Use Of Relative Performance Evaluation Research Articles

The Use of Relative Performance Evaluation in Firms with Weak Internal Controls

The Use of Relative Performance Evaluation in Firms with Weak Internal Controls

Industry informational interactions and corporate fraud

We examine three information channels through which product market interactions in an industry can affect firms' incentives to misreport financial information to investors. We find that lower product market sensitivity to individual firms' information and greater use of relative performance evaluation encourage the commission of financial fraud. Industry structures that give rise to less collection of information about individual firms decrease the probability of fraud detection and increase the probability of fraud commission. We also examine dynamic effects of fraud. Our results suggest that, in fragmented industries, fraud can amplify cyclical fluctuations in the real economy.

CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment

This paper examines the effect of CEOs’ outside opportunities on the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO compensation. My tests exploit the staggered rejection of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) by US state courts as an exogenous increase in CEOs’ outside opportunities. I find that the rejection of the IDD leads to a significant increase in the sensitivity of CEO pay to systematic performance (less RPE). This increase is more pronounced for CEOs with greater labor market mobility and industries where proprietary information is more important and not related to measures of governance quality. These results suggest that firms link CEO pay to systematic performance to retain talent and ensure participation.

On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay

We study how friendly boards design the structure of optimal compensation contracts in favor of powerful CEOs. Our study yields unexpected results. First, powerful managers receive higher pay and a contract with a higher pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) if firm performance is low and vice versa. Moreover, we identify conditions where expected pay and expected PPS are both increasing in the friendliness of the board. Second, we show that friendly boards provide managers with higher salaries, more shares, but less options. Third, friendly boards offering contracts with a higher PPS also make more intensive use of relative performance evaluation (RPE). Overall, our results suggest that frequently used indicators of poor (or sound) compensation practices should be interpreted with care. Extending the scope of our model beyond executive pay, we show that powerful managers underinvest in capital but have less incentives to manage earnings.

Avaliação relativa de desempenho na compensação pecuniária de executivos: evidências empíricas no Brasil

The objective of this study was to analyze the implicit use of relative performance evaluation in BMFBovespa listed companies as a way to measure the remuneration of its executives. To define the sample, we sought to identify companies that disclosed information about the compensation of their executives between 2009 and 2012, totaling the sample size in 67 companies, totaling 112 observations. They were then categorized in order to capture risk sharing as predicted by the theory of relative performance evaluation. The results of this research indicate a strong asymmetry in the distribution of the compensation, mainly due to the long-term compensation, which caused the occurrence of outliers. As a result of this situation, and following studies already developed, it was decided to test the model through quantile regression. Even with the use of the median regression it was not possible to identify statistically significant evidences of the occurrence of relative performance evaluation, therefore, there is no evidence that the variation of the result of the sector reduces the impacts that the results obtained by the organizations exercise on the executive remuneration.

CEO risk‐taking incentives and relative performance evaluation

AbstractThis paper examines how changes in CEO risk‐taking incentives are associated with changes in the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO contracts. Using a shock to the accounting for executive stock options (FAS 123R), I confirm that risk‐taking incentives and option grants declined following FAS 123R using a within‐firm design, but not a within‐CEO‐firm design. Decreased risk‐taking incentives lead executives to invest in projects with lower systematic risk and can result in reduced incentives to hedge exposure to systematic risk in CEO compensation contracts via RPE. However, CEO relative risk aversion increases with decreases in risk‐taking incentives, potentially increasing incentives to protect CEO wealth from systematic performance via RPE. Testing these competing predictions, I find modest evidence consistent with reduced RPE surrounding FAS 123R, suggesting that when CEO risk‐taking incentives are reduced, so are incentives to shield CEO pay from systematic performance.

Optimal Risk Trade-Off in Relative Performance Evaluation

ABSTRACTIn this study, I consider a company's optimal use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in principal/agent relations to filter out common risk. I construct a risk-parity aggregate of the company's peer group to be the sum of the ratios of the common- and idiosyncratic-risk components of the group of peers' outputs, scaled by the variance of the common risk. I demonstrate that this aggregate embodies the peer group's informativeness about the common risk, so it captures precisely the group's innate capability to trade off optimally between the common- and idiosyncratic-risk components of those peers' outputs. The optimal use of RPE therefore entails a partial substitution of the common risk with the peers' idiosyncratic risks. Moreover, the risk-parity aggregate enables us to identify a boundary condition, which helps us rule out ineffective uses of RPE that completely eliminate the common risk, thereby improving the statistical power of a strong-form RPE test.JEL Classifications: J3; M2.

Incentive Contracting under Ambiguity-Aversion

This paper studies a principal–agent model in which the information on future firm performance is ambiguous and the agent is averse to ambiguity. We show that if firm risk is ambiguous, while stocks always induce the agent to perceive a high risk, options can induce him to perceive a low risk. As a result, options can be less costly in incentivizing the agent than stocks in the presence of ambiguity. In addition, we show that providing the agent with more incentives would induce the agent to perceive a higher risk, and there is a discontinuous jump in the compensation cost as incentives increase, which makes the principal reluctant to reset contracts frequently when underlying fundamentals change. Thus, compensation contracts exhibit an inertia property. Lastly, the model sheds some light on the use of relative performance evaluation and provides a rationale for the puzzle of pay-for-luck in the presence of ambiguity.

Incentive contracting under ambiguity aversion

This paper studies a principal–agent model in which the information on future firm performance is ambiguous and the agent is averse to ambiguity. We show that if firm risk is ambiguous, while stocks always induce the agent to perceive a high risk, options can induce him to perceive a low risk. As a result, options can be less costly in incentivizing the agent than stocks in the presence of ambiguity. In addition, we show that providing the agent with more incentives would induce the agent to perceive a higher risk, and there is a discontinuous jump in the compensation cost as incentives increase, which makes the principal reluctant to reset contracts frequently when underlying fundamentals change. Thus, compensation contracts exhibit an inertia property. Lastly, the model sheds some light on the use of relative performance evaluation and provides a rationale for the puzzle of pay-for-luck in the presence of ambiguity.

Do tournaments solve the adverse selection problem?

This paper provides a solution to a puzzle in the analysis of tournaments, that of why there is no agent discrimination or differential contracting in certain business practice settings. The paper examines the problem of a principal contracting with multiple agents whose activities are subject to common shocks. The presence of common shocks invites the use of relative performance evaluation to minimize the costs of moral hazard. But, in the additional presence of adverse selection, the analysis shows that there may be no need for ex ante screening through menus of offers. This is so because the principal becomes better informed ex post about agent types, via the realization of common uncertainty, and can effectively penalize or reward the agents ex post. Thus, unlike the standard adverse selection problem without common uncertainty where the principal always benefits from ex ante screening, it is shown that ex post sorting through relative performance evaluation reduces the scope for ex ante screening through menus, and can eliminate it completely if agents are known to not be very heterogeneous. This is consistent with observed practice in industries where the primary compensation mechanism is a cardinal tournament which is uniform among employees. The analysis connotes that by using relative instead of absolute performance measures, firms with employees who are not substantially heterogeneous not only can alleviate the agency problem, but there is also no need to extract the agents' ex ante private information about their innate abilities via a screening menu.

Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation

We extend the Holmstrom and Milgrom (Econometrica 55:303–328, 1987) model by introducing model uncertainty to study robust long-term contracting and focus on relative performance evaluation. Concerns regarding model misspecification induce a tradeoff between incentives and ambiguity sharing, which increases the pay-performance sensitivity. When compensation contracts can be written on some additional signal, such as industry average performance, we find that an ambiguity-averse principal increases the agent’s exposure to the common shock by reducing the use of relative performance evaluation. Thus, optimal contracting involves effectively paying for luck and our model provides a theoretical explanation for the well-documented lack of relative performance evaluation in CEO compensation from the perspective of model uncertainty.

Incentive Contracting Under Ambiguity Aversion

This paper studies a principal-agent model in which the information on future firm performance is ambiguous and the agent is averse to ambiguity. We show that if firm risk is ambiguous, while stocks always induce the agent to perceive a high risk, options can induce him to perceive a low risk. As a result, options can be less costly in incentivizing the agent than stocks in the presence of ambiguity. In addition, we show that providing the agent with more incentives would induce the agent to perceive a higher risk, and there is a discontinuous jump in the compensation cost as incentives increase, which makes the principal reluctant to reset contracts frequently when underlying fundamentals change. Thus, compensation contracts exhibit an inertia property. Lastly, the model sheds some light on the use of relative performance evaluation, and provides a rationale for the puzzle of pay-for-luck in the presence of ambiguity.

The role of operating efficiency and asset productivity in relative performance evaluation and CEO compensation in Indian firms

The use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) to determine compensation improves contracting efficiency, reduces moral hazard, and provides effort incentive. This study investigates how RPE usage in CEO compensation in Indian private sector firms is associated with a firm’s operating efficiency and asset productivity. It documents that firms with lower operating efficiency and asset productivity use more RPE by placing a more negative weight on their peer’s performance. Further, this study documents that more RPE usage is associated with lower asset productivity in both business group-affiliated firms as well as independent firms. In contrast, more RPE usage is associated with lower operating efficiency only in independent firms. This indicates that a firm’s ownership structure too plays a role in the RPE usage in Indian private sector firms.

The Moderating Effect of Relative Performance Evaluation on the Risk Incentive Properties of Executives’ Equity Portfolios

ABSTRACTWe offer evidence that the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEOs’ incentive contracts influences the effect of risk‐taking incentives on both the magnitude and composition of firm risk. We find that, when the incentive design lacks RPE features, the incentive portfolio vega motivates CEOs to increase total risk through the systematic component because it can be hedged. In contrast, when the incentive design includes RPE features, CEOs prefer idiosyncratic risk because RPE filters out the systematic component of firm performance. We also document that the use of RPE reinforces the incentive portfolio vega's effect on the total risk.

Executive compensation in business groups: Evidence from China

This paper examines executive compensation in the subsidiaries of business groups in China. Analyzing a sample of China business groups (the so-called “XiZu JiTuan” in Chinese) from 2003 to 2012, we find convincing evidence of the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in the executive compensation of the subsidiaries of business groups. Specifically, when the change in performance of one subsidiary is lower than that of the other subsidiaries, the change in its executive compensation is significantly lower. Further, when the business group is private and the level of marketization is high, the subsidiary’s executive compensation is more likely to be influenced by the performance of the other subsidiaries. This research improves our understanding of the decision mechanisms of executive compensation in business groups and enriches the literature on executive compensation and business groups.

Incentives and Relative Wealth Concerns

If risk-averse agents prefer to be wealthier both in absolute terms and relative to their peers (relative wealth concerns), then (1) they prefer positive correlation, and (2) they are averse to negative correlation between their payoffs. A laboratory experiment shows that subjects prefer positively correlated payoffs. Subjects interested in relative payoffs display stronger aversion to negatively correlated payoffs. This novel evidence has implications that motivate firms' extensive use of broad-based incentive plans and firms' scarce use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) contracts.

The Use of Relative Performance Evaluation at the Business Unit Manager Level

Relative Performance Evaluation is a widely studies topic in the theoretical and analytical literature. Also the empirical literature addresses this topic, with its main focus on executive compensation, and using archival data. This study assesses the of RPE in the performance evaluation of business unit managers. Survey data on 325 business unit managers indicate that RPE is used extensively. Also, the findings suggest that RPE improves the quality of the performance evaluation, reducing noise and risk in the performance contacts.

Board interlock networks and the use of relative performance evaluation

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore how networks of boards of directors affect relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. Design/methodology/approach – In this study, the authors propose that an interlocking network is an important inter-corporate setting, which has a bearing on whether boards decide to use RPE in CEO compensation. They adopt four typical graph measures to depict the centrality/position of each board in the interlock network: degree, betweenness, eigenvector and closeness, and study their impacts on RPE use. Findings – The authors find that firms that have more connected board members and whose board members are connected to better connected firms are more likely to reward their CEOs contingent on their peers’ performance, indicating that information transmission along the board interlock network facilitates the adoption of RPE. This result is robust to alternative measures for board interlock networks and various types of CEO compensation. It highlights the role of interlocking directorates in disseminating information and practice of RPE use along board network. Originality/value – The authors use social network analysis to measure the relationships and flows between the connected nodes and study the impact on executive compensation design.

Product Market Interactions and Corporate Fraud

We examine three information channels through which product market interactions in an industry can affect firms’ incentives to misreport financial information to investors. We find that lower product market sensitivity to individual firm’ information and greater use of relative performance evaluation encourage the commission of financial fraud. Less collection of information about individual firms decreases the probability of fraud detection and increases the probability of fraud commission. We also examine dynamic effects of fraud. Our results suggest that, in fragmented industries, fraud can amplify cyclical fluctuations in the real economy.

Do Tournaments Solve the Adverse Selection Problem?

This paper provides a solution to a puzzle in the analysis of tournaments, that of why there is no agent discrimination in practice. The paper examines the problem of a principal contracting with multiple agents whose activities are subject to common shocks, when there is moral hazard and adverse selection. The presence of common shocks invites the use of relative performance evaluation to minimize the costs of moral hazard. But, in the additional presence of adverse selection, the analysis shows that at the optimum there may be no need for ex ante screening through menus of contract offers (i.e., for agent discrimination). This is so because the principal becomes better informed ex post about agent types, via the realization of common uncertainty, and can effectively penalize or reward the agents ex post. Thus, unlike the standard adverse selection problem without common uncertainty where the principal always benefits from ex ante screening, it is shown that ex post sorting through relative performance evaluation reduces the scope for ex ante screening through menus, and eliminates it completely if agents are known to not be very heterogeneous. This is consistent with observed practice in industries where the primary compensation mechanism is a cardinal tournament which is uniform among agents.