Use Of QALYs Research Articles

The QALY at 50: One story many voices

Research on quality adjusted life year (QALY) has been underway for just over 50 years, which seems like a suitable milestone to review its history. The purpose of this study is to provide a historical overview of why the QALY was developed, the key theoretical work undertaken by Torrance, Bush and Fanshel and how two seminal papers shaped its subsequent development.Moving the QALY forward – there are several historical and reflective exercises. The historical interplay between politics, policy and the challenges facing the National Health Service (NHS) in formulating the QALY concept in the UK has been explored in some depth already, whilst the conceptualization and development of the methodological framework is relatively underexplored. We address this gap by viewing the QALY through the lens of the methodological debates, reflecting upon two key papers underpinning the QALY methodology and how these methods have been developed over time. In part the changes in technology e.g. Google Scholar, and the availability of tools to search for early uses of the QALY allow us to better understand the historical context in which the theoretical development of the QALY has taken place.Here we celebrate two seminal papers that shaped early QALY development. The first section provides a history of these papers, summaries their contributions and explores the uptake of these papers over time. The second section reviews the methodological debates that have surrounded the QALY over the last 50 years and looks at how the QALY has moved to address these challenges. The third section presents the voices of diverse commentators representing the field of health economics who have contributed to the subsequent development of the QALY in both theoretical and empirical capacities and captures their thoughts about future research and policy use of QALYS.

The Complicated Relationship of Disability and Well-Being.

It is widely assumed that disability is typically a bad thing for those who are disabled. Our purpose in this essay is to critique this view and defend a more nuanced picture of the relationship between disability and well-being. We first examine four interpretations of the above view and argue that it is false on each interpretation. We then ask whether disability is thereby a neutral trait. Our view is that most disabilities are neutral in one sense, though we cannot make simple generalizations about disability's relationship to well-being in other important senses. After defending this view, we discuss its practical implications for selective abortion for disability, nondisabled people's interactions with disabled people, and the use of QALYs in health policy.

The right amount of chemotherapy in non-curable disease: Insights from health economics

This article applies concepts from health economics to address what is the “right” amount of chemotherapy in non-curable disease. A health economics perspective is beneficial because it forces a focus on objectives and constraints. We review and apply the concepts of “Choice of Comparator”, “Use of QALYs” and “Equating Marginal Benefit to Marginal Cost”, demonstrating their fit for purpose when considering the optimal amount of chemotherapy for non-curable disease. Many efforts underway to improve healthcare can be viewed as applications of these key economic principles. The true value is in the concepts themselves and not in the associated calculations. Given the difference between a population and a patient perspective, different “optimal” amounts of chemotherapy may exist. For many, however, best may not be most. Optimal decisions may vary depending on whether the goal of treatment is to maximize hope or health.

New tests of QALYs when health varies over time

This paper performs new tests of the QALY model when health varies over time. Our tests do not involve confounding assumptions and are robust to violations of expected utility. The results support the use of QALYs at the aggregate level, i.e. in economic evaluations of health care. At the individual level, there is less support for QALYs. The individual data are, however, largely consistent with a more general QALY-type model that remains tractable for applications.

New Tests of QALYs When Health Varies Over Time

This paper performs new tests of the QALY model when health varies over time. Our tests do not involve confounding assumptions and are robust to violations of expected utility. The results support the use of QALYs at the aggregate level, i.e. in economic evaluations of health care. At the individual level, there is less support for QALYs. The individual data are, however, largely consistent with a more general QALY-type model that remains tractable for applications.

“The trouble with QALYs…”

This paper summarises the use of QALYs in evaluating changes in mental health states, highlighting the benefits and challenges of their use in this field. The general principles underlying the QALY measure and the most common methods of measuring QALYs are discussed briefly. Evidence of the usefulness and problems of using this generic measure of health-related quality of life are provided from a sample of recent studies relating to depression, schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and dementia. In each case, attempts were made to use QALYs to measure changes in health states. While in principle, the QALY is enormously attractive, its suitability for measuring changes in many mental health conditions remains open to doubt as existing tools for generating QALY scores such as the EQ-5D have tended not to perform sufficiently well in reflecting changes in many mental health states. New developmental work is needed to construct better QALY-measuring tools for use in the mental health field. Both the conceptualisation and measurement of QALYs need to be built on a valid, comprehensive model of quality of life specific to a mental health disorder, to ensure that the resultant tool is sensitive enough to pick up changes that would be expected and seen as relevant in the course of the illness.

Use of QALYs by UK NICE for IFN-Β decision inappropriate

Use of QALYs by UK NICE for IFN-Β decision inappropriate

Establishing health state valuations for disease specific states: an example from heart disease.

This study considers the feasibility of defining a QALY from disease-specific data using the New York Heart Association (NYHA) classification of heart failure. The study derives health state values for the four different NYHA classifications of disease progression using the time trade-off (TTO) instrument associated with the five dimensional (EQ-5D) health state valuation method. Consistent mappings between the disease classification and the chosen QALY instrument are found. With this being the case, the assumption of constant proportionality, which is necessary to define the QALY as an acceptable measure of health related preferences, is considered. It is found that constant proportionality does not hold across the more severe health states, thus questioning the use of QALYs as representing cardinal preference structures.

Quality‐adjusted life years (qalys) versus willingness to pay in matters of life and death

Qalys (quality‐adjusted life years) are used to make judgements about resource allocation in medical care and other matters. Since this may involve the qalys of prospective individuals (who are not yet born but may be born under some relevant alternative and not in another), the use of qalys involves a fundamental philosophical problem related to optimal population, believed to be “insoluble”. This paper provides a solution to this problem that is based on the classical utilitarian position modified to account for the partiality of existing people towards their own welfare. However, a different difficulty with qalys is raised since the use of qalys may be Pareto inefficient in comparison to using willingness to pay. The objection to willingness to pay based on inequality is responded to.

QALYs and ethics: A health economist's perspective

Objectors on ethical grounds to the use of QALYs in priority-setting in public health care systems are here categorised as (1) those who reject all collective priority-setting as unethical; (2) those who accept the need for collective priority-setting but believe that it is contrary to medical ethics; (3) those who accept the need for collective priority-setting and do not believe that it is contrary to medical ethics, but reject the role of QALYs in it on other ethical grounds; and (4) those who accept the need for collective priority-setting in principle, but are unwilling to specify how it should be done in practice. It is argued that the first two groups of objectors are simply wrong, if distributive justice is a proper ethical concern in this context. The third group is of more interest, as this group appears to believe that QALYs are unethical because it is unethical to regard QALY maximisation as the sole objective of the health care system. This paper argues that QALYs are relevant to a much wider range of objectives than QALY maximisation, and that they can accommodate a wide variety of health dimensions and sources of valuation. They can also accommodate the differential weighting of benefits according to who gets them, so they do not commit their users to any particular notion of distributive justice. What they do commit their users to is the notion that the health of people is a central concept in priority-setting, and that it is desirable, for reasons of accountability, to have the bases for such priority-setting made as precise and explicit as possible. The fourth group of objectors needs to acknowledge that there is no perfect system on offer, and since priority-setting does and will proceed willy-nilly we cannot wait until there is. It would be more constructive to set up the desiderata that a priority-setting system should ideally fulfil, and then appraise all feasible alternatives (including the status quo) even-handedly by those criteria. None will be perfect, but this author predicts that QALYs would emerge from such an appraisal with a significant role to play.

Would Aristotle have played Russian roulette?

This paper continues the debate between myself and Peter Singer et al started in the Journal of Medical Ethics volume 21, no 3 about the ethical respectability of the use of QALYs in health care allocation. It discusses the question of what, in the way of health care provision, would be chosen by rational egoists behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance", and takes forward the vexed question of what is to count as "doing good" and hence as "doing the most good" in health care. Most importantly, this paper argues that it would be unfair to discriminate against people because they have been disadvantaged by their genetic condition. It notes that McKie et al in their reply to my first contribution to this debate continue to fail to distinguish between chance and probability and it is argued that this failure causes them to miss the whole point of the argument.

Outcome measurement in economic evaluation

Outcome measurement in economic evaluation

Qalys

Qalys (quality-adjusted life years) are used to make judgements about the allocation of resources in medicine, and also about the medical care of particular individuals. This paper assesses that practice. It raises an objection to one common method of making the adjustment for quality, and it describes one serious unsolved difficulty that afflicts the use of qalys. But, subject to those qualifications, the paper tries as far as possible to provide sound theoretical grounds for the practice.

QALYS and long-term care for elderly people in the UK: scales for assessment of quality of life.

QALYs have developed in the UK as a tool for comparing the outcome of health care procedures in a single index over time. This tool can then be used, along with information on costs of procedures, in decision-making about health service resource allocation. It is shown that the attributes of disability and distress, on which QALYs are presently based in the UK, are insensitive to changes in the health status of elderly people in long-term care when compared to other measures of quality of life which are frequently used in studies of older people. Thus, if the use of QALYs increases, they should be based on attributes appropriate to the groups studied, otherwise certain groups may be discriminated against in health service resource allocation owing to the use of an insensitive measure of outcome.