Use Of Political Violence Research Articles

Justifying Political Violence: African American Attitudes Toward Protests Against Police Attacks on Black People

Concern over the breadth of support for political violence is rising among scholars. However, important unanswered questions remain: First, are attitudes toward political violence, as commonly measured, too abstract to have any real-life meaning? Second, how do ever-present contextual factors shape judgments in the events in which violence materializes? Third, given that African Americans are so often on the receiving end of violence, how supportive are Black people of the use of political violence? Finally, what accounts for variability among Black people in attitudes toward violence—what role is played by experiences with unfair treatment by the police and in-group attachments and identities? Based on a nationally representative panel survey of African Americans, I provide empirical answers to each of these important questions. Black support for political violence is indeed connected to both identities and experiences, as well as to core values such as support for the rule of law.

Marshaling a Triumph: The Park Chung Hee Era, Developmental State Theory, and the Meaning of Success in South Korea

South Korea has long been looked to as a model of developmental success. Undoubtedly, South Korean society has experienced a remarkable expansion of wealth, social well-being, and technological capacity over the last half-century. The central turning point in this momentous transformation coincided with the authoritarian rule of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979). As such, scholars of political economy and development have paid close attention to the various facets of his regime to glean the primary causes underpinning South Korea's developmental feats. The most significant of these efforts have emerged from works emphasizing the role of the South Korean developmental state. This paper critically explores the theoretical foundations of developmental state theory to consider intellectual architecture of the success narrative widely appended to the era. The analysis builds from a premise that, given its widespread use of political violence and surveillance, framing the Park regime as a success carries significant ethical undertones. As such, the paper centers the interplay of ethics and empirics in the theoretical engagement with this crucial site in both Korean and development history. As such, it demonstrates that developmental state theory's reluctance to engage with these significant ethical questions systematically corresponds to distorted analytical and empirical representations of the case.

Gangs and the Culture of Violence in El Salvador (What role did the US play?)

Gang violence in El Salvador has resulted in conditions that have perpetuated an environment of terror and culture of violence. This paper aims to understand the emergence of transnational gangs in El Salvador and the US involvement in this process. The article is divided into the following subtitles; 1980s civil war and the repercussions of US involvement, Salvadorans migration to the US and reverse migration (with a focus on Los Angeles and San Salvador), and US exportation of heavy-handed policies to El Salvador’s institutionalized use of political violence. The paper concludes that US involvement in El Salvador created a foundation for a culture of violence and through interlinked factors US influence and actions instigated circumstances for gang proliferated in El Salvador.

Is there a culture of political violence in the Basque Country?

An analytical tradition considers political violence linked to ethno-nationalist claims from a culturalist approach, which intends to offer a relevant interpretative model. This article aims to test this type of approach to the conflict in the Basque Country. In order to examine the validity of this interpretative model, we conducted a qualitative sociological survey among 73 former clandestine militants. The empirical data allow us to conclude that a culturalist and essentialist approach of the use of political violence in this case is irrelevant. On the other hand, we will show the interest of an analysis of the symbolic production of armed groups that gives a prominent place to the motives of resistance and national liberation.

The Portuguese Republic at War: States of Emergency or Business as Usual?

ABSTRACT During Portugal’s troubled and divisive participation in the First World War, successive governments resorted to emergency powers in order to keep order throughout the country, notably in Lisbon. Considering that in 1926 the army took power through a coup d’état, and that this gave way over time to Salazar’s Estado Novo, it is tempting to establish a causal link between these two sets of events. This article suggests, however, that the repeated suspensions of constitutional guarantees, while damaging to the quality of Portuguese democracy and the long-term prospects of the country’s young republican regime, were by no means a recent departure, having already been a feature of politics during the late constitutional monarchy. The article examines these successive interventions, and their context, as well as a number of possible reasons for their occurrence, noting the existence of a paradox: although usually deployed by a vanguard party, the Democrats, in defence of the embattled republican regime, these moments of constitutional exception did not result (despite claims to the contrary) in a ‘Terror’, since those in authority baulked before any consistent and widespread use of political violence or even the imposition of harsh sentences. Neither did the military – transformed or not by the experience of colonial warfare (this is still to be determined) – seek to impose its will on the civilian authorities during the war years and their immediate aftermath. Ultimately, one must consider with great care Portugal’s political culture, notably the failure to secure widespread popular support for the basic rules that must underpin democratic governance.

From Moderate Action to Radical Protest Intentions

Abstract We examine how anti-Trump democrats ( N = 460), prior to the 2020 election, managed their options to protest, focusing on when moderate collective action predicts more radical intentions to protest. We investigate the relationship of moderate action involvement and effectiveness with radical action intentions and the effects of various other variables such as intergroup emotions, group identification, and political vs. participative efficacy. Although moderate action involvement is correlated with radical intentions, the effectiveness of moderate action is negatively related to radical intentions. Analogously, while political efficacy positively predicts radical action, participative efficacy negatively predicts radical action, both with increasing moderate action experience. Social-identity-based collective action models explain this radical use of political violence as protest (e.g., ESIM) and the counteracting effect of efficacy forms (SIDE, NTL).

Political Polarization and Political Violence

Is political violence and support for political violence more prevalent in democratic societies with high levels of affective polarization? This study argues that affective partisan political polarization fosters dehumanization of opposing partisans, lends a moralistic and zero-sum nature to political life, and facilitates group mobilization. These all produce an environment in which political violence is both more socially acceptable and more frequent. The study tests this assertion using two sets of empirical tests: an original survey of 1,899 US residents and a cross-national time-series analysis of eighty-three democracies. It finds that in the United States, Democrats who express aversion toward Republicans are 8% more likely to express support for the use of political violence, whereas Republicans who express aversion toward Democrats are 18% more likely to endorse political violence. Furthermore, in the cross-national analysis, democracies characterized by higher levels of affective partisan political polarization are 34% more likely to experience frequent political violence.

Pulling the Brakes on Political Violence: How Internal Brakes Limited Violent Escalation from the Provisional IRA in Pre- and Post-Good Friday Northern Ireland

ABSTRACT Under what circumstances do paramilitary groups place limits on their use of political violence? This article considers why one of the most prominent paramilitary groups active during the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, the Provisional IRA (PIRA), exercised restraint and limited their use of political violence, both in the lead up to, and in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement. It applies Busher, Holbrook, and Macklin’s “internal brakes” typology to understand why despite the PIRA’s proven capacity to sustain a campaign of armed violence for more than thirty years, they reined in on paramilitarism during the 1990s peace process. Through the lens of various brakes, the analysis identifies seven developments that were particularly salient in limiting the PIRA’s use of armed violence. These developments included: a weakened capacity to continue their armed campaign, waning popular support, an opening of political opportunities, the need to maintain ties with strategically important non-violent allies, the gradual softening of out-group boundaries, the decommissioning process, as well as the creation of spaces for non-violent activism within the wider movement. This study’s findings contribute to the scholarly debate on understanding how militant groups manage the parameters of their violence, highlighting several factors that may mitigate the risk of extremist views escalating to political violence.

Democracy in Myanmar: The failure of another Asian democracy in late modernity

Can Myanmar ever become a genuine democracy? It appears that ever since the exit of the British forces in the post-WWII era, any form of genuine democracy remains an impossible dream for that naturally wealthy regime. Democracy does not appear to be synonymous with Burma or what is now called Myanmar. On August 27, 2023, the Myanmar Junta expelled Timor-Leste’s ambassador over allegations of authoritarianism, calling the locallybased anti-coup shadow government a sham. The two Southeast Asian states have been at loggerheads since early 2021 due to widespread clashes in Naypyidaw over the National Unity Government (NUG) [(1):746]. The Southeast Asian nations have been locked in a crisis since the Myanmar military seized power (again) in February 2021 after another failed (and mostly public) experiment with democracy that had led to widespread political violence. The official Myanmar news agencies that remain the voice of the junta have condemned the anti-coup demonstrations. Most ASEAN states-Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Cambodia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei– have failed to attempt to broker any compromise that could solve the problem. Only Thailand and Timor-Leste have attempted to resolve the political violence. Jakarta tends to remain “neutral” or uncommitted to any arguments over Timor-Leste (and in this case the expulsion of the Timor-Leste Ambassador to Myanmar in late August 2023) because Indonesia (under Suharto) had not only annexed Timor-Leste under Suharto but also was committed to the widespread use of political violence and other human rights’ atrocities by the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) against the largely peaceful Catholics and Christians under former rebel leader Xanana Gusmao. The current crisis Napidydaw now faces invites many human rights observers and Amnesty International advocates to raise questions about Myanmar’s poor record since the British left after the post-WWII era. The paper attempts to explain why democracy remains a problem in Myanmar. It uses a seven-question democratic framework to determine feasibility of democracy in Myanmar today.

De stilte voor de storm? Een onderzoek naar tolerantie jegens politiek geweld in Nederland

The calm before the storm? Investigating tolerance for political violence in the Netherlands Scholars increasingly worry about an increase in citizens’ tolerance for political violence. The present research aimed to gauge tolerance for political violence in the Netherlands and investigate its predictors. In Study 1, tolerance for political violence was assessed in a representative sample of Dutch citizens (N = 515) in a preregistered survey. Results showed that, depending on the wording of the question, 2% to 19% of participants supported the use of political violence. In Study 2, data from the Dutch part of the European Values Study (N = 2,404) was used to investigate predictors of tolerance for political violence. The results revealed that participants with lower incomes and participants who indicated that the Netherlands is not governed democratically indicated higher levels of tolerance. This suggests that economic uncertainty and perceptions of political legitimacy are the main drivers of tolerance for political violence.

The Ideology of Incels: Misogyny and Victimhood as Justification for Political Violence

ABSTRACT A new group of socio-political actors has emerged from the depths of the internet. Thriving in the online Manosphere, the involuntary celibates, or “Incels,” are men who feel they have been victimized by feminism. Initially just another misogynist social group online, this article argues that Incels are moving beyond social commentary to become a political movement. This article demonstrates that Incels have begun to craft a particularly violent political ideology drawing on a unique form of misogyny rooted in the construction of a counternarrative to hegemonic masculinity. Using critical narrative analysis, this article assesses the discourse and narratives used by the Incels to create their unique worldview and identifies core components of their emerging political ideology to understand how this group may justify the use of political violence as part of their political movement.

It’s About Hate: Approval of Donald Trump, Racism, Xenophobia and Support for Political Violence

Is approval of Donald J. Trump associated with support for political violence? If so, what explains the link between Trump approval and political violence? Using an original, nationally representative survey of over 1,500 adults in the United States we produce two findings. First, individuals who express approval for Trump are also significantly more likely to endorse positive descriptors for the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol and are more likely express support for the use of political violence more broadly. Second, the effects of Trump approval on support for the use of political violence are mediated through racist and xenophobic attitudes. Trump supporters in the study disproportionately exhibit racist and xenophobic/anti-foreigner attitudes, and these attitudes are associated with a positive endorsement of both January 6 and the use of political violence.

A comparison of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and the world

Although political violence has been perpetrated on behalf of a wide range of political ideologies, it is unclear whether there are systematic differences between ideologies in the use of violence to pursue a political cause. Prior research on this topic is scarce and mostly restricted to self-reported measures or less extreme forms of political aggression. Moreover, it has generally focused on respondents in Western countries and has been limited to either comparisons of the supporters of left-wing and right-wing causes or examinations of only Islamist extremism. In this research we address these gaps by comparing the use of political violence by left-wing, right-wing, and Islamist extremists in the United States and worldwide using two unique datasets that cover real-world examples of politically motivated, violent behaviors. Across both datasets, we find that radical acts perpetrated by individuals associated with left-wing causes are less likely to be violent. In the United States, we find no difference between the level of violence perpetrated by right-wing and Islamist extremists. However, differences in violence emerge on the global level, with Islamist extremists being more likely than right-wing extremists to engage in more violent acts.

Continuidades y discontinuidades de la violencia política en la transición a la democracia en Chile

Este artículo es una reflexión sobre la violencia política en la transición chilena, realizado a partir del diálogo con siete narrativas en las que se abordan las memorias construidas por activistas que la ejercieron durante ese período. Tomando como punto de partida los conocimientos producidos por las y los activistas, por medio del método de las “producciones narrativas”, surgen dos ejes de análisis: las reconfiguraciones de las prácticas, sentidos y posibilidades de las violencias para la lucha social en la democracia post-dictatorial y las continuidades de la violencia política estatal. Se concluye que la transición política chilena se constituye en un dispositivo de pacificación de la sociedad, en el que se crean instituciones, leyes y discursos que deslegitiman, persiguen y estigmatizan el uso de la violencia política como forma de lucha, mientras que se legitima la violencia política de Estado, dirigida principalmente a quienes representan un riesgo para el mantenimiento del nuevo orden.

A Threat to Open Societies? Conceptualizing the Radicalization of Society

Which are the factors that favor societal radicalization? Few studies in international and national radicalization research have been directly interested in investigating the societal level and discussing the impact of radicalized groups, milieus and strata on society and its potential radicalization. This article provides on overview of current research and discusses factors favoring the radicalization of societies. The latter arises when the legitimacy of the political system is called into question and a society witnesses a departure from prevailing social norms in political dealings, especially if the use of political violence is no longer rejected. All in all, radicalized individuals, groups, milieus or strata can hold the potential for radicalizing societies. Increasing and incremental socio-political changes can lead to decreasing social cohesion. In view of this possibility, the authors call for strengthening social resilience and civilizing the public debate.

Rethinking the Nature of States and Political Violence

AbstractIt is a long-held belief that states must retain the monopoly over political violence in order to be states, and to survive. However, there are recent criticisms of this view forcing us to consider not just the state's use of political violence but the very nature of the state. Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings's Can Political Violence Ever Be Justified? argues that it cannot. Ned Dobos's Ethics, Security, and the War-Machine raises a series of arguments against states having standing militaries, and Alex Vitale's The End of Policing similarly raises a series of arguments against the institution of the police. In this review essay, I suggest that these arguments all force us to revisit the very nature of the state. There are concerns about simply abolishing these institutions of political violence, but we can indeed conceive of states without the monopoly on violence.

Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation

Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation

Drought, Resilience, and Support for Violence: Household Survey Evidence from DR Congo

The effects of climate variability and change on security are debated. While this topic has received considerable attention in both policy circles and academia, the microlevel pathways and conditions under which climatic shocks increase conflict risks are poorly understood. We suggest that household resilience provides one key to understanding these relationships. Using novel household survey data from two conflict-affected regions in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, we study variation in the support for violence related to reported exposure to drought and resilience metrics. Using comprehensive multifaceted objective and subjective indicators of resilience, we find that less resilient respondents who report having experienced drought and associated losses are more likely to be supportive of the use of political violence. In contrast, our findings suggest that there is no general association between reporting drought exposure and support for violence.

Harassment and Intimidation of Parliamentary Candidates in the United Kingdom

AbstractThe use of political violence to attain political goals has long been a source of concern. Once thought to be exclusive to countries with high levels of general violence, recent evidence suggests that harassment and intimidation of political elites in the UK is more widespread than previously thought. Using data from the 2017 general election candidate survey, we find that four in every ten candidates experienced at least one type of harassment. Evidence suggests that women and young candidates are more likely to suffer from harassment and intimidation. We conclude by formulating an agenda for future research, focussing, in particular, on the perception of harassment and the effect of harassment on political careers.

The Spectre of Nat Turner

We have a complicated, sometimes contradictory, perception of the use of political violence. This article discusses the possible legitimacy of a particular kind, referred to as “resistance violence,” or violence carried out by vulnerable targeted social groups. After providing distinctions regarding who, when, and why resistance violence happens, this article considers two examples that highlight different factors. By considering the work of various philosophers including Locke, Arendt, Fanon, and Fricker, this article proposes two theses: first, that epistemic contextualization requires that the legitimacy of resistance violence always be evaluated with the understanding that vulnerable social groups often reside outside the parameters of legal/criminal/judicial protection. And, second, that resistance violence is a politically legitimate option and need not promise practical success to be worth pursuing due to the fact that resistance actors often see violence as establishing their dignity and humanity.