Veil Of Ignorance Research Articles

SETTING AND EXAMINATIONS WITH HIGH STAKES IN GENERAL EDUCATION SYSTEMS: A SOCIO-PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS

The article examines the socio-philosophical foundations of the debate about the appropriateness of high-stakes exams and setting in general education systems. The arguments “for” and “against” that are most often used in the discussion are analysed. It is shown that the answer to the question of the appropriateness of high-stakes examinations and setting can be framed as an ethical choice between fairness and efficiency. D. Rawls’s mental argument “the veil of ignorance” and its logical consequences are presented as a possible universal argument in favour of justice. The conclusion emphasises the philosophical nature of key debates about the education policy.

Rationality and Justice: Textual investigation based on A Theory of Justice

Rawls put forward the concepts of "the original state" and "the Veil of ignorance" in his book A Theory of Justice, which made an outstanding contribution to the reconstruction of the social contract theory. On this basis, he demonstrated the combination of the two principles of justice, namely the principle of equal liberty, the principle of equal opportunity and difference principle, which had a strong impact on the long-term mainstream utilitarian view of justice. Based on the textual investigation of A Theory of Justice, this paper starts from the reason basis shared by the two, takes the relationship between reason and justice as a clue, analyzes the differences between Rawls and utilitarianism in moral philosophy and methodology, and explains the connotation of Rawls's two principles of justice in detail. On the other hand, Rawls' systematic recognition and adoption of utilitarianism, as well as the utilitarian characteristics presented in the principle of difference, make the relationship between the two show a complex state of opposition and interwoven. In this paper, Rawls's theory of justice will be deeply explored, and the internal logic of Rawls's thought of justice will be analyzed, so as to further clarify the relationship between reason and justice.

Algorithmic Fairness and Social Welfare

What constitutes a fair algorithm? In the literature on algorithmic fairness, a common approach is to formulate fairness concerns as statistical constraints and to select the most accurate algorithm satisfying this constraint. This approach is facially distinct from a long tradition in economics based on social welfare, where the utilities of different social identities are aggregated from behind a veil of ignorance. We show that the constrained optimization and social welfare approaches can be fundamentally opposed and propose a framework that nests both approaches as special cases.

An Islamic “Theory of Justice” commentary on consumer well-being

PurposeIn this paper, the philosophy of John Rawls, known as “Justice as Fairness,” is discussed. This philosophy examines the responsibilities social actors hold toward their societal organizations. From an Islamic perspective, justice is pivotal in safeguarding collective interests, aligning with Rawls' conviction that just societies nurture happiness and foster well-being across various life aspects. To achieve customer welfare, our viewpoint underscores the importance of justice in reflecting on consumer well-being from both Rawls’ theory and Islamic perspectives.Design/methodology/approachWe adopt a conceptual approach where secular views of Rawls’ “Theory of Justice” are merged with the Islamic view, resulting in novel insights regarding the hermeneutics involved in the notion of justice and the preservation of consumer well-being.FindingsOur analysis reveals that John Rawls' “A Theory of Justice” aligns with the Islamic perspective in several respects yet diverges in others, notably in the concepts of pre-creation consciousness and divine guidance. These distinctions are emphasized in our paper.Originality/valueOur paper presents a perspective on justice founded on the concepts of the “Original Position” and the “Veil of Ignorance.” The commentary explores consumer well-being by integrating Rawls' principles with an analysis that elucidates the role justice plays in enhancing societal welfare.

The Relevance of Rawlsian Justice in India

Rawls defines justice as fairness, equality, and social justice. According to philosopher John Rawls, justice should be founded on fairness and equality, not what individuals believe or do. Rawlsian justice is crucial in India because rank, poverty, and inequality have produced unequal treatment. Original circumstance and veil of ignorance are key to Rawlsian justice. The initial idea was that individuals may not realize their social standing, class, or other distinguishing features. They would choose moral norms that benefit everyone. The wall of ignorance suggests individuals should judge fairness without understanding their experiences. This allows them determine what's best for everyone. Rawlsian justice can heal India's poverty, inequality, and bigotry. Laws that make sure everyone gets the same education and job opportunities could end racism and poverty. Scheduled Caste and Tribe rules might make people less prejudiced. India needs to make its society open, fair, and respectful of people's rights. Fairness laws based on Rawls might let this happen. Everyone can achieve and be happy in India if society is fair and equitable.

Veil-of-ignorance reasoning affects moral judgment and cognitive flexibility in people with obsessive-compulsive disorder

Individuals with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) have rigid moral judgments compared to healthy people. They tend to prefer deontological options when they face moral dilemmas. Recent research has indicated that activating the Veil-of-Ignorance (VOI) reasoning changes moral judgment in healthy participants, leading them to favor utilitarian choices. However, the effect of VOI reasoning on OC patients' moral judgment has not been studied. The present research aimed to investigate the effect of VOI reasoning on moral judgment and cognitive flexibility of OC patients across two studies (N = 336). In study 1, we recruited 80 OCD participants and 80 healthy participants via convenience sampling and assigned them randomly to either the VOI or non-VOI group. Participants in the VOI group read the VOI versions of the footbridge (personal dilemma) and trolley (impersonal dilemma) dilemmas prior to answering the standard scenarios. In the control group, participants only responded to the standard versions of the dilemmas. In study 2, 88 OCD participants and 88 healthy participants were recruited and followed the same procedure as the first study except that they responded to the bioethical personal and impersonal dilemmas. At the end of each experiment, participants answered the cognitive flexibility test. Results indicated that OCD participants who engaged in VOI reasoning subsequently made more utilitarian choices in response to impersonal dilemmas compared to the OCD participants in the non-VOI condition. However, VOI reasoning did not change their choices in response to personal dilemmas. On the other hand, healthy participants favored utilitarian options in response to personal dilemmas. Both healthy and OC participants performed better on the cognitive flexibility test after engaging in VOI reasoning.

Exploring gamete distribution for Somatic cell nuclear transfer embryonic stem cell procedures

Somatic cell nuclear transfer is a modern technology most famously known for producing clones, such as ‘Dolly’ the sheep. However, its purpose is being explored in what is called ‘therapeutic cloning.’ This is the process of using somatic cell nuclear transfer to produce embryonic stem cells (ntESC). These stem cells can then be used in a variety of treatments, such as organogenesis and ailments for chronic illnesses such as type II diabetes. Australia has recently lifted the ban on research conducted into somatic cell nuclear transfer testing, and thus, the question arises of how an already-strained gamete pool can be distributed towards ntESC procedures. Firstly, using Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’, the concept of a waiting-list structure is considered due to its unbiased nature. Then, the permissibility of such a list will be analysed from the perspective of ntESC technology potentially being critical for time-restricted scenarios. It is thus concluded that a gamete waiting list for ntESCs is conditionally just if patients are not in dire situations.

Fairness of Land Value Taxation: A Derivation of Optimal Tax from behind a Veil of Ignorance

Fairness of Land Value Taxation: A Derivation of Optimal Tax from behind a Veil of Ignorance

Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’: Not only Political but also Metaphysical

In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls develops an account of justice, ‘justice as fairness’ (JAF, henceforth). In his later works, he claims that JAF is supposed to depend on neither philosophical nor religious claims but on political claims. So, the conception of justice he wishes to defend is political but not metaphysical. This political (as well as moral in a specific sense) conception of justice is supposed to apply to political, social, and economic institutions. By presenting JAF, Rawls aims to show how free and rational persons would hold the same conception of justice he defends if they have been invited to construct a just social contract. This would be the case, Rawls reasons, only if those persons determine the principles of justice as if they are in a purely hypothetical situation. Rawls calls this situation ‘the original position’ and thinks that in the original position, parties and decision makers can be fair and impartial to construct a social contract if they can stand behind ‘The Veil of Ignorance’ which is the main feature of the original position. The parties (free and rational persons) who stand behind the veil of ignorance know nothing about their place, class position, social status, intelligence, abilities, and the like in society. They do not know their conceptions of the good either. Since the parties are rational and capable of having a sense of justice, the fundamental agreement they could make behind the veil of ignorance with respect to the principles of justice will be fair. Rawls also develops an account of law (the Law of Peoples) to show that the principles of justice will be universal in its reach. He claims that both reasonably just liberal and decent hierarchical peoples (like the Muslim peoples of the utopian state, Kazanistan) would accept the principles of justice. Rawls argues, however, that since a decent hierarchical society does not consider its members as free and equal citizens as a liberal society does, it cannot be as reasonable and just as a liberal society. So, liberal peoples must encourage decent peoples to recognize the advantages of having liberal institutions and try to convince them to become more liberal in order to have a reasonably just society. In this paper, I will argue that Rawls’s accounts of the original position and the Law of Peoples show that unlike what Rawls contends, JAF is not only political but also metaphysical. I will suggest that since Rawls’s accounts of JAF and person require some metaphysical assumptions, theists who necessarily hold comprehensive metaphysical claims on justice and person have a good reason to reject that they should step behind the veil of ignorance in order to construct a just social contract.

Равенство удачи: развитие эгалитарных концепций справедливости в конце XX века

Since the publication of John Rawls’s Theory of Justice, the egalitarian tradition, which associates fair institutional structure with reaching equality in one aspect or another, has started to play a central role in academic discussions of the social justice problem. The article is devoted to the analysis of the evolution of egalitarianism of luck, which by the end of the 20th century has become the main direction in the framework of this tradition. The proponents of this direction in their argument depart from Rawls’s idea about the lottery of birth, according to which a game played by a fortune, being arbitrary from the moral point of view and affecting the distribution of resources in society, is unfair, and therefore should be compensated. Rawls’s approach to minimizing the role of luck in a fair distribution did not guarantee sufficient compensation for natural inequalities, assuming at the same time excessive compensation for “expensive tastes”. Trying to solve this problem, Ronald Dworkin distinguished between brute and option luck, using the model of the “veil of ignorance”, behind which the amount of fair compensation is determined. Further development of egalitarianism of luck at the turn of the 1980—1990s is associated with the names of Richard Arneson, Gerald Cohen, John Roemer and some other authors who made a number of amendments and changes to the concept of undeserved luck and proposed their own ways to neutralize its consequences for society. The arguments of proponents of luck egalitarianism at the end of the 20th century aimed at strengthening the role of an individual’s freedom of choice and implantation of the ethics of responsibility into the theory of social justice. At the same time, the interpretation of luck as a true “currency of equality” made the question of fair distribution conditional upon the consensus on the limits of human capacity for systematic cultivation of virtues and the scope of individual responsibility for one’s own destiny.

Sustainability, Distributive Justice, and Law: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Compatibility of Environmental and Social Goals

This essay aims at addressing the legal philosophy’s uptake on whether environmental sustainability can be integrated with distributive justice. After an analysis of the European legal framework, where the notion of sustainable development has been built, concepts such as the veil of ignorance, the capability approach, and human flourishing will be examined, arguing that sustainability and distributive justice are necessarily linked, as mutually reinforcing goals to human development. However, a transformational change is still necessary in the way we think about sustainability, to work towards a direction that should be holistic and inclusive of the needs of both people and the planet.

Public acceptance of nuclear waste disposal sites: a decision-making process utilising the ‘veil of ignorance’ concept

This study demonstrates that a decision-making process utilising ‘the veil of ignorance’ concept, defined in process terms as beginning from a blank slate encompassing the entire country as potential sites and shortlisting candidate sites based on scientific (geological) safety, promotes public acceptance of siting a repository for the geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste and fosters procedural fairness. A hypothetical scenario experiment was conducted in Japan, manipulating the site selection process by setting two conditions—one being the application/proposal condition that the Japanese government currently employs, such as an application by municipalities or a proposal by the government, and the other being the veil of ignorance condition, in which multiple candidate areas are selected from a blank slate for the entire land area based purely on geological factors. Three stages of acceptance were presumed—at the level of general management policy, the site selection process itself with a specified decision policy, and the siting of a repository in their area of residence. Two hypotheses were tested: (a) the veil of ignorance condition will be evaluated as a more acceptable and fairer procedure and will engender increased national consensus than the application/proposal condition at the site selection and repository siting stages, and (b) procedural fairness and national consensus will impact acceptance at each stage; these variables at each stage help shape the same variables in the next stage. The results supported these hypotheses. This study discusses the importance of the site selection process, beginning where any de facto site can be a candidate and shortlisting the candidate sites based on scientific criteria.

Blinding to Circumvent Human Biases: Deliberate Ignorance in Humans, Institutions, and Machines

Inequalities and injustices are thorny issues in liberal societies, manifesting in forms such as the gender–pay gap; sentencing discrepancies among Black, Hispanic, and White defendants; and unequal medical-resource distribution across ethnicities. One cause of these inequalities is implicit social bias—unconsciously formed associations between social groups and attributions such as “nurturing,” “lazy,” or “uneducated.” One strategy to counteract implicit and explicit human biases is delegating crucial decisions, such as how to allocate benefits, resources, or opportunities, to algorithms. Algorithms, however, are not necessarily impartial and objective. Although they can detect and mitigate human biases, they can also perpetuate and even amplify existing inequalities and injustices. We explore how a philosophical thought experiment, Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” and a psychological phenomenon, deliberate ignorance, can help shield individuals, institutions, and algorithms from biases. We discuss the benefits and drawbacks of methods for shielding human and artificial decision makers from potentially biasing information. We then broaden our discussion beyond the issues of bias and fairness and turn to a research agenda aimed at improving human judgment accuracy with the assistance of algorithms that conceal information that has the potential to undermine performance. Finally, we propose interdisciplinary research questions.

Moral reasoning behind the veil of ignorance: An investigation into perspective-taking accessibility in the context of autonomous vehicles.

Perspective-taking (PT) accessibility has been recognized as an important factor in affecting moral reasoning, also playing a non-trivial role in moral investigation towards autonomous vehicles (AVs). A new proposal to deepen this effect leverages the principles of the veil of ignorance (VOI), as a moral reasoning device aimed to control self-interested decisions by limiting the access to specific perspectives and to potentially biased information. Throughout two studies, we deepen the role of VOI reasoning in the moral perception of AVs, disclosing personal and contingent information progressively throughout the experiment. With the use of the moral trilemma paradigm, two different VOI conditions were operationalized, inspired by the Original Position theory by John Rawls and the Equiprobability Model by John Harsanyi. Evidence suggests a significant role of VOI reasoning in affecting moral reasoning, which seems not independent from the order in which information is revealed. Coherently, a detrimental effect of self-involvement on utilitarian behaviours was detected. These results highlight the importance of considering PT accessibility and self-involvement when investigating moral attitudes towards AVs, since it can help the intelligibility of general concerns and hesitations towards this new technology.

Is the Veil of Ignorance more than a Thought Experiment? An Empirical Application to Grocery Shopper Preferences during the COVID-19 Pandemic

During the COVID-19 pandemic, grocery shoppers face a moral dilemma: to go inside the store or to use online alternatives, such as curbside pickup or home delivery to limit physical interaction. The veil of ignorance, a hypothetical state of mind, is an experimental tool used to nudge people toward the social welfare option during a decision-making process. We empirically test the effect of the veil of ignorance on grocery shopper preferences by implementing an online choice experiment with 613 U.S. consumers. Subjects who are veiled by ignorance about the state of the COVID-19 pandemic are not willing to pay significantly more for curbside pickup or home delivery than (unveiled) subjects in the control group. We also find heterogeneous effects by vaccination status. Consistent with limited evidence in the prior literature, the veil of ignorance is seemingly unable to induce moral choice behavior in real-world scenarios.

HİÇ YERDEN ADALET: THOMAS NAGEL’İN VE JOHN RAWLS’UN DÜŞÜNCESİNDE ETİK-SİYASAL NESNELLİK

The question regarding the relationship between ethics and politics has always occupied the minds of philosophers and political theorists. Thomas Nagel is one philosopher among others who clearly draws a close link between the ethical and the political. Accordingly, Nagel’s inquiry on the issues of objectivity and subjectivity is providing the readers not only with ethical but also political insights regarding the matter. On the other hand, John Rawls’s ideas of an “original position” and a “veil of ignorance” in their relation to his understanding of political justice, similarly, interrogate the possibility of an alternative perspective for an objective standpoint that recognizes and encompasses individuality while offering a model for a political community which is founded upon impartial principles. Although Rawls’s discussion is mainly contractual and strictly political, certain aspects of his works on political justice and liberalism might be reconsidered in an investigation which also engages with issues in morality and ethics. Therefore, the present study will attempt at reading Nagel’s discussion of objectivity and impartiality from an ethico-political standpoint which juxtaposes ‘the view from nowhere’ with Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”. For this, relevant arguments of both philosophers will be explored in a comparative manner while highlighting potential parallelisms between the two.

Les Misérables: An analysis of low SWB across the world.

Global trends indicate that the prevalence of low subjective wellbeing is on the rise, though not all regions are equal in terms of both absolute levels and their trajectories. In this paper, we explore the relative importance of individual- and country-level factors in predicting low SWB. Put differently, we ask if a person found themselves behind a veil of ignorance, should they want to know who they will be or what country they will live in to better understand their risk of having low wellbeing. To answer this question, we leverage data from the most extensive wellbeing survey in the world-the Gallup World Poll. We explore people's likelihood of reporting low evaluative wellbeing (that their life is close to the worst possible life on the Cantril ladder) and low experiential wellbeing (reporting having felt angry, sad, stressed, and worried for most of the day yesterday). Using multilevel models on both measures, we show that individual factors have the greatest explanatory power across both measures, but that country level factors are almost four times more important in explaining the variation in low evaluative wellbeing than low experiential wellbeing around the world. We also present evidence that individual and country-level factors interact, suggesting that a complex system of people and places determines people's likelihood of reporting low SWB.

People's Preferences for Inequality Respond Instantly to Changes in Status: A Simulated Society Experiment of Conflict Between the Rich and the Poor.

Most people in the United States agree they want some income inequality but debate exactly how much is fair. High-status people generally prefer more inequality than low-status individuals. Here we examine how much preferences for inequality are (or are not) driven by self-interest. Past work has generally investigated this idea in two ways: The first is by stratifying preferences by income, and the second is by randomly assigning financial status within lab-constructed scenarios. In this paper, we develop a method that combines both experimental control and the social experience of inequality-a simulated society experiment. Across two experiments (N = 138, observations = 690), participants voted on the distribution of rewards-first behind a veil of ignorance, and then when they were randomly assigned a status within a game of chance. Status varied repeatedly across five rounds, allowing us to measure dynamic preferences. Under the veil of ignorance, people preferred inequality favoring the top status. When the veil of ignorance disappeared, self-interest immediately influenced inequality preferences. Those who randomly landed in top positions were satisfied with the status quo established under the veil of ignorance, whereas those who randomly landed in bottom positions wanted more equality. Yet these preferences were not stable; decisions about the optimal level of inequality changed according to changes in social status. Our results also showed that, when inequality grows in a society, preferences regarding inequality become polarized by social status. Individuals in low-status positions, particularly, tend to demand more equality.

Humanistic geography in an indigenous community of Mexico: Santa Catarina Lachatao

IntroductionThe present study aim was to rethink the geographical reasoning of everyday life toward a new understanding of knowing how to think about space through an interdisciplinary approach, architecture-psychology. This allowed establishing logical relations in spatial and socio-spatial distributions and uses of social phenomena, typical of Santa Catarina Lachatao, an indigenous Mexican community in Sierra Norte Zapoteca.MethodsBased on ethnographic qualitative interdisciplinary research methods along with a total of three visits lasting 15 weeks, the daily experience of people and their community in different times and spaces, experiences, perspectives, and prejudices, were studied. The geographical approach (cartographies) reflects the social construction of the spatial components as the basic understanding of the territory from everyday life. In this study we worked on indigenous citizenship and its territory, analyzing, and contrasting social phenomena such as power-subjection, wealth-poverty, and exclusion-inclusion that transversally allow us to reflect and understand some of the characteristics of diversity and territoriality of the indigenous communities in Mexico.ResultsCharacteristics that predominating in indigenous communities was recognized and featured. This was observed in the social production of their public space which evidence intergenerational pride and sense of community and belonging and their commitment to preserve their life project sustaining their space, community, and traditions. The natural rural context emerges from the interplay between the natural landscape and the built environment (in constant expansion). The bodies of water are respected and protected by the community and the original crossings are still preserved as precious resources, just as any other natural element. Landscape takes precedence over the irregular built environment, reflected in the urban trace.DiscussionDeveloping interdisciplinary research -architecture and psychology–allowed studying the community development of a Mexican indigenous community, respectfully approaching diversity and territoriality of Santa Catarina Lachatao, Oaxaca. Societies must be understood in and by means of space. Public policy is crucial to strengthen the autonomy and configuration of indigenous communities, warranting their active participation in the design and evaluation of government programs that favor the sustainable use of their lands and natural resources, as well as the preservation of their values and traditions. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. John Rawls

Gerrymandering in the laboratory

AbstractGerrymandering, the drawing of electoral boundaries for political advantage, is a controversial political topic. Previous theoretical work has treated gerrymandering as a one‐stage strategic game against nature, but this paper treats drawing districts as the first stage in a two stage game where parties subsequently compete for undecided voters within districts. In a laboratory experiment, subjects overwhelmingly engage in gerrymandering, which maximizes their probability of winning a majority of the districts and maximizes their expected payoff. However, the subjects self‐report being opposed to the practice in politics regardless of their own political ideology. When forced to draw the electoral map behind a veil of ignorance, the subjects indicate a clear preference for symmetric maps although not the map with the highest theoretical expected payoff. Additionally, while subjects overspend in second stage competition, average spending is similar across electoral maps.