Values Of Schedule Delay Research Articles

Carpooling with heterogeneous users in the bottleneck model

We investigate the effects of carpooling in a dynamic equilibrium model of congestion, which captures various dimensions of heterogeneity: heterogeneity in the preference for and cost of carpooling, heterogeneity in values of time and values of schedule delay. We investigate various policy scenarios: no-toll, first-best pricing, and subsidization of carpooling. The optimally differentiated subsidy equals each type of users’ marginal external benefit (MEB) of switching to m-person carpooling or carpooling, which turns out to be heterogeneous for “ratio heterogeneity”, where the ratios of the values of time and schedule delay vary, and homogeneous for “proportional heterogeneity”, where these values vary in fixed proportion over the population. If such differentiation over users is impossible, the subsidy is a weighted average of the MEB’s, with the weights reflecting the relative sensitivity of the group size of carpoolers to the subsidy. Using a numerical example, we investigate the welfare effects and distributional effects of different policies. The relative efficiency of the differentiated subsidization first increases and then falls with the degree of ratio heterogeneity, and decreases over the entire parameter range and more with the degree of proportional heterogeneity.

Carpooling with Heterogeneous Users in the Bottleneck Model

When drivers opt for carpooling, road capacity will be freed up, and this will reduce congestion. Therefore, carpooling is interesting for policy makers as a possible solution to congestion. We investigate the effects of carpooling in a dynamic equilibrium model of congestion, which captures various dimensions of heterogeneity: in preference for carpooling, ratio heterogeneity between the values of time and the values of schedule delay, and proportional heterogeneity that scales all values equally. We investigate three policy scenarios: no-toll, first-best pricing, and subsidization of carpooling. The optimal second-best subsidy equals each type’s heterogeneous marginal external benefit (MEB) of switching to carpooling. If such differentiation is impossible, the third-best subsidy is a weighted average of the MEBs, where the weights depend on the number of each type and their sensitivity to the subsidy. In our numerical example, we find that when increasing the degree of ratio heterogeneity, the relative efficiency of the second-best subsidization first increases and then falls with the degree of and L type carpoolers benefit more than H type carpoolers. However, when increasing the degree of proportional heterogeneity, H type users benefit more than L types for both solo drivers and carpoolers. Moreover, the relative efficiency of the second-best subsidization decreases throughout.

Why Congestion Tolling Could be Good for the Consumer: The Effects of Heterogeneity in the Values of Schedule Delay and Time on the Effects of Tolling

In studying congestion tolling, it is important to account for heterogeneity in preferences of drivers, as ignoring it can bias the welfare gains. We analyse the effects of tolling, in the bottleneck model, with continuous heterogeneity in the value of time and schedule delay. The welfare gain of a time-variant toll increases with heterogeneity in the value of schedule delay. With heterogeneity, tolling makes the arrival ordering more efficient, and this lowers scheduling costs. If there is not much more heterogeneity in the value of time than in the value of schedule delay, then first-best tolling decreases the generalised price for most users. In our model, first-best tolling is not most detrimental for the lowest values of time and schedule delay: it raises prices more for users with an average value of schedule delay and a slightly larger value of time. Further, the lowest values of time are among those who gain most from a public pay-lane.

Hotelling Models with Price-Sensitive Demand and Asymmetric Transport Costs: An Application to Public Transport Scheduling

We formulate a horizontal differentiation model with price-sensitive demand and asymmetric transport costs, in the context of transport scheduling. Two competitors choose fares and departure times in a fixed time interval. Consumers are distributed uniformly along the interval; their location indicates their desired departure time. In a standard Hotelling model, locations are chosen before prices. In our context, the opposite order is also conceivable, but we show that it does not result in a Nash equilibrium; the same is true for a game in both variables are chosen simultaneously. We also discuss Stackelberg game structures and second-best regulation.We conclude that the addition of price-sensitive demand results in equilibria in the traditional Hotelling model with price setting; there, services are scheduled closer together than optimal. We also show that it is possible to include asymmetric schedule delay functions. Our results show that departure times can be strategic instruments. Optimal regulatory strategies depend on the value of schedule delay, and on whether the regulator can commit.

Value of time by time of day: A stated-preference study

This paper proposes an alternative, dynamic framework for estimating time-varying values of travel time savings and values of schedule delay, in which time-preferences are represented as the time-varying excess-willingness-to-pay (EWPT) to being in the one location, over being elsewhere. It is shown how the conventional linear model, with time-independent values of travel time savings and schedule delay costs, is a special case of our model, and that it is implausible particularly in that it implicitly assumes that the willingness to pay for spending a minute at home instead of being in the vehicle does not vary by time of day, even not for very early departures. The framework is applied to SP data representing the respondents’ departure time choices for the morning commute. The results suggest that individuals’ time-related shadow prices indeed vary strongly over the morning peak, and values of travel time savings are consequently strongly time-dependent, following plausible and intuitive patterns.

Value of Time by Time of Day: A Stated-Preference Study

This paper proposes an alternative, dynamic framework for estimating time-varying values of travel time savings and values of schedule delay, in which time-preferences are represented as the time-varying excess willingness to pay (EWPT) to being in the one location, over being elsewhere. It is shown how the conventional linear model, with time-independent values of travel time savings and schedule delay costs, is a special case of our model, and that it is implausible particularly in that it implicitly assumes that the willingness to pay for spending a minute at home instead of being in the vehicle does not vary by time of day, even not for very early departures. The framework is applied to SP data representing the respondents' departure time choices for the morning commute. The results suggest that individuals' time-related shadow prices indeed vary strongly over the morning peak, and values of travel time savings are consequently strongly time-dependent, following plausible and intuitive patterns.