomeinism. Second, it examines Shariati’s discourse and a new reading of his thought in the post-revolutionary context. Third, it demonstrates that these discourses differ radically on the three concepts of radicalism, public religion, and state. The conclusion sheds some light on the conditions of Khomeinism after Khomeini, and Shariati’s discourse three decades after the revolution. It suggests that Iran has gradually entered into a new era of post-Islamism.

The discursive representation of Iran’s supreme leader in online media

This study examines the interplay of politics, religion and discourse in the representation of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in government-controlled news websites in Iran. It is grounded in critical discourse analysis (CDA), and Van Leeuwen’s social actor network model (2008) is used as the theoretical framework to analyse the linguistic representation of the Iranian leader. In the samples analysed, Khamenei is discursively depicted by features associated with the Prophet Muhammad and the 12 infallible Imams of the Shia tradition. Such representations elevate the authority of Khamenei in texts, and naturalise the ideology of Velayat-e Faqih, which authorises a Faqih (Jurist) to assume political leadership in Iran. In this way, the texts are used to maintain and reinforce the dominance of people in positions of power.

Creeping Secularism

The Islamic revolution in Iran at the closing decades of the twentieth century was a shocking, unexpected phenomenon in the context of modern history. Its religious emblem, the presence of the Shiite clerics as it's mobilizing motor for mass demonstrations and, eventually, the bizarre composition of Islam and revolution—an amalgam of two conceptually alien elements, with unprecedented ideological claims— created a new peculiar model of state and statecraft. The substitution of a fundamentalist regime for a semisecular monarchy replaced the crown with the turban as the paramount symbol of the Iranian national sovereignty, under the fundamentalist formulation of the “governance of the canonist” (velayat-e faqih). This new state manifesting itself through specific signs, symbols, slogans, discourses, and behaviors, as well as by appropriation of modern means of ideological propaganda, the use of revolutionary violence, and organized terror, embodied in the very structure of a state, addressed itself to the world as a new militant ideological and political power aiming, once again, to change the world. How could this extremely unexpected event happen? Explanations are various and they focus either on the dictatorial manners and erroneous actions of the shah, alongside the role played by the Western powers, specifically the United States, or on the presence and the political role of Shiism and its clergy in Iranian history. However, a few fundamental questions remain unanswered. How could a radically traditionalist religious establishment, which was normally marked by modern revolutionaries as reactionary, merge with the most radical revolutionary groups and views? What are the universal results of such a “chemical” composition for both the otherworldly religionism and secular revolutionism? How do they essentially differ in action and discourse from what they had been previously? What were the innermost historical forces that made possible this seemingly impossible phenomenon?

The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein'ali Montazeri in the Politics of Post-1979 Iran

Ayatollah Montazeri was a Khomeinist who came to regret being Khomeini's unabashed protegé. Though he has never abandoned the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, he has sought to reconceptualize it by furnishing it with democratic principles. In this, he has not been credible, although he has managed to portray himself as a reformer among some Iranian activists who themselves have credible reformist credentials, such as Akbar Ganji. But other reformists believe that the principles of the mandate of the jurist permit authoritarian abuses. And those among them who seek a mujtahid's support for overthrowing that doctrine would prefer to turn to the writings of Ayatollah Dr. Mehdi Ha'iri (d. 1999).

Political and Religious Leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini: an interpretation of political leadership in modern Iran

The author argues the specificity of the Iranian social and political structure, placing the country between Islamic traditionalism and modern society. Attempting to gain a deeper understanding of the essence of the political culture of contemporary Iranian society, Kulyushin explores the relationship between religion and politics in the country. He traces the transformation of religious leadership to the political one in the 16 th ‑20 th centuries, the historical evolution of the velayat-e faqih theory, which has made it possible to legitimize the rule of the ‘ ulama’ within the ideological framework of the Imami Shi'ism. The focus of Kulyushin’s study is on the figure of Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79. The author explores the role of the religious component in the formation of Khomeini’s political status. In particular, basing on the preamble to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran as amended in 1989, the official biography of Khomeini and the school textbook on modern history, Kulyushin discusses the conventional title of Khomeini, imam , and its relation to Shi‘i theological concept of imamah , explaining the use of this title as a “political metaphorization”, when moral and political expectations related to the “hidden Imam” (­ al-imam al-qa’im ) are being transferred onto the outstanding political leader.

The Invasion of the Private Sphere in Iran

The Invasion of the Private Sphere in Iran MEHRANGIZ KAR THE Islamic regime that governs Iran constantly violates the private domain of the Iranian citizen through religious and legal means. The intrusion of political power into the private lives of citizens is characteristic of totalitarian regimes. In Iran the regime has disguised the intrusion as a religious ethics requirement and justifies it by cloaking it in a religious guise. The private sphere of those labeled “dissidents” is more threatened than that of other citizens. Using the legal and religious laws the regime has adopted, government agencies have brought all aspects of the private life of dissidents, critics, artists, and political activists under surveillance. For instance, listening to the telephone conversations of dissidents is a widespread practice, allowing the authorities to monitor and control dissidents’ private interaction and communication. Through these methods the regime conspires against dissidents, accusing them of illegal sexual activities, apostasy, and spying. This infringement of citizens’ private lives by the police and the regime’s security forces by falsely accusing them of ideological and sexual crimes, clearly violates Article 37 of the Iranian constitution, which calls for the presumption of innocence. Violation of the private sphere is not limited to dissidents but extends to all Iranian citizens. Since 1979, technocrats have legitimized this intrusion based on an appeal to Islamic laws. They have drawn on the religious interpretations of political clergy who are connected to political power in Iran to pass legislation that blatantly contradicts the principles of freedom and human rights. SOCIAL RESEARCH, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Fall 2003) The ruling clergy thus puts its stamp of approval on the systematic violation of citizens’ private lives. The constitution of the Islamic Republic that was adopted in 1981 envisioned that the country’s laws and policies would not contravene Sharia, or religious law (this is stated in Article 4 and 94). This means that the rights formulated in the 30 articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot be incorporated in Iranian laws—and this also means that government agencies have free rein to carry out their intrusions and oppression. The application of Sharia makes possible the control of the private sphere of citizens’ lives. In this paper I will discuss two legal means by virtue of which the regime keeps private lives of citizens under surveillance. These are: 1) legalized inquisition; and 2) the obligation to enjoin the good and forbid the evil.1 Legalized Inquisition Even though Article 23 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran forbids inquisition, the regime actively carries out the practice. The legal and political architectonics of the Islamic Republic justifies inquisition as necessary for the protection of Islamic and revolutionary values. And the scope of religious government is so vast that it allows for the investigation of every aspect of an individual’s private beliefs. A few examples follow. Individuals trying to register a political party or cultural organization or who want to obtain a license to publish a newspaper must submit to inquisition. To register a political party or to run for office requires a thorough investigation of one’s private convictions . The approval of an applicant depends on a positive evaluation by the administrative agencies. During the evaluation process the agencies not only inspect the applicant’s past but also his or her personal beliefs, private thoughts, and family history. 830 SOCIAL RESEARCH If in any of these areas there is any evidence that the applicant is not committed to the doctrine of velayat-e faqih, or rule by the clergy, his or her application is rejected. The conduct of inquisition for the purposes of political and cultural activities is so rigorous that even the pious are required to prove their faithfulness. Of course, the measure of faithfulness is always how faithful one is to velayat-e faqih. Those whose conduct reveals a critical view of that doctrine or evidence that puts into doubt their absolute loyalty to the regime are branded as infidels, counter-revolutionaries, and spies, and their candidacy for an office or their application for a license rejected. To keep such individuals under surveillance, they are followed, their phone lines are tapped...

The constitution of Iran: politics and the state in the Islamic Republic

Part 1 Contradictions in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic: the composition of the Constitution the genesis of the Constitution the clash over velayat-e faqih. Part 2 The supression of the democratic elements: the power of the leader the impotence of the people the supression of fundamental rights the power of the clergy. Part 3 The fate of the Constitution's Islamic legalist elements: the unavoidable acceptance of laws alien to the shari'a circumventing the shari'a through the Rule of Emergency circumventing the shari'a through Secondary Contractual Conditions state ordinances the interests of the ruling system as a standard for legislation a problematic criterion of legitimacy. Part 4 The crisis of the shari'a: an awareness of crisis the search for solutions criticism from outside.